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A

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
. CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

D.C.L. OXON. AND LL.D. CAMB.,
VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

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LIST OF PLANS.

	PAGE
Battle of Mantinea to face	104
Plan of Syracuse as it stood at the end of the reign of Dionysius the Elder „	316

CONTENTS OF VOLUME X.

PART II—CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE

CHAPTER LXXIX

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSÉNÉ AND MEGALOPOLIS
TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS

	Page		Page
Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra	1	The Spartan allied army defends the line of Mount	
Changes without Peloponnesus	2	Oneium—Epaminondas breaks through it and marches into Peloponnesus	13
Amyntas prince of Macedonia	1b		
Ambitious views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra	2	Sikyon joins the Thebans—Phlius remains faithful to Sparta	15
Her aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of Illyria	4	Reinforcement from Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta	17
She wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognises her right to the place	17	Tolerance and mildness of Epaminondas	18
Athens and Amphipolis	6		
Death of Jason and Amyntas—state of Thessaly and Macedonia	7	Energetic action and insolence of the Arcadians—Lykomedes animates and leads them on	19
Alexander of Phoeæ—he is opposed by Pelopidas—in flight of Thebes in the early State of Macedonia—Alexander son of Amyntas—Lysidike—Ptolemy	15	Great influence of Lykomedes	19
Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikratês to the family of Amyntas	9	Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union, to the great offence of Elis	20
Iphikratês and Timotheus	11	Mission of Philiskus to Greece by Aristobarzanês	1b
Terms of alliance discussed and concluded between Athens and Sparta	17	Political importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the great	

CHAPTER LXXIX.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olym- pia	21	das and other envoys to Susa	36
Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly	22	Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favourable rescript	37
The Tearless Battle—victory of the Spartan Archidamus over the Arcadians	24	Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the rescript	39
Third expedition of Epaminon- das into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities	25	Pelopidas brings back the re- script. It is read publicly before the Greek states con- voked at Thebes	40
The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on com- plaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not re-elect him Boetarch	27	The states convoked at The- bes refuse to receive the re- script. The Arcadian depu- ties protest against the head- ship of Thebes	41
Disturbed state of Sikyon— Euphron makes himself des- pot—his rapacious and san- guinary conduct	28	The Thebans send the rescript to be received at Corinth: the Corinthians refuse: fail- ure of the Theban object . .	ib.
Suffering of the Phliasians— their steady adherence to Sparta	29	Mission of Pelopidas to Thes- saly. He is seized and de- tained prisoner by Alexan- der of Phæræ	43
Assistance rendered to Ptoleus by the Athenian Charès—sur- prise of the fort Thyamia . .	30	The Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated and retreating, is only saved by Epaminon- das, then a private man . .	ib.
Euphron is expelled from Si- kyon by the Arcadians and Thebans—he retires to the harbour, which he surrenders to the Spartans	32	Triumph of Alexander in Thes- saly and discredit of Thebes. Harsh treatment of Pelopi- das	44
Euphron returns to Sikyon—he goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated	ib.	Second Theban army sent into Thessaly, under Epaminon- das, for the rescue of Pe- lopidas, who is at length re- leased by Alexander under a truce	ib.
The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes—their defence	33	Oropus is taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Charès from Corinth	46
They are acquitted by the The- ban Senate	35	Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Ly- komedês and the Arcadians.	
Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favourable to Eu- phron—honours shown to his body and memory	ib.	Death of Lykomedês	47
The Sikyonians recapture their harbour from the Spartans . .	36	Epaminondas is sent as envoy	
Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopi-			

CHAPTER LXXIX.—*continued.*

Page	Page
into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus 48	for Athens. Athenian kle- ruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors 56
Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth: they are dis- appointed 49	Difficulties of Athens in estab- lishing her kleruchs in the Chersonesos 58
The Corinthians, Epidaurians, and others are anxious to make peace. They apply to Sparta 53	Kotys of Thrace—Timotheus supersedes Iphikratée 5b.
Refusal of the Spartans to ac- knowledge the independence of Messénè; they reproach their allies with consenting 5b.	Timotheus acts with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikè. He falls at Amphipolis 60
Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius &c. conclude peace with Thebes, but without Sparta—recogn- ising the independence of Messénè 52	Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the Chersonesos . . 62
Complicated relations between the Grecian states after this peace 5b.	Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent with an army against Alexan- der of Phœæ 63
Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king—altered rescript from him pronoun- cing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession 53	Epaminondas exhorts the The- bans to equip a fleet against Athens 5b.
Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia—Agésilas—revolt of Artabazanes 54	Discussion between him and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly 64
Conquest of Samos by Timo- theus 5b.	Menekleidas seemingly right in dissuading naval prepara- tions 65
Partial re-admission to the Chersonesos obtained by Ti- motheus 56	Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the Helles- pont and Bosphorus 66
Samos and the Chersonesos— now proprietary acquisition	Pelopidas attacks Alexander of Phœæ—his success in battle —his rashness—he is slain 67
	Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his death 68
	The Thebans completely sub- due Alexander of Phœæ . . 69

CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEÆ.

Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against Thebes —destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans 71	Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed compli- cations in Peloponnesus . . 73
Repugnance excited against the Thebans—regret and dis- pleasure of Epaminondas . . 72	State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and Achæans in alliance with Sparta 7b.

CHAPTER LXXX.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia—the Spartans, at recovering Messenê	73	View taken by Epaminondas His view is more consistent with the facts recounted by Xenophon himself	80
War between the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia	74	Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans	83
Second invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians. Archidamne and the Spartans invade Arcadia . .	75	Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at Tegea . .	89
Archidamne establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him—armistice . .	76	Muster of the Arcadians and other enemies of Thebes, at Mantinea. Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for . .	ib.
The Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison	77	Night-march of Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time to prevent surprise	90
The Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the Eleians	78	Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds it defended He marches back to Tegea—despatches his cavalry from thence to surprise Mantinea .	91
The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians	ib.	The surprise is baffled, by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage	93
Feelings of the spectators at Olympia	80	Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near Mantinea . .	95
The Arcadians take the treasures of Olympia to pay their militia	81	View of Xenophon—that this resolution was forced upon him by despair—examined . .	96
Violent dissensions arising among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces against it	82	Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is given . . .	97
Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis	83	Mantineico-Tegeatic plain—position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineians	98
The peace generally popular—celebrated at Tegea—seizure of many oligarchical members at Tegea by the Theban harmost	84	March of Epaminondas from Tegea	ib.
The Theban harmost releases his prisoners, and makes an apology	85	False impression produced upon the enemy by his manoeuvres. They are led to suppose that there would be no immediate battle	99
Conduct of the Theban harmost	ib.	Want of adequate command among the allies opposed to Epaminondas	100

CHAPTER LXXX.—continued.

Page	Page
Theban order of battle—plans of the commander 101	Formidable revolt of the satraps in Asia Minor—it is suppressed by the Persian court, through treachery . . 123
Disposition of the cavalry on both sides 102	Agasilaus goes as commander to Egypt—Ochabrias is there also <i>ib.</i>
Unprepared state of the Lacedæmonian army 103	Death and character of Agæolaius 124
Battle of Mantinea—complete success of the dispositions of Epaminondas 104	State of Egypt and Persia . . 127
Victory of the Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded <i>ib.</i>	Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal family <i>ib.</i>
Extreme discouragement caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory and pursuit . . . 106	Athenian maritime operations—Timotheus makes war against Kotys 129
Proof of the influence which he exercised over the minds of the soldiers 107	Ergophilus succeeds Timotheus at the Chersonese—Kallisthenes succeeds him against Amphipolis—war at sea against Alexander of Phæria 130
Victory claimed by both sides—nevertheless the Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce 108	Ergophilus and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful—both tried 131
Dying moments of Epaminondas <i>ib.</i>	Antoklê in the Hellespont and Bosphorus—convoy for the corn-ships out of the Euxine 132
The two other best Theban officers are slain also in the battle <i>ib.</i>	Miltokythês revolts from Kotys in Thrace—ill-success of the Athenians <i>ib.</i>
Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons honoured for it 109	Menon—Timomachus—as commanders in the Chersonese. The Athenians lose Sestos 133
Peace concluded— <i>status quo</i> recognised, including the independence of Messenê—Sparta alone stands out—the Thebans return home . . . 110	Kephisodotus in the Chersonese. Charidêmus crosses thither from Abydos 135
Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans 111	Assassination of Kotys . . . <i>ib.</i>
Character of Epaminondas . . 112	Kersobleptês succeeds Kotys. Berisadês and Amadokus, his rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kephisodotus 136
Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send thither a force under Pammenês, which maintains the incorporation . . 119	Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodoros—Charidêmus . . . 138
Agasilaus and Archidamus . . 120	Charidêmus is forced to accept the convention of Athenodoros—his evasions—the Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens 139
State of Persia—revolted satraps and provinces—Data 141	The tra <i>vi a</i>

CHAPTER LXXX.—*continued.*

	Page	Page
Athens now at its maximum.		Maximum of second Athenian
Mischievous effects of her		empire—accession of Philip
conquests made against Olyn-		of Macedon 142
thns 141		

CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian armament . . 144	Oligarchical system and sen- timent at Carthage 159
Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution at Thurii 145	Powerful families at Carthage —Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal 161
Syracusan squadron under Her- mokratès goes to act against Athens in the Ægean . . . 146	Quarrel between Egesta and Selenus in Sicily 162
Disappointed hopes—defeat at Kynossema—second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus 146	Application of Egesta to Car- thage for aid—application granted—eagerness of Hanni- bal 163
Sufferings of the Syracusan seamen—disappointment and displeasure at Syracuse . . 148	Carthaginian envoys sent to Si- cily—neutrality of Syracuse 164
Banishment of Hermokratès and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Harmo- kratès to the armament. Their displeasure at it 148	Confidence of the Selinuntines —they are defeated by the Egesteans and Carthaginians 165
Hermokratès had promised the Syracusans what he could not realise; but his conduct as commander had been good 149	Measures of Selinus—promise of aid from Syracuse—large preparations of Hannibal . . 166
Internal state of Syracuse— constitution of Dioklès . . 150	Hannibal crosses over to Si- cily with a very large arma- ment. He lays siege to Se- linus 166
Difficulty of determining what that constitution was . . . 151	Vigorous assault on Selinus— gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed . . . 167
Invasion from Carthage . . 152	Selinus is sacked and plunder- ed—merciless slaughter . . 168
State of the Carthaginians . . 152	Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. An- swer of Hannibal to their embassy 169
Extent of Carthaginian empire —power, and population— Liby-Phœnicians 153	Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid from Syracuse under Dioklès— early from Himera against the besiegers—victory of Han- nibal 171
Harsh dealing of Carthage to- wards her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage . . 155	
Military force of Carthage . . 156	
Political constitution of Car- thage 158	

CHAPTER LXXXI.—*continued.*

Page	Page
Syracusan squadron—resolution taken to abandon Himera 172	temper among their army. Religious terrors—sacrifice 186
Partial evacuation of Himera—resistance still continued. the town is at length stormed and captured 173	Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them The Agrigentine generals also decline to attack them in the retreat 187
Hannibal destroys Himera, and slaughters 3000 prisoners, as an expiation to the memory of his grandfather 174	Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine generals for having been backward in attack. They are put to death 189
Alarm throughout the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage 175	Privations in both armies—Hamilkar captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans—Agrigentum is evacuated 190
New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokratès comes to Sicily 176	Agrigentum taken and plundered by the Carthaginians . . 191
He levies troops to effect his return by force 177	Terror throughout Sicily . . . 192
He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians 178	Bitter complaints against the Syracusan generals 193
His farther attempts to re-enter Syracuse, with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Dioklès 179	The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius 194
Hermokratès tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force. He is defeated and slain 180	Harangue of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals, who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others appointed in their room . . 196
First appearance of Dionysius at Syracuse 181	Ambitious arts of Dionysius—his intrigues against his colleagues and frustrates all their proceedings. He procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles 198
Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political discord—party of Hermokratès. Danger from Carthage 183	Dionysius is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the execution or banishment of the Gelæan oligarchy 200
Fresh invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. Immense host under Hannibal and Imilkon 184	He returns to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues of gross treason 201
Great alarm in Sicily—active preparations for defence at Agrigentum 184	
Grandeur, wealth, and population of Agrigentum 185	
The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish the tombs of its walls. Dis-	

CHAPTER LXXXI.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
Dionysius is named general, single-handed, with full powers	201	A vote is taken there, whereby a body of guards are assigned to him	204
Apparent repentance of the people after the vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body of paid guards	202	Dionysius establishes himself at Syracuse as despot	205
March of Dionysius to Leontioi	203	Dionysius as despot—the means whereby he attained the power	206

CHAPTER LXXXII.

SIICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to attack Gela	208	Near coincidence in time, of this peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy of Sparta with Dionysius	210
Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them	209	Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilyheum	ib.
Plan of Dionysius for a general attack on the Carthaginian army	210	Strong position of Dionysius	220
He is defeated and obliged to retreat	ib.	Strong fortifications and other buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia	ib.
He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the Carthaginians	211	He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew	221
Indignation and charges of treachery against Dionysius	212	Exorbitant exactions of Dionysius—discontent at Syracuse	223
Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen—they ride off to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius	213	Dionysius marches out of Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers of Herhesa—Dorikus the commander is slain	224
Their imprudence—they are surprised and overpowered by the rapid return of Dionysius	214	The Syracusan insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messenæ, besiege Dionysius in Ortygia	ib.
Dionysius master of Syracuse	216	Despair of Dionysius—he applies to a body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid	225
Propositions of peace come from Imilkon. Terms of peace	ib.	He amuses the assailants with feigned evasion—	226
Collusion of Dionysius with the Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in the Carthaginian army	217		

CHAPTER LXXXII.—*continued.*

Page	Page
of the Campanians — victory of Dionysius 226	a Lokrian maiden named Doris 239
Dionysius strengthens his despotism more than before — assistance lent to him by the Spartan Aristus — Nikotelés the Corinthian is put to death 228	Immense warlike equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse—arms, engines, &c. 240
He disarms the Syracusan citizens — strengthens the fortifications of Ortygia — augments his mercenary force 229	Naval preparations in the harbour of Syracuse—very great also. Enlargement of the build of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes 241
Dionysius conquers Naxos, Katana, and Leontini 230	General sympathy of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage 242
Great power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alcea by Archonidés 231	He hires soldiers from all quarters <i>ib.</i>
Resolution of Dionysius to make war upon Carthage 232	He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the same day —Doris and Aristomaché. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse towards him . . . 243
Locality of Syracuse — danger to which the town had been exposed, in the Athenians' siege <i>ib.</i>	He convokes the Syroecusan assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage . . . 244
Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up to the Euryalus 233	He desires to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the Carthaginian dominion than of his . . . 245
Popularity of the work—efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius himself 234	He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage — suffering in Africa from the pestilence <i>ib.</i>
Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the Carthaginians 235	Dionysius marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against the Carthaginians in Sicily 246
Improvement in the behaviour of Dionysius towards the Syroecusans 236	Insurrection against Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures inflicted on the Carthaginians 247
His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhégines towards him. Their application to Messénê . . . 237	Dionysius besieges the Carthaginian seaport Motyé . . . 248
He makes peace with Messénê and Rhégium. He desires to marry a Rhégine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed 238	Situation of Motyé—operations of the siege—vigorous defense <i>ib.</i>
He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is granted — he marries	Dionysius overruns the neighbouring dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of Motyé — appearance

CHAPTER LXXXII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is obliged to return	249	Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans	264
Desperate defence of Motyè. It is at length taken by a nocturnal attack	250	Public meeting convened by Dionysius — mutinous spirit against him—vehement speech by Theodorus	265
Plunder of Motyè—the inhabitants either slaughtered or sold for slaves	252	Sympathy excited by the speech in the Syracusan assembly	267
Farther operations of Dionysius	253	The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius — who finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse movement	268
Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—he successful operations—he retakes Motyè	ib	Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius — suitable to her general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas	269
Dionysius retires to Syracuse	254	Dionysius tries to gain popularity	ib
Imilkon captures Messênè	255	Terrific pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse	270
Revolt of the Sikels from Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium	256	Dionysius attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his mercenaries	271
Provisions of Dionysius for the defence of Syracuse — he strengthens Leontini—he advances to Katana with his land army as well as his fleet	257	Success of Dionysius, both by sea and by land, against the Carthaginian position	272
Naval battle of Katana—great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under Magon	258	Conflagration of the Carthaginian camp — exultation at Syracuse	273
Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near Katana — fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætina	259	Imilkon concludes a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians, and abandon his remaining army	ib
Dionysius retreats to Syracuse — discontent of his army	260	Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and Iberians	274
Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse — the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbour — their imposing entry. Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbour	262	Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon	275
Imilkon plunders the suburb of Achradina—blockades Syracuse by sea	263	Danger of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects — at length put down	ib
Naval victory gained by the Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius	264		

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS (*continued*). — FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO
THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B.C. 394-367.

	Page		Page
Frequent occurrences of pestilences among the Carthaginians, not extending to the Greeks in Sicily	273	sus allies himself with the Lucanians	287
M tiny among the mercenaries of Dionysius — Aristoteles their commander is sent away to Sparta	279	Dionysius attacks Rhegium — the Rhegines save the Krotonians first — fleet of Dionysius ruined by a storm	288
Difficulties of Dionysius arising from his mercenaries — heavy burden of paying them	ib.	Defeat of the inhabitants of Thurii by the Lucanians. Lepitines with the fleet of Dionysius off Lūs — his conduct towards the survivors	289
Dionysius re-establishes Messana with new inhabitants	280	Fresh expedition of Dionysius against the Italian Greeks — his powerful armament — he besieges Kaulonia	291
Conquests of Dionysius in the interior of Sicily	281	United army of the Italian Greeks advances to relieve the places — their advanced guard is defeated, and Hieron the general slain	ib.
Alarm at Rhegium — Dionysius attacks the Sikels town of Tauromenium — desperate defence of the Sikels — Dionysius is repulsed and nearly slain	ib.	The whole army is defeated and captured by Dionysius	292
Agrirentum declares against Dionysius — reappearance of the Carthaginian army under Magon	283	Generous lenity of Dionysius towards the prisoners	293
Expedition of Dionysius against Rhegium — he fails in surprising the town — he concludes a truce for one year	ib.	Dionysius besieges Rhegium — he grants to them peace on severe terms	ib.
Magon again takes the field at Agrigentum — is repulsed by Dionysius — truce concluded	284	He captures Kaulonia and Hipponium — inhabitants transported to Syracuse — territory made over to Lokri	294
Dionysius again attacks Tauromenium — captures it, drives out the Sikels, and plants new inhabitants	285	Artifices of Dionysius to impoverish and disarm the Rhegines	ib.
Plans of Dionysius against the Greek cities in Southern Italy — great pressure upon these cities from the Samnites and Lucanians of the interior	ib.	He besieges Rhegium — desperate defence of the town under the general Phyton. Surrender of the place from famine, after a blockade of eleven months	295
Alliances contracted among the Italian Greeks, for defence both against the Lucanians and against Dionysius. Dionysius		Cruel treatment of Phyton by Dionysius	296
		Strong sympathy excited by the facts of Phyton	297
		Rhegium dismantled — all the	

CHAPTER LXXXIII.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
territory of the southern Calabrian peninsula united to Lokri.	208	ing of this manifestation against him—his suspicious and cruelness	310
Peace of Antalkidas—ascendent position of Sparta and of Dionysius. Kroton conquered by Dionysius. Splendid robe taken from the temple of Hérè	290	Marked and singular character of the manifestation against Dionysius	311
Schamss of Dionysius for transmarine colonies and conquests, in Epirus and Illyria	300	Plato visits Syracuse—severely treated by Dionysius—acquires great influence over Dion	315
Dionysius plunders the coast of Latium and Etruria, and the rich temple of Agylla	302	New constructions and improvements by Dionysius et Syracuse	316
Immense power of Dionysius—his poetical compositions <i>ib.</i>		Intention of Dionysius to renew the war with Carthage	317
Olympic festival of 384 B.C., the first after the peace of Antalkidas. Dionysius sends thither a splendid legation—also chariots to run—and poetical compositions to be recited	304	War with Carthage. Victory of Dionysius over the Carthaginian army under Megon	318
Feeling of the crowd at the festival—Dion of Keulonia	305	Second battle with the Carthaginians at Kronium, in which Dionysius is defeated with terrible loss	319
Herangue of Lysias at the festival against Dionysius, in reference to the political state of the Grecian world, and the sufferings of the enslaved Sicilians	306	He concludes peace with Carthage, on terms very unfavourable to himself: all the territory west of the river Halykus is surrendered to Carthage: he covenants to pay tribute to Carthage	<i>ib.</i>
Hatred of the past, and fear of the future conquests of Dionysius, both prevalent	307	Affairs of Southern Italy: wall across the Calabrian peninsula projected, but not executed	320
Lysias exhorts his hearers to destroy the tents of the Syracusan legation at Olympia, as an act of retribution against Dionysius	308	Relations of Dionysius with Central Greece	321
Intense explosion of antipathy against the poems of Dionysius recited at Olympia—insects heaped upon his name and person	309	New war undertaken by Dionysius against Carthage. He is at first successful, but is ultimately defeated near Lilybæum and forced to return home	322
Excessive grief, wrath, and remorse, of Dionysius on hearing		Dionysius gains the prize of tragedy at the Lenæan festival at Athens. His joy at the news. He dies of fever soon afterwards	323
		Character of Dionysius	<i>ib.</i>

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS —
DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER—AND DION.

	Page		Page
Family left by Dionysius at his death	332	antly consents to visit Syracuse	347
Dion—his connexion with the Dionysian family	333	Plato visits Syracuse—unbounded deference and admiration manifested towards him at first by Dionysius. Fear and hatred felt by Philistus and other courtiers	348
Personal character of Dion	334	Injudicious manner in which Plato dealt with Dionysius	350
Plato, Dion, and the Pythagorean philosophers	ib.	Strenuous exhortations addressed by Plato and Dion to Dionysius, to reform himself, and correct his own deep-seated mental imperfections	351
Extraordinary influence of Plato upon Dion	335	Plato damps the inclination of Dionysius towards political good	ib.
Dion learns to hate the Dionysian despotism—he conceives large political and reformatory views	336	If Plato had tried to impel Dionysius towards a good practical use of his power, Dionysius would at that time have obeyed him, with the aid of Dion	353
Alteration of habits in Dion—he brings Plato into communion with Dionysius	337	Difficulties which they would have encountered in trying to realise beneficent projects	ib.
Dion maintains the good opinion and confidence of Dionysius, until the death of the latter—his visits to Peloponnesus	338	Intrigues by Philistus and others to set Dionysius against Plato and Dion	354
Death of the elder Dionysius—divergences of interest between the two lines of family	340	Relations between Dionysius and Dion—natural foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius	355
The younger Dionysius succeeds his father—his character	ib.	Dionysius loses his inclinations towards political improvements—comes to hate Dion	ib.
Conduct of Dion—he submits to the younger Dionysius—gives him frank and wholesome advice	341	Banishment of Dion from Syracuse to Italy	356
Dion acquires great influence and estimation from Dionysius	342	Dionysius retains Plato in the acropolis, but treats him well, and tries to conciliate his esteem	ib.
Recall of Philistus from exile	343	He dismisses Plato—then recalls him—second visit of Plato to Syracuse—his dissatisfaction	
Dion tries to work upon the mind of Dionysius, towards a freer political government and mental improvement	344		
His earnest exhortations produce considerable effect, inspiring Dionysius with a strong desire to see and converse with Plato	345		
Invitation sent to Plato, both by Dion and by Dionysius	346		
Hesitation of Plato—he reluct-			

CHAPTER LXXXIV.—*continued.*

	Page	Page
—Dionysius refuses to recall Dion	358	March of Dion from Herakleio to Syracuse 368
Dionysius confiscates the property of Dion—mortification of Plato, who with difficulty obtains leave to depart from Syracuse	359	Dion crosses the river Anapus, and approaches the gates of Syracuse 369
Resolution of Dion to avenge himself on Dionysius, and to force his way back to Syracuse by arms	360	Mistake of Timokratēs, left as governor of Syracusæ in the absence of Dionysius 370
Plato rejoins Dion in Peloponnesus—exasperation of Dion—Dionysius gives his sister Aretē, the wife of Dion, in marriage to Timokratēs . .	361	General rising of the Syracusans to welcome and assist Dion. Timokratēs is obliged to evacuate the city, leaving Ortygia and Epipolæ garrisoned
Means of auxiliaries of Dion—Plato—the Academy—Alkimenēs. Dion musters his force at Zokynthus	362	Entry of Dion into Achrodina—joy of the citizens—his proclaims liberty 371
Small force of Dion against the prodigious power of Dionysius. Resolution of Dion to conquer or perish . . .	363	Dion presents himself at the Pentapyla in front of Ortygia—challenges the garrison of Ortygia to come out and fight—is chosen general by the Syracusans, with his brother Megaklēs 372
Circumstances which told against Dionysius—discontent at Syracusæ	ib.	Dion captures Epipolæ and Euryalus. He erects a cross-wall from sea to sea, to block up Ortygia 373
Herakleidēs exiled from Syracuse—his projects an attack upon Dionysius, at the same time as Dion	364	Return of Dionysius to Syracuse. He tries to negotiate with Dion and the Syracusans—deceives them by fallacious propositions 374
Weakness of character—dissolute and drunken habits—of Dionysius himself	365	Sudden sally made by Dionysius to surprise this blockading wall—he is nearly successful—great bravery, efforts, and danger of Dion—he at length repulses the attack and recovers the wall . . . 375
Alarm of the soldiers of Dion at Zakynthus, when first informed that they were going against Dionysius	ib.	Ortygia is again blocked up by land—efforts of Dionysius with his fleet—arrival of Herakleidēs from Peloponnesus with a fleet to cooperate against Dionysius 377
Eclipse of the moon—religious disquietude of the soldiers—they are reassured by the prophet Miltas—fortune voyages from Zakynthus to Sicily	366	Arrival of Philistus with his fleet to the aid of Dionysius. Battle of the Great Harbour
Dion lands at Herakleia—he learns that Dionysius with a large fleet has just quitted Syracuse for Italy	367	

CHAPTER LXXXIV.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
between the fleet of Philistus and that of the Syracusans—Philistus is defeated and slain	378	forcement to the Dionysian garrison in Ortygia	385
The Dionysian dynasty almost perished with Philistus . .	ib	Advantage gained by Herakleidēs, and the Syracusans over Nysius as he came into Ortygia—extravagant confidence in Syracuse—Nysius sallies forth from Ortygia, masters the blockading wall, and forces his way into Neapolis and Achradina . . .	ib.
Intigues of Dionysius against Dion in Syracuse	379	Danger and distress of the Syracusans—they send to Leontini to invoke the aid of Dion . . .	387
Relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty—suspicions entertained against him by the Syracusans—his highly manly Rivalry of Herakleidēs	ib	Assembly at Leontini—pathetic address of Dion	ib.
Herakleidēs is named admiral Dion causes him to be deposed, and then involves himself for his re-appointment . . .	380	Limitation of the soldiers of Dion and of the Leontines—their eagerness to go to the aid of Syracuse	388
Intigues and columnies raised against Dion in Syracuse, by the management of Dionysius	381	Reluctance of Herakleidēs to let Dion into Syracuse—renowned assault and increased danger from Nysius—unanimous prayers now sent to invite Dion	ib.
Mistrust of Dion by the Syracusans, mainly in consequence of his relationship to the Dionysian family. Columnies of Sōsias	382	Entrance of Dion into Syracuse—he draws up his troops on Epipolæ. Frightful condition of the city	389
Further propositions of Dionysius. He goes away from Ortygia to Italy, leaving his son Apolloniatēs in command of the garrison	383	Dion drives back Nysius and his troops into Ortygia—he extinguishes the flames and preserves Syracuse	390
Increased dissension between Dion and Herakleidēs—Dion is deposed, and his soldiers deprived of the pay due to them—new generals are named	ib	Universal gratitude and admiration on the part of the Syracusans, towards Dion. Herakleidēs and Theodotēs throw themselves upon his mercy, and entreat his forgiveness . .	391
Dion is forced to retreat from Syracuse—bad conduct of the new generals and of the people towards his soldiers—he defends himself, but refuses to employ any more force than was essential to defence	384	Dion pardons Herakleidēs—his exposition of motives	ib.
Dion reaches Leontini—the Leontines stand by him against the Syracusans—arrival of Nysius with a rein-		Remarkable features in this act of Dion	392
		Dion re-establishes the blockade of Ortygia, and ransoms the captives taken	393
		Dion named general on land, at the motion of Herakleidēs,	

CHAPTER LXXXIV.—*continued.*

Page	Page
who is continued in his command of the fleet 393	gean scheme of government and discipline 398
Dangerous intrigues and dissensions, raised by Herakleides against Dion. The operations against Dionysius are frustrated 394	Mistake of Dion as to his position 399
Attempt to supersede Dion through Gæsylus the Spartan—good conduct of Gæsylus 395	Dion takes no step to realise any measure of popular liberty 400
Surrender of Ortygia by Apollonkratès to Dion 396	Opposition raised against Dion by Herakleides—impatience of the Syracusans to see the demolition of the Dionysian strongholds and funereal monument <i>ib.</i>
Entry of Dion into Ortygia—restoration of his wife—speedy death of his son <i>ib.</i>	Dion causes Herakleides to be privately slain 401
Conduct of Dion in the hour of triumph <i>ib.</i>	Increased oppressions of Dion—hatred entertained against him in Syracuse <i>ib.</i>
Suspicious previously entertained respecting Dion—that he was aiming at the despotism for himself—confirmed by his present conduct 397	Disquietude and irritability of Dion on account of his unpopularity 402
Herastains his dictatorial power, with the fortress and garrison of Ortygia—he grants no freedom to Syracuse 398	Conspiracy of Kallippus against him—artifices and perjury <i>ib.</i>
Intention of Dion to constitute himself king, with a Lykur-	Kallippus causes Dion to be assassinated 404
	Life, sentiments, and altered position, of Dion <i>ib.</i>

CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B.C. 353-336.

Position and prospects of Kallippus, after the assassination of Dion 408	Drunken habits of the Dionysian princes 411
He continues master of Syracuse more than a year. His misrule. Return of Hipparinus son of Dionysius to Syracuse. Expulsion of Kallippus 409	Lokri—dependency and residence of the younger Dionysius 412
Miserable condition of Syracuse and Sicily, as described by Plato <i>ib.</i>	Sufferings of the Italian Greeks from the Lucanians and Brutians of the interior <i>ib.</i>
Plato's recommendations fruitless—state of Syracuse grows worse. Dionysius returns to Ortygia, expelling Hipparinus 411	Dionysius at Lokri—his unpopularity and outrageous misrule—cruel retaliation of the Lokrians upon his female relatives 418
	Distress of the Syracusans—fresh danger from Carthago. They invoke the aid of Hi'e.

CHAPTER LXXXV.—*continued.*

Page	Page
tas—in concert with Hiketas, they send to entreat aid from Corinth 414	desiring that no troops might be sent to Sicily 423
Secret alliance of Hiketas with the Carthaginians—he conspires to defeat the application to Corinth 415	Timoleon sets out for Sicily with a small squadron—favourable omens and oracular answers from the gods 415
Application from Syracuse favourably received by the Corinthians—vots passed to grant aid 415	Timoleon arrives at Rhegium—is prevented from reaching Sicily by a Carthaginian fleet of superior force—insidious message from Hiketas 424
Difficulty in finding a Corinthian leader—most of the leading citizens decline—Timoleon is proposed and chosen . . 415	Stratagem of Timoleon to get across to Sicily, in collusion with the Rhegines 415
Antecedent life and character of Timoleon 416	Public meeting in Rhegium—Timoleon and the Carthaginians both present at it—long speeches, during which Timoleon steals away, contriving to send his fleet over to Sicily 425
His conduct towards his brother Timophanes, whose life he saves in battle 416	Timoleon at Tauromenium in Sicily—formidable strength of his enemies—despots in Sicily—despondency at Syracuse 426
Timophanes makes himself despot, and commits gross oppression—Timoleon with two companions puts him to death 417	Success of Timoleon at Adranum. He surprises and defeats the troops of Hiketas, superior in number 428
Beneficial effects of the act upon Corinth—sentiment towards Timoleon 418	Improved position and alliances of Timoleon—he marches up to the walls of Syracuse . . 429
Bitter reproach of Timoleon by his mother 419	Position of Dionysius in Ortygia—he resolves to surrender that fortress to Timoleon, stipulating for safe conveyance and shelter at Corinth 430
Intense mental distress of Timoleon. He shuts himself up and retires from public life 419	Timoleon sends troops to occupy Ortygia, receiving Dionysius into his camp 431
Different judgements of modern and ancient minds on the act of Timoleon. Comments of Plutarch 420	Timoleon sends news of his success to Corinth, with Dionysius himself in a trireme 431
Timoleon is appointed commander to Syracuse—he accepts the command—admonition of Telekleides 421	Great effect produced at Corinth—confidence of the citizens—reinforcement sent to Timoleon 432
Preparations made by Timoleon—his scanty means—he engages some of the Phokian mercenaries 421	Sight of the fallen Dionysius 432
Bad promise of the expedition—second message from Hiketas, withdrawing himself from the Corinthian alliance, and	

CHAPTER LXXXV.—*continued.*

Page	Page
at Corinth—impression made upon the Greeks—numerous visitors to see him. Conversation with Aristoxenus	433
Immense advantage derived by Timoleon from the possession of Ortygia—numerous stores found in it	436
Large Carthaginian army under Magon arrives to aid in attacking Ortygia. Defeated by Neon, during the absence of Magon and Hiketas. Neon acquires Achradina, and joins it by a line of wall to Ortygia	ib.
Return of Magon and Hiketas to Syracuse—increased difficulty of their proceedings, since the victory of Neon	437
Return of Timoleon to Syracuse—fortunate march and arrival of the Corinthian reinforcement	438
Messénê declares in favour of Timoleon—he establishes his camp near Syracuse	ib.
Magon distrusts Hiketas and his position at Syracuse—he suddenly withdraws his army and fleet, leaving Syracuse altogether	439
Timoleon masters Epipolæ and the whole city of Syracuse—Hiketas is obliged to escape to Leontini	440
Lengthy defence made by the troops of Hiketas	441
Great effect produced by the news that Timoleon was master of Syracuse	ib.
Extraordinary admiration felt towards Timoleon—especially for the distinguished favour shown to him by the gods	442
Timoleon ascribes all his successes to the gods	443
Temptations to Timoleon in the hour of success—easy possibility of making himself despot of Syracuse	444
Timoleon invites the Syracusans to demolish the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia	445
He erects courts of justice on the site	446
Desolate condition of Syracuse and other cities in Sicily. Recall of exiles. Application on the part of Timoleon and the Syracusans to Corinth	ib.
Commissioners sent from Corinth to Syracuse—they revive the laws and democracy enacted by Dioklès—but with various changes and additions	447
Poverty at Syracuse—necessity for inviting new colonists	448
Large body of new colonists assembled at Corinth for Sicily	ib.
Influx of new colonists into Sicily from all quarters	449
Relief to the poverty of Syracuse	450
Successes of Timoleon against Hiketas, Leptinês and other despots in Sicily	451
Hiketas invites the Carthaginians again to invade Sicily	ib.
The Carthaginians land in Sicily with a vast army, including a large proportion of native troops	452
Timoleon marches from Syracuse against the Carthaginians—mutiny of a portion of his mercenaries under Thrasyas	ib.
Timoleon marches into the Carthaginian province—omen about the parsley	454
He encounters the Carthaginian army while passing the Krîmêns. War chariots in their front—Timoleon orders his cavalry to charge	455
Strenuous battle between the	

CHAPTER LXXXV.—*continued.*

	Page		Page
infantry of Timoleon and the native Carthaginian infantry.		Gratitude and reward to him by the Syracusans	466
Terrific storm—complete victory of Timoleon	456	Great influence of Timoleon, even after he had laid down his power	<i>ib.</i>
Savageries of the Carthaginians in the battle, especially of their native troops. Immense booty collected by the soldiers of Timoleon	457	Immigration of new Greek settlers into Sicily, to Gela, Agrigentum, Kamarino, &c. . .	467
Discouragement and terror among the defeated army, as well as at Carthage itself . .	458	Value and importance of the moral ascendancy enjoyed by Timoleon, in regulating these new settlements	469
Great increase of glory to Timoleon—favour of the gods shown to him in the battle .	459	Numerous difficulties which he would be called upon to adjust	469
Timoleon returns to Syracuse—he dismisses Thersites and the mercenaries who had deserted him—he sends them out of Sicily—their fate . .	460	Residence of Timoleon at Syracuse—chapel to the goddess Automatia	470
Success of Timoleon against Hiketas and Mamerkus . .	<i>ib.</i>	Arrival of the blind Timoleon in the public assembly of Syracuse, during matters of grave and critical discussion .	471
Victory gained by Timoleon over Hiketas, at the river Demurius	461	Manner in which Timoleon bore contradiction in the public assembly—his earnest anxiety to ensure freedom of speech against himself	472
Timoleon attacks Hiketas at Leontini. Both the place and Hiketas in person are surrendered to Timoleon by the garrison. Hiketas and his family are put to death . .	462	Uncorrupted moderation and public spirit of Timoleon . .	473
Timoleon gains a victory over Mamerkus—he concludes peace with the Carthaginians .	463	Xenophontic ideal—command over willing free men—qualities, positive as well as negative—of Timoleon . . .	474
Timoleon conquers and takes prisoners Mamerkus and Hippon. Mamerkus is condemned by the Syracusan public assembly	464	Freedom and comfort diffused throughout all Sicily for twenty-four years, until the despotism of Agathoklès . .	<i>ib.</i>
Timoleon puts down all the despots in Sicily	465	Death and obsequies of Timoleon	475
Timoleon lays down his power at Syracuse	<i>ib.</i>	Proclamation at his funeral—monument to his honour .	<i>ib.</i>
		Contrast of Dion and Timoleon .	476

HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS.

Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were reconducted home by Epaminondas.

How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial re-constitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Pericæi and Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from their dependence, and organized into self-acting, jealous neighbours in the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea

Changes in
Pelopon-
nesus since
the battle
of Leuktra.

and Mantinea. The once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta; and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians and Thebans against her.

Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable; partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the position and policy of Athens.

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbours like the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of Sparta and of Athens,¹ especially the former. It was by Spartan aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379 B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies. But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens (from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land; while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of the Athenians had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta with Macedonia,

¹ *Æschinæe*, De Fals. Leg. c. 18. p. 249; *Isokratæe*, Or. v. (Philipp.) s. 124. 'Ο γὰρ πατήρ σου (*Isokratēs* to Philip) πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), εἰς σοὶ περαινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἀνδράς οἰκίστας εἶναι.

The connexion of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been con-

siderable; that with Argos was based upon a strong legendary and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds; with Athens, it was both political and serious, with Sparta, it was attested by the most essential military aid and co-operation.

and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.¹ To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful Athenian generals, Iphikratês and Timotheus. He adopted the former as his son;² at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have already stated that Iphikratês had married the daughter of Kotys king of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys on the Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in great favour with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.³ Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and was treated with considerable favour.⁴

The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendancy of Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and even compelled to solicit her aid—but new rivals, the Thebans, were suddenly lifted into an ascendancy inspiring her with mingled jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in my preceding chapter)—of causing

Ambitious
views of
Athens
after the
battle of
Leuktra.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vi. 1, 17.

² Æschinês, De Fals. Leg. c. 13.
p. 249. See above, Ch. LXXVII.

³ Demosthen. cont. Timotheum.
c. 8. p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.

⁴ Æschinês, De Fals. Leg. c. 13.
p. 248. τῇ περὶ τῶν εὐνοῶν, καὶ τὰς

ἐνδοξασίας ἀς ὁμοῖς ὑπὲρβῆτε Ἀμόντα.
τῷ Φιλίππῳ πατρὶ, &c.

Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. c.
80. p. 660. τῇ περὶ τῶν φίλων ἀνα-
γούσῃ (Philip to the Athenians):
compare ibid. c. 29. p. 657.

the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;¹ thus silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.

On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place, at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378 B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possession. This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during the last seven years to raise her again into naval pre-eminence, is now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince, Philip son of Amyntas.

Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in 371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for her help in case of need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was

Her aspirations to maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies.

She wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognises her right to the place.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vi. 5, 2.

re-sworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, and Potidæa; all which we find a few years afterwards occupied by Athenians.¹ How much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;² and the moment was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides. Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled envoys, recognised without opposition the right of the Athenians to Amphipolis.³

¹ Demesthen. (Philippic. ii. c. 4. p. 71; De Halcunneso, c. 3. p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2. p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demesthen. c. 6. p. 163.

² Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C., when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokidēs were under consideration—aspirations, which were then regarded as beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about (Andokidēs, De Pace s. 16). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χερρόνησον καὶ τὰς ἀπειρίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ ἡρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ' οὕτω βρασιλεύς, οὐτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ' ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.

³ Æschinēs, De Fals. Leg. c. 14. p. 260.

Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελευσέως, εἰς ὧν τούτων, Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατήρ, καὶ πέμπω, σὺ μέδρον, καὶ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ, ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τῇ Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ καινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ἐκ

τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων μάρτυρας παρασχόμεν.

The remarkable event to which Æschinēs here makes allusion, must have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed—leaving out only Thebes, or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as president.

My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion—at Athens. First, the reference of Æschinēs to the δημοσία γράμματα leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city, secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in any situation to exact such a reserve in their favour, prior to the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held, not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of terminating the war and concluding peace; while the

Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Athens and Amphipolis, though bordering on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,¹ next taken from Athens in 421-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydîdês, then re-colonized under Lacedæmonian auspices—it had ever since remained an independent city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of Nîkias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the mining district of Pangæus—rendered it a tempting prize: and the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men and money;

subsequent congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.

¹ The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in his *Epistola ad Athenienses*, ap. *Demosthen.* p. 164), that Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from it—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydîdês. At least, if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the spot, he must have lost it afterwards, for it was occupied by the Edonian Thracians, both in 495 B.C., when Athens made

her first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there—and in 437 B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv. 102).

The expression of *Æechinês*, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. "gave up or receded from" Amphipolis (ὤν δ' Ἀμύντας ἀνέστη—*De Fals. Leg.* l. c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it; though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the town.

from which we shall find her shrinking now, as she had done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 431 B.C., and the years immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military action—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognised in the congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards, the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas in Macedonia.¹ The former was cut off (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude of his vigour; and his great power could not be held together by an inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before he had committed gross enormities, by killing and banishing many of the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the estimable Polydamas.² The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting possession of Larissa and Kرانon; both which cities he kept under his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron and Alexander of Pheræ.³

Death of
Jason and
Amyntas—
state of
Thessaly
and Mace-
donia.

¹ Diodor. xv. 60.

² Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 33, 34.

Diodorus (xv. 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus; Plutarch (Pisopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not ex-

pressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.

³ Diodor. xv. 61.

This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason's despotism in Pheræ, and to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army, and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection; apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom he contracted an alliance.¹ A large portion of Thessaly thus came under the protection of Thebes, in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.

Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian, half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus (or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise, and Apolllophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.²

¹ Diodor. xv. 67.

The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther—that Pelopidas marched into Macedonia, and brought back as an hostage to Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia, and free, after the death of Alexander. And I believe that the march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of Philip as a hostage, took place in

the following year 368 B.C.

Justin also states (vii. 5), erroneously, that Alexander of Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the Illyrians, next to the Thebans.

² Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58. p. 402; Diodorus, xv. 71.

Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωπίτης, which description would hardly be applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of Æschinês, Fals. Leg. c. 14. p. 250, shows that

But besides these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias—a man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;¹ who, having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans in Macedonia—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa, and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas. Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her affairs, and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.²

Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian admiral Iphikratês, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen (369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Coriuth with the retreating army of

B.C. 368.
Assistance rendered by the Athenian Iphikratês to the family of Amyntas

Ptolemy was not son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the fact.

See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, c. 4.

¹ Diodor. xvi. 2.

² Æschinês, *Fals. Legat.* c. 13, 14. p. 249, 250; Justin. vii. 6.

Æschinês mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and her two younger sons. Æschinês also mentions Alexander as having recently died, but says nothing about his assassination. Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenês and Diodorus; and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (*Pelop.* c. 27), Marcellus

(ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus. Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour. The statements of Æschinês rather tend to disprove the charge of her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of Alexander.

Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.

Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on his invasion, Iphikratês happened to be on the Macedonian coast. He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age, the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had also adopted him (Iphikratês) as his son, and had thus constituted him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands, and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration, or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikratês, moved by this affecting supplication, declared in her favour, acted so vigorously against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent for the time.

This striking incident is described by the orator Æschinês¹ in an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who then clasped the knees of Iphikratês, lived afterwards to overthrow the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.

Though the interference of Iphikratês maintained the family of Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chal-

¹ Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* c. 13, 14. p. 249, 250; Cornelius Nepos, *Iphikrates*, c. 3.

kidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.¹ Iphikratês prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a general named Charidêmus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These mercenaries served under Iphikratês for three years,² until he was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens, is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,³ which opened a prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.

It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of information, that Iphikratês during his command between 369-365 B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.

. μισθοὶ πάλιν αὐτό, (Charidêmus) τοῖς Ὀλυθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐχούσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατα τοῦτον τὸ γρόνον.

Demosthenês is here speaking of the time when Timotheus superseded Iphikratês in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C. But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of 369 or 368 B.C.

² Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 663, c. 149 o. 37.

³ Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149. o. 37.

The passage in which the orator alludes to these *hostages* of the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikratês, is unfortunately not fully intelligible without farther information.

(Charidêmus) Πρώτο, μὲ, τοὺς Ἀμ-

φιπολιτῶν, ὁμήρους, οὗς παρ' Ἀρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῶν, ψηφισάμενος, ὅμων ὡς οὐδὲς κομισαί, παρῶν Ἀμφιπολίταις καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ' ἐμποδίων κατέστη.

Who Harpalus was—or what is meant by Iphikratês “obtaining (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them as security. Charidêmus, as we see afterwards, when acting for Kersobleptês, received hostages from the inhabitants of Seetos (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679 c. 40. s. 177).

not only Iphikratēs to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.) to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanēs the satrap of Phrygia.¹ That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn, towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.

Though the Athenians had sent Iphikratēs (in the winter of 370-369 B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them. Envoys from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for that purpose.² All pretensions to exclusive headship on the part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant

n.c. 369.

Terms of
alliance dis-
cussed and
concluded
between
Athens and
Sparta.

¹ Demosth. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5. p. 193.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 1.

The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔται must denote the year beginning in the spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v. ch. 40. p. 145 note); differing from him however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this—that I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.

The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII. he says, τῷ δ' ὑστέρῳ ἔται Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήνας, βουλευσόμενοι καὶ ὅτι ἡ συμμαχία ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων.

Now the words τῷ δ' ὑστέρῳ ἔται denote the spring of 369 B.C.

Xenophon goes on to describe

the assembly and the discussion at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description occupies, from vii. 1, 1 to vii. 1, 14, where the final vota and agreement is announced.

Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to say—Στρατεύομεν δ' ἄμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἐδοξε κοινῇ φυλάττειν τὸ Ὀρίον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι, παρταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἀλλήθεν τοῦ Ὀρίου.

I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly—the march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of Oneion—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus—are here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the interval of a year between the vote of the

discussion in the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing, found favour both as equitable and convenient until an Athenian named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality, would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.¹

Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station and to guard the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,² so as to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus. It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban invader from her frontier, had been held, during the war from 394-387 B.C.,

B.C. 369.

The Spartan allied army defends the line of Mount Oneium—Epaminondas breaks through it, and marches into Peloponnesus.

assembly and the march of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messenê, recently begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.

It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that Epaminondas could not have been re-

elected Boeotarch in 369 B.C. But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making it more probable—not less probable—that he and Pelopidas were re-elected Boeotarchs immediately.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 10-14.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv. 68.

by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia. Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth, recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the Argolic Gulf from Prasîæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and a large allied force (not less than 20,000 men according to Diodorus)—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians, Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta—was established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.

It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly
B.C. 369. Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies, already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy, just when the night-guards were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got under arms¹—he directed an assault along the whole line. But his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in the most assailable part of the line.² So skilfully was his movement

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 16; Polyænus, ii. 2, 9.

This was an hour known to be favourable to sudden assailants, affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylæ in Attica (Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 6).

² Xen. Hellen. lb.; Pausanias, ix. 15, 2.

Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought *πρὸς Διόνατον*; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.

Diodorus (xv. 68) states that the whole space across, from Kenchreæ

conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them. The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground. He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack, nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention, while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found another good position on one of the neighbouring eminences, and might have summoned reinforcements from his allies—and that the Thebans, in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavourable judgement pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already high military renown.¹

Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum, and Kenchirææ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.² At Sikyon, a vote of the people being

B.C. 369.
Sikyon
joins the
Thebans—
Phlius re-
mains
faithful to
Sparta.

on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true, because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchirææ, it is not probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn, though the assailable points were probably thus guarded.

Xenophon does not mention either trench or palisade.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv. 68.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 18; vii. 2, 11; Diodor. xv. 69.

This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi. 3, 1), the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the enemy's commander with his own hand.

taken, it was resolved to desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron—a citizen hitherto preponderant in the city by means of Sparta, and devoted to her interest—now altered his politics and went along with the stronger tide.¹ We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises—the foundation of Messénè and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his victorious army. The little town of Phlius—situated south of Sikyon and west of Corinth—which was one of the most faithful allies of Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders; and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the neighbouring hill Trikaranon announced that the allied enemies were in sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders, overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without; thus preserving their town.² The fidelity of the Phliasians to Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority of their enemies

The stratagem of the Boeotian Pammenes in attacking the harbour of Sikyon (Polyænus, v. 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this undertaking.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 18, 22, 44; vii. 3, 2-8.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 5-9.

This incident must have happened in 369 B.C., just about the time

when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book, Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia, through 369, 368, 367 B.C.

in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their territory from multiplied hostile neighbours (Argos, Arcadia, and Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly neighbour to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.¹

Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses. Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town. But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to the walls.² This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse, bringing a body of 2000 mercenary Gauls and Iberians, with fifty horsemen, as a succour from the despot Dionysius. Such foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery, and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long stay;³ while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.

n.o. 368.

Reinforcement from Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 17.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 19; Diodor. xv. 69.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 23; Diodor. xv. 70.

Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with pay for five months, if this is correct, I presume that we must understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus even so long as three months.

I think it certain however that much more must have passed in this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would hardly have forced the passage of the Onchium for such small objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.

An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 87 a. Addenda to vol. i. p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of Syra-

One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard them as belonging to other cities.¹ We find him always trying to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political opponents.

Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion, by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous depression of Sparta—that they fancied themselves not only capable of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta. Lykomedês the Mantineian, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian synod)—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were originally immigrants, they alone were indigenous occupants of the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as the bravest and hardest men, who bore the Hellenic name—of which proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian auxiliaries. "Let us follow no man's lead (he

case—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we know from Demosthenês that the Athenians granted the freedom of their city to Dionysius and his descendants

(Demosthenês ad Philip. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to warrant any other inferences.

¹ Pausanias, ix. 15, 2.

concluded), but stand up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall presently find them to be Spartans under another name."¹

Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for Lykomédès, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended; calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under Chabrias—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomédès with his Arcadians, fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the new city of Messênè and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as Asiné, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the suburbs of Asiné were destroyed.² Probably the Spartan mastery of the south-western corner of Peloponnesus was terminated by this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies, and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the winter season—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the Thebans.³

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 23.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 25.

Σπαρτιασμένοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνέκησάν τε τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουράν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον Σπαρτιάτην γεγεννημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προ-

δοστον τῶν Ἀσινάων ἐπὶ ῥήσαν.

Diodorus states that Lykomédès and the Arcadians took Pellênè, which is in a different situation and can hardly refer to the same expedition (xv. 67).

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 26.

B.C. 368-367. While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.¹ Ever since that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their lost supremacy. But the formation of the new "commune Arcadum" at Megalopolis interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The Triphylian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,² solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.³ The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became greatly alienated from the Arcadians.

B.C. 369. Ariobarzanês, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had just established a correspondence, now endeavoured (perhaps at their instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money. Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties, Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, &c., to meet him. These envoys never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace (says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence, he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the Spartans⁴

¹ Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 30, 31.

² Polyb. iv. 77.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 26; vii. 4, 12.

⁴ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 27. 'Ἵκετ' ὅτι

ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν ἐκεινώσαντο, ὅπως δὲ ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.

peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while Philiskus, declaring himself in favour of Sparta and Athens, employed his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding them in the war.¹ We do not find, however, that he really lent them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt from Artaxerxês; and that his probable purpose in trying to close the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and abundantly. Though the threat of Philiskus produced no immediate result, however, it so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês had already gone up to the Persian court, to solicit on behalf of Sparta.²

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too, on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom Xenophon³ specifies as if there were no others of the same sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were, at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in their favour.⁴

A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which served

n.c. 368.

Political importance of the reconstitution of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord. Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 27; Diodor. xv. 70.

Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxês; which seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanês in the name of Artaxerxês. Diodorus also says that Philiskus was left with

pay provided, for the service of the Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 33.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 27.

⁴ See this fact indicated in Isokratês, Archidamus (Or. vi.), s. 2-11.

as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived, Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the 103rd Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.)—which occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the foundation-stone of Messênê—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,¹ no Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community; accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved, or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three centuries, Damiskus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Théory (or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians; probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta, would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe oppression of the Messenians.² This Olympic festival—the first after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra—was doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.

During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed, their aid. But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly, in order to protect

B.C. 368.
Expedition
of Pelopidas into
Thessaly.

¹ Pausanias, vi. 2, 5.
Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval; but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this last-ma-

tioned name.

² See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling—disgust at the idea of persons who had recently been their slaves, presenting themselves as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia—set forth in Isokratês, Or. vi. (Arohidamus) s.

111 110

Larissa and the other cities against Alexander of Phæræ, and to counterwork the ambitious projects of that despot, who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which came from all sides against his cruelty—and at the language, first, admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think himself in safety, and fled home to Phæræ. Pelopidas established a defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans; surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence. Among the hostages was the youthful Philip son of Amyntas, who remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the care of Pammenês.¹ It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active intervention of Iphikratês and the Athenians not many months before, nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans, the enemies of Athens. Æschinês the Athenian orator denounces them for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against Athens.² And Pelopidas returned to Thebes,

¹ Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.

² Æschinês, De Fals. Leg. c. 14. p. 249.

... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντίπαρτα (Ptolemy) τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαπερομένων Ἀθηναίων, συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, &c.

Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which embassy took place in 367 B.C.: see Mr. Clinton,

Fast. Hellen. on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and two after it.

1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander of Macedon.

Diodorus mentions this fact (xv. 67), but he adds, what is erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as a hostage.

2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv. 71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).

Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with the seizure and detention of Pelopidas

having extended the ascendancy of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia, assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her and Alexander of Phæræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius. Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might cooperate in repelling or invading the Arcadians.¹ Reinforced by the Sicilians and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.² Here Kissidas, the Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire,

by Alexander of Phæræ. But it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the hostages.

3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C. In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner by Alexander of Phæræ, until he was released by Epaminondas. Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—*μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, &c.*); but with this mistake, in my judge-

ment, that he places it before the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in 367 B.C.

4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain (Diodor. xv. 80; Pintaroh, Pelopid. c. 32).

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 28.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned. O. Müller proposes to substitute Malma for Midea; a conjecture, which there are no means of verifying.

as the period to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of responsive ardour. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge, that the Arcadians were thoroughly daunted, and fled with scarcely any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory—or, as it came to be called, “the tearless battle”—news was forthwith transmitted by the herald Demotelés to Sparta. So powerful was the emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the Ephors, setting the example;¹—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in working on these minds of iron temper!

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos, instigated by a private request of Epaminondas,

n.c. 367.
Third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv. 72; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 33.

was enabled suddenly to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of 2000 men and seven days' provision. The Theban commander, hastening his march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.¹ Until the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest. Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men), and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection either with Arcadians or Thebans.² Not being in a condition to resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes; engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas

¹ I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy, because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the embassy lasted several months: moreover the expedition was made while Epaminondas was Boeotarch; and he ceased to be so during the year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C., there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 44 seq.).

The relation of contemporaneity between the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, see as indicated

when we compare vii. 1, 33 with vii. 1, 48—Συνεχῶς δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὥτως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, εὐνοίεσαν εἰ τέρψιναν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλεῖα, &c. Then Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its unfavourable reception on returning, which takes up the entire space until vii. 2, 41, when he says—Ἀλλ' οἱ δ' Ἐπικρινέωντας, βουλευθέντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὥτως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ οἱ Ἀρχάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι συμμαχοῖι προσέχουσιν τὸν νόον, ἐγνώκας στρατεύεσθαι εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχάϊαν.

This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in the former words—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, &c.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 42—44.

The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards: ἐπεὶ δὲ καταβόντες οὐκ ἔτι ἐμίσουν, &c.

deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly, by virtue of his own personal ascendancy, he agreed to accept them as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of the oligarchical.¹ Such a proceeding was not only suitable to the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epamiuoudas, but also calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus, in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians, by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians; the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians. Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,² which were held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favour with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition party in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed by Menckleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the displeasure of the Thebans—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend the Arcadians—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas in Achaia, but also refrained from re-electing him as Bœotarch during the ensuing year.³ They sent harmosts of their

The Thebans reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians and others. They do not re-elect him Bœotarch.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 42.

His expression marks how completely these terms were granted by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling opposition—ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαμεινωῦδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεύσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστήσαι, &c.

² Diodor. xv. 75.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.

Diodorus (xv. 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared the Spartans and not pushed his victory so far as might have been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Onesim in 369 B.C. But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been displeased

own to each of the Achæan cities—put down the existing oligarchies—sent the chief oligarchical members and partisans into exile—and established democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon became accumulated; who, watching for a favourable opportunity and combining their united forces against each city successively, were strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took decided and active part with Sparta;¹ vigorously pressing the Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical, still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron, took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth, and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution, seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra, carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her purposes and interest. The Arcadians

Disturbed
state of
Sikyon—
Euphron
makes him-
self despot
—his rapa-
cious and
sanguinary
conduct.

on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed to be possible.

Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oæfium; that is, in 387 B.C. This

is much more probable in itself, and much more consistent with the general series of facts, than the census assigned by Diodorus.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 23.

For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities, congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i. 113.

and Argeians, entering into the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans. The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded to re-organise them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength. Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety, and being thus master of the city under the ostensible colour of chief of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious and sanguinary tyranny.¹ He caused several of his colleagues to be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism; confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid force.² The power which he thus acquired became very great. The money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master of the town and harbour.

During the height of Euphron's power at Sikyon, the neighbouring city of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious

B.C. 367.

Sufferings of the Phliasians—their steady adherence to Sparta

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 44—46; Diodor. xv. 70. ² Xen. Hellen. vii. 3, 8

hardships. I have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius, having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and resistance of its citizens.¹ In the ensuing year, 368 B.C., the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain, doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.² In the ensuing year, 367 B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of 2000—the armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê—and the Theban har- most and garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within; while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated line of ground called the *Trikaranum* (which had been fortified by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to repair.³

An eminent Pellenian citizen named Proxenus having been here made prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined

Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian Chares—surprise of the fort Thyamia.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 6-9.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 10.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 11-15.

the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê, bringing about a peace between that city and Philus.¹ Such an accession afforded sensible relief—it might almost be said, salvation—to the Philians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment; since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult to bring home in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The military Philians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to Philus, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Philus, but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.²

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to the Philians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the Arcadians, who had helped to raise

¹ This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii. 4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections 18-20 of vii. 2.

The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave little Philian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere, he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the general series.

With all those defects and partiality of Xenophon's narrative, however, we must recollect that it is a description of real events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to all that he says, inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who write at second-hand and after the time—or from orators whose purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence I have given a short abridgement of these Philian events as described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise influence on the main course of the war.

² *ve* Hellen. vii. 2, 18-23.

him up, became disgusted. Æneas of Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the acropolis, and there summoned the Sikyonian *notables* to an assembly. Under his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbour; where he invited Pasimélus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open partisan of Sparta. The harbour, a separate town and fortification at some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth), was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself, however, though evacuated by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents, the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take by assault¹—his possession even of the town was altogether precarious, until such formidable neighbours could be removed. Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do not know; except that he took with him a large sum of

Euphron returns to Sikyon—he goes to Thebes and is there assassinated.

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¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 8, 9.

money for the purpose of bribery.¹ His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair, they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight—on the Kadmeia, and even before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates and Senate were sitting.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized forthwith, and put upon their trial before the Senate. The magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death, insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage, committed almost under the eyes of the authorities—as well as upon the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the security, of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated, we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation; but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows—taking up the language of the accusing magistrates:—

“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I trusted in your righteous judgement. I knew that *you* did not wait for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,² whom you caught after a career similar to that of Euphron—but punished them at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already under sentence of death by all men. Well! and was not Euphron too guilty of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 3, 4-6.

² This refers to the secret expedition of Pelepidas and the six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through

the contrivance of the secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian ascendancy, and put them to death. This event is described in Ch. LXXVII.

n.c. 367.

The assassins are put upon their trial at Thebes—their defence.

silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favoured and upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to her—handing over the harbour of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew, not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you, you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you, and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend, I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but as he is a traitor playing you false, how is he more my enemy than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord, confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not *in* Thebes also, when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile, who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes—if you put me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very worst enemy—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on that of your whole body of allies.”¹

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 3, 7-11.

To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so characteris-

tic and emphatic on the part of the agent—Schneider and others refer, with great probability, the

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others, and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian Senates or assemblies elsewhere.

Very different however was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished pre-eminence of being buried in the market-place.¹ There, along with his tomb, a chapel was erected in which he was worshipped as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city. He received the same honours as had been paid to Brasidas at Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had conferred liberty and political franchise—or at least the name of a political franchise—remembered him with grateful admiration as their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges. A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic citizen to confer favours and earn popularity among the many, and thus to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit of the Many, goes along with their anti-

They are
acquitted
by the
Theban
Senate.

Sentiment
among the
many of
Sikyon,
favourable
to Euphron
—honours
shown to
his body
and
memory.

allusion in the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii. 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θυβίου ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐπέλυσε κρίναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθάνειν, ὡς οὐκ ἀδίκ-

ζον ἐν ἀποκτείνειν τὸν δίκαιως ἀποθνήσκοντα.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 3, 12.

pathies when it humbles or crushes the previously monopolizing Few.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban harmost in the acropolis—nor how the intestine dissensions, between the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were composed—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We learn only that not long afterwards, the harbour of Sikyon, which Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens; and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town, aided by the Arcadians.¹

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the harbour) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367 B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of Philiskus—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the satrap Ariobarzanês and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats seem never to have been realized—as well as by the presence of the Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas²) at the Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now

The Sikyonians recapture their harbour from the Spartans.

Application of Thebes for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopidas and other envoys to Susa.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 1.

² Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

pretensions to the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals; while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.—it had become a sort of recognised fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The vitality and chance for duration, of both—especially those of the latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend with—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the Greek mind, if they were recognised as autonomous under a Persian rescript. To attain this object,¹ Pelopidas and Ismenias now proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast, the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them. Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile envoys all went up thither in the same company.²

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of prostration,³ was favourably received by the Persian court. Xenophon—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only copying the

Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favourable rescript.

¹ It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv. 81), but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 36.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

The words of Xenophon ἡγοῦσθαι δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to some Argæian envoy; though the name

is not mentioned, and must probably have dropped out—or perhaps the word τῆς, as Xenophon may not have heard the name.

It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408 B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same company (Xen. Hellen. i. 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

³ Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

example of Sparta in courting Persian aid—affirms that his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta, at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,¹ which could only reach Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra; that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle). Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas—confirmed as matters of fact even by the Athenian Timagoras—would convince the Persian ministers that it was their interest to exercise ascendancy over Greece through Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta: Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them, in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced with instant compulsion by Persian force.²

His colleague, Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his ring, and then to have stopped to pick it up, immediately before the King: thus going through the prostration.

¹ Plutarch, Pelopidae, c. 30.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 36. 'Ex δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο αὐτῷ γραφεῖναι, εἶπεν ὅτι Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθη-

ναίους ἀνέλκεν τὰς ναῦς· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ παύσονται, στρατεύειν ἐπ' αὐτούς· εἴ τις οὐ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον ἵσταναι.

It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of 387 B.C.; though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its exact words (v. 1, 31).

What he states afterwards (vii. 1, 38) about the Arcadians proves

In reference to the points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced in favour of the Eleians;¹ probably at the instance of Pelopidas, since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and Arcadians.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing aloud when he heard it read—
 "By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King." This remark, made in the King's hearing and interpreted to him, produced the following addition to the rescript: "If the Athenians have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and inform him." So vague a modification, however, did little to appease the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in treasonable promises, and receiving large bribes from the Persian King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.² The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally

Protost of the Athenians and Arcadians against this rescript.

that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognised as autonomous. This we read in Demosthenés, *Fals. Leg.* p. 383. c. 42. Καὶ γὰρ τοὶ πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δοῦλην κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ἣν τότε σὺν μαχῶν αὐτῷ καὶ φίλην ἔγραψεν. Demosthenés is here alluding to the effect produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

In the words of Xenophon—εἰ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀπολυσθεῖν—the headship of Thebes is de-

clared or implied. Compars the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the latter was subdued (v. 3, 26).

¹ Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρεσβέων ὁ μὲν Ἡλείος Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι προὔτιμῃσεν τῇν Ἰλλίην πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων, ἐπῆναι τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ὁ δ' Ἀντιόχος, ὅτι ἡλᾶτο τοῦτο τοῦ Ἀρκάδιόν, οὕτε τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, &c.

² Demosthen. *Fals. Leg.* c. 42. p. 383.

In another passage of the same oration (o. 57. p. 400), Demosthenés says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras for four years. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that

indignant at the rescript; refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions of the Athenian Timagoras.¹ Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia, made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said) plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, &c., but as for men competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden planetree was not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.²

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official companion from Susa—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes since the times immediately preceding the battle of Plataea—who, after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud; as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of Antalkidas.³

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the like ready acquiescence, when

Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi. 5, 1, 2). This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned from their first embassy, were now sent jointly on

a second. Demosthenês has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

¹ Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

Demosthenês speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras from the Persian king as having been 40 talents, ὡς λέγεται (Fals. Leg. p. 383) besides other presents and conveniences. Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 38.

³ Xen. Hellen. v. 1, 30.

they called on the deputies present to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes. All replied they had come with instructions, authorising them to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst. Lykomedês and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused Lykomedês of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy; upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of the synod was defeated.

The states convoked at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies protest against the headship of Thebes.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively, calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So confident were they in the terrors of the King's name and seal, that they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium, and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king. The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities

The Thebans send the rescript to be received at Corinth: the Corinthians refuse: failure of the Theban object.

visited, at least from so large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure, was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her headship;¹ though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and recognised Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt the dignity, of that new-born city.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Phœ. That despot seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing the application; had nevertheless respected the public morality held sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys (whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not so the tyrant of Phœ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and carried them off to Phœ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of Phœ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture, and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes. Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendancy of their neighbour and rival.² They immediately despatched to his aid thirty triremes

B.C. 366.
Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly. He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Phœ.

B.C. 366.
The Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private man.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελεύθη. μὲν ἡ Πελοποννησὸς καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων ² The strong expressions of De-

and 1000 hoplites under Autoklès; who, unable to get through the Euripus, when Boeotia and Eubœa were both hostile to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay 5000 hoplites and 600 cavalry to recover or avenge him. Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been re-chosen commander since his last year's proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenês with other Boeotarchs had the command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians, and placed under the command of Autoklès, was found exceedingly formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger; and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered impracticable by the incompetence of the Boeotarchs. Unable to make head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy's cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils. Epaminondas accepted the duty—marshalled the retreat in consummate order—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off all the attacks of the enemy—and conducted the army safely back to Thebes.¹

mosthenês show what a remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 s. 142).

Τὶ δ' Ἰ. Ἀλέξανδρον ἔχειν τὸν Θερταλόν, ἥντι' εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον θήρας Παλοπίδαν, ἐγὼρὸς δ' ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦ, Θύβρις, ὅμιν δ' οἰκίῳς διεκτετο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ' ὁμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβροθεῖτε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ'

ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, &c.

Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 198 E.).

¹ Diodor. xv. 71; Plutarch, Pelop. o. 28; Pausanias, ix. 15, 1.

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful Boeotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too, appears to have lasted some time, before the Thebans, discouraged by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second expedition for his release.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than a temporary truce,¹ coupled with the engagement of evacuating

¹ Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, would have been satisfied with a truce for thirty days; but it is difficult to believe that Alexander term so very short.

Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.¹ That event

¹ The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv. 71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 3, Pausanias, ix. 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia, which embassy I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the close of the career of Pelopidas.

Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367 B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned victorious, bringing back the hostages.

The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when Epaminondas was not Boeotarch, nor in command of the Theban army. Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Acbala, that Epaminondas missed being reelected as general.

Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia, mentions his grounds for expecting a favourable reception, and the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii. 1, 35). Now if Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for some months in prison by Alexander of Phœræ, surely Xenophon would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to be trusted. But in this case we must recollect that he dislikes both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one, immediately preceding.

Pelopidas was taken prisoner, by Alexander, not in battle, but when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him (παράπαισις—Plutarch, Apophth. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix. 15, 1; "legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur"—Corn. Nep.). His imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii. 1) and others. But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

with its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly, together with the Magnètes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence and connection at Athens.¹

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an important point was gained in their favour on the other side of Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison, despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal constituent member of the Athenian common-wealth, but only recognised as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier, many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of the neighbouring Deme Græa.² So recently before as the period immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were forced to yield, and their partisans in Orôpus were banished.³ It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves of Orôpus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to Athens.⁴ So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians,

B.C. 366.
Oropus is taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The Athenians recall Charês from Corinth.

On these grounds, which, in my judgement, outweigh any probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia, not without feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be rendered absolutely certain.

¹ Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 31-35

² See the instructive Inscription and comments published by Professor Ross, in which the Deme

Γρᾶς, near Orôpus, was first distinctly made known (Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, p. 6, 7—Halle, 1846).

³ Isokratês, *Orat.* xiv. (Plataio.) s. 22-40.

⁴ Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 78.

The previous capture of Orôpus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C., was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thueyd. viii. 60).

that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place, but also recalled their general Charês with that mercenary force which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian force alone would have sufficed to retake Orôpus, had not the Thebans occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to impartial arbitration.¹

This seizure of Orôpus produced more than one material consequence. Owing to the recall of Charês from Corinth, the harbour of Sikyon could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town; who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both town and harbour again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians. Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies, for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Orôpus, although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantineian Lykomedês; the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian rescript.² Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well as from Sparta, Lykomedês now took advantage of the discontent of Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority of the Arcadian Ten Thousand

B.C. 366.

Athens discontented with her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedês and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedês

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 78.

Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123, Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Orôpus the trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with the memorable harangue of the latter which

Demoethonês heard as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on the point. Rehdantz (Vitam Iphicratis, Chabrie, et Timothei, p. 109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies, in an instructive chapter.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 39; vii. 4, 2.

to send him thither as ambassador. There was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition, from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favourable answer was then given to Lykomédès. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled, and these men put him to death at once.¹ In spite of his death, however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to pass, though not without opposition.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man and her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer, in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus, the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. "Were not Orestes and Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus), natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his mother, a native of Thebes?"—"Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply), they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these persons, while they lived at home, were innocent or reputed to be so. As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them; and then it was that Athens received them,

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 3.

Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomédès had only to make his choice, and to depart as when he would dis-

embark. He fixed upon the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that they were there—καίτοι οὐκ ἔμελλεν ἀποβῆσαι.

stained with confessed guilt.¹ This clever retort told much to the credit of the rhetorical skill of Epaminondas, but his speech as a whole was not successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus; while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in regard to the summons to Orôpus, rendered her mistrustful of their fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth; there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under Charês was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian port of Kenchreæ, Charês found himself shut out even from admittance. The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians, had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their services were no longer needed. Charês pretended to have learnt that Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.²

Project of the Athenians to seize Corinth, they are disappointed.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6; Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix. 3).

Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus, that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly at Messênê, to which Aristotle makes

allusion (Rhetoric, iii. 17, 3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 4-6.

The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favourable to the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in like manner, in Thucydides, iii. 3.

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos, were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;¹ but while thus providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. "We are on the point of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we make peace without you." The Epidaurians and Phliasiens, reduced to the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience for peace.²

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of the independence of Messénê. To this the Corinthians and other allies of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavoured to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession. The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription. They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognising as free Greeks and equal neighbours, those who had so long been their slaves. They proclaimed their determination of continuing

¹ It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by the Corinthians under the command of Timophanês, and employed by him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries equipped about this time (as far as we

can verify his chronology) and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connexion with Timoleon and Timophanês—of whom I shall have to say much in a future chapter.

² Compare Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 8, 9 with Isokratês, Or. vi. (Archidamus) s. 106.

the war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they had lost;¹ and although they could not directly prohibit the Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves—yet they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honour.² The Spartan prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 9.

² This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is strongly and repeatedly set forth in the Oration of Isokrates called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this synod—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta. Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians, and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13—εἰς τοῦτο δ' ἔχουσι πολλοὶ ἐξ ἡμῶν καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεργάσασθαι χεῖρην, ὥστε πολλὰς ἡμᾶς ἀξιώσας ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πολιτείας, ὑπὲρ Μεσσηνίας οὐκ οἶεται δεῖν ἡμᾶς κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ' ἵ' αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς καραῶνται, πατρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρή τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς ἡμετέρας παραχωρησθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπαπειλοῦσθαι, ὡς, εἰ μὴ τούτα συγχωρήσωμεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς. Compare

sect. 87, 87, 97, 105, 106, 123.

We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the latter advised them to relinquish Messênê—was much greater than the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii. 4, 8-11) would lead us to believe.

In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply—peace would be granted, εἰ Μεσσηνίῃ ἀποικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι. Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose, the Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory condition requiring that Messênê should be recognised. Next, the Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonise or reconstitute (ἀποικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans themselves.

5

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians, Phlians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded peace; recognising the independence of Messênê and affirming the independence of each separate city within its own territory, without either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined, saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side; whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect, of Theban headship.¹

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those near the Isthmus—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and Argos—Sparta and Athens²—still at war; as well as Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states however were now somewhat complicated: for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians; while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly terms, though not yet at

¹ Diodorus (xv. 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys to Greece, who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace now concluded was upon the

general basis of that rescript. so far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus about Persian intervention is exact.

² Diodorus (xv. 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the Boeotian and Laedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of Leuktra.

actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians themselves were losing their internal cooperation and harmony one with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging the recognition of Messênê as an independent state—so they were no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript granted to Pelopidas.¹ The Athenians also were dissatisfied with this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas, for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favourable terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian possession instead of a free city.² Whether

Athenians
sends a
fresh em-
bassy to
the Persian
king—al-
tered re-
script from
him, pro-
nouncing
Amphipolis
to be an
Athenian
possession.

¹ Xenophon, *Enc. Agesil.* ii. 30.
ἐπορεύετο τῷ Πέρσῃ βασιλῇ, ἐπιθῆναι
καὶ τῶν ἑσθλῶν, καὶ ἵτοι μὴ, σύμφωνα
εἶναι φάσκω, ἐπείτατε Μεσσηνίῃ,
αἰετέναι.

² This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to Pelopidas, *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 1, 37), appears to me implied in Demosthenês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 381. s. 16; p. 420. s. 283; *Or. De Halonneso*, p. 84. s. 30.

If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens—and if he sent

down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis—this information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (*Xenophon, Enc. Ages.* viii. 3; *Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon.* p. 1213 E.), brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

that other article also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems probable.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of his long-established military reputation to promote the interests of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanês the satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydos, with the view either of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favourable to Sparta, or of aiding the latter against them.¹ Ariobarzanês was then preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanês—yet with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanês (with his three sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.² That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer, exercised extensive ascendancy, disgraced by much tyranny and brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the Conquest of Samos revolted Ariobarzanês, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos; which was by Timotheus now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military force in the service of Tigranês, Persian satrap on the opposite mainland. How or when Tigranês had acquired it, we do not know; but the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet possession of the

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 27.

p. 103. s. 10. cont. Aristokrat. p.

² Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert.

669. s. 165; p. 687. s. 242.

continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to push their dominion over the neighbouring islands. After carrying on his military operations in Samos, with 8000 peltasts and 30 triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or extorting contributions from allies.¹ An important possession was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of Ariobarzanês and the uncertain fidelity of various neighbouring satraps, shook for some time the King's authority, and absorbed his revenues in these regions. Autophradâtês, the satrap of Lydia—and Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy—attacked Ariobarzanês, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence of Agesilaus.² As the latter had no army, nor any means of allurements (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanês), we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanês himself against the Persian king.³

¹ Demosthen. *ut sup.*, Isokiatês, Or. xv. (De Permut.) s. 118; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.

The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristotolês. *Œconomic* ii. 23, and in *Polyæn.* iii. 10, 9; so far as we can understand them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin disguise, upon the inhabitants.

Since Ariobarzanês gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have given some to Timotheus during this siege.

² Xenoph. *Enc. Ages.* ii. 26, *Polyænus*, vii. 26.

I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer the siege of Artanens by Autophradâtês, which he was induced to relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the place (*Aristot. Politic.* ii. 4, 10).

³ It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis*, Chabrie, et Timothei, chap. v. p. 118-

Agésilas obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid for Sparta.¹

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens. It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia Minor—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian cities, to revolt—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanês, who rewarded both Agésilas and Timotheus. Agésilas was enabled to carry home a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus, declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon of re-admission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanês made over to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for occupation.²

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion, new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first Miltiadês and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favourable turn of fortune and eventual re-entry.³ That moment had now arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation

130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the scraps of information: compare also Weissenborn, *Hellen.* p. 192-194 (Jena, 1844).

¹ Xen. *Enc. Ages.* ii. 26, 27.

² Isokratês, *Or. xv.* (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius Nepos, *Timotheus*, c. 1.

Isokratês particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquest of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὡς

ληφθαισῶ, ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκίους ἀνεγκάστθῃ τῇ πόλει ἐγενέσθαι, &c. (s. 111).

From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes called "the flour-board of the Peiræus"—ἡ πηλὴ τοῦ Παιριῶς (Aristot. *Rhetor.* iii. 10, 3).

³ See Andokidês de Pace, s. 15.

of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in fear of Sparta. The same system of *kleruchies*, which had so much discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many *kleruchs*, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any *kleruchs* there before.¹ But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places; whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese, or at least most part of it, as

¹ That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in part) by *kleruchs*, began in 366 or 365 B.C.—is established by Diodorus, xviii. 8-18—when he mentions the restoration of the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional detachments of *kleruchs* were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C., as mentioned by the Scholiast on *Æschines* cont. *Timarch.* p. 31. c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii. p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (*F. H. ad ann. 352*). I think it highly improbable that so long an interval should have elapsed between the capture of the isl. and the sending of the

kleruchs, or that this latter measure, offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been first resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the progress of Philip. Strabo mentions 2000 *kleruchs* as having been sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or all the different batches together, we cannot say (Strabo, xiv. p. 638). The father of the philosopher Epikurus was among these *kleruchs* compare Diogen. Laert. x. 1.

Rehdantz (*Vita Iphieratis, Chabrie et Timothei*, p. 127) seems to me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this period.

Demosthenes mentions the property of the *kleruchs*, in his general review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in Olym. 108, before 352 B.C. (*De Symmoris*, p. 182. s. 19).

her own ancient possession—from its extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.¹

This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378 B.C.

Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the kleruchs to Samos.² However, obnoxious as the measure was to criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,³ which resisted her pretensions—and with resident proprietors whom she was to aid her citizens in dispossessing—but also with a new enemy, Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus, when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanês drove him away,⁴ to make room for Timotheus and the Athenians.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys⁵—the new Thracian enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens—was father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikratês, whom he had enabled to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on the coast of Thrace. Iphikratês had been employed by the Athenians for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of a mercenary

¹ See Demosthenês, *De Halonneso*, p. 86. s. 40-42; *Æschinês*, *De Fals. Legat.* 264 s. 74.

² *Aristotel Rhetoric.* ii. 8, 4.

³ *Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat.* p.

677. s. 201; p. 679. s. 209.

⁴ *Xenophon*, *Enc. Agesil.* ii. 26.

⁵ *Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat.* p.

660. s. 141.

general named Charidēmus with a body of troops. How so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like Iphikratēs, is to be explained—we cannot tell. But it naturally placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Sunos and the Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikratēs, too, was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to recall him, and appoint Timotheus¹ to an extensive command, including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikratēs had been the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have seized this opportunity of retaliating.² At all events the dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.³ He had got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to him by Harpalus: which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the mercenary general Charidēmus, though a vote had been passed in the Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.⁴

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τον μὲν Ἰφικράτην ἀρεστέαρχον ἐποίησαν, Τιμοθεον δ' ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ Χερσονήσου ἐπεμψάντες στρατηγόν, &c.

² See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikratēs a γρῶν, ξείας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikratēs, as to give his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204. s. 78).

To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γρῶν ξείας

may refer to the connexion of Iphikratēs with Kotys, which might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of citizenship, for it is difficult to understand how γρῶν ξείας, in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against Iphikratēs; who not only performed all the active duties of a citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the people distinguished honours.

³ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664. s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ τῶν λότων πραγμάτων, ἐναντία τοῖς ὁματίοις ἀπράτητοις ναυμαχεῖν.

⁴ Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669 s. 174-177. Respecting these hostages, I can do nothing more

As soon as the appointment of Iphikratês was cancelled, Charidêmus forthwith surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all. Though Charidêmus had been three years with his band in the service of Athens under Iphikratês, yet when the new general Timotheus wished to re-engage him, he declined the proposition; conveying away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikratês himself.¹ He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardias to take service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was again prevailed on to serve Athens.

It was against these two cities, and the general coast of Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia, which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikratês. Ptolemy of Alôrûs, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.) by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.² Perdikkas, during the first year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the coast of Macedonia.³ Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting Athens to subdue or

than repeat the brief and obscure notice of Demosthenês. Of the various conjectures proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory. Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669 s. 175.

The orator refers to letters written by Iphikratês and Timotheus to the Athenian people in support of these allegations. Unfortunately these letters are not cited in sub-

stance

² Diodorus, xv. 77. Æschiaüs da Fals Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

³ Demosthenês (Olynth. 1. p. 21. s. 14) mentions the assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus. Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 164. s. 9). This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn iii. 10, 14.

enfeble it, just as his father Amyntas had invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places. As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus, the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered it.¹ Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a temporary coinage of base metal.² Yet though Timotheus was thus victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had most at heart—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental capture of Charidêmus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully appreciated at Athens.³ Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus, who was repulsed—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the Amphipolitans, aided by the neighbouring Thracians, in large numbers (and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance, that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off in the face of the enemy.⁴

¹ Diodor. xv. 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokratês, Or. xv (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14. cont. Philokl. s. 19.

I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth contained in the large assertion of Isokratês—Χαλκιδεῖς ἀπαντὰς κατεκόλμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit”—is

vague.

² Isokratês, l. c.; Aristotel. Oeconomie ii. 22, Polyeu. iii. 10, 14.

³ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 609. s. 177.

⁴ Polyænus (iii. 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii. 9) the description of the attack made by the Athenian Euseion upon Amphipolis in 414 B.C.

These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive, in that catalogue of nine defeats, which the Scholiast on Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 766, Reiske)

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean—a Theban fleet.

n.c. 363.

Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the Chersonese.

specifies as having been undergone by Athens at the territory called *Nine Ways* (Ἐννέα Ὀδοί), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built. They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—

6. οἱ ἐν ἑσυνῆς ἐπ' Ἠδὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελέθησαν. The only way in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is, by supposing that they allude to the diving in of all the out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami. We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should then have to construe οἱ ἐν ἑσυνῆς ἐπ' Ἠδὸν Ἀθηναῖοι—"the Athenians residing at Eion," which, though not an usual sense of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only definite meaning which can be made out here.

7. οἱ μὲν Σιμμίχου στρατηγούοντος διεφθάρησαν.

7. δὲ πρῶτος ἀρχὸς ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολίτων αὐτοῦ παραδόντων τοῖς ὁμόροις Ἑρπεί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from a MS.). These two last mentioned occurrences are altogether unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when Iphikratēs was commending the forces of

Athens in these regions, from 365-363 B.C.

8. ἐκτεμνέεις ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀχιλμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτῷ, παραδόντων αὐτοῦς Ἑρπείν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνησιν ἀρχούοντος.

The word Τιμοθεου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place of Τιμοθέους, which appeared in Reiske's edition.

9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμῶσι.

Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the archonship of Timokratēs, which exactly coincides with the command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti of Athens. Winiewski (Comment in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39), Bohnecke, and other commentators follow Oursini in representing Kalamion to be a corruption of Καλλιμάχης, who was archon from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr Clinton even inserts the fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after Midsummer 360 B.C. can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokretēs. Without being able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and without determining whether the real mistake may not consist in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ—I cannot but think that Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and another by

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonourably repulsed, and had only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas, then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardour to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading Thessaly.¹

B.C. 364-363.

Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent with an army against Alexander of Pheræ.

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans. Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension, by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring the chastisement of the Great King;² a mandate, which she had so completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon his countrymen, that,

Epaminondas exhorts the Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens.

himself, near Amphipolis—both of them occurring in 364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C., the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, &c.

My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with that of Dr. Thirlwall (*Hist. Gr. vol. v. ch. 42, p. 244-257*).

¹ Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv. 80.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 86.

Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them—in language such as had been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, and by Hermokratês at Syracuse¹—that men such as the Thebans, brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once been mere landmen, until the exigences of the Persian war forced them to take to the sea.² “We must put down this haughty rival (he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel, the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of the acropolis at Athens.”³

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardour on the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it should be ready, to Hellespont and the islands near Ionia; while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with Athens.⁴ Some opposition however was made in the Theban assembly to the new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker, who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos and Plutarch in odious colours. Demagogues like him, whose power resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war: I have endeavoured in a former volume to show,⁵ that it is not a fair estimate

¹ Thueyd. ii. 87; vii. 21.

² Diodor. xv. 78.

³ Æschinês, Fals. Leg. i. 276. c. 32. s. 111. Ἐπταμινώνδης, οὗχ ὑποπτήζοντος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξιώμα, εἴπε διαρρήδη, ἐν τῷ πληθει τῶν θύβαιων,

ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια μετανεγκεῖν εἰς τῇ, προσταίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

⁴ Diodor. xv. 78, 79.

⁵ See Ch. LIV.

even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues generally, unwarlike men both in taste and aptitudes. Menekleidas at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. "By the help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was ten years in taking a single city: while I, with the single force of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of the Agamemnonian Sparta."¹ While repelling the charge of personal motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be tantamount to an abnegation of the leadership of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished to maintain that ascendent station, she must keep her citizens in constant warlike training and action.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiadês administered at Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against Syracuse.² If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendancy on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove too hard for her;

Menekleidas seemingly right in dissuading naval preparations.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopides, c. 26, Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

Neither of these two authors appears to me to conceive rightly either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is a real foundation for the attack, and a

real point in the reply; as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither the one nor the other.

That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen from Herodotus, vii. 169.

² Thucyd. vi. 17, 18.

to maintain ascendancy by land and sea at once would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both, she would probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting, that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of Athens—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.¹

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 n.c. In the same year, apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban land-force, against Alexander of Phæræ. What the fleet achieved, we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian guard-squadron under Lachês, prevailing upon several of the allies of Athens to declare in his favour.² Both he and Timotheus appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both declined to furnish aid.³ Timotheus is said to have liberated the besieged town of Kyzikus; by whom it was besieged, we do not certainly know, but probably by

n.c. 363.

Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosporus.

¹ Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea, when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a situation for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch, Respublic.

Gerend. Præcept. p. 512 E.).

Bauch (in his tract, *Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie*, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas was constrained against his own better judgement to undertake this maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii. 11, 6) proves as little as the above extract from Plutarch.

² *Isokiatês*, Or. v. (Philip.) s. 58; Diodor. xv. 79. *ἔβλας τὰς πόλεις τοῖς ἑθνεῖσις ἐτίθησεν*. I do not feel assured that these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which had before been mentioned.

³ Justin. xvi. 4.

the Theban fleet.¹ Epaminondas brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained any splendid victory, or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes; yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in 364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still farther;² but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition of Thebes was likewise the last.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnètes, and having Athens as his ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes, that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him.

B.C. 363.

Pelopidas
attacks
Alexander
of Phæræ
—his suc-
cess in
battle—his
rashness
—he is
slain.

Nor was he daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog's Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit.

¹ Diodor. xv. 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1. ² Diodor. xv. 73.

Ordering his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank, he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh ardour, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill. Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten; while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were within his reach, this detested enemy—whose treacherous arrest and dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every one's mouth—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness, like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his brother Artaxerxès. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth and fight. The latter, declining the challenge retired among his guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who followed him, and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.¹

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds still untended, flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and

¹ For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv. 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 5.

obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians. Pelopidas had been re-elected without interruption to the annual office of Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed¹ (378-364 B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and all their glories: he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendancy of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered enemies.²

All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,³ conducted a powerful force of 7000 hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army, they pressed Alexander

The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Phœne.

¹ Diodor. xv. 51. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states substantially the same.

² Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.

³ Diodorus (xv. 78) places in one and the same year both—1. The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly with its immediate consequences.—He mentions first the former of the two, but he places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which Timokratēs was archon at Athens, that is, from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following up his ideas of maritime activity.

The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The maritime expedition, immediately

preceding that battle, would therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval equipments.

I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred while Epaminondas was absent on ship-board. A probable reason is thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at home, this would hardly have been.

The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention to have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th of June, 364 B.C., at five o'clock in the

hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnètes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus acquired greater ascendancy in Northern Greece than they had ever enjoyed before.¹ The power of Alexander was effectually put down on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea, as will be seen in the ensuing year.

morning. On the other hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian year, at a quarter before eleven o'clock in the day (see *L'Art de vérifier les Dates*, tom. i. p. 257). We may remark, that the day named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the month preceding the commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August, fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to admit.

Both Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall accept the eclipse mentioned by Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopides commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes no notice of it in his *Tables*; which seems to show that he was not satisfied

as to the exactness of Dodwell's statement on the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes—I should then fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.) as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by Diodorus.

But it appears to me that further astronomical information is here required.

¹ Flutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.

CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE
OF MANTINEIA.

It was during this period—while Epaminondas was absent with the fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign from whence he never returned—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus. That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been disaffected towards Thebes. The absence of the two great leaders, as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and richest among the citizens, 300 in number) as a favourable moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardour. But before the day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed. Moreover, the resolution was taken to destroy the town, to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into slavery.¹ This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout the neighbours, as well as repugnance

B.C. 364-363.

Conspiracy
of the
knights of
Orchome-
nus against
Thebes—
destruction
of Orcho-
menus by
the The-
bans.

¹ Diodor. iv 79

against Theban cruelty;¹ a sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to have been concurrent—that the Thebans appropriated the territory among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighbouring town of Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.² Thebes thus absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of her own city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.

We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause. Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.³ All their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who was deeply chagrined on his return.⁴ He well knew the bitter censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the

¹ See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem, p. 489 s. 121—an oration delivered in 355 B.C.; eight years after the destruction of Orchomenus.

² Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. s. 21; Philippic. II. p. 69. s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375. s. 122, p. 387. s. 162; p. 445. s. 373.

³ Diodor. xv. 57.

⁴ Pausan. ix. 15, 2.

Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts.—1. The maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban victories over Alexander of Phœæ. 3. The conspiracy of the Orchomenian Knights and

The year in which he places them is, the archonship of Timokratēs—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.

That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on his return—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is (in my judgement) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366 B.C.

This date is not so ----- the date assigned by Diodorus; nor do the chronological conceptions

inhabitants of these two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold into slavery.

On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C., Epaminondas was re-elected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of Pelopidas—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom he could trust—might deter him from a second absence; while the affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated as to render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.

Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, &c., Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited among themselves, had oven gone so far as to contract an alliance with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into alliance again with Sparta,¹ relinquishing their alliance with Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous cooperation with Sparta² ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans, who reversing the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas, violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with Elis also, in or before 365 B.C.³ And thus Sparta, though robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, &c., had now acquired in exchange Elis and Achaia—confederates not less valuable.

Triphylia, the territory touching the western sea of Peloponnesus, immediately north of the river Neda—and the Pisatid (including the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia), immediately north of Triphylia—both of them between Messenia and Elis—had been in former times conquered and long held by the

B.C. 362.

Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed complications in Peloponnesus.

State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and Achæans in alliance with Sparta.

The Eleians aim at recovering Triphylia—the Spartans at recovering Messênê.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 19.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 43.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 17.

Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.¹ No sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;² while the subjects on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian confederacy.³ The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas (367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognising the imperial rights of the Eleians.⁴ But as the Arcadians had repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians, but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes, sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to return.⁵

Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with Arcadia—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius (on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia), which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;⁶ but the Eleians, claiming it as their own, and suddenly marching in along with a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some of the neighbouring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging the affront. A body of their Pan-

B.C. 366-365.

War between the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia.

¹ Xen. Hellen. iii. 3, 80, 81.

² Xen. Hellen. vi. 5, 21.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 26.

⁴ Xen. Hellen. vii. 1, 38.

⁵ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 12.

⁶ It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399 B.C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 31).

Arcadian militia called the Epariti, collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion, defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle, on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified (though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation; while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the ruling oligarchy—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the malcontents, to the number of 400, to evacuate the city. Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus (in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the Arcadian border¹), where they were reinforced not only by a body of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on a harassing war against the Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender, and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste the territory around.²

Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country, even approaching Kyllênê, the harbour of Elis on the western sea. Between the harbour and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,

B. C. 365.

Second invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.

¹ Pausanias, vi. 22, 3. ² Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 18-18; Diodor. xv. 77.

Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia. but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress of the Eleians became greater than ever.

In hopes of drawing off the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia. Accordingly the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of King Agesilaus), invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis, and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê), which he fortified and garrisoned with about 200 Spartans and Perioeci. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home, they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in killed, and 200 of their number ultimately made prisoners. Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death; all the remainder sold for slaves.¹

Archidamus establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain advantages over him—armistice. Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis, was joined by allies—Thebans², Argeians, and Messenians—and marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian garrison by a double palisade carried all round, which they kept a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian armies,³ had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great force, and

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 26.

² Xen. Hellen vii. 4, 27.

The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or

Messênê. No fresh Theban troops had come into Peloponnesus.

³ Thucyd. v. 68; Xen. Rep. Laced. xli. 3; xlii. 6.

was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon slain.¹ The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan, stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice, "What need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and separate?" Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their advantage, and there erected their trophy.²

Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion of it guarded by the Argeians.³ They broke down an opening, and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force, drove off the assailants and re-enclosed the besieged, who were soon compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than 100 prisoners, Spartans and Pericæi together, were distributed among the captors—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians and Messenians—one share to each.⁴ Sixty years before, the capture of 220 Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria, by Kleon and Demosthenês, had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout

The Arcadians blockade Kromnus, and capture the Spartan garrison.

¹ The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi. 6.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ σπείσασθαι.

νοὺς διαλυθῆναι;—ἄσμενοι δὲ ἀμφοτέροι ἀκούσαντες, ἐσπείσαντο.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius—τοῦ κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους—seems here just and necessary.

⁴ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 27.

all Greece; emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.¹ Now, not a trace of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So sadly had Spartan glory declined!

Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came about mid-summer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis, had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.² Their request had been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude to do worthy honour to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian protection.³ The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: since doubtless the Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their rights and sent round their notices as usual.

It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be dishonoured by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a considerable body of allies; 2000 hoplites from Argos, and 400 horsemen from Athens. So imposing

B.C. 364.

The Arcadians celebrate the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the Eleians.

B.C. 364.

The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 40.

² Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 31.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 2, 29. Compare

Pausanias, vi. 22, 2.

a force being considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling match came first in order. The running match had already been completed, and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the space between the stadium and the great altar!—when suddenly the Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank of the little river Kladeus—which flowed at a little distance to the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus, falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the farther approach of the Eleians.² The latter,

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 29. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἱκανοῦμένων ᾗδῃ στενοῦχεςσαν, καὶ τὰ δρομικά τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ' εἰς πάλην ἀφικόμενοι οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. Οἱ γὰρ Ἡλείοι παῖσαν ᾗδῃ, &c.

Diodorus erroneously represents (xv. 78) the occurrence as if the Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.

² Xen. Hellen. l. c. Οἱ γὰρ Ἡεῖοι παῖσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅλοις εἰς τὸ τέμενος. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρχάδες πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἀπῆντησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Κλοῦδου ποταμοῦ παρετάξαντο, ὅς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταβρέων εἰς τὸν Ἀλφειὸν ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν οἱ Ἡεῖοι τὰ πῖθότερα τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρετάξαντο, σφαιρισάμενοι δὲ εὐθύς ἐχώρουν.

The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning the entire breadth of consecrated

ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed through the τέμενος, but *alongside* of the Altis. The tomb of Eneus, which was doubtless included in the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi. 21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.

Colonel Leake (in his *Peloponnesiaca*, pp. 6, 107) has given a copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia, as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it. Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake—not those proposed by Kiepert in the plan comprised in his maps—or by Ernst Curtius, in the Plan an-

with a boldness for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by Stratolas with his chosen band of 300, and vigorously charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as it was by numerous buildings—the Senate-house, the temple of Zeus, and various porticos—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs. Stratolas was here slain, while his troops, driven out of the sacred ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before, but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up to accommodate the crowd of visitors.¹ Such precautions rendered the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed. They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue, when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who had been proclaimed victors, which appear in the lists like the rest.²

Such was the unholy combat which dishonoured the sanctuary of Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the competing leaders of

Feelings of
the spec-
tators at
Olympia.

nexed to his recent Dissertation called *Olympia* (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.

I cannot agree with Colonel Leake

however in supposing that Pisa was at any time a city, and afterwards deserted.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 32. ὅσα οὐδ' ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς ἐχρόνοντες τὰ διαπρονήματα σκηνοματῶν, &c.

² Diodor. xv. 78; Pausanias, vi. 8, 2.

Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed to confirm them, under colour of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage to the sacred ground—"imminentium templorum religio."¹ Most of them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents, having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity. And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a special inspiration of the gods.²

If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with both, in abundant measure, from this war; the one from the farms, the stock, and the field-labourers, of the Eleian neighbourhood generally, more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;³ the other from the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings, distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate these sacred treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they

The Arcadians take the treasures of Olympia to pay their militia.

¹ Tacitus, Hist. i. 40. He is describing the murder of Galba in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—

"Igitur milites Romani, quasi Volgeson aut Peocorum avito Ar-sacidarum solio depuleuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et senem, trucidare pergerent—dis-jecta plebe, proculcato Senatu,

truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: neo illos Capitolii aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est quisquis succeseit."

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 32.

³ Xen. Hellen. iii. 2, 2s; Polybius, iv. 73.

doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus. Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better paid than ever they had been before, so that the service attracted numerous volunteers of the poorer class.¹

At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.² How far the project had ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed their ancient rivalry.³ The Mantineians, jealous both of Tegea and Megalopolis, began to labour underhand against Arcadian unity and the Theban alliance—with a view to renewed connexion with Sparta; though only five years before they had owed to Thebes the re-establishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds, offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantineian assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 33, 34.

² Thucyd. i. 121.

Periklēs in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood purpose

of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i. 143).

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv. 82; Pausanias, viii. 8, 6.

of the Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it, but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial before the Pan-Arcadian assembly—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis—on the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.¹ The Mantineian leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand—a detachment of the Epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineians, that many other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also, publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the Olympian treasures.

B.C. 368-362.

Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis.

Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained, in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineians speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of paying the Epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other, enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into their own.² The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly, that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent intimation to the Thebans of the

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ Ἀργεῖον, ἀναγγελοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μύριους τοὺς

πρωτάταξ αὐτῶν, &c.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 34.

impending change of policy, inviting them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed of this proceeding,¹ the opposite leaders brought it before the Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned—and cancelling the preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.²

The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans. Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities, came to be sworn also at Tegea—not only the city authorities, but also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of 300 Bœotians, were present and took part in the ceremony. After it had been finished, most of the Mantineians went home; their city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the peace by libations, pœans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were in such considerable number, as

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 34. Οἱ δὲ τὰ πράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ βουλευόμενοι ἐπεισαν τὸ κοινόν, τῶν Ἀρχαίων, πάντας πρέσβεις σίνειν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, &c.

The phrase here used by Xenon

phon, to describe the oligarchical party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii. 5, 1. οἱ ἀγρόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, &c.

² Xen. Hellen. l. c.

to fill both the prison and the government-house; though there were few Mantineians among them, since most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent arrest was brought thither. The authorities—while they sent round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting them at once to arms—despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all the Mantineian prisoners there detained. They at the same time protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community; and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be preferred.¹

Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith released all his prisoners. He then called together an assembly—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of mistrust²—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet envoys were immediately sent to Thebes, probably from the Mantineians and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting that he should be punished with death.

The Theban harmost releases his prisoners, and makes an apology.

On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to get possession of the Mantineians, and that, when he found but few of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would have done it while the Mantineians were still in

Conduct of the Theban harmost.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 4, 37, 38.

τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπότεοι γε δὴ συνεθέσιν

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 39. συγκαλέσας

ἡθέλησαν, ἀπελογίτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθεῖν.

the town, instead of waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian Epariti believed in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger. To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by opponents.¹

The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal—reached Thebes at the same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the complainants by counter-complaints of his own—"The arrest (he said) was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested. You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into Peloponnesus—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make war to support our partisans in the country."²

Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating Peloponnesus—yet

¹ The representation of *Diodorus* (xv. 82), though very loose and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposi- g parties at Tegea

came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the peace.

² *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 4, 10.

with the proviso, as to headship, that each state should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken by the Mantineians and their partisans, now forming the majority in the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon) "were really solicitous for Peloponnesus."¹ "Why do these Thebans (said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come? For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need of *them*? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?"² Though this is the language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing his Philo-Laconian bias—yet when we follow the facts as he himself narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves. They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord, taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years. They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed that there had been a real plot to betray

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 1. Οἱ χυδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 2, 3.

Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta—Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.

This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavourable judgement of Xenophon with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial witness.

I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas, whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In 364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363 B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia. Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on, the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantineian and oligarchical party, profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea:

Policy of
Epaminon-
das and the
Thebans.

being communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into Peloponnesus.

The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing. It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a large number of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Phæræ, who had now become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænians, and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes was for alliance purely defensive.¹ Having passed the line of Mount Oneium—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his former entrance—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined by the Sikyonian contingent,² and where he halted, in hopes of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect them;³ but the information turned out false. The Athenians never appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt, he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegæa, Pallantium, Asea, and Megalopolis, the Messenians—all these forming the line of frontier against Laconia—and the Argeians.

The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose, was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting of the Mantineians with the major part of the other Arcadians—the Eleians—and the

n.c. 362.

Epaminondas marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus to muster at Tegea.

Muster of the Arcadians and other enemies of Thebes, at Mantinea. Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 5; Diodor. xv. 83.

² Diodor. xv. 85

³ The explanation which Xeno-

Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans; and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description of force—some of them indeed having none at all.

Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the enemy.¹ He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to be forced.²

On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward. Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon that town, "like a nest of unprotected young birds," at a moment when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta except the providential interposition of the gods,³ signified

phon gives of this halt at Nemea—as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar hatred of Athens (Hellen. vii. 5, 8)—seems alike fanciful and ill-tempered.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 8.

² Plutarch, De Gloria Athen. p. 346 B.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 10 Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡρῆς, θεία τινὶ μοῖρᾳ προσελθόν, ἐπὶ γαίῃ τῇ Ἀγγελιάφῃ προσίον τὸ στρατεύμα, ἐξ ἧς, ἂν τῇ, πολὺν ὥσπερ

νεοττιάν, παντάσῃν ἐργῶν τῶν ἀμυνόμενα.

Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv. 82, 83), though with many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by Xenophon, even against his own partialities.

Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been conveyed to Agesilaus by a Theopian

by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea. Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however, his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea. Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately to the relief of Sparta.¹

The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability, well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied—still less to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not choose to hazard a general action. He had found it impracticable to take this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former invasion of 370-369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in active co-operation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army in the field.

B.C. 362.

Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds it defended.

named Euthynus (Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34).

¹ Xenophon (Hellen. vii. 5, 10, 11) describes these facts in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix. 8), and from Diodorus (xv. 83). Xenophon's authority appears to me better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already gone forward)—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms, that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea—that he marched from thence with the whole army to

Sparta, but that Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.

Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named Kleomenês.

Polyænus (ii. 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which are too uncertain to copy.

Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta¹ (which had no walls to keep him out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution, not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses. He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in number, they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of defence, with a small company of 100 hoplites, scrambled over some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with some loss; pursuing them for a space until he was himself repulsed and forced to retreat.² The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too, son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honour to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded, with his body oiled as in the palaestra. Wielding in his right-hand a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back unwounded; so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance and desperate hardihood. The Ephors decorated him afterwards with a wreath of honour, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself without defensive armour.³

Though the Spartans displayed here an honourable gallantry, yet these successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable; nor did he do more than try

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 11. 'Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπταμινωνίδαν τῇ πόλει τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, &c.

² Xen Hellen. vii. 5, 12, 13.

Justin (vi. 7) greatly exaggerates

the magnitude and violence of the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.

³ Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.

the city round, to see if he could detect any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas, but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and before they could be apprised of this change of purpose. Breaking up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population, free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendancy of Epaminondas—coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder—could have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at Tegea.¹

Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantinians doubtless ascribed to the providence of the gods—as Xenophon regards the previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis (probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied Nemea), they took their

The surprise is baffled, by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle of Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the advantage.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 14. Πάλιν τὴν Τεγῆαν, τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς εἰδύμενο τάχιστα εἰς τοὺς δὲ ἰππεὺς ἐπαμύνει εἰς τὴν Μαντινίαν.

evening meal and rested at the Isthmus of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or annoyance.¹ They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea, arriving thither without having yet broken fast, either themselves or their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea, and when they had yet taken no refreshment—that the Theban and Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the gates.²

The Mantineians were terror-struck at this event. Their military citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though hungry and tired, immediately went forth—and indeed were obliged to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and property. Xenophon extols³ (and doubtless with good reason) the generous

τιμειαν, δεηθείς αὐτῶν προσκατεργῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκός ἐξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα, πάσης δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλως τε καὶ οἴτου συγχρομίδης οὐσης.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 15, 16.

The words—δυστοχήματος γεγεννημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν—allude to something which we have no means of making out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii. 4, 6-10), may have seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen while resting on their territory.

² Polybius, ix. 8.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 15, 16, 17.

Plutarch (De Gloria Athen. p. 346 D.-E.) recounts the general fact of this battle and the rescue of Man-

teinea; yet with several inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.

Diodorus (xv. 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being 6000 soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilans is named by Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. i. 54—compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. iii. 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The infantry must have come up somewhat later.

Polybius also (ix. 8), though concurring in the main with Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of Xenophon.

energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued. But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet more severe hunger and fatigue—that Epaminondas would never have sent them forward in such condition, had he expected serious resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander Kephisodôrnus,¹ together with Gryllus (son of the historian Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineians also paid distinguished honours.

Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united camp in the neighbourhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians, Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number in all, of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, if we could trust the assertion of Diodorus;² who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas as 30,000 foot and 3000 horse. Little value can be assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle, nor did he at all despair

¹ Harpokration v. Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii 63, Pausan. i. 3, 4; vii. 9, 8; viii. 11, 6.

There is confusion, on several points, between this cavalry battle near Mantinea—and the great or general battle, which speedily followed it, wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem as if the picture of Euphranor represented

Gryllus in the act of killing the Theban commander; and as if the later tradition of Athens as well as of Tholus, erroneously bestowed upon that Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.

See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schafer, p. 68, 69, in the *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erster Heft).

² Diodor. *l. v.* 84.

of the result.¹ He had brought out his northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching. Moreover his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;² the new crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack the enemy forthwith.

But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without fighting—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his own side, and so many assembled against him—and by the necessity of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.³ This is an estimate of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle. With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence, without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea, Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known beforehand) to attempt a *coup de main*, first against Sparta, next against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to actual attainment, would have been a prodigious

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 8. καὶ μὴ, οἷόμενος κρείττων τῶν ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, &c.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 18. ἀπάντα δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεία ἔχοντας ὕμῳ πείθεσθαι ἐθέλειν, &c.

³ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελομφομένος παντάπασιν τῇ ἐκποῦ ῥᾶν ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν, εἰ, Λακε-

δαίμονι αὐτὸν πολλῶν ὀπλιτικῶν ὑπ' ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱκπομαχία, αἴτιος δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στρατίαν, τοῦ οὐνεατά, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, ὥστε οὐκ ἐδόκει δύνασθαι εἶναι ἀμαχεῖ παραλθεῖν, &c.

point gained;¹ but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as the only probable way of deciding the contest.

The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention. He had kept them within the walls of Tegyæ, thus not only giving them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the border of the Mantinea territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their helmets—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban ensign.² The best spirit and confidence animated

Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas, when the order for fighting is given.

¹ Polybius, ix. 8, 2.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἑλευκούντες εἰς ἡμέρας τὰ κράνη, κατεύοντες ἐκείνου ἐπεγράφετε δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπλίται, ρόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς θηβαῖοι ὄντες πάντες δὲ ἡκονῶντες καὶ λόγχας καὶ μάχαιρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρόνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.

There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλίται; and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as Thebans.

Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40. p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this

passage to mean that "the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans." I cannot think that this interpretation is the best—at least until some evidence is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club. Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly of the Theban hoplites—see vii. 5, 12. The mention, of λόγχας καὶ μάχαιρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ρόπαλα ἔχοντες, immediately before, means "men armed with clubs;" the natural sense of the words.

The horsemen are said to have

all the allies, as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the order of march commanded by Epaminondas.

The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, 2000 feet above the level of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the greatest of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains themselves.”¹ Its length stretches from north to south, bordered by the mountain ranges of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south of Mantinea;² thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at this position, covering the whole Mantinian territory, that the army opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.³

Epaminondas having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate, arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy; himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being completed, he at first began his

March of
Epaminon-
das from
Tegea.

“whitened their helmets (or head-pieces).” Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 25.

¹ See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. ii. ch. 24. p. 45.

² Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-54) “a low ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting part of the Mænialium, formed a natural

division between the districts of Tegea and Mantinea.”

Compare the same work, vol. i. ch. 3. p. 100, 112, 114, and the recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha, 1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried across the plain at this boundary (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 141-143).

³ See the indications of the locality of the battle in Pausanias,

forward march in a direction straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course, turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains, which forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;¹ until at length he neared the enemy's position, upon their right flank. He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best soldier in it) at the head; though we do not know how many of these lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line. In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.²

The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight up to the front of their position, and thus expected a speedy battle. But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day. Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though, by advancing along the skirts of the mountain,

False impression produced upon the enemy by his manoeuvres. They are led to suppose that there would be no immediate battle.

viii. 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 21.

Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and a half from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about four miles, and Gell's Itinerary of the Morea much the same.

Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell as two

hours and five minutes—or seven miles.

Colonel Leake, *Travels in Morea*, vol. i. p. 83-100; Gell's *Itinerary*, p. 141; Dodwell's *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 418-422.

It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march, must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium. Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 22.

he gradually arrived very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many of the horsemen even took off their breast-plates and unbridled their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence—that mental preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to inflame by a special harangue at the moment—was allowed to slacken and run down.¹ So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.

Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was no supreme chief to whom the body of Lacedæmonian allies paid deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present—a point not distinctly ascertainable—he would have no command except over the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineians occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the battle was in their territory,² and because the Lacedæmonians had lost

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5. 22. Καὶ γὰρ ὅη, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὅρῳ ἐγένετο, ἀπὲρ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ ὄπλα· ὥστε εἰκόσθη ἀτρακτοειδομεῖν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας,

ἔλυσεν μὲν τῶν πλείωνων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην ἀρρακτοῦ, ἔλυσεν δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συνάξεσιν.

² Thucyd. v. 67; Pausanias, viii. 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.

their once-recognised privilege), together with the other Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians, Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.¹ There was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left—Eleian on the right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.²

In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and Bœotians was on the left; the Argæians on the right; the Arcadians, Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.³ It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops, until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided. Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites—occupying the left of his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the left extremity of each—to wheel to the right and form in column fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in file behind them.⁴ What the

Theban
order of
battle—
plans of
the com-
mander.

¹ Diodor. xv. 85.

That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon (Hell. vii. 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of the arrangement of the allies on either side.

² Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 23.

³ Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we obtain only from Diodorus (xv. 85).

The *Tactica* of Arrian, also (xi. 2) inform us that Epaminondas formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at Man-

tinea, of all the Bœotians.

About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch, *Quæst. Roman.* p. 282 D.

⁴ Xen. Hellen. vii. 5, 22. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησάτο τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὲ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἤγειτο· οἱ δὲ ἠκολούθουν. . . . Ὅ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίκρουον ὥς περ τριήρη προσήγε, νομίζων, ὅτι ἐμβαλὼν διακοψαίε, διασφραεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων στράτευμα, &c.

actual depth was, or what was the exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra Epaminondas had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through the enemy's phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against the midship of her antagonist.

It was apparently only the Boeotian hoplites who were thus formed in column, projected forward in advance; while the remaining allies were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.¹ Epaminondas calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy's phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could easily deal with them.

Against the cavalry on the enemy's right, which was
 Disposition of the cavalry on both sides. marshalled only with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or perhaps eight deep²), and without any light infantry intermingled with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack. He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and

¹ I agree with Folard (*Traité de la Colonne*, p. lv.-lxi. prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering ἰσόλοχος to be a column—rather than a wedge tapering towards the front. And I dissent from Schneider's explanation, who says—"Epaminondas phalaogem contrahit sensim et colligit in frontem, ut cunei eorum rostrina navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ igitur ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον." It appears to me that the troops which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the advancing column, con-

isted only of the left or Theban division, the best troops in the army—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεκκευχέτο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόρρω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover, the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made the attack from his own left against the enemy's right, or right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in flank from their own left.

² Compare a similar case in Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 4, 13, where the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to be drawn up ὡς περ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, &c.

slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Malian Gulf.¹

There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and Boeotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy's left. To guard against any such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.

All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry for attack on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from their neighbouring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.² Nor was it until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the word of command to "take up arms," that they had any suspicion of the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.³ And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to allow such mischief to be partially corrected—yet soldiers thus taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.

The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters and light troops from Thessaly,

Unprepared
state of the
Lacedæ-
monian
army.

¹ These *πύργοι ἀμύκτοι*—light-armed footmen intermingled with the ranks of the cavalry—are numbered as an important item in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon (Herodot. vii. 158).

² Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front. Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (i. 3, 14).

³ Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 5, 22.

broke and routed the enemy's cavalry opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit, turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas on his part with his Theban column came into close conflict with the Mantineian and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force and weight. He broke through the enemy's line of infantry at this point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight. The remaining troops of the enemy's line, seeing the best portion of their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The centre and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly, as it would appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,¹ until the Eleian cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban left and Lacedæmonian right and centre—and from whose narrative we should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry beaten on their own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left; reversing the statement of Diodorus.

In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and the ultimate result.² The calculations of Epaminondas were completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and cavalry, made by himself

Victory of the Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded.


¹ Diodor. xv. 85.

The orator Æschinês fought among the Athenian hoplites on this occasion (Æschinês, Fals. Leg.

p. 300. c. 53).

² The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves notice. He states that the description given

BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.



GRÖTE'S GREECE, Vol. X.

BLACK LINE—March of Epaminondas from Tegea

BLACK—Army of Epaminondas as formed for attack

SHADY LINE—Opposing Army Mantinians, Lacedaemonians, Athenians, Eleians, &c.

with his left wing, not only defeated the troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy's whole army to take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in the breast. He was, by habit and temper, always foremost in braving danger, and on this day probably exposed himself pre-eminently, as a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms (spear, shield, &c.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin, and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and

of the battle by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus had displayed the like incompetency also in describing the battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect; because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship, which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any one who measured the ground and studied the events reported in his

narrative (Polybius, xii. 25).

Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea, I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus for greater judgment and accuracy, in the description of naval battles.

Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus, which he so much disparaged.

employed them in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his breast with a spear.¹ I cannot altogether omit to notice these details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the perusal of the *Iliad* than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for Kleombrotus at Leuktra.

The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words of the contemporary historian. "It was thus (says Xenophon) that Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx of the enemy's infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy's cavalry was also in full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over towards the enemy's left.

¹ Diodor. xv. 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details. He does not seem to have read Xenophon.

I commend the reader again to

an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on Thucydides, iv. 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylus.

with the security of conquerors; but there (being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to pieces by the Athenians."¹

Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general. That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more—that the army which he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of completing an unfinished campaign—we can readily conceive. But that on the actual battle field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier's blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have become at once paralysed and disarmed on hearing of his fall—this is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders

Proof of the influence which he exercised over the minds of the soldiers.

¹ Xen. Hellen. vii. 6, 26. Τὴν μὲν δὴ οὐμβολὴν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐφεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· κρατήσας γὰρ, ἢ προσαέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ μὴν ἐκείνος ἔπεισεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἐτι ἐδυνάσθησαν χρῆσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἐνθα ἡ οὐμβολὴ ἐγένετο· φυ-

γόντων δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὐθ' ὀπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττωμένοι παροβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπασαν. Καὶ μὴν οἱ ἄμικτοι καὶ οἱ πελτασταί, συν- νεικηχότας ὡς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίχοντο μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐωνόμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.

were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned triumph—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must have been embittered if he lived to hear it—was Epaminondas himself. But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the ascendancy established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies in Thesaly over the dead body of Pelopidas¹ on the hill of Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of arms in the tempting hour of victory.

That the real victory, the honours of the day, belonged to Epaminondas and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon. But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps rallied even before reaching the town—as the Athenian cavalry had cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops—they too pretended to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides. Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.² This was the understood confession of defeat.

The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe; and his shield-bearer, answering in the

Victory
claimed by
both sides
—never-
theless the
Lacedæmo-
nians are
obliged to
solicit the
burial truce.

Dying mo-
ments of
Epaminon-
das.

¹ Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.

² The statement of Diodorus (xv. 87) on this point appears to be

more probable than that of Xenophon (vii. 5, 26).

The Athenians boasted much of

affirmative, produced it before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and was informed that his own army was victorious.¹ He then desired to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them had been slain.² "Then (said he) you must make peace with the enemy." He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of blood speedily terminated his life.

Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust, shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year. Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity, after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.

The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior was assigned the honour of having struck the blow. The Mantineians gave it to their citizen Machærius; the Athenians, to Gryllus son of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman

The two other best Theban officers are slain also in the battle.

Who slew Epaminondas? Different persons honoured for it.

the slight success with their cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, De Gloria Athen. p. 35 A.).

¹ Diodor. xv. 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii. 80, 86; Epistol. ad Familiares, v. 12, 5.

² Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 184 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii. 3.

Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back to the camp. But it seems that

there could hardly have been any camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him. Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineians showed to the traveller Pausanias a spot called Skopé near the field of battle, to which (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas had been carried off, in great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from whence he had looked

Antikratês.¹ At Sparta, distinguished honour was shown, even in the days of Plutarch, to the posterity of Antikratês, who was believed to have rescued the city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of Epaminondas.

How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing, in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened and peace was concluded—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus. The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than the recognition of the *status quo*; to leave everything exactly as it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it—and admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her allies sympathised with her feelings. Some indeed were decidedly against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.² Neither Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta

with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii. 11, 4).

¹ Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35, Pausanias, i. 3, 3; viii. 9, 2-5; viii. 11, 4; ix. 15, 3.

The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of Machæron which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of Plutarch.

Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not

clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the Athonian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea, when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans and Theætalians—and the general action which followed a few days afterwards, wherein Epaminondas was slain.

² See the oration of Democritus on behalf of the Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi. s. 10. p. 204; s. 21. p. 206).

strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly the peace was sworn to on these conditions. The autonomy of Messênê was guaranteed by all, except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times—rather than submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.¹

Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city, territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion—that “there was more disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle than before it”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by Sparta as no peace at all—partly as based on the circumstance, that no definite headship was recognised as possessed by any state. Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity, and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results—though it was disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia (Tegea, Megalopolis, &c.) was on the point of being crushed by the

Results of the battle of Mantinea, as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans.

¹ Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35, Diod. xv. 89, Polybius, iv. 83.

Mr. Fyass Clinton (*Festi Hellen.* B.O. 361) assigns the conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the battle and the

peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter immediately after the former. This would not count for much, indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the probability here (in my judgement) is rather in favour of immediate sequence between the two events.

Mantineians and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the affirmation of Xenophon—that Thebes did not gain by the battle either city, or territory, or dominion—we must at the same time add, that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.

This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly indeed was it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his verdict—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.¹ He was buried on the field of battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration—from all, sincere and hearty—from some, enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.² The judgement of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgement. The best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,³ set before them Epaminondas as their model to copy.

The remark has been often made, and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent history—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harpost and garrison, and the subversion of the ruling oligarchy—to the fatal day of Mantinea (379-362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendancy belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.). Throughout this whole period, both

¹ Pausanias, viii. 11, 4, 5.

princeps, meo iudicio, Græciæ," &c.

² Cicero, Tusculan. i. 2, 4; De Orator. iii. 24, 139. "Epaminondas,

³ Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 86.

all that we know, and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgement of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too—let it be observed—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon; for the chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta—mentions him only to record what is honourable—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra¹—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath to Thebes—who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê, and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every predisposition against him), there was no such violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter of Xenophon's 'Hellenica' contains a panegyric,² ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenês³) like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of his army was

¹ See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix. 16, 8):—

Ἡμετέρας βουλὰς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκεί-
ρατο δόξαν, &c.

² Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, § 9

³ Demosthenês, Philipp. I. p. 51,

kept comparatively back until the action had been thus decided—is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is slurred over in his description, as if it were so common-place as not to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus—how great is the superiority of the first—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other ways—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate deficiencies in another.¹ His splendid military capacity was never prostituted to personal ends; neither to avarice, nor ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners.² Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the

¹ The remark of Diodorus (xv. 88) upon Epaminondas is more emphatic than we usually find in him—Παρά μέν γάρ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ἀνέμοις προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, κατὰ δὲ τοῦτο πᾶσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡθροισμίσ/ατ.

² Polybius, xxxii. 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c. 4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though

we cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber, Diomedon of Kyzikus, came to Thebes.

Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia (the period to which Plutarch's dialogue assigns it), but may have happened afterwards.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch's Life of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.

perilous exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity and goodwill, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen.¹ He once incurred the displeasure of his fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies—the condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without any angry renunciation of patriotic duty.²

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the precedents and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal and creditable to both,

¹ Aristotel. Politic. iii. 2, 10.

² Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. 'Ἐπει τὸ γε μὴ λιπαρῇ μηδὲ θρασυτενὸν ὄνυχον εἶναι, καὶ Μίετλλον εἶγε καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῇ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὧν δῆμος ἐστὶ καὶ δοῦναι

καὶ ἀφελῆσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακίζόμενοι καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὀργίζοντο τοῖς πολιταῖς ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡγάπων αὐτοὺς μετ' αἰσιομένης καὶ διημιλάττοντο παρακαλοῦντων.

though most creditable to Pelopidas, the richer, as well as the inferior man of the two. To both, and to the harmonious cooperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived splendour and ascendancy. Yet when we compare the one with the other, we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon of the Pheræan Alexander; nor would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the counsellor, the debater, of his country,¹ as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus.² The possession of such eloquence, amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting, which Isokratēs and other Athenian sophists³ set before their hearers as the

¹ See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος, &c. Athenæus, xiv. p. 650 E.

² Homer, *Iliad*. iii. 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—

'Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ Τρῶεςσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιγθην,
ἦεναι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην
αἰχμῶν,

Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγῶς· ἐπὶ οὐ πολὺμυθος, &c.

.. 'Ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἔει (Odysseus),

Καὶ ἔπειτα νιφάδεσσιν εὐκίοντα χειμερίησιν,

Οὐκέτι' ἔπειτα' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειας βροτὸς ὄλλος, &c.

³ See Ch. I. & VII. of this History—ᾤρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, &c.

stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself. He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs—nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Periklēs that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Periklēs must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both—and the remark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence—that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them—trained to varied intellectual combinations, and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly—familiarized with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom—his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognise in this advice the same accurate estimate of permanent causes—the same long-sighted view, of the con-

ditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas would have done—whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating—if he had survived the victory of Mantinea—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honourable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said to have indulged.¹ Among the countrymen of Pindar,² devoted attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus and Kephisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;³ the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to him.⁴

¹ Plutarch, *Apophtheg.* Reg. p. 192 E.; *Athenæ.* xiii. p. 590 C.

² Hieronymus ap. *Athenæ.* xiii. p. 602 A.; Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, c. 18; *Xenoph. Rep. Lacedæmon*, ii. 12.

See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, *Fragm.* 2 of the

Skolia, in Dissen's edition, and Boeckh's edition of Pindar, vol. iii. p. 611, ap. *Athenæum*, xiii. p. 605 C.

³ See Theopompus, *Frag.* 182, ed. Didot, ap. *Athenæ.* xiii. p. 605 A.

⁴ Plutarch, *Pelopid.* *ut sup.*; Plutarch, *Amatorius*, p. 701 D.; compare *Xenoph. Hellen.* iv. 8, 39.

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships, all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves to the plans of Lykomêdes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The Mantineians had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians, insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty. A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into Arcadia 3000 hoplites under Pammenês. This force enabled the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable rigour, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory members in communion.¹ And it appears that the interference thus obtained

n.o. 362-361.

Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The Thebans send thither a force under Pammenês, which maintains the incorporation.

¹ Diodor. xv. 94.

I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these 3000 men were *Athenians*, not *Thebans*; that the Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from *Athens*, and that the *Athenians* sent these 3000 men under Pammenês.

That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—

1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenês in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period) respect-

ing the propriety of sending an armed force to defend Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think, that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenês urges, and those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude the reality of any such previous proceeding.

2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus, xvi. 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship

was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus, so strenuously set forth by Isokratês, had only ended by isolating Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their wives and families, and convert their military population into a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.¹ Yet he and his father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been for some time in a sort of correspondence.²

of, Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in the preceding year—not the Athenians, who had fought against them—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans from furnishing aid.

3. Lastly, Pammonês is a Theban general, friend of Epaminondas. He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another

place (xvi. 34), but also by Pausanias (viii. 27, 2), as the general who had been sent to watch over the building of Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch. Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch, Reipuh. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v. 16, 3). We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammonês, a goldsmith, mentioned in the oration of Demosthenês against Meidias (s. 31. p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so named.

Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammonês and his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.

I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v. ch. xliii. p. 368, note).

¹ See Isokratês, Orat. vi. (Archidamnia) s. 85-93.

² Isokratês, Or. vi. (Archid.) s. 73.

About the time of the battle of Mantinea—and as it would seem, for some years before—a large portion of the western dominions of the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavoured to subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals Iphikratēs and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanēs, satrap of the region near Propontis and the Hellespont, appears to have revolted about the year 367—366 B.C. In other parts of Asia Minor, too—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, &c.—the subordinate princes or governors became disaffected to Artaxerxēs. But their disaffection was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and vigour of a Karian named Datamēs, commander for the king in a part of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them, by rapidity of movement and well combined stratagem. At length the services of Datamēs became so distinguished as to excite the jealousy of many of the Persian grandes; who poisoned the royal mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with Ariobarzanēs. It was in vain that Autophradatēs, satrap of Lydia, was sent by Artaxerxēs with a powerful force to subdue Datamēs. The latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridatēs (son of Ariobarzanēs), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a traitor to his father Ariobarzanēs and to Datamēs, simulated zealous cooperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview, and there assassinated him.¹

n.c. 362.
State of
Persia—
revolted
satraps and
provinces—
Datamēs.

¹ Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datamēs at some length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He places Datamēs, in point of military talent, above all *barbari*, except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vi. 29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief. Compare too Diodorus, xv. 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii. 8, 4.

We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the chronology, of Datamēs. His exploits seem to belong to the last ten years of Artaxerxēs Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken place a little before the death of that prince, which last event is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. Hell. ch. 18, p. 316, Appendix.

Still however there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus prince of Karia, Orontês satrap of Mysia, and Autophradatês satrap of Lydia—the last having now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders, who selected Orontês as their chief; confiding to him their united forces, and sending Rheomithrês to Egypt to procure pecuniary aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination by corrupting both Orontês and Rheomithrês, who betrayed their confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars we know little or nothing.¹

Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with 1000 Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian hoplites—and the Athenian general Chabrias—were invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer, without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension and bad judgement marred all the combinations

¹ Diodor. xv. 91, 92; Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* viii. 8, 4.

Our information about these disturbances in the interior of the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently introduced into

the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (*Vit. Iphierat. Chabr. et Timoth.* p. 154-161) brings together all the statements; but unfortunately with little result.

against the Persian king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,¹ was received with little respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man, of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognised as general of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems for obtaining money from the Egyptians.² The army having been thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant, nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian throne; while Nektanebis also, on his side, began to bid high for the favour of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided in favour of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of Tachos,³ who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom he had come to serve—or recalled by special order of his countrymen, in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt. Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against the Persian empire were abandoned,

¹ Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv. p. 616 D.; Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.

² See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomio. ii. 25.

³ Diodorus (xv. 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis with Agesi-

laus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and supported him with success, against Nektanebis.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C. (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677. s. 204).

and nothing was effected as the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and with a public donation to Sparta of 230 talents. Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain from that town and its port ships for the passage home. But he died on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not to be obtained.¹

comport himself as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander; yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account. His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was, that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and foreign coercion (represented by the *dekarchy* and the *harmost*) which had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference, proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian impulse for which his pauegyrist gives him so much credit.¹ He was hero employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the truly honourable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgement, with little reason, he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394—387 B.C., he displayed that vigour and ability which never forsook him in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to purchase such aid, in itself dishonourable, by the

¹ Xenoph. *Encom. Ages.* vii. 7. Εἰδ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσιν εἶναι, &c.

still greater dishonour of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy seemed to succeed. From 387 to 379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band), the ascendancy of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the war turns out unfavourably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds. Of this intense misotheban impulse, which so speedily brought about the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself, allowed. And though Plutarch seems displeased with him¹ for obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea) when acknowledged by all the other Greeks—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal brought any actual mischief to Sparta: and circumstances might well have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician, he deserves little esteem. We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left her at his death—"Murmuream invenit, lateritiam reliquit." Nothing but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are considering the misfortunes of Sparta

¹ Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.

during his reign, not to recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last expedition to Egypt had the effect of establishing firmly the dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that country for the time from being re-conquered by the Persians; an event that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontès and Rheomithrès so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters, that Artaxerxès Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the exception of Egypt) unimpaired.

B.C. 352-361.
State of
Egypt and
Persia

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five or forty-six years.¹ His death was preceded by one of those bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxès, had been declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant it.

Death of
Artaxerxès
Mnemon.
Murders in
the royal
family.

¹ Diodorus, xv. 93.

There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of death, of Artaxerxès Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C. See Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix, ch. 18, p. 316—where the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch states the reign of Artaxerxès Mnemon to have lasted 62 years (Plutarch, *Artax.* c. 33); which cannot be correct, though in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.

An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognises the forty-fifth year of the reign of Artaxerxès, and thus

supports the statement in the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of reign. See Boeckh, *Corp. Inser.* No. 2691, with his comments, p. 470.

This same Inscription affords ground of inference respecting the duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus recognised himself as satrap, and Artaxerxès as his sovereign, in the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the forty-fifth year of Artaxerxès Mnemon. The revolt therefore must have been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, *Geschichte von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea*, p. 373, note.

Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the favourite inmates of his father's harem, for whom he had contracted a passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxès that he seemed likely to make a new appointment as to the succession: discarding Darius and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier, named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxès; but the plot was betrayed, and the King caused both Darius and Teribazus to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still remained two princes, older than he—Arsamès and Ariaspès. Both these brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous deceit, entrapping him to take poison—the other by assassination. Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long denied to him; for Artaxerxès—now very old, and already struck down by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son Darius—did not survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so speedily afterwards.¹ He expired, and his son

¹ Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x. 1-3.

Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for, was, Aspasia of Phocæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger, who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxès after the battle of Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch's affections.

But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the part of Artaxerxès to give her up—can have been the person who accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa *forty years* before; for the battle of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability would be still greater, if we adopted Plu-

tarch's statement that Artaxerxès reigned 62 years, for it is certain that the battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign, and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.

Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of Artaxerxès Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that the plot against the life of Artaxerxès was concerted by Darius in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the principal persons about the court, together with their wives and children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.

Ochus, taking the name of Artaxerxês, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had placed himself on the throne.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though relieved by the general peace¹ from land-war, appears to have been entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Phœ to Thebes—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C. that the Athenian Timotheus—having carried on war with eminent success against Olynthus and the neighbouring cities in the Thermaic Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis—transferred his forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general Iphikratês, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his country.¹ Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.² It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character, and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys: for Iphikratês would only lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese.³

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year, we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese, and Kallisthenês (seemingly) as Athenian commander against Amphipolis.⁴

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 684. s. 153.

² The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into the Athenian treasury 1200 talents, appears extravagant as to amount;

even if we accept it as generally true.

³ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 684. s. 155.

⁴ See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratidis, Chabrias, et Timothei, p. 151, and the preceding page.

M. Rehdantz has put together,

The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were far from improving. Besides that under the

B.C. 362.

Ergophilus
succeeds
Timotheus
at the Cher-
sonese—
Kallisthe-
nēs suc-
ceeds him
against
Amphipolis
—war at
sea against
Alexander
of Phœæ.

new general she seems to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Phœæ. A short time previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,¹ and equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet captured the island of Tenos,

ravaged several of the other Cyclades, and laid siege to Peparethus. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and about the end of August (362 B.C.),² two months after the battle of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs, and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenēs to defend Peparethus—met with a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes and 600 prisoners.³ We are even told that soon after this naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before), where they seized both property on ship-board and men on the quay, before there was any force ready to repel them.⁴ The Thessalian marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbour of Pegasæ; yet not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some

with great care and eagacity, all the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions deducible from such scanty premises.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 4.

² We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly—the 23rd of the month Metageismon, in the archonship of Molœon—mentioned by Demosthenēs adv. Polyclem, p.

1207. s. 5, 5.

³ Diodor. xvi. 95: Polyænus, vi. 2, 1.

⁴ Polyænus, vi. 2, 2.

It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander of Phœæ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of Charidæmus and his mercenary band, then in or near the Troad. His application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676. s. 192).

disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenês was condemned to death; while several trierarchs—who, instead of serving in person, had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract—were censured or put upon trial.¹

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenês also, who had succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis. At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the first time, to be no longer a free city: but to be disjoined from Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a possession of Macedonia.² Kallisthenês thus found himself at war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince however, having gained time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as obstinately as before. Kallisthenês had let slip an opportunity which never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled, on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have been conquered. For this misjudgement or

n.o. 362.
Ergophilus
and Kalli-
sthenês
both unsuc-
cessful—
both tried.

¹ Demosthenês, de Ooronâ Trierarch. p. 1230. s. 0.

Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Charês in command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this admiral

took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder the allies (Diodor. xvi. 95).

² Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 174-176; and Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 260. c. 14.

misconduct he was put upon trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against Kotys.¹ The people were much incensed against both; but most against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenês was tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath of the Dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they acquitted him.²

Autoklês was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens, but at many of the islands in the *Ægean*, and at Byzantium and other places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine. The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets; and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe transit of such supplies to Athens herself.³ The Athenian fleet, guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autoklês was favoured with an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian named Miltokythês against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys, that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time

¹ The facts as stated in the text are the most probable result, as it seems to me, derivable from *Æschinês*, *Fals. Lag.* p. 250 c. 14.

² *Aristotel. Rhetoric.* c. 3, §. 3.

Ergophilus seems to have been fined (*Demosthen. Fals. Leg.* p. 398. s. 200).

³ *Demosthen. adv. Polyclelem*, p. 1207. s. 6.

n.c. 362-361.
Autoklês in
the Helles-
pont and
Bosphorus
—convoy
for the
corn-ships
out of the
Euxine.

n.c. 361.
Miltoky-
thês revolts
from Kotys
in Thrace—
ill success
of the
Athenians.

Miltokythês also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received. The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikratês), was so unfavourable,¹ as to send him away not merely in discouragement, but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote, the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythês against Kotys. Their general Autoklês was recalled after a few months, and put upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy unassisted.² How the trial ended or how the justice of the case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of Demosthenês.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autoklês; and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus. Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew, as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war;³ not merely for provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in the Chersonese became yet more unfavourable to Athens. In the winter of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the cooperation of a body of Abydene citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos, contrived to surprise Sestos;⁴ the most important place in the Chersonese, and

B.C. 361.

Menon—
Timomachus—as
commanders in the
Chersonese.
The Athenians lose
Sestos.

¹ Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 655. s. 122; cont. Polyclism, p. 1267.

ὅτι Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυς. . . ἐγράφει παρ' ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτο, εἰ οὐ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν, ἀπὸ λθ' ἐφοβήσετο καὶ νομίμα: ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχουσιν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὅρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θαυμάτων ἐγένετο.

The word ἀπὸ λθ' implies that Miltokythês was at Athens in person.

The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the revolt of Miltokythês, is referred to by

the orator, p. 658. s. 136, 137.

² Demosthenês adv. Polyol. p. 1210. s. 16; Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 123.

³ Demosthen. adv. Polyclism, p. 1212. s. 24-26; p. 1213. s. 27; p. 1225. s. 71.

⁴ Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 673. s. 187. 'Ex γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τῶν πάντων γρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ Σηατῶν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηατῶν διεβάνην, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is speaking of Charidêmus.)

The other oration of Demosthenês

the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and endeavoured to prevail on Iphikratês to take part in his projects. But that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens, refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once to visit Athens, retired to Lesbos.¹ In spite of his refusal, however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese were attacked and imperilled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues both of strait and harbour.²

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autoklês, Menon, Timomachus, had been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and had undergone accusation at home.³ Timomachus was now superseded by

(adv. Polycl. p. 1212) contains distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians until after November 361 B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.

It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that the purpose of this oration against Polyklês (composed by Demosthenês, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He uses the person whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of the year, but who had

kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.

Rehdantz (Vita Iphicratis, Chabriæ, &c. p. 144, note), in the valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time *after which* the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to have taken place two or three years earlier.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664. s. 155.

² Demosthenês, cont. Aristokrat. p. 658. s. 136; p. 679. s. 211.

What is said in the latter passage about the youthful Kersobleptês, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.

³ Demosthen. pro Phormions. p. 960. s. 64; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 398. s. 200.

Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikratēs and Kotys.¹ But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors, and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys — Charidēmus with the mercenary division under his command. That officer, since his service three years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending to hold them as a little principality.² Finding his position, however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens. This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for Charidēmus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese, far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took service with Kotys against her; so that Elæus and Krithôtê, her chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.³

B.C. 360.
Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
Charidēmus crosses thither from Abydos.

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by two brothers, Python and Herakleidēs, Greeks from the city of Ænus in Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic military character.⁴ Having made their

B.C. 360.
Assassination of Kotys.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672. s. 184.

² Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671. s. 183. Compare Pseudo-Aristot. *Œconomic*. ii. 30.

³ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.

The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which threatened the place since the arrival of Charidēmus.

⁴ Aristotle (*Politie*. v. 8, 12) men-

escape, Python and his brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every demonstration of honour, and presented with the citizenship as well as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.¹ Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in the assembly, Python is said to have replied—"It was a god who did the deed; we only lent our hands."² an anecdote, which, whether it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration of tyrannicide.

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptês, was only a youth;³ moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisadês and Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of Thrace. Kersobleptês employed as his main support and minister the mercenary general Charidêmus, who either had already married, or did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been

B.C. 360.

Kersobleptês succeeds Kotys. Berisadês and Amadokus, his rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kersobleptês.

tions the act, and states that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he notices the event in illustration of the general category—Πολλοὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγέννηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχυροῦσθαι τῶν μονάρχων τινας (compare what Tacitus says about *mos regius*—Annal. vi. 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys—Ἀδὰμας δ' ἀνέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐντραπήνην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πικρῶς ὥς ὕβρισμαίος.

Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 531, 532.

Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 726, 726) places the death of Kotys in 369 B.C.; and seems to infer from Athenæus (vi. p. 249, xii. p. 531) that he had actual communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the evidence does not appear to me to

bear out such a conclusion.

The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys; because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal communication with Kotys.

My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more probably in 360 B.C.

¹ Demosthenês cont. Aristokrnt, p. 660. s. 142; p. 662. s. 150; p. 675. s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E. Plutarch, adv. Koloten, p. 1126 B.

² Plutarch, de Sui Laude, ut sup.

³ Demosthen cont. Aristokr. p. 674. e. 193. μεταρρύλλισον, &c.

formed in like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and by Berisadês with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like Iphikratês and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.¹ These Grecian mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the princes whom they served, as Seuthês had proposed to Xenophon, and as the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems, Charidêmus on behalf of Kersobleptês was the strongest. He and his army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those fair promises which Charidêmus had made in his letter from Asia. But Charidêmus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the Athenians were besieging at the neighbouring islet on its western coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonourable, that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.²

¹ Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12, p. 664. s. 153 (in which passage *κηφισοδότης* may be fairly taken to mean any near connection by marriage). About Athenodorus, compare Isokratês, Or. viii. (de Pace) s. 31.

² Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676. s. 193-199.

In eccl. 194, are the words *ἦξε δὲ Κηφισοδότος στρατηγῶν, πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸς (Charidêmus) ἐπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ αἱ τριῆρεις, αἱ, δὲ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶν, καὶ μὴ συγγωρούντος Ἰρταβάζου ὠλεῖν ἐμελλόντων αὐτὸν.*

The verb *ἦξε* refers, in my judgement—not to the *first coming out* of Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes *to Perinthus*, near which place Charidêmus was, for the purpose of demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised. see s. 190. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (*παρόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς δὲ τῇ ἐπιστολῇ ἐπεπόμψαι—s. 195*) to make this demand, then Charidêmus, in-

Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and fined; the orator Demosthènes (we are told), who had served as one of the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.¹

Among the articles of this unfavourable convention, one was that the Greek city of Kardias should be specially reserved to Charidémus himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely hostile to Athens—became his principal station.² He was fortunate enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian Miltokythês, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had cooperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this important prisoner to Kersobleptês, because the life of Miltokythês would thus have been saved; it not being the custom of Thracians, in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.³ We remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a people decidedly more barbarous and bloodthirsty than the Greeks. Charidémus accordingly surrendered Miltokythês to the Kardians, who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and then drowned the father himself.⁴ It is not improbable that there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning intense antipathy on the

n.c. 359.

Improved prospects of Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodorus—Charidémus.

stead of behaving honestly, acted like a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter from Charidémus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἤξει cannot refer to his first coming out.

The term ἐκτα μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of Kotys.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676. s. 199; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 381. c. 20.

Demosthenês himself may probably have been among the trierarchs called before the Dikastery

as witnesses to prove what took place at Perinthus and Alopekonesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676. s. 200); Euthyklês, the speaker of the discourse against Aristokratês, had been himself also among the officers serving (p. 676. s. 196; p. 683. s. 223).

² Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. s. 209; p. 681. s. 216 Demosthen. de Halonneso, p. 87. s. 42.

³ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676. s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος νομίμου τοῦ θραξίν ἀλλήλου: ἀποκτινύνειν, &c.

⁴ Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 677. s. 201

part of the Kardians towards Miltokythês, and inducing Charidêmus to hand him over to them as an acceptable subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to the cause of Kersobleptês and Charidêmus. Though Kephisodotus had been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any successor came from Athens, yet Berisadês and Amadokus joined their forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus the general of Berisadês, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptês and Charidêmus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens; and that the son of a leading man named Iphiadês at Sestos, held by Charidêmus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be surrendered to Athens also.¹

This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus; who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of pay. Upon this Kersobleptês and Charidêmus at once threw up their engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,

B.C. 338.

Charidêmus is forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus—his evasions—the Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens.

¹ Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677. s. 202-204.

Aristotle (*Politia*, v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction of Iphiadês as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at Sestos; at

least we are told, that the revolution which deprived the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of Antalkidas.

insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be re-sworn by all the three Thracian competitors—Berisadês, Amadokus, Kersobleptês; if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing from Charidêmus and Kersobleptês, except delay or refusal; while Berisadês and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358 B.C.)—the Athenian Charês arrived in the Chersonese, at the head of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the presence of the latter as well as of Berisadês and Amadokus.¹ And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized. Charidêmus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its principal town Sestos, to Athens;² yet he retained for himself

¹ Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678. s. 205, 206; p. 680. s. 211, 212. The arrival of Charês in the Hellespont is marked by Demosthenês as immediately following the expedition of Athens to drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle of 358 B.C.

² We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered by Charês five years afterwards, in the year 353 B.C. (Diod. xvi. 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration of Demosthenês, that Charidêmus did actually surrender the Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenês says, comparing the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of Kersobleptês towards Athens—ἐπειδὴ ἐπειδὴ Ποσειδάων οὐχ ἡμεῖς ἀπέδωκεν, ἡνίκ' ἀποστρεψαί, οὐκ ἐπ' οἷός τ' ἦ, ὡς περ ὑμεῖς

Κερσobleπτῆς Χερρόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly announces that the Chersonese was given back to Athens, though reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptês. Sestos must have been given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that Charês in 353 B.C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants of military age and reduced the rest to slavery—we must suppose the town again to have revolted between 358 and 353 B.C.; that is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable. But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptês in 353 B.C., on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia. That had already been done in 358 B.C., and without any reference to Philip; and if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B.C., Kersobleptês had

Kardia,¹ which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it) not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptês, Berisadês, and Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each, was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure possession of the Chersonesc.²

It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the Chersonese against the neighbouring Thracian potentates. And it would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered not only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also various continental possessions: Byzantium—the Chersonesc—Maroneia³ with other places on the southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.⁴ This last portion of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal alliance of neighbouring cities, against which Athens too, as well as Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of Greece, had made war with an inauspicious success. The Macedonian king

B.C. 358.

The transmarine empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her conquests made against Olynthus.

afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his possession in the beginning of 363 B.C.—it seems unaccountable that Demosthenês should say nothing about the reconquest, in his oration against Aristokratês, where he is trying to make all points possible against Kersobleptês.

¹ Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681. s. 218.

² Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 628. s. 8; p. 664. s. 121. The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vite Iphicratês, Chabrie, &c. p. 147) appears to me nearly correct, in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont.

Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and more exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727, who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the Chersonese in 358 B.C., which is, I think, a full year too late. Rehdantz does not allow, as I think he ought to do, for a certain interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which Athenodorus acted for Athens.

³ Demosthen. cont. Polydem. p. 1212. s. 26.

⁴ Demosthen. Philippic. I. p. 41. s. 6. εἰρημὸν κατεήμας, ὃ ἀδελφεὶ Ἀθηναίων, Πύδαν καὶ Πεκιδίαν καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον εἰλεῖον κόλλῃ, &c.

Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandisement of his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbours, reciprocally attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens, even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 B.C., was hardly less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandisement; neither was found competent to provide any adequate protection to Greece in its room.

The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,¹ lasted but for a moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first, his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless. Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognised, in the inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How, by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by

¹ I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa (whereby Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island), though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of the Chersonese.

That expedition will more prop-

erly come to be spoken of in a future chapter. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.

the faults and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained this inauspicious eminence—will be recounted presently.

In 403 B.C., after the surrender of Athens, Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered among the followers of Sparta.

But the conflicts already recounted (during an interval of forty-four years—404-403 B.C. to 360-359 B.C.) have wrought the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily, each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself. The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Periklēs.

It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the aggressor from Macedonia arises.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
ATHENIAN ARMAMENT BEFORE SYRACUSE.

IN the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenês with nearly their entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in
B.C. 413.
Syracuse
after the
destruction
of the Athe-
nian arma-
ment.
 September 413 B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly all the Grecian cities in the island—for all of them had joined Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging; except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians—and Agrigentum, which remained neutral.¹ Unfortunately we know little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance against them.² But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to aggrandize that city farther; while

¹ Thucyd. vii. 50-58. ² Lysias, Orat. xx. (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.

the Syracusans themselves also would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known to Nikias during the last months of the siege,¹ and fatally misleading his judgement—were so heavy as to task severely their powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to hire—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the citizens,²—there would probably be a general disposition to repose rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated during the year of the siege.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion reigned throughout Greece that Athens³ could not hold out for one single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion founded greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous. Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,¹ which had been friendly to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenés in his expedition to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardour. The feeling of reaction at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution at Thurii.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 48, 49.

² Diodor. xiii. 34.

³ Thucyd. viii. 2: compare vii 55.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 38-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysia, p. 463.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following the catastrophe of the Athenian armament), a Sicilian squadron of twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command of Hermokratês, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus, and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum and Lokri, followed soon after. It was Hermokratês who chiefly instigated his countrymen to this effort.¹ Throughout the trying months of the siege, he had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the plans of Gylippus with equal valour and discretion. As commander of the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter), his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action, and popular in his behaviour towards those under his command; but what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honourably, was his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernês, conniving at his betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid seamen—Hermokratês and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap himself.² They were the more earnest in performing this duty, because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in larger proportion than the remaining fleet.³

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokratês and his companions in crossing the sea from Sicily—that one single effort would gloriously close the war—was far from being realized. Athens resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred. Tissaphernês

B.C. 412.
Syracusan
squadron
under Her-
mokratês
goes to
act against
Athens in
the Ægean.

Disap-
pointed
hope—
defeat at
Kynossema
—second
ruinous
defeat at
Kyzikus.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 20, 35, 31.

² Thucyd. viii. 20, 45, 78, 84.

³ Thucyd. viii. 84.

was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokratês vainly tried to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.¹ Accordingly the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed, received news generally unfavourable, and at length positively disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colours, had found means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats, which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the Hellespont² (once at Kynossema—411 B.C.—a second between Abydos and Dardanus—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and calamitous than the preceding—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.), wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the satrapy of Pharnabazus.³ That satrap, with generous forwardness, took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium, one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the re-construction took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was passed to all of them who chose to accept it.⁴

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch, addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokratês, surviving second officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of the defeated armament

¹ Thucyd. viii. 56.

² Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 19.

³ Thucyd. viii. 105; Xen. Hellen.

⁴ Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 23-26.

—“Our honour is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men are hungry. We know not what to do.”¹ This curious despatch has passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse. Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus, whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokratês and his colleagues; who—having instigated their countrymen three years before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens—had not only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced to be incapable of farther resistance.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against Hermokratês and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted to Asia, and made known by Hermokratês himself to the armament, convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to maintain unabated good behaviour for the future, and to choose new admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs, the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached to Hermokratês from his popular manner, his constant openness of communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions, loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under, any other leaders.² But the admirals repressed this disposition,

Banishment of Hermokratês and his colleagues. Sentence communicated by Hermokratês to the armament. Their displeasure at it.

¹ Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 23. Ἐβρει τὰ πῶδες· ἀπορώμεας τι γρή δρᾶν. καὶ Μιθάρους ἀπεσσοῦσα πεινῶντι

² Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 27.

deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had knit them together by the ties of honourable fellowship. No man stood forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.¹

Though Hermokratês, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly. For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokratês to any misconduct or omission on his part; in regard to personal incorruptibility, and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernês, he stood out as an honourable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokratês had fallen into disgrace, circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious means to revenge such refusal.² But this story, whether believed elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus; who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokratês immediately employed in getting together triremes and

Hermokratês had promised the Syracusans what he could not realise; but his conduct as commander had been good

¹ Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 27-31.

² Thucyd. viii. 86.

mercenary soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.¹ We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust, would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

The party opposed to Hermokratēs had now the preponderance in Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor, young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting intestine discontent.² But in the period immediately after the siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named Dioklēs, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president, for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code, or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences

Internal
state of
Syracuse—
constitution
of
Dioklēs.

¹ Xen. Hellen. i. 1, 31; Diodor. xiii. 63. ² Thucyd. vii. 55.

minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief. It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklès, the chief of the Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the dominion of the Romans.¹

We have the austere character of Dioklès illustrated by a story (of more than dubious credit,² and of which the like is recounted respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism by the most violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions of government.³ If the constitutional forms

¹ Diodor. xiii. 33-35.

² Compare Diodor. xiii. 75—about the banishment of Dioklès.

³ Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 4. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος, αὐτίς γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς

Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.

v. 4, 4, 6. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἤξιωθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἐχθρὰν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὢν.

were rendered more democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still continued to be rich men.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after continuing more than three years,¹ was brought to a close by an enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas, Carthage.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480 B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians, who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens, inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,² had been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the *Ægean*.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to B.C. 480-410. the conclusion of the second Punic war, the Extent of Carthaginian empire—power, and population—Liby-Phœnicians. Carthaginians will be found frequent in their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them abstain from intervention during the preceding

¹ Diodor. xiii. 56.

² Thucyd. vi. 34. Speech of Her-

generations, we are unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea both of her oligarchical government, and of her extensive colonial possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the amplest licence of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.¹ While the connexion of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and her institutions, relates to the fourth, third or second centuries B.C.; yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the fifth century B.C., especially

mokratēs to his countrymen at Syracuse—δοκτὶ δὲ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἀμεινον εἶναι πεμψει. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνέπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσι μὴ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλθῶσιν, &c.

¹ Polybius, iii. 22. 23, 24.

He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part) between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.: the earliest to 508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by Ca-

saubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii. 27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far more restrictive than the first, against the Romans, for it interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa, except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome, which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.

in reference to the general system pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the city, not less than 700,000 souls¹ were computed in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own, and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius. The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally) was within the distance of seven miles from Carthage² on the one side, and Tunis seemingly not much further off on the other. Even at that time, too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed 300 tributary cities in Libya.³ Yet this was but a small fraction of the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480—410 B.C. That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni, near the Great Syrtis—westward all along the coast to the Pillars of Heraklès and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis, was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of still earlier settlement in the country.⁴ These Liby-Phœnicians

¹ Strabo, xvii. p. 532, 533; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.

Strabo gives the circumference as 360 stadia, and the breadth of the isthmus as 60 stadia. But this is noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste des Mittelmeers, p. 25).

² Appian. Reb. Punie. viii. 75.

³ Strabo, *ut sup.*

⁴ This is the view of Movers, sustained with much plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der Phœnizier, vol. ii. part. ii. p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx. 55.

dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce. They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness of their soil.¹ Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are told that both Agathoklès and Regulus in their respective invasions captured no less than 200. A single district, called Tuska, is also spoken of as having 50 towns.²

A few of the towns along the coast—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus, Leptis, &c.—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself. With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian, Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as much as one-half of their produce,³ and doubled at one stroke the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or 365 talents annually. Such exactions were not collected without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the tax-payer of all that he possessed; and even tearing him from his family to be sold in person for a slave.⁴ Accordingly the general

Harsh dealing of Carthage towards her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage.

¹ Livy xxix. 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of Herodotus.

² Diodor. xv. 17; Appian. viii. 3, 68.

³ Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks, who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of Turkish proprietors—"The Helots seem to have resembled the Greeks, who labour on the Turkish farms in the plains of Turkey, and who are bound to account to their masters

for one half of the produce of the soil, as Tyrteus says of the Messenians of his time—

Ὅσον οὖτοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι

Δασπύνοισι φέροντας, ἀναγκαιῆς ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,

Ἡμισυ κἄν, ὅσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.

(Tyrteus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)

The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so hard" (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).

⁴ Polybius, i. 72; Livy, xxxiv. c2.

sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have guarded against such contingences by paid garrisons; but they also provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double purpose of obviating discontent among their town population at home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.¹

In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the Syracusan Agathoklès. Nor were their enemies on the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes, half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of ditch to keep them off.² But

Movers (*Geschichte der Phönizier*, ii. 2. p. 455) assigns this large assessment to Leptis Magna, but the passage of Livy can relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.

Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near the Great Syrtis.

Dr. Barth (*Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des Mitteländischen Meers*, p. 81-146) has given a recent and valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the neighbouring regions. On his map, however, the territory called Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, 200 miles from Carthage (Pliny, N. H. v. 17). Yet it seems certain that the name Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and approaching

very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia. He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably not included in the name Emporia (Livy xxix. 25-27).

¹ Aristotel. *Politica*. ii. 8, 9; vi. 8, 5.

² Appian. viii. 32, 54, 58; Phlegon. *Trall.* de Mirabilibus, c. 18. Εὐμπαγες δὲ φησὶν ἐν Περιήγησει, Καρχηδονίους περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὐραῖν δὲ ὀρύσσοντας δυοὺς σκελετοὺς ἐν σὸρῳ χειμένων, &c.

The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage of the Carthaginian dominion; for

these barbarians did not acquire sufficient organisation to act for permanent objects, until the reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion of Agathoklès), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean, together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native Carthaginians,¹ though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No less than forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of Carthage to resist Agathoklès, together with one thousand cavalry, and two thousand war-chariots.² An immense public magazine—of arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions—appears to have been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.³ A chosen division of 2500 citizens, men of wealth and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,⁴ distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the splendour of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen troops occasionally employed on service in Sicily; but most part of the Carthaginian army consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, &c., a mingled host got together

the Carthaginians afterwards, as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.

Movers (*Gesch. der Phöniz.* ii. 2. p. 467) identifies this trench with the one which Pliny names near Thénæ on the Lesser Syrtis, as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion of the native kings (Pliny, *H. N.* v. 8). But I greatly doubt such identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the Carthaginians

trench.

¹ A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served campaigns (Aristotel. *Polit.* vii. 2, 6).

² Diodor. xx. 10.

³ Appian, vii. 40. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the last siege of Carthage.

See Bötticher, *Geschichte der Carthager*, p. 24-25.

⁴ Diodor. xvi. 8.

for the occasion, discordant in language as well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause in which they fought—seldom, to the commanders under whom they served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith, and recklessly abandoned to destruction.¹ A military system such as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in Sicily these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied, like Persians, upon numbers—manifesting little or no military skill; until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and precedence were, the two Kings or Suffetes, who presided over the Senate.² They seem to have been renewed annually, though how far the same persons were re-eligible or actually re-chosen, we do not know; but they were always selected out of some few principal families or gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred, out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of thirty

¹ See the striking description in Livy, of the motley composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having always maintained his ascendancy over them, and kept them in obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii. 12). Compare Polybius, i. 65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 75-77).

² There were in like manner two Suffetes in Gades and each of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii. 37). Cornelius Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made *king* (*rex*) when he was invested with his great foreign military command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv. 54) talks about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii. 166) about Hmilkar.

principes representing the *curiæ*;¹ sometimes a still smaller, of only ten *principes*. These little councils are both frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia or Council of Ancients—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls the Senate.² Aristotle assimilates the two Kings (Suffetes) of Carthage to the two Kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also to that of Sparta;³ which latter consisted of thirty members, including the Kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate. He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five—the Pentarchies. He compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan Ephors; yet again he talks of the Pentarchies as invested with extensive functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or *Ordo Judicum*; of which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its members perpetual, and so powerful that it overruled all the other assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year, instead of being perpetual.⁴

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage may be said to be unknown.⁵ But

Oligarchical system and sentiment at Carthage.

¹ See Movers, *Die Phönizier*, ii. 1, p. 483-499.

² Polybius, x. 18; Livy, xxx. 16. Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed to the *πληθὺς* or people (vi. 51). It would seem that by *Γερωντίον* he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage

(x. 18) *Σύγκλητος*.

³ Aristotel. *Politica*, ii. 8, 2.

⁴ Livy, xxxiii. 46. Justin (xix. 2) mentions the 100 elect Senators est apart as judges.

⁵ Heeren (*Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt*, part. ii. p. 138. 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his *Dissertation, Aristoteles de Politicâ Carthaginiensium*, Wratel. 1824) have discussed all these passages with ability. But

it seems clear that the general spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich, old, and powerful families divided among themselves the great offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;¹ that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which, through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were visited, was cruel in the extreme.² It appears that wealth was one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of such corruption, one variety was the habit of constantly regaling the citizens in collective banquets of the *curiæ* or the political associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the *phiditia* or public mess of Sparta.³ There was a *Demos* or people at Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the Suffetes and the small Council were not all of one mind.⁴ How numerous this *Demos* was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised, we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, &c. The purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded, and the great offices held—Suffetes, Senators, Generals, or Judges—by the members of a small

their materials do not enable them to reach any certainty.

¹ Valerius Max. ix. 5, 4. "Insolentia inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasiemulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur."

² Diodor. xx. 10; xxiii. 9; Valer. Max. ii. 7, 1.

³ Aristotel. Politic. iii. 5, 6.

These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings—as well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant for the com-

parison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points—the intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two must have been so great that the comparison seems not happy.

Livy (xxxiv. 61) talks of the *circuli et convivii* at Carthage; but this is probably a general expression, without particular reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.

⁴ Aristotel. Polit. ii. 3, 3.

number of wealthy families; and the chief opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity, as for systematic foreign and commercial aggrandisement. Within the knowledge of Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.¹

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a victorious career in Sardinia;² the other, Hamilkar, commanding at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar, his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.³ But the sons of Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens in the state: carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other indigenuous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute which Carthago had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so powerful, that a check upon their ascendancy was supposed to be necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators sitting as Judges were now

Powerful families at Carthage—Mago, Hamilkar, Hasdrubal.

¹ Aristot. Polit. ii. 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v. 6, 2), which is also mentioned in Justin. (xxi. 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his family being put to death along with him.

Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle's statements about the Carthaginian government—but some of them are even contradictory. One of these (v. 10, 3) has been pointed out by M. Berthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes

to read ἐν Χαλχηδόνι instead of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v. 10, 4) Aristotle calls Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατούμενη) a state democratically governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii. 8, respecting its government.

Aristotle compares the Council of 104 at Carthage to the Spartan Ephors. But it is not easy to see how so numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of administrative and other business performed by the five Ephors.

² Justin, xix. 1.

³ Diodor. xiii.

nominated for the first time.¹ Such wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410 B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us—and down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens (as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in Sicily both aggrandisement and revenge.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel, who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage. The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival neighbours at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties.

They had applied to Carthage first, without success,² before they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe, wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility from their neighbours, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident, as well as angry, were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans turn, with any chance

¹ Justin, xix. 2.

² Diodor. xii. 83.

It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was re-

ally a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor. xi. 86—with Wesseling's note) Lilybæum as a town attained no importance until after the capture of Motya by the elder Dionysius in 396 B.C.

of finding both will and power to protect them, except to Carthage.¹

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Carthaginian settlements—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency of Selinus—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive, that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their closest Hellenic neighbour were allowed thus to aggrandize herself. Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming military operations in Sicily—which had been laid aside for seventy years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections²—at a moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension, also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his death. Hannibal was at this moment King, or rather first of the two Suffetes, chief executive magistrate of Carthage, as his grandfather had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He had chosen the Greek city of Selinus, where probably Hannibal also had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to his family consequence—and from whence he brought back an intense antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by a signal revenge the dishonour both of his country and of his family. Accordingly,

Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid—application granted—anger of Hannibal.

¹ Diod. 48

² Diod. 49

espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for their protection.¹

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected. The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage; thus leaving the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: 5000 Libyans or Africans; and 800 Campanian mercenaries, who had been formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.²

¹ Diodor. xiii. 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα πολεμήσαντος Ἀμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρα τελευτήσας, υἱὸς δὲ Γίσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἥττα ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν ἐν τῇ Σελινούντι. Ὁ δ' οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὦν μὲν καὶ φῦσει μισέλλην, ὁμῶς δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, &c.

The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the Greek republics, and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even where there seems neither proof nor probability that

he had been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgement, or omission. But I do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks, will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review the proceedings of the Carthaginians.

² Diodor. xiii. 43, 44.

In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta. Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines by surprise, defeated them with the loss of 1000 men, and recaptured the whole booty.¹

B.C. 410.

Confidence of the Selinuntines—they are defeated by the Egestæans and Carthaginians.

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now, had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed by a citizen named Empedion,² urgently recommended: for Selinus appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;³ a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality, as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before; for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of

Measures of Selinus—promise of aid from Syracuse—large preparations of Hannibal.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 44² Diodor. xiii. 59.³ Diodor. xiii. 55; xi. 21.

Selinus, so that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta. Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement, by which Hannibal at once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with various Greeks who were willing to take service.¹

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B. C., through the exuberant wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a great fleet of sixty triremes, and 1500 transports or vessels of burthen;² conveying an army, which, according to the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than 100,000 men; while Ephorus extended the number to 200,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry, together with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum; taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê—and not to approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction.

The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor. Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian neighbours, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of any foreign besieger, and were now

¹ Diodor. xiii. 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνας συμμαχοῦντες, &c.

It cannot therefore be exact—that which Plutarch affirms, Timoleon, c. 30—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks in their service, at the time of the battle

of the Krimæus—B.C. 340.

² Thucyd. vi. 34. δυνατόι δὲ εἰς (the Certheginians) μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουλευθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀργυρὸν πλείστον ἐκπλήτνται, ὅθεν δὲ τε πόλεμος καὶ ἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.

in many places out of repair. Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction, he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and the neighbouring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth, he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and moveable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language—in everything, except bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.¹

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from their Hellenic brethren on the

B.C. 409.

Vigorous assault on Selinus—gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed.

¹ Diodor vii 54 55

southern coast—Agrigentum, Gela, and especially Syracuse—all of whom they had sent to warn and to supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance. They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually—though their own strength was every day failing—and though not a single friend arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city. Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried, continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers, and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them closed their gallant defence by an honourable death. A small minority, among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.¹

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites—murderous, lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad details of a town

Selinus is
sacked and
plundered
—mor-
ciless
slaughter.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 56, 57.

taken by storm are to a great degree the same in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished heads on the points of their spears and javelins.¹ The Greeks (seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.² These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any account of the entire population in its different categories—old and young—men and women—freemen and slaves—citizens and metics. We can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

It does little honour either to the generosity or to the prudence of the Hellenic neighbours of Selinus, that this unfortunate city should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos—next, to muster a large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate siege—and not reflecting

Delay of the Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to their embassy.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 57.

² Diodor. xiii. 57, 58.

that he was at the head of a vast host of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against strong walls recently erected—they were thunderstruck on being informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture.

The Syracusan soldiers, a select body of 3000, who at length joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint embassy was sent by the three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and characteristic—"The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods have become offended with them, and have taken their departure from the town."¹ To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and re-occupy the town with its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be destroyed.² What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not hear.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 59. 'Ο δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπερίβη, τοὺς μὲν Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πείραν τῆς δουλείας λήψασθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινούντος οἴεσθαι, προσκοψάντας τοῖς ἀνοικοῦσιν.

² Diodor. xiii. 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient temples of Selinuse, are vast and imposing; characteristic as specimens of Doric art during the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. From the great magni-

tude of the fallen columns, it has been supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.

This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, *Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 207.

Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder, Hannibal now quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot. Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success, but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not unassisted, for 4000 allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed by the Syracusan Dioklès, had come to their city as a reinforcement. For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults. No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so confident in their own valour, that they resolved not to copy the Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out at day-break the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field. Ten thousand gallant men—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian allies—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew the assault, looked for nothing less than a sally, were taken by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards

B.C. 409.

Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it. Aid from Syracuse under Dioklès—sally from Himera against the besiegers—victory of Hannibal.

the neighbouring hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely and slaughtered great numbers (6000 according to Timæus, but not less than 20,000, if we are to accept the broad statements of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive and succour his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the Carthaginians.¹

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city. So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in the Bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round Cape Lilybæum and along the southern coast into the harbour of Syracuse, now defenceless through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the Bay of Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and picked up these tidings in explanation. Here

Syracusan
squadron—
resolution
taken to
abandon
Himera.

was intelligence more than sufficient to excite alarm for home in the bosom of Dioklès and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency now reigning. Dioklès not only enjoined the captains of the fleet to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon Dioklès to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the only chance of refuge now open to these unhappy Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler part of the population—elders, women, and children—crowding on board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklès also marched out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally. Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their departure along with Dioklès, as their only chance of escape; since it was but too plain that the triremes would not carry away all. The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet notwithstanding all the

Partial evacuation of Himera—resistance still continued; the town is at length stormed and captured.

pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the physical force, of these brave men was now at an end. The gods were quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or fell into the hands of the victor.¹

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and satisfy the exigences, of revenge for his slain grandfather. Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose. Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the soldiers. But all the male captives, 3000 in number, were conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there put to death with indignity,² as an expiatory satisfaction to his lost honour.

Hannibal
destroys
Himera,
and slaugh-
ters 3000
prisoners,
as an ex-
piation to
the memory
of his
grand-
father.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 61, 62.

² Diodor. xiii. 62. Τῶν δ' αἰγυ-

λώτων γυναῖκές τε καὶ παῖδας διαθούς
εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε τῶν

Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the Carthaginians in the neighbourhood.¹

No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts of Hannibal's life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that it realized in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honour as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain, rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honourable and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation of devotional fervour, and were especially resorted to in times of distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been unfortunately called upon to study, B.C. 409. we have found few or no examples of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing and uninterrupted prosperity—had both of them been stormed, ruined, and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three months.² No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495

Alarm throughout the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns to Carthage.

ὁ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς ἀλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνιέρθη, καὶ πάντας αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

The Carthaginians, after their

victory over Agathoklēs in 307 B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to the gods (Diodor. xx. 65).

¹ Diodor. xiii. 78.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 37.

B.C.¹), which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped Grecian cities. The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized. Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily (from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home. Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.² Hannibal carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.³

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily—and Syracuse especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of a second Carthaginian invasion—had stronger motives for keeping themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately, it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan general Hermokratès had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily; where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent

B.O. 409-408.

New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokratès comes to Sicily.

¹ Herodot. vi. 28.

² Diodor. xiii. 62-80.

³ Diodor. xiii. 7.

serving with the Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse against the three admirals. Hermokratês was exceedingly popular among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence, unmerited by his behaviour, was dictated by acute vexation for the loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations which Hermokratês had held out; combined with the fact that Dioklês and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against their common city and country:¹ upon which the trierarchs, when they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means untried for procuring his restoration.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokratês to the forwardness of the trierarchs, would have been honourable to his patriotism, had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favour he stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money, which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships, to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own restoration.² Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily, and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to be built, besides taking into his pay 1000 of the expelled Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his way into Syracuse, under concert with his

He levies troops to effect his return by force.

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 28. Οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔπρασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν, &c.

² Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 31; Diodor. xiii. 63.

friends in the city, who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans

n.c. 409-408. He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians.

against Hermokratês, so we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against Dioklês and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of blame may fairly attach to Dioklês for these misfortunes, we are not in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokratês. Nevertheless that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon which he marched his little army across the interior of the island, and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh colonists from other quarters. Re-establishing a portion of the demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of 6000 chosen hoplites—probably independent of other soldiers of inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian settlements in the neighbourhood, Motyê and Panormus.¹ Having defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily; for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valour of Hermokratês, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceedings of Dioklês

at Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokratês had been banished, was emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction in his favour, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival Dioklês. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning towards him, Hermokratês made renewed preparations for his return, and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera, informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border. Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display respect for the law—though in his previous attempt he had gone up to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering them to the citizens for the purpose of being honoured with due funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure against Dioklês, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of battle. "It was to Hermokratês (so his partisans urged) and to his valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering to them the funereal solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans, after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to Hermokratês by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against Dioklês by a sentence of banishment."¹ Dioklês with his partisans was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of Hermokratês, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and so strong was the

n o. 408-407. His farther attempts to re-enter Syracuse, with the bones of the Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Dioklês.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 63, 75.

reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans of Hermokratês carried their proposition for sentencing Dioklês to banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as to obtain the restoration of Hermokratês himself. The purposes of the latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command—that his re-admission would have been nothing less than a deliberate surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.¹

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote of consent, Hermokratês saw that his return could not at that moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre. Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Dioklês, who probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence. After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokratês contrived a plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head of 3000 soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,² and reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at Corinth³) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokratês, though joined

¹ Diodor. xiii. 76. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδύθη, τὸν δὲ Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ' ὡς προσεδέξατο ὑπωπτευσεν γὰρ τὴν τάνδρος τόλμαν, μὴ ποτε τυχῶν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδεδίχηται αὐτὸν τύραννον.

² Diodor. xiii. 76. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τοῦ καιροῦ οὐχ ὄρῳν εὐρίστον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀγε-

χώρησεν εἰς Σελινούντα. Μετὰ δὲ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὤρμησε μετὰ τρισχιλίων οπρωτωνῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἦκε νυκτός ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.

³ Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 8.

by his partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval, the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened, mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokratēs himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them. Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a condemnation.¹

Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius—for the next coming generation the most formidable name in the Grecian world—now appears for the first time in history. He was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position, described as even of low birth

First appearance of Dionysius at Syracuse.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 75.

Xenophon (Hellen. i. 3, 13) states that Hermokratēs, ἡδὲ φεύγων, ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings of Hermokratēs as described by Diodorus: his coming to the Sicilian Messénē—his exploits near Solinus

—his various attempts to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokratēs.

It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the eminent Hermokratēs. Whether it was another person of the same name—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed—I will not take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary Syracusans bearing that name, for

and low occupation; as a scribe or secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential, function.¹ He was the son of Hermokratês—not that eminent person whose death has been just described, but another person of the same name, whether related or not, we do not know.² It is highly probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies; and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents for military action—bravery, force of will, and quickness of discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the party of Hermokratês, and was one of those who took arms in the city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle, and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead by his relations.³ In this manner he escaped the sentence of banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced as unexpectedly living—we may presume that his opponents and the leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party lent their aid to exalt him.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokratês to penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they had left a formidable

the father of Dionysius the despot was named Hermokratês.

Polybius (xii. 25) states that Hermokratês fought with the Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 9; xiv. 66.

Isokratês, Or. v. Philipp. s. 73—

Dionysieus, πολλοστὸς ὢν Συραγοικῶν καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν, &c.

Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem. p. 505. s. 178. γραμματικῶς, ὡς φησι, &c. Polybius (xv. 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως ὁμιλητής, &c. Compare Polyænus, v. 2, 2.

² Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἐρμοκρατεύου. Diodor. xiii. 91.

³ Diodor. xiii. 75.

body of malecontents behind; while the opponents also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Dioklès. This magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing the sentiments of the rich—and that they seem to have manifested but little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokratès upon their dependencies at Motyè and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects, the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.¹

B.C. 407.

Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political discord—party of Hermokratès. Danger from Carthage.

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had been got together during the winter, greater than that which had sacked Selinus and Himera; 300,000 men, according to Ephorus—120,000, according to Xenophon and Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age, and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed across, in a fleet of 120 triremes, with no less than 1500 transports.² To protect the landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to the Bay of Motyè. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival of the grand armament. They were victorious,

B.C. 406.

Fresh invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. Immense host under Hannibal and Imilkon.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 70.² Diodor. xiii. 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 21.

destroying fifteen of the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared, disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western cape of Sicily.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy. The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most frightened and the most busily employed. Contemporaneous as they were with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their service, with 1500 hoplites; reinforced by 800 of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera, but had quitted him in disgust.¹

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of grandeur, prosperity and magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population was very great; comprising, according to one account, 20,000 citizens among an aggregate total of 200,000 males—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an aggregate total of no less than 800,000 persons;² numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious

B.C. 406.
Great alarm
in Sicily—
active pre-
parations
for defence
at Agrigen-
tum.

Grandeur,
wealth, and
population
of Agrigen-
tum.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 81-84.

² Diogen. Laërt. viii. 63.

territory highly cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius—its statues and pictures—its abundance of chariots and horses—its fortifications—its sewers—its artificial lake of nearly a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked with fish—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid cities of the Hellenic world.¹ Of the numerous prisoners taken at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before, a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines, and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the advantage or ornament of the city.² The hospitality of the wealthy citizens—Gellias, Antisthenès, and others—was carried even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its breed of horses,³ which the rich Agrigentines vied with each other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion (that is at the 93rd Olympiad—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him home in procession with 300 chariots, each drawn by a pair of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the festival by which the wealthy Antisthenès celebrated the nuptials of his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences, not very consistent with soldierlike efficiency, were allowed to the citizens on guard.

Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions, however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both propositions were declined.⁴

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not

¹ Diodor. xiii. 81-84; Polyb. ix. 7.

² Virgil, *Æneid*. iii. 704.

³ Diod.

⁴ Diod.

unreasonable, in the strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the loftiest, being about 1100 feet above the level of the sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum, and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine sepulchres.¹

Reinforced by 800 Campanian merceuaries, with the 1500 other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from Gela—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or moveable towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here that Hannibal, after reconnoitring the town all round, began his attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train, which was burnt during the night by a sally of the

The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious terrors—sacrifices.

¹ See about the Topography of Agrigentum—Seyfert, Akragas, p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg 1845).

The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and round which the traces of the old walls

may be distinctly made out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.

Compare Polybius, i. 18; ix. 27.

Pindar calls the town *καταμικτή* Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi. 6; *ἱερὸν οὐχ ἡμᾶς καταμικτὸν*—Olymp. ii. 10.

besieged.¹ Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on guard; while the judgement of the gods was manifested in a violent pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops, by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal victims as offerings to Poseidon.²

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated, or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon, while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but the manœuvre produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by the arrival of a powerful army which

Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum, under Daphneus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to pursue them. The Agrigentine generals

¹ Diodor. xlii. 86.

We read of a stratagem in Polymnus (v. 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies, into

incautious pursuit, by a simulated fight; and thus to have inflicted upon them a serious defeat.

² Diodor. xlii. 86.

also
decline to
attack them
in the
retreat.

marched from Syracuse, under Daphnaeus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, on reaching the river Himera, the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against them a body of Iberians and Campanians;¹ who however, after a strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under the protection of the main army. Daphnaeus, having secured the victory and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his troops from disordering their ranks in the ardour of pursuit, in the apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day—as had happened in the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement, the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 87.

It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum still bears the name of *Il Campo Cartaginese*, raising some presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians. Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel Daphnaeus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agri-

gentum, from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching. Seyfert (*Akragas*, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that they must have been on the *western* side; misled by the analogy of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving army under Hanno were coming from the westward—from Herakleia (*Polyb. i. 19*).

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum, and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory, were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than remissness, cowardice, or corruption (so it was contended), on the part of the generals—first the Syracusan generals, and next the Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter, the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation. Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês—himself one of the leaders, seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was severely censured.¹

How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would have been valid—is a point which our scanty information does not enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this

Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack. They are put to death.

Privations in both armies—Hamilkar captures the provisions of the Syracusans—Agrigentum is evacuated.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 87.

The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high command, makes us rather imagine

that he was of noble birth: compare Thucyd. vi. 38—the speech of Athenagoras.

time forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for provision and with menace of deserting, round the tent of Imilkon; who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,¹ coupled with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief. The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian triremes from Motyé and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the Syracusan convoy, noway expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan triremes were destroyed, the remainder were driven ashore, and the whole fleet of transport fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians, while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer tenable for want of supplies; upon

¹ Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians—of the abundance of gold and silver drinking-cups, and rich personal ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military service (Diodor. xvi. 81, Plutarch, Timo-

leoo, c. 28, 29).

There was a select body of Carthaginians—a Sacred Band—mentioned in these later times, consisting of 2500 men of distinguished bravery as well as of conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi. 80; xx. 10).

which they immediately retired, and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be evacuated by its population during the coming night.¹

A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than that which had witnessed the flight of Dioklès with the inhabitants of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering. No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen, combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders; but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning's dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight on the road to Gela.

Agrigentum taken and plundered by the Carthaginians.

For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon the town

¹ Diod. r. i. 11.

with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became victims like the rest; a fate which Gellias only avoided by setting fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins. The great public ornaments and trophies of the city—the bull of Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures—were preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.¹ While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months' siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.

I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus
a.c. 406. permits us to know, this momentous and tragical
Terror portion of Sicilian history; a suitable preface
throughout to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evi-
Sicily. dent that the seven or eight months (the former
of these numbers is authenticated by Xenophon, while the
latter is given by Diodorus) of the siege or blockade must
have contained matters of the greatest importance which
are not mentioned, and that even of the main circumstances
which brought about the capture, we are most imperfectly
informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its
causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were
terror-striking and harrowing in the extreme. When the
storm which had beaten down Selinus and Himera was now
perceived to have extended its desolation to a city so much
more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most populous
in the Grecian world—when the surviving Agrigentine
population, including women and children, and the great
proprietors of chariots whose names stood recorded as vic-
tors at Olympia, were seen all confounded in one common
fate of homeless flight and nakedness—when the victorious
host and its commanders took up their quarters in the
deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests farther

¹ Diodor. xlii. 89, 90.

² Diodor. xlii. 91.

after a winter of repose—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily who did not tremble for his life and property.¹ Several of them sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island altogether, emigrating to Italy.

Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast upon them before, for not having

Bitter complaints against the Syracusan generals.

vigorously pursued the defeated Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause. For the town was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and famine in Agrigentum.² The efficiency of Dexippus and the other generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands sadly inferior to the vigour and ability displayed by Gylippus before Syracuse, as described by Thucydides. And we can hardly wonder that by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines—or in extreme alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.

Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party—repelled during the preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed—now re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more aggressive even than Hermokratês himself.

The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 91.

² Diodor. xiii. 88.

Xenophon confirms the statement

of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was taken by famine (Hellen. i. 5, 21; ii. 2, 24).

Throughout ancient as well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of Hermokratês in the preceding year. But alarms of every kind now overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful silence reigned;¹ as in the memorable description given by Demosthenês of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the taking of Elateia.² The generals had lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius, though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokratês and in the battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich family who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the despotism;³ Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse), rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause; and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius, to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 91.

² Demosthenês de Coronâ, p. 286. s. 220.

This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable historical work (*Recherches sur les Etablissements des Grecs en Sicile*, Part II. s. 39. p. 219).

³ Aristotel. Politic. v. 5, 6. Ἔστιν αὖτε μεταβολὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσέλγως· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶνοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐκινεῖται

αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον ὥσπερ Ἰππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις.

Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.

Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius, than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 353 A.; p. 355 F.).

Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians—and as the persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds, real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate, and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of the generals recently at Agrigentum. "There they sit, the traitors! Do not wait for legal trial or verdict, but lay hands upon them at once, and inflict upon them summary justice."¹ Such a brutal exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he caused the execution of Theramenês, in the oligarchical senate, was an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order, and fined him, as they were empowered by law.² But his partisans were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed—and incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper. That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the magistrates, and so vehement the cry against

Harangue of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals, who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others appointed in their room.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθὼν Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῷ μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγορήσας, ὡς προδίδωται, τὰ πράγματα τοῖς Κερκυραίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τῇ αὐτῶν τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλήρον, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν ὀλίην.

² Diodor. xiii. 91. Τῶν δ' ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸ Διονύσιον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἰατρορίας ὑστερον αὐγγράφας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, &c.

In the description given by Thucydides (vi. 32-39) of the debate in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to personal violence or infringement of the law.

them, in the actual position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical sway—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.¹ His bitter invective against generals already discredited, together with the impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against the rich, were both alike favourably received. Plato states that the assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius, Hipparinus, and others.² This latter statement is, in my opinion, the more probable.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 91.

² Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Ἱππαρίνου ἀρχόντων, Σικελιώται τότε ως ψῆγόντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔξω, τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἀμα ἀρχόντων ἀρχότες· οἱ καὶ τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς κατέλευσα, βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μὴδενὶ μήτε σὺ, οἷκῃ μήτε νόμῳ δεσποτῇ, ἐλεύθεροί δ' εἴε, πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.

Diodor. xiii. 92. παρατυχῆς τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσεν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐτέρους δὲ ἔειλετο στρατηγούς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death, Daphneus and Demarchus (xiii. 96): now Daphneus was one of the generals (xiii. 86-88).

If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it, we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus, or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.

But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines, being inflamed against their generals for what they believed to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the Carthaginians, had stoned four

Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot's progress, successfully consummated. The pseudo-

of them on this spot, and only spared the fifth on this score of his youth (Diodor. xiii. 87).

I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above citation is made) was written in his old age—fifty years after the event.

This is one inaccuracy as to matter of fact, which might be produced in support of the views of those who reject the letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it, while going through the letters *seriatim*, and condemning them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions. After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast's conclusion. The first letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious, and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.

Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside

the first letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and thirteenth—are the most full of allusions to fact and details. Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done, on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take to be a fault of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends the Syracusans to name Dion's son as one of the members of a tripartite kingship, along with Hipparchus (son of the elder Diocysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523) cannot be correct, because Dion's son died before his father. To make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion had only one son; for which there is doubtless the evidence of Plutarch, who, after having stated that the son of Dion, a youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which he circulated—ὥς ὁ Δίων, ἄπασις γυγνῶς ἐγένετο τὸν Διονυσίου καὶ τὴν Ἀπιδόμαντιν καὶ κοινῶς διέδωκεν (Plutarch, Dion, c. 55, 56: compare also c. 21—τοῦ πατρὸς). But since the rumour was altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking advantage of a notorious accident

demagogue Dionysius outdoes, in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse, or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new Board of Generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He

Ambitious
arts of
Dionysius
—he in-
trigues
against his
colleagues,
and frus-
trates all
their pro-
ceedings.
He procures
a vote for
restoring
the Herno-
kratenn
exiles.

which had just proved fatal to the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at home. It is not certain that the number of Dion's children was familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find in another chapter of Plutarch's *Life of Dion* (c. 31), that the son of Dion was called by Timæus, *Areteus*—and by Timonidēs, *Hipparinus*—this surely affords some presumption that there were two sons, and not one son called by two different names.

I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add that the letter does not mention the name of Dion's son (though Ast says it calls him *Hipparinus*); and that it does specify the three partners in the tripartite kingship suggested (though Ast says that it only mentioned two).

Most of Ast's arguments against the authenticity of the letters,

however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact, but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism and pedantry, &c. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to prove the point for which he contends—the spuriousness of the letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*De adm. vi* dicend. in *Demosth.* p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable composition of Plato's dialogues, does not scruple to pass an unfavourable criticism upon him as a speech writer; referring to the speeches in the *Symposium* as well as to the funeral harangue in the *Menexenus*. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.

That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally involved, in the quarrel between

refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have committed any such treason in favour of the Carthaginians. But among them was his accomplice Hipparinus;¹ while probably the rest also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any rate his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the leading and more intelligent citizens, found favour with the bulk of the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the situation to suspect every one. The new Board of Generals being thus discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their country, and burning to save her, having already refused the offers of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus. His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms with Hermokratês when he was slain. They returned glowing with party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.²

Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the subject—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over him, on all grounds—that he would manifest a lofty opinion of himself and his own philosophy—is perfectly natural and credible. And when we

consider both the character and the station of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured canon as to the epistolary tone in which Plato would think most suitable to address him.

¹ Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 3.

² Diodor. xiii. 93.

The second step of the despot's progress was now accomplished. Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be about to march thither. Dionysius, being empowered to conduct thither a body of 2000 hoplites with 400 horsemen, turned the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries, under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a public vote, testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans, who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he would presently return with a larger force.¹

A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela—with increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of the double pay—and with the means of coining and circulating a new delusion.

¹ Diodor. i. 11 § 2

It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached the town just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire. What news about the Carthaginians? "Do not ask about your foreign enemies (was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within among you. Your magistrates—these very men upon whose watch you rely during the indulgence of the festival—they are the traitors who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners, but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in their treachery."

He returns to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues of gross treason.

Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd pressing round him—renewed at length, with emphatic formality, in the regular assembly held the next day—and concluding with actual resignation—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed, but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed with enthusiasm by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood, was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were incensed

Dionysius is named general single-handed with full powers.

against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his partisans to come forward with their main proposition: "Why not get rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious victory over the 300,000 Carthaginians at Himera was achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers." Such rhetoric was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly—when the partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation—when his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without any positive scheme to propose—and when the storm which had already overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;¹ by what majority we do not know.

The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his dignity, was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense, there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.

Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the despot's progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power unknown to and above the laws—unlimited and irresponsible. But he was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no intention of permanently abnegating their freedom—that they meant only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving their freedom against a foreign enemy—and that even thus much had been obtained by

Apparent
repentance
of the
people after
the vote.
Stratagem
of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a body of paid guards.

¹ Diodor. viii 34

impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed than symptoms of regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.¹ It therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.

But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days' provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were likely to lend either their

March of
Dionysius
to Leon-
tini.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγοροῦν, τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοὶς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι, τὴν ἐσομένην δυνάμειαν ἀπεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὐ, βαβαιῶσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαβον

ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, τὴν μετ' αὐτοῖς τῶν ἑλλων φθάσαι βουλόμενος, ἐπέλγει δι' οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο πῶλα καὶ αἰτήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος. τοῦτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, βαδίζων ἤμελλε κυριεύειν τῆς τυραννίδος.

votes or their swords willingly to the purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there, besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him, would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.¹ For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view, than an outmarch of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.

Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported, ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he caused a factitious clamour and disturbance to be raised during the darkness around his own tent—ordered fires to be kindled—summoned on a sudden his most intimate friends—and affected to retire under their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened, of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia Centuriata—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed during the preceding night—calling upon them emphatically to stand by him against the incessant snares of his enemies—and demanding for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous partisans, met with complete success. The assembly—Syracusan or quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini—passed a formal decree, granting to Dionysius a body-guard of 600 men, selected by himself and responsible to him

¹ Diodor. xiii. 95. Ἀπὸ τῆ δ' ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε προὔριον ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλήρως ὤνταρον φυγάδων, καὶ ξένων, ἀνθρώπων. Ἐλπίζε γὰρ τοὺς συρακυστάς εἶναι, ἀνθρώπων δεομένους μεταβολῆς τῶν δὲ

Συρακουσίων, τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ' ἤξειν εἰς Λεοντίνους.

Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii. 89).

alone.¹ One speaker indeed proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.² But such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered, when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned, Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He immediately enrolled more than 1000 men, selected as well for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized, regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers; choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating slaves for the purpose.³ Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer away to Peloponnesus—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering them anew with men devoted to himself.

This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the

Dionysius establishes himself at Syracuse as despot.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 85.

² Aristotel. Politic. iii. 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ἔχει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις δίδόναι τοσαύτους τοὺς φύλακας—ἰ. ε. τοσαύτην

τὴν ἰσχύν, ὥσθ' ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑὸς καὶ συμπαισίωνος χρεῖται, τοῦ δὲ πλεόνους ἤττω, εἶναι.

³ Diodor. xiv. 7. τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δοῦλους, &c.

city, commanding the harbour), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly—convoked under the pressure of his force, and probably composed of none but his partisans—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute, upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents, and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one of the previous public assemblies.¹ One step alone remained to decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of the Hermokratæan party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokratês; giving his own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased chief.²

Dionysius as despot—the means whereby he attained the power.

Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot's progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle) is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as the chief and representative of the Hermokratæan party, acquired the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than an exile like Hermokratês, in prosecution of the same ambitious purposes. Favoured by the dangers of the state and the

¹ Diodor. xiii. 96.

² Diodor. l. c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

agony of the public mind, he was enabled to stimulate an ultra-democratical ardour both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in 406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his ardour for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy; and tries to acquire the favour of the people by placing himself in the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before, in the debate between Hermokratês and Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of the rich. In 406 B.C. the leader of the Hermokratean party has reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervour much more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius—who took up the trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favour, and then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all correction—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who, as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure at a second.

In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from time to time to re-discussion and correction. That error will from time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing protector.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER
DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

THE proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405 B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice of 406 B.C.¹ He was not molested during this period by the Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage—and in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not be carried away.² In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines. He ensured his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both of Gela

B.C. 405.

Imilkon
with the
Carthagi-
nian army
marches
from Agri-
gentum to
attack Gela.

¹ Xen. Hellen. ii. 2, 24. 'Ο ἐνισχυὶς ἔλθων, ἐν ᾧ μεσούτι Διονύσιος ἐτυπίνησε, &c.

The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the first quarter of the Julian year.

If we compare however Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 21 with ii. 2, 24, we shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct; for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.

It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in either

one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took place at the close of O.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer 406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the year which falls between the two passages above referred to in Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other. Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.

² Diodor. xiii. 82, 96, 108, τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττωτέρως εἰρησμένα κατέσκαψεν, &c.

and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood, without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus—the Geloans despatched pressing entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against the Carthaginian plunderers—the mass of the citizens repelled the assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the walls themselves—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum—gave way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate valour, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; re-establishing during the night the breaches which had been made during the day. The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the Syracusan citizens, and succours from the Italian as well as from the Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to 50,000 men, according to Ephorus—to 30,000 foot, and 1000 horse, as Timæus represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus to cooperate with them off Gela.¹

Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives with an army to relieve them.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 103.

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavourably to the Greeks. At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius, finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there, accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks, sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies, was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.¹

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre never attacked at all. The right

B.C. 405.
Plan of
Dionysius
for a general
attack
on the Car-
thaginian
army.

B.C. 405.
He is de-
feated and
obliged to
retreat.

¹ Diodor viii 109

had to make a circuitous march, over the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right, not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been already repulsed, were compelled to retreat after a brave struggle, by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault, —or both the one and the other—we are unable certainly to determine. There will appear reasons for suspecting that Dionysius was not displeased at a repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same position as Dioklès after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of 2000 light troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.¹ Under cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to evacuate their city in mass at the

B.C. 403.

He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the Carthaginians.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 111.

commencement of night, while he himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina—Kamarina the immoveable,¹ as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road from Gela to Syracuse; a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy. The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind; old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.²

Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army. He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans, intimidated by these formidable neighbours so close to their borders, might remain in patient

¹ Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γάρ ἀμείνων—

“*fatīs nunquam concessa moveri*
Apparet Camarina procul.”

Virgil, *Æneid*, iii. 701.

² Diódor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς ψαίδω τῶν ἀλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπληρώς τῶν ἡτυχηκότων οὐκ μὲν ἀνεσταύρουσιν, οἷς δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπ’ ἡγῶν ὕβρις.

servitude under his dominion. It was remarked that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries especially, the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss, but had never been brought into action; that while his measures taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his flight—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all—except his own mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the centre of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracuseans in the army, especially the horsemen, the principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having been commenced in gross fraud, and consummated by violence, was now deprived of the only plausible colour which it had ever worn—since Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the Carthaginians, as those other generals whom he had denounced and superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusean horsemen watched for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of re-establishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks and harbour, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power.

Mutiny of the Syracusean horsemen—they ride off to Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius.

They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius, which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the outrage.¹ Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as the daughter of Hermokratès. They at the same time spread abroad the news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army, and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed against him.² After having betrayed his army, together with Gela and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real ground of necessity (they asserted)—he had been exposed, disgraced, and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct. The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina (the outer city) against his re-entry. The energy and promptitude of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers—100 horsemen and 600 foot—he left his army and proceeded by a forced march to

B.C. 405.

Their imprudence—they are surprised and overpowered by the rapid return of Dionysius.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 112; xiv. 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 8.

² Diod.

Syracuse; a distance of 400 stadia, or about 45 English miles. He arrived there about midnight, and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that of Achradina which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between them.¹ Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered, with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance, of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place, which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within, and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the Syracusan horsemen—who but the evening before were masters of the city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in it—were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles they established themselves in the town of Ætna.²

¹ Diodor. viii. 113. παρῇ, περιμέουσα νύχτας πρὸς τὴν πύλιν τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς . . . εἰσῆλθαι διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, &c.

For an explanation of the topography of Syracuse, the reader is referred to an Appendix annexed to the last preceding Volume of this History, with two plans, illus-

trating the siege of the town by the Athenians; also to a third plan, annexed to this volume, representing Syracuse as it stood at the end of the life of Dionysius, with his additions.

² Diodor. xii. 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 5.

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies, who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their betrayer—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius. Leontini thus became again an independent city.¹

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The horsemen whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before which he was liable to be arraigned—as he himself had arraigned his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of this sort, he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which came spontaneously tendered by the Cartha-

B.C. 405.
Propositions of peace come from Imilkon. Terms of peace.

¹ Xenophon (Hellen. ii. 3, 5) states that "the Leontines, co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from Dionysius and the Syracusans."

This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction as

what Diodorus notices (xiii. 113). Leontini, recognised as independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv. 14). It had been annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.

ginian general. Peace was concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions, and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep, besides, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina may be re-occupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikeli inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.¹

4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her, either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore of Sicily—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina, the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper, which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way somewhat confused.² And when we read, as one of the articles

Collusion of Dionysius with the Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence in the Carthaginian army.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 114. Καὶ Συρακούσιους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου τετάχθαι, &c.

² Diodor. xiii. 114.

Diodorus begins this chapter with the words—Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκάζομενος Ἰμῖλκων, ἐπεψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα, παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ' ὑπακούσαντος τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, &c.

Now there is not the smallest

matter of fact either mentioned or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian camp—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina—the occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians—the disorder, mutiny, and partial dispersion of the

in the treaty, the express and formal provision that "The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius"—we discern plainly, that there was also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to Syracuse and recognising its autonomy, could have no interest in dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognise by formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly conclude that he had purchased the favour from them by some underhand service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and Agathoklès—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards—availed themselves of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of Syracuse.¹

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers. The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.²

army of Dionysius in its retreat—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is nothing in all this to which *ἐπίπαις* can refer. But a few lines farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified, Diodorus alludes to the terrible disease (*ὄντος τῆς νόσου*) which laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it before.

I find in Niebuhr (*Vorträge über alte Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus "intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any editor." Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the

place, and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it—since the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was still at Gela.

Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of Gela through miserable generalship—that he lost it by design, as suitable to his political projects—and that by the terms of the subsequent treaty, he held the territory round Syracuse only under Carthaginian supremacy.

¹ Justin, xxii. 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.

² Diodor. xiii. 114.

It was in the summer of 405 B.C. that this treaty was concluded, which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendancy and power of Athens, and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The Dekarchies and Harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way, to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of Greece.¹

B.C. 405.

Near coincidence in time, of this peace with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy of Sparta with Dionysius.

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress, depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be re-occupied by their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls—with all traces of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers—and under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence. No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Depressed condition of the towns of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 10.

The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is emphatically

denounced by Isokratēs, Orat. iv. (Panegyric.) s. 145; Orat. vii. (De Pace) s. 122.

Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for Dionysius.¹ It had been brought about under him, though not as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him as the saviour of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity, before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favourable opportunity, to resist.

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall, provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind, immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient places for transacting business, porticoes spacious enough to shelter a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort, destined for a public magazine of corn.² It suited his purpose that the trade

¹ Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on this occasion as the envious of Syracuse, does not insist upon extraordinary valour and ability on their parts, but assigns the result mainly to fortune and the favour of the gods (Plato, *Epistol. viii.* p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).

His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at Syracuse, between the party of freedom and the descendants of

Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case as he can, in favour of the title of both the two latter to the gratitude of the Syracusans.

He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).

² That this was the position of the fortified *horrea publica* at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv. 21. I think we may presume that they

of the town should be carried on, and the persons of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbour or Portus Lakkus. Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbour, closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time, though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but enabling him to attack them whenever he chose—and making him master, at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against foreign enemies.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents, was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the islet or interior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in the citadel—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept Syracuse in subjection.¹ Having provided houses for his soldiers, by extruding the residents in Ortygia—he proceeded to assign to them a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of proprietors, and re-appropriation of lands, without. He distributed anew the

He assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he distributes the lands of Syracuse anew.

were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they form a natural part of his scheme.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 7.

The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters of his

mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within Ortygia—are noticed in Plato's account of his visit to the younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350; Epist. iii. p. 315).

entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command of his mercenaries—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.¹

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands, Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be confiscated, and would fall into his possession for re-assignment. It would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and re-appropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as amounting to about 10,000.² To ensure landed properties to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice. How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from Dionysius into a

¹ Diodor. xiv. 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τῆς μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξέλεψε καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἔδωκεν αὐτὸς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας καταγεμένους· τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐμέριον ἐπίσης ἐξέλεψε καὶ πολίτην, συμπεριλαμβῶν τῶν τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἡλευθερωμένους δοῦλους, οὓς ἐκάλεε νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐχίας τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, τῇ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Νήσου τοῦτα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μετὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει.

δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀντιθέτου καὶ ὡς ἐδόκει διψηχέαι, &c.

² Diodor. xiv. 78.

So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks of his military force as having been βαρβάρων, μυριάδων φυλαχῇ (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little pretence to numerical accuracy.

traditional observance for future anti-popular governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native Syracusan residents.¹

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that the pecuniary cost of such fortification must have been very heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know. Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years, the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is, 20 per cent. per annum upon their whole property.² To what years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the favourable opportunity of excluding Dionysius when the Horsemen were actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came back from Gela.³

Exorbitant
exactions of
Dionysius
—discon-
tent at
Syracuse.

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries,

¹ Cicero in Verrem, v. 82, 84; 88, 98.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορά τῶν τελῶν (τυραννικὴν ἐστὶ)

ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἑπασσεν εὐαγγελοχίμαιαι τεταταμένη.

³ Diodorus, xiv. 7.

B.C. 404-403.

Dionysius marches out of Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers at Herbesa—Dorikus the commander is slain.

Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly of armed Syracusan citizens, under a commander named Dorikus. While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most mutinous speakers;¹ upon which the soldiers rushed forward in a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves again with loud shouts free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every effort to recover their liberty.

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to Messênê and Rhégium, as well as to Corinth, for aid;

¹ Diodor. xiv. 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 130).

while they at the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as to the Lesser Harbour.¹ A considerable naval force was sent to their aid from Messênè and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him up on the sea-side; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikotelês as adviser.² The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert him.

Several of the mercenaries attracted by such offers, as well as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which characterises the first burst of a popular movement, actually came over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade, brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack. And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion; discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by a dishonourable flight. There remained but one means of rescue; to purchase the immediate aid of a body of 1200 mercenary Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed

Despair of Dionysius — he applies to a body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 8.² Diodor. xiv. 10.

probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends—Helôris and Megaklês—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was the only honourable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged away by the leg.¹ Accordingly Dionysius determined to hold out, without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians, with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty the possession of Syracuse.

To gain time for their arrival by deluding and disarming the assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed about the country to their various lands and properties. The same difficulty of keeping a popular

He amneses the assailants with feigned submission—arrival of the Campanians—victory of Dionysius.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 5; xx. 78. Isokratês, Or. vi. (Archidamus) sect. 49.

It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation had been made by another person (Plutarch, Pion, c. 35).

The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as

having been delivered by Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv. 22).

Isokratês, while recording the saying, represents it as having been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the earlier occasion named by Diodorus.

force long together for any military operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,¹ was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the sudden arrival of the Campanians,² who, attacking and defeating them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of 300 fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed Horsemen, declared in favour of throwing it up altogether and joining the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Aehradina. He was victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity. He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder; for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna, where no less than 7000 hoplites were now assembled along with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance

¹ Herodotus, v. 71; Thucydides, i. 112.

² It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse, passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv.

9). But if we look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed anywhere near to it.

towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well-treated, in hopes of inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.¹

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and re-established in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption (as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for his restoration, he was well-aware that they were utterly faithless, and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against him.² But he adopted other more efficient means for strengthening his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikotelês, who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or less of free government—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikotelês, whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendancy of Sparta in defence of their freedom,³ he

¹ Diodor. xiv. 9.

² Diodor. xiv. 9. The subsequent proceedings of the Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the southwestern portion of Sicily—Diod. xiv. 48), where they were welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the

night they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of the town for themselves.

³ Diodor. xiv. 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον, ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακοῦσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι καταλιπεῖν τὴν δουλοκρασίαν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ σκευοῦσας

gained their confidence, and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted in the conspiracy against their liberties.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses in the city to be searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther proceeded to construct additional fortifications round the islet of Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her imperial ascendancy;¹ and by the presence of the mighty Lysander at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.² The Spartan alliance however did not prevent him from enrolling among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and Kephallenia with no other possession left except their arms³—and whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.

αὐξῆσαι τὴν τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ αὐγκατασχευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχήν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξω τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ' Ἀριστοῦς καταπλεύσας εἰς Συρακοῦσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρᾳ περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τοὺς τε Συρακουσίους ἀνασειῶν, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνέειλεν, ἀφηγοῦμενον τῶν Συρακουσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσας, τὰς προόδους, τὸν μὲν τύραννον (τυγυρόν)

κοτέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν ἄμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv. 70.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὥς ἂν ἔργοις ᾗδῃ πείραν εἰληφώς, ὅτι πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακοῦσιν χάρις· οὐδὲ μὴ δουλεύειν.

² Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

³ Diodor. xiv. 34.

So large a mercenary force, while the people at Syracuse were prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian (Chalchidic or Ionic) cities, Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—the Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalchidic cities were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians, when it had been declared independent. Naxos and Katana had contrived to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation,¹ yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it; upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita.

His march in this direction, however, was little more than a feint, for the purpose of masking his real views upon Naxos and Katana, with both which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general of Katana, and Proklês, general of Naxos, were both carrying on corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed, Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with an Ennean citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the sceptre of his native town—by promises of assistance, on condition of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius: who resented this proceeding so

¹ Diodor. iv. 70

vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxos and Katana had taken effect.

At length the terms were fully settled. Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful garrison. Naxos was next put into his hands, by the like corruption on the part of Proklês; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his possession hostages for their fidelity;¹ the site of Naxos, to the indigenous Sikels in the neighbourhood. These captures struck so much terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.²

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonidês, the Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of Alæsa.³

¹ Diodor. xiv. 16.

² Diodor. xiv. 15.

³ Diodor. xiv. 16. This Archonidês may probably have been son of the Sikel prince Archonidês, who, hav-

ing taken active part as an ally of Nikias and the Athenien invaders against Syracuse, died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii. 1).

Great power of Dionysius. Foundation of Alæsa by Archonidês.

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First, he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all contingences. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had im-
 pressed valuable lessons on the mind of every
 Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh
 blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried
 from sea to sea; which was actually more than
 half completed, and would have been entirely
 completed, had the original commander been
 Demosthenês instead of Nikias. The prodigious
 importance of the slope of Epipolæ to the safety of the
 city had been demonstrated by the most unequivocal evi-
 dence. In a preceding volume, I have already described
 the site of Syracuse and the relation of this slope to the
 outer city called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent
 west of Achradina. It was bordered, along both the north
 side and the south side, by lines of descending cliff, cut
 down precipitously, about twenty feet deep in their lowest
 part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at the summit
 of the slope, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or
 road between elevated banks, which communicated with
 the country both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ
 thus formed a triangle upon an inclined plane, sloping up-
 ward from its base, the outer wall of Achradina, to its
 apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed, the
 one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of
 cliffs. This apex formed a post of the highest importance,
 commanding the narrow road which approached Epipolæ
 from its western extremity or summit, and through which

B.C. 400-397.
 Resolution
 of Diony-
 sius to
 make war
 upon Car-
 thage.

Locality of
 Syracuse—
 danger to
 which the
 town had
 been ex-
 posed, in
 the Athe-
 nian siege.

alone it was easy for an army to get on the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep, though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.¹ Unless an enemy acquired possession of this slope, Syracuse could never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great Harbour; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the slope of Epipolæ. I have already described how the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half finished—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward down to the Great Harbour, and being partially completed from the same point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the outer wall of Achradina, a cross-wall traversing their intended line of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of junction carried down the slope of Epipolæ.²

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenitês. The outer city of Syracuse was thus left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide for Syracuse a protection

Additional fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of the cliffs of Epipolæ, up to the Euryalus.

¹ See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari — Zur Topographie von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.

² See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Oh. LIX., LX.—and the Appendix

at the end of the preceding volume, illustrated by two plans of the city and its environs.

The reader will also find at the end of the present volume, a Plan of Syracuse as it stood after the additions made by Dionysius.

substantially similar to that contrived by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent. He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê (which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the summit of that slope at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became connected together—not as in the time of Gylippus,¹ by a single cross-wall out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the slope of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but—by one continuous new line bordering the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn, some of them four feet in length.² The quarries at hand supplied abundant materials, and for the labour necessary, Dionysius brought together all the population of the city and its neighbourhood, out of whom he selected 60,000 of the most effective hands to work on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry, while 6000 teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of 100 feet each to regiments of suitable number, each under the direction of an overseer.³

As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud, violence, and spoliation for the purpose of establishing his own dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandising himself by new conquests on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia, a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself against the people of Syracuse—it was a valuable protection to the people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers. It tended much to guarantee Syracuse

Popularity of the work—effort made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius himself

¹ Thucyd. vi. 75.
² Diodor. xiv. 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have been

cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.

³ Diodor. xiv. 18.

from those disasters which had so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly, it was exceedingly popular among the Syracusans, and produced between them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had not before been seen. Every man laboured at the work not merely with goodwill, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanour,¹ proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way. Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled, often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution; at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen preserved to us of ancient fortification.² To bring them into such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days. Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its line, leaving towers, gates, &c. to be added afterwards.

To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however, was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.

B.C. 390-398.

Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against the Carthaginians.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθήμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βᾶρος, ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ἀπαδείκνυσ, &c.

Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—

μισοῦντες τὸ βᾶρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων ἐπιβρατείας, &c.

² According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the architect

Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change. The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and conciliation.¹ Where the system had before been so fraught with positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express order by no means repesented the whole amount of evil which they suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the entire harbour, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens, or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and house-property by wholesale.² Now, while the despot himself was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny, would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians, thought it prudent

under whose directions the excavations were made in 1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).

¹ Diodor. xiv. 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ

ἡδὴ τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλενθρωπότερον ἤρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονέων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, καὶ ἀπὲρ εἰώθει.

² Diodor. xiv. 7.

to soften the rigour of his own proceedings; since his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made it now his interest to conciliate some measure of good-will from the Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage, the Syracusans cordially sympathised in the aggressive schemes of Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a restoration of the arms snatched from them.¹

Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines, in spite of their fellowship of race, had refused the invitation of Nikias² to lend assistance, being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxos and Katana, with the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen, the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now driven from Ætna and the other neighbouring cities to

n.c. 399-398.

His conciliatory offers to other Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines towards him. Their application to Messenæ.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 45.

² Thucyd. vi. 46.

Rhegium), confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succour should be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to Messênê, soliciting cooperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent plea that the ruin of Naxos and Katana could not be passed over, either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbours on either side of the strait. These representations made so much impression on the generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly, they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier—6000 Rhegine and 4000 Messenian hoplites—600 Rhegine and 400 Messenian horsemen—with 50 Rhegine triremes. But when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked. Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single-handed, went home also.¹

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now re-conducted them back to Syracuse, and listened favourably to propositions for peace which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.² He was anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might find no Grecian allies to cooperate with them in Sicily. He acquired an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired, we do not know. He farther endeavoured to open an intimate connexion with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important benefits, both in territorial

He makes peace with Messênê and Rhegium. He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed.

¹ Diodor. v. 40

² Diodor. vi. 40

aggrandisement and in other ways. After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the recent destroyer of Naxos and Katana; and it appears that some of the speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for him.¹ Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal reply or resolution of the assembly²), it left the bitterest animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request, with similar offers, at the neighbouring city of Lokri; where it was favourably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandisement to themselves out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted (Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-balanced aristocracy. The marital connexion now contracted by Dionysius with a Lokrian female, Doris the daughter of a citizen of distinction named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow of the oligarchy of Lokri.³ And even among the Lokrians, the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named Aristeidēs (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge

He makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is granted—he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 44, 106, 107.

² Diodorus, where he first mentions the answer, does not give this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to it as having been said to be (φασί) so comprised (xiv. 44-107).

³ Aristot. Polit. v. 6, 7. Ἐτι διὰ τὸ πάσαις τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας

ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνωρίμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσαὶ ἐργάζονται, καὶ ἔξουσι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ἑταροὺς θέλωσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδεύσεως· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, εὐδὲ ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμυγμένη.

for this bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeidēs to be put to death.¹

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage; which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint, partly by allurements, all the best engineers, mechanists, armourers, artisans, &c., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric tribes round the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, &c., from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a bustling military workshop—not only the market-places, porticoes, palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties; especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called *Catapulta*, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that the shields

B.C. 398-397.

Immense
warlike
equipment
of Dionysius
at
Syracuse—
arms, engines,
&c.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation were not less than 140,000 in number, and the breast-plates 14,000, many of them unrivalled in workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets, spears, daggers, &c., with other arms and weapons in indefinite variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.¹ The magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of his son.²

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on the well-clothed slopes of *Ætna* and the Calabrian Apennines; teams of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment of Syracuse comprised 110 triremes; the existing docks contained 150 ship-houses, or covered slips for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith undertook the construction of 160 new ship-houses, each competent to hold two vessels—and then commenced the building of new ships of war to the number of 200; while he at the same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinoklês;³ it was not until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes had become extensively employed; nor had any

Naval preparations in the harbour of Syracuse—very great also. Enlargement of the build of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 42, 43.

The historian Philistius had described with much minuteness these warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged

from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv. ed. Marx and ed. Didot).

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

³ Thucyd. i. 13.

larger vessels ever been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood pre-eminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship's direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy's ship with the beak of their own—so, if the size of their ship had been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when fighting against the latter in the confined harbour of Syracuse,¹ they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of triremes.² Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than Greece had ever conceived.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.³ Their sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts, for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

After the material means for war had thus been completed—an operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three years—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius were not less aspiring. Besides his

n.o. 398-397.

General sympathy of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage.

He hires soldiers from all quarters.

¹ Thucyd. vii. 36-62.

² Diodor. xiv. 42.

³ Diodor. xiv. 41. Συμπροσθμυ-
μείων δὲ τῶν Συρακούσων τῇ τοῦ

Διονυσίου προεπιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέ-
βαινε γενέσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν περὶ
τὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν κατασκευὴν.

own numerous standing force, he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens, as well as from cities in his dependency. He sent friendly addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire, he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean were hired also.¹ He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction, in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and well-stocked armoury (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native and appropriate weapons.²

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two wives—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use made of one among his newly-invented quinquere vessels, was to sail to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver, for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white horses.³ He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his house on the same day; no one knew which bed-chamber he visited first; and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the younger; and four

n.c. 397.

He celebrates his nuptials with two wives on the same day—Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good feeling at Syracuse towards him.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 43, 44, 45.

² Diodor. xiv. 41.

³ Diodor. xiv. 44; xvi. 8.

by Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless; which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.¹ It was the rumour at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man's mind was full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and bed-chamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except either his wives or his daughters.²

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage (he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans, this ought to be an imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.³

¹ Pintarch, *Dion. c. 8.*

xiv. 2.

² Cicero, *Tusc. Disp. v. 20, 57-68;*

³ Diodor, xiv. 45.

Valer. Maxim. ix. 13; Diodor.

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war, though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage; whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join him.¹

He desires to arrest the emigration of those who were less

the Carthaginian dominion than of his.

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man. And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission, which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels belonging to Carthage in the harbour, so that the plunder was lucrative.² But though such may have been the case in ordinary times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances, any Carthaginian (person or property) can

B.C. 397-396.

He grants permission to plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm at Carthage—suffering in Africa from the pestilence.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 41.

² Diodor. xiv. 46.

There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some consideration, who resided at Carthage and seemed to have continued resident there throughout the war between the Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv. 77). We should infer, from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it

affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.

For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii. 169; Livy, xxiv. 6.

Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician inscription signifying *The Island*—which was the usual denomination of Ortygia (Movere, *Dio Phœnizier*, ii. 2. p. 327).

have been at Syracuse except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced, not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage¹) can have been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment, when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which herald was not sent until after the licence for private plunder had been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,² as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second and third years of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort and heard with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was however no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian possessions.³

The first news that reached them was indeed appalling.

Dionysius
marches out
from Syra-
cuse with a
prodigious
army
against the
Carthagi-
nians in
Sicily.

Dionysius had marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign, accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries of Gelon had been struck with awe⁴ at the superiority of his force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius. More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for the same purpose of liberating the

¹ Diodor. xiv. 55. Τοῦτο δ' ἐμπα-
νήσατο (ἱμῖλκων) πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν
κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατα-
πλοῦν τῇ Διονυσίῳ, &c.

² Diodor. xiv. 46, 47.

³ Diodor. xiv. 47.

⁴ Herodot. vii. 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος
πρήγματα μεγάλα ελέγετο εἶναι, οὐδα-
μῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω
Compere c. 110-162.

maritime cities of Sicily subject to Carthage;¹ cities whose number and importance had since fearfully augmented.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage; whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border, and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and the other conquered cities.² The Hellenic war-practice, in itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These "Sicilian vespers," which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured. Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear, however, from

Insurrection against Carthage, among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures inflicted on the Carthaginians.

¹ Herodot. vii. 158. Gelon's speech to the Lacedæmonians who come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.

Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμὲν πρότερον δεηθέντες βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπέψασθαι, ἔτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνέηκτο. . . . ὑποτεινοντές τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, &c.

² Diodor. xiv. 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν, ἀλλὰ

καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πάσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβρι, εἰς τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημνεύοντες ὡ, αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸ, ὕστερον χρόνον, ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδάχθῃ, καὶ μηκέτι παραιομεῖν εἰς τοὺς ὑποπεσόντας.

their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart; while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties with less humanised neighbours, contributed to lower in the Sicilian Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterised the Hellenic race in its own home.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of 80,000 men, besides more than 3000 cavalry; while the ships of war which accompanied him along the coast were nearly 200, and the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than 500. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately north of Cape Lilybæum.¹

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily—Motyê, Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis—Motyê was at once the nearest to the mother-city,² the most important, and the most devoted. It was situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet, separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole, so as to form a regular, though narrow footpath. It was populous, wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbours and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful a force—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of defence. They broke up their mole, again insulated themselves from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in conjunction with his principal

Situation of
Motyê—
operations
of the siege
—vigorous
defence.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 47.

² Thucyd. vi. 2; Pausan. v. 25, 3.

engineers. It deserves notice, that this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.¹

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptinæus with a portion of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with the remainder laid waste the neighbouring territory dependent on or allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness, without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.² Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyæ with the utmost ardour, and with all the appliances which his engineers could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbour, he undertook the laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth) which divided Motyæ from the main island;³—or at least as much of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbour of Syracuse, in hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to detach a portion of his fleet from Motyæ. Though the attack, however, was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbour, yet the assailants were beaten off without making

Dionysius overruns the neighbouring dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of Motyæ—appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is obliged to return.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 48. Διογύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονῶν κατεσκεψάμενος τοὺς τοίχους, &c.

Artemon the engineer was consulted by Periklēs at the siege of Samos (Pintarch, Periklēs, c. 27).

² Diodor. xiv. 48, 49.

³ Diodor. xiv. 49. ἐχώνους τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἔμα τῇ τοῦ χωματός ἀξίῃσαι προσήγαγε τοῖς ταίχεσι.

any more serious impression, or creating the diversion intended.¹ Imilkon next made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they lay hauled ashore in the harbour near Motyê. Crossing over from Carthage by night, with 100 ships of war, to the Selinuntine coast, he sailed round cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbour prepared to attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been got afloat. As the harbour was too confined to enable Dionysius to profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been saved by his numerous land-force and artillery on the beach. Showers of missiles, from this assembled crowd, as well as from the decks of the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta, of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbour, but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in breadth, which separated the harbour of Motyê from the outer sea. Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and quinqueremes, the strength and ardour of the army sufficed for this toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but returned at once back to Africa.²

Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory, and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê

Desperate
defence of
Motyê. It
is at length
taken by a
nocturnal
attack.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 50.

² Diodor. xiv. 50; Polyænus, v. 2, §.

itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault. While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork, and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines took fire in the wood-work, and it was not without difficulty that the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first, remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near, but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyènes, resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform. For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyènes became each day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to their night's repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be undisturbed, he one fatal night took them by

surprise, sending the Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a position within the town before resistance could be organized. In vain did the Motyênes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavour to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought up across the artificial earthway to confirm their success, and the town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which continued even after it had become hopeless.¹

The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain, in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step, which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments, and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those who had distinguished themselves; 100 minæ being given to Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the surviving Motyênes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;² a specimen of the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic neighbours and enemies.

Plunder of
Motyê—
the inhabit-
ants either
slaughtered
or sold for
slaves

¹ Diodor. xiv. 51, 52, 53.

² Diodor. xiv. 53.

The siege of Motyè having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius now re-conducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a large portion of his fleet, 120 ships, under the command of his brother Leptinès; who was instructed to watch for the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in besieging the neighbouring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful, through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy's camp, with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighbouring territory dependent upon Carthage.¹

B.C. 396.

Further operations of Dionysius.

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus, to 100,000 men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily by 30,000 more—and in the more ample computations of Ephorus, to 300,000 foot, 4000 horse, 400 chariots of war, 400 ships of war, and 6000 transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at Carthage,² even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise him of all movements or public orders.

B.C. 396.

Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—his successful operations—he retakes Motyè.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 54.

Leptinès was brother of Dionysius (xiv. 102; xv. 7), though he afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius—a marriage not condemned by Grecian sentiment.

² Justin. xx. 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who, from political enmity to Hanno, wrote

letters in Greek to communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn Greek—either to write it or to speak it.

But Imilkon, to obviate knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land, gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place of rendezvous.¹ The transports made directly for that port, without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of war approached the harbour of Motyê and sailed from thence along the coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was found practicable; while Leptinês on his side was even fortunate enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost vessels of the large transport fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He destroyed no less than fifty of them, with 5000 men, and 200 chariots of war; yet the remaining fleet reached the port in safety, and were joined by Imilkon with the ships of war. The land-force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian, having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout defence.²

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which
 B.C. 396-395. had cost him so much blood and toil during the
 preceding summer. We are surprised to learn
 Dionysius that he made no effort to prevent its re-capture,
 retires to that he was then not far off, besieging Egesta
 Syracuse. —and though his soldiers, elate with the successes of the
 preceding year, were eager for a general battle. But
 Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous, resolved
 to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
 he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would
 have been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse,
 carrying with him some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded
 to evacuate their abode in the Carthaginian neighbourhood,
 promising to provide them with better homes elsewhere.
 Most of them however declined his offers; some (among

¹ Diodor. xiv. 54, Polyænus, v. 10, 1.² Diodor. xiv. 55.

them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result of moment—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.¹

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished by recent misfortune—resolved to turn his arms against Imilkon
captures
Messênê. Messênê in the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched—so little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good repair—and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.² Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his fleet coasting in the same direction to cooperate with him. He made terms with Kephalaëdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that "to carry water" meant, of course, "to be a slave;" hence the Messenians, persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out their chosen military force to

¹ Diodor. xiv. 55.

² Diodor. xiv. 56, 57. τῶν ἱσίων
ἐκείνων ἐν Συρακούσαις ὄντων, &c.
... δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν ταχὺν
ἐσθλασμένων, &c. τὰ τείχη κατα-

περὶ τὰ, &c.

Compere another example of in-
attention to the state of their walls,
on the part of the Messenians
(xix. 63).

meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbour of the city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders. A north wind so favoured the advance of the ships, that they entered the harbour full sail, and found the city on that side almost unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened back, but were too late; while Imilkon himself also, pushing forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the neighbouring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels; while about 200 of them near the harbour, cast themselves into the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.²

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly defended—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally, and lessened his facilities for obtaining succour from Italy. But most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly burnt and demolished; a task, which his numerous host are said to have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything but ruins without a trace of human residence.³ He received adhesion and reinforcements

¹ Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar *manœuvre* (Thucyd. v. 2).

² Diodor. xiv. 57.

³ Diodor. xiv. 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσηνίας τὰ τειχῆ κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιωταῖς καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μῆτε κέραρον, μῆθ' ὕλην, μῆτ' ἄλλο μὲν ὑπο-

λιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίβαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ τῶν οὐρα-
τιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν
ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις ἀγνωστος
ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκίσθαι
συνέβηκεν. Ὅρων γάρ τὸν τόπον πόρρω
μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχιδῶν πόλεων
πεχωρισμένον, εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν
περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προήρητο δευτε-

from most of the Sikels¹ of the interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians, with their city probably unwallled. But anxious as they were to escape from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxos—to the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavourably celebrated among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon, who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of Taurus, a fortified post which formed the beginning of the city afterwards known as Tauromenium.² Magon was sent with the Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê, exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence on her northern frontier. Naxos and Katana being both unfortified, he was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontiri his chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications of the city as well as those of the neighbouring country forts, wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile plains around. He had still a force of 30,000 foot and more than 3000 horse: he had also a fleet of 180 ships of war—triremes and others. During the year preceding, he had brought out both a land-force and a naval force much superior to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he could now command no more, even for defence and at home—or what had become of the remainder—we are not told. Of

Provisions
of Diony-
sius for the
defence of
Syracuse—
his strength-
ens
Leontini—
he advances
to Katana
with his
land army
as well as
his fleet.

θάτερον, ἢ τελῶς ἀοίκητον διατρεῖν
ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν πλείων
αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.

Ἐναποδείξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς
Ἕλληνας μίσους ἐν τῇ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ
ἀτυχίᾳ, &c.

It would appear, however, that

the demolition of Messênê can
hardly have been carried so far in
fact as Imilkon intended; since
the city re-appears shortly after-
wards in renewed integrity

¹ Diodor. xiv. 69-76.

² Diodor. xiv. 69.

the 180 ships of war, 60 were only manned by the extraordinary proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible among Carthaginians as well as Greeks—indeed throughout most part of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of 1000 mercenary auxiliaries.¹ Having thus provided the best defence that he could throughout the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force to Katana, having his fleet also moving in cooperation, immediately off shore.

Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving, in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon intended himself to march with the land-force on shore, keeping constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon was sailing southward towards Katana.

Dionysius availed himself of this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately. The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of 500 sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen—that is, furnished with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars. But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand to cooperate with his fleet; an advantage, which in ancient naval warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the enemy's means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he

B.O. 396-395.
Naval battle
off Katana
—great vic-
tory of the
Carthagi-
nian fleet
under
Magon.

¹ Diodor. v. 58

came in sight of the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet rowing up to attack him—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly to accept the battle. Leptinês, the Syracusan admiral—though ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible, in consequence of his inferior numbers—attacked with boldness, and even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers presently closed round him, and after a desperate combat, fought in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels; and in the end, no less than 100 of the Syracusan ships, with 20,000 men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could render no assistance. The neighbouring water became strewed, both with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was dearly purchased.¹

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged, yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable—partly as visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph for encouragement

n.c. 395-394.
Arrival of
Imilkon to
join the
fleet of
Magon near
Katana—
fruitless
invitation
to the
Campanians
of Ætna.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 60.

to his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the arrival of Imilkon.¹ The latter, after no very long interval, came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians were now again in cooperation. While allowing his troops some days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage (which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.² The Campanians of Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best soldiers were now serving.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them again to the scene of action, that they might either

B.O. 395-394.

Dionysius
retreats to
Syracuse —
discontent
of his army.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodorus at Syracuse afterwards (c. 65), from which we gather a more complete idea of what passed after the battle.

² Diodor. xiv. 61. Καὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν γένος ἀπεδείκνυε πλε-

μὴν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχυρῶν.

These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the various neighbours of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to notice, though they are not often brought before us.

assail the Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious fleet might sail thither, enter the harbour, and possess himself of the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies; who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.¹

Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing, if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies. He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.² Polyxenus his brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.³

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the Great Harbour was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of the second

¹ Diodor. xiv. 61.

² Diodor. xiv. 61.

³ Diodor. xiv. 63.

Polyxenus (v. 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of *Leptinês*, practised

in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to Sicily, on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may be the Lacedæmonian division intended.

Athenian

B. C. 395-394.

Imilkon marches close up to Syracuse—the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy the Great Harbour—their imposing entry. Fortified position of Imilkon near the Harbour.

armament, when Demosthenês first exhibited its brilliant but short-lived force.¹ Two hundred and eight ships of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order and adorned with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. There were followed by transports, 500 of them carrying soldiers, and 1000 otherwise either empty or bringing stores and machines. The total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost 2000, covering a large portion of the Great Harbour.² The numerous land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of war also, being divided into two fleets of 100 ships each, showed themselves in face of the two interior harbours or docks (on each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land) wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was accepted.

Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern entrance of the harbour, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbour, midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp, near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous

¹ Thucyd. vii. 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii. 11.

² Diodor. xiv. 62 The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require no lectural alteration

which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not so as to remove all that is obscure. The word *σισαομας* still remains to be explained or corrected

tombs around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.¹

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis, wherein were situated the temples of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, which he stripped of their rich treasures.² But if such was his plan, he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise, however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbour, and his left arm northward to the sea at Trogilius. As far as we are able to make out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the slope of Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbour and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ; so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around remained partially open on two sides—westward, through the Euryalus at the upper extremity of Epipolæ—and northward towards Thapsus and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern

Imilkon
plunders
the suburb
of Achra-
dina—
blockades
Syracuse by
sea.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 63.

² Diodor. xiv. 63. Κατελάβετε δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδίνης προαστεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νέους τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσώλησαν.

Cicero (in Verrem, iv. 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Tementêes, as among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the

identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of Achradina. This identity, recognised by Serra di Falco, Colonel Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Soverio Covollari, on grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

See Colonel Leake, Notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.

cliff of Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification, which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least on two sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much stronger than the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle, yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and Leptinês went forth themselves from the harbour with armed squadrons to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly raised their spirits.

One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to Imilkon's fleet being seen entering the Great Harbour, the Syracusans suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into their own dock.

To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They captured the admiral's ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded, challenging the enemy to battle.¹ As the challenge was not accepted, they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public with unbounded exultation. "Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies; under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any longer?" Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the consciousness that they were now all

Naval victory gained by the Syracusan fleet, during the absence of Dionysius.

Effect of this victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 63, 64.

armed and competent to extort freedom—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to produce and re-distribute the arms which he had previously taken from them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence, promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.¹

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly, when a citizen named Theodorus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman or Knight—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately and were well known to feel.²

Public meeting convened by Dionysius—mutinous spirit against him—vehement speech by Theodorus.

Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by Theodorus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review, and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius, concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves from his dominion. "Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is a worse enemy than the

¹ Diodor. xiv. 64.

² Diodor. xiv. 64. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλα τοιοῦτων λόγων, γινόμενων, Διονύσιος γασπελευας, καὶ συναγαγών, ἐκκλησίαν, ἔπηνει τοὺς Συρακοῦσιους, καὶ παρεκάλει θάρσειν, επαγγελλόμενος ταχέως

καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἦδ' οὐδ' αὐτοῦ μελλόντος διαλύειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακοῦσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν εὐδοκίμων, καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πραγματικὸς, ἀπετολμήσας περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοιοῦτοις γρησασθαι λόγοις.

Carthaginians; who, if victorious, would be satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused our confidence—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate him general—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice. He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has compelled him to restore—and these, if we are men, we shall now employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”¹

“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous, it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally. He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our Grecian brethren

¹ Diodor. xiv. 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μεν ἱερὰ σὺλγους, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλοῦτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν νεκρομένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος, τοὺς οἰκίτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείᾳ. . . .

ο. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων θύλοις τερρομένη, κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιτετείσχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφρων, πλοῦτος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῶν Συρακουσίων ᾗθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης βαρβάρων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλομότητος πλεονεξία κρινῶν πράττειν πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχουσι τῆς γῶρας· Διοῦσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τῇ τυρκενίδᾳ συναυξήσιν ἐδωρήσατο. . . .

. . . . Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους

δὴν μάχας ἐνστυγάμενος, ἐν ἐνατέρις ἡττῆται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολιταῖς πιστευθεὶς ἀπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθὺς ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλθούσιν· φοβούμενος τοὺς παρόρηται, ἀγοίτας ὑπὲρ τῶν νόμων, φεγεῖσθαι, δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν φεγεῖσθαι, γυναικας οἰκίταις καὶ μιγάσι, ἀνθρωποῖς συιοιζών, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅκλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους. . . .

ο. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυρόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σευληγόντα;

ο. 68. Διόπερ ἕτεροι, ἡγεμόνα ζητήσαντες, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σευληγόντα τοὺς τῶν θεῶν, τοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ, θεομαχῶμεν. . . .

and neighbours of Naxos and Katana; transferring the latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former. He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage. He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence; not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him, we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

"Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus) in place of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens—or from our metropolis Corinth—or from the Spartans, the presidents of all Greece."

Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus; the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the Syracusans—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over them—these are assertions of

Sympathy
excited by
the speech
in the Syra-
cusan as-
sembly.

matters of fact, which coincide in the main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words, Theodorus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta, against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas. That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodorus.

Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier period of her history.¹ Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodorus, and stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in Sicily.² Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the Thirty tyrants of Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in the acropolis.³ Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself emphatically in favour of the despot; intimating that he had been sent to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians—not to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this declaration was denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence, not without unavailing curses

¹ Thucyd. i. 18; Herodot. v. 92.

² Diodor. xiv. 70. Τοιοῦτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησθένους λόγοις, οἱ μὲν Συρακούσαιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀτίβλητον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦτος τῷ, συμ-

μάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκουν ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

³ Diodor. xiv. 70. 'Ο δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχω, οἰκτιρῶς, &c.: compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 14.

against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius, thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste round his person—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a free spokesman was heard.¹ And he was thus enabled to dismiss an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodorus, well aware that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander, with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within. Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril. The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued throughout the Grecian world.

Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been assisted to escape. Under the first impression of alarm, he strove to gain something like popularity; by conciliatory language and demeanour, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to his table.² Whatever may have been the

Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius—suitable to her general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended upon Pharakidas.

Dionysius tries to gain popularity.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 70. Παρά δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς ἀποστάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον, οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσινοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἶχον, πολλὰ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρωμένοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ Ἀτρεΐδι-

μόνιος (he is called previously *Aristus*, xiv. 10), ἀντιλαμβανόμενος αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προσότης καὶ τότε Φαρακίδας ἐνίστηται ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων.

² Diodor. xiv. 70.

success of such artifices, the lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us¹) by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground near the Great Harbour, under the chill of morning contrasted with the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper—the rapidity with which it spread from man to man—and the countless victims which it speedily accumulated—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed, the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of 150,000 unburied bodies.² The military strength of the Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.³

¹ Diodor. xiv. 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δεσπονοῦ ἀσθενείᾳ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταῦτο συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, &c.

² Diodor. xiv. 71-76. πανταχοῦδε καὶ μυριάδας ἐπέειδον ἀτάφους διὰ τὸν

λοιμὸν, σταρωσευμένους.

I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as anything more than an indication of a great number.

³ Thucyd. ii. 54.

When the Roman general Mar-

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerning measures for a simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptinês, with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he surprised Plemmyrium¹), and making a circuit until he came, on the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of 1000 mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been made jointly, in the heat of combat, the horsemen fled, leaving their comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.² We have as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate,

Dionysius attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a detachment of his mercenaries.

cellus was besieging Syracuse in 212 B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans, and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished (Livy, xxv. 26).

¹ Thucyd. vii. 22, 23.

² Diodor. xiv. 72 Οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονεξίαις ἀποστάσεις καὶ παραγὰς ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσι, ἣν παρηγγελκώς, δεῖν ἐξάπτωσθαι τῶν πολεμίων, φεῖσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐγκαταλείπειν ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθῆναι, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες κατεκόπησαν.

the gross perfidy of deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed to keep them under his command.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack, first upon the fort of Polchné, next upon that near the naval station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes, ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well-directed, drove against them on the quarter or mid-ships, and broke through the line of their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the best ships were thus speedily disabled.¹ Following up their success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land, the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard; while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.²

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing Syracusan ships of war, and

¹ Diodor. xiv. 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν χιλις ἑκατὶσιν ἐποιοῦντο φόρον, &c.
ἐξοχωτάτων καὶ ὑψιστομένων, αἱ μὲν
ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀπαρτήτομεναι λα-

² Diodor. xiv. 73.

probably also the assailants by land. But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across the breadth of the Great Harbour, it presented a spectacle grand and stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen. The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children, and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the same harbour, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they could find, and rowed across the harbour to the scene of action, where they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and towing away some of the enemy's vessels deserted but not yet on fire. The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon.¹ Though they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at Polichnè and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected and deplorable condition.

Conflagration of the Carthaginian camp—exultation at Syracuse.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence—near Agrigentum and near Gela—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenès, had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbour, long after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise impracticable—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army, and with the Sikels of the interior on his side—had he possessed the good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of anything like that unconquerable energy which

Imilkon concludes a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the Carthaginians, and abandon his remaining army.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 74.

ennobled the closing days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius, unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of 300 talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested. Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The sum of 300 talents was accordingly sent across by night to Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius. During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians, put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbour. Their stealthy flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but also manœuvred some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the rest, with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.¹

Dionysius—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians, with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing—applied himself with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining. During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon, speedily promulgated, had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No command—no common cause—no bond of union—now remained among this miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes. Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius

Destruction
of the re-
maining
Carthagi-
nian army,
except
Sikels and
Iberians.

¹ Diodor. iv. 7.

propositions to transfer to him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans, being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives, and were probably sold as slaves.¹

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as prisoner at Syracuse —yet without anything worse than the usual fate of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he ensured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress. Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans, who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the temples, with words of atonement and supplication—replied to all the inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper—and then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved himself to death.²

Yet the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection; but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived to come back. All the various

Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon.

Danger of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects—at length put down.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 75.

² Diodor. xiv. 70; Justin. xix. 2.

Libyan subject-towns had on this matter one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress, agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to have reached 120,000 men. They established their head quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within short distance of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in the field that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the wrath of the goddesses Dêmêtêr and her daughter Persephonê; who, not content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa. Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have been offered by the sacrifice of human victims—and those too the most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in their city any worship of Dêmêtêr or Persephonê; they now established temples in honour of these goddesses, appointed several of their most eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered. After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Dêmêtêr and Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest. The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her Libyan subjects, were established as they

had previously stood, leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.¹

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign—successful against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage—will come to be recounted in my next succeeding chapter.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 77.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS (*continued*).—FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CARTHAGINIAN ARMY BY PESTILENCE BEFORE SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE DEATH OF DIONYSIUS THE ELDER. B.C. 394—367.

IN my preceding chapter, I described the first eleven years of the reign of Dionysius called the Elder, as despot at Syracuse, down to his first great war against the Carthaginians; which war ended by a sudden turn of fortune in his favour, at a time when he was hard pressed and actually besieged. The victorious Carthaginian army before Syracuse was utterly ruined by a terrible pestilence, followed by ignominious treason on the part of its commander Imilkon.

Within the space of less than thirty years, we read of four distinct epidemic distempers,¹ each of frightful severity, as having afflicted Carthage and her armies in Sicily, without touching either Syracuse or the Sicilian Greeks. Such epidemics were the most irresistible of all enemies to the Carthaginians, and the most effective allies to Dionysius. The second and third—conspicuous among the many fortunate events of his life—occurred at the exact juncture necessary for rescuing him from a tide of superiority in the Carthaginian arms, which seemed in a fair way to overwhelm him completely. Upon what physical conditions the frequent repetition of such a calamity depended, together with the remarkable fact that it was confined to Carthage and her armies—we know

¹ Diodor. xiii. 86-114; xiv. 70; xv. 24. Another pestilence is alluded to by Diodore in 368 B.C. (Diodor. xv. 78.)

Movers notices the intense and frequent sufferings of the ancient

Phœnicians, in their own country, from pestilence; and the fearful religious expiations to which these sufferings gave rise (Die Phönizier, vol. ii. part ii. p. 9).

partially in respect to the third of the four cases, but not at all in regard to the others.

The flight of Imilkon with the Carthaginians from Syracuse left Dionysius and the Syracusans in the full swing of triumph. The conquests made by Imilkon were altogether lost, and the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily was now cut down to that restricted space in the western corner of the island, which it had occupied prior to the invasion of Hannibal in 409 B.C. So prodigious a success probably enabled Dionysius to put down the opposition recently manifested among the Syracusans to the continuance of his rule. We are told that he was greatly embarrassed by his mercenaries; who, having been for some time without pay, manifested such angry discontent as to threaten his downfall. Dionysius seized the person of their commander, the Spartan Aristotelês: upon which the soldiers mutinied and flocked in arms round his residence, demanding in fierce terms both the liberty of their commander and the payment of their arrears. Of these demands, Dionysius eluded the first by saying that he would send away Aristotelês to Sparta, to be tried and dealt with among his own countrymen: as to the second, he pacified the soldiers by assigning to them, in exchange for their pay, the town and territory of Leontini. Willingly accepting this rich bribe, the most fertile soil of the island, the mercenaries quitted Syracuse to the number of 10,000, to take up their residence in the newly assigned town; while Dionysius hired new mercenaries in their place. To these (including perhaps the Iberians or Spaniards who had recently passed from the Carthaginian service into his) and to the slaves whom he had liberated, he entrusted the maintenance of his dominion.¹

B.C. 395.

Mutiny among the mercenaries of Dionysius—Aristotelês their commander is sent away to Sparta.

These few facts, which are all that we hear, enable us to see that the relations between Dionysius and the mercenaries by whose means he ruled Syracuse, were troubled and difficult to manage. But they do not explain to us the full cause of such discord. We know that a short time before, Dionysius had rid himself of 1000 obnoxious mercenaries by treacherously betraying them to

Difficulties of Dionysius arising from his mercenaries—heavy burden of paying them.

death in a battle with the Carthaginians. Moreover, he would hardly have seized the person of Aristotelês, and sent him away for trial, if the latter had done nothing more than demand pay really due to his soldiers. It seems probable that the discontent of the mercenaries rested upon deeper causes, perhaps connected with that movement in the Syracusan mind against Dionysius, manifested openly in the invective of Theodôrus. We should have been glad also to know how Dionysius proposed to pay the new mercenaries, if he had no means of paying the old. The cost of maintaining his standing army, upon whomsoever it fell, must have been burdensome in the extreme. What became of the previous residents and proprietors at Leontini, who must have been dispossessed when this much-coveted site was transferred to the mercenaries? On all these points we are unfortunately left in ignorance.

Dionysius now set forth towards the north of Sicily to re-establish Messênê; while those other Sicilians, who had been expelled from their abodes by the Carthaginians, got together and returned. In reconstituting Messênê after its demolition by Imilkon, he obtained the means of planting there a population altogether in his interests, suitable to the aggressive designs which he was already contemplating against Rhegium and the other Italian Greeks. He established in it 1000 Lokrians,—4000 persons from another city the name of which we cannot certainly make out,¹—and 600 of the Peloponnesian Messenians. These latter had been expelled by Sparta from Zakynthus and Naupaktus at the close of the Peloponnesian war, and had taken service in Sicily with Dionysius. Even here, the hatred of Sparta followed them. Her remonstrances against his project of establishing them in a city of consideration bearing their own ancient name, obliged him to withdraw them: upon which he planted them on a portion of the

¹ Diodor. xiv. 78. Διονύσιος δ' εἰς Μεσσηνίην ναυπηγεῖ χιλίους μὲν Λοκρούς, τετρακισχίλιους δὲ Μεδιμναίους, ἑξαχρεσίους δὲ τῶν ex Πελοποννήσου Μεσσηνίων, ἔκ τε Ζακύνθου καὶ Ναυπάκτου φευγόντων.

The Medunneans are completely unknown. Cluverius and Wesseling conjecture *Medmæans*, from *Medma*

or *Medamæ*, noticed by Strabo as a town in the south of Italy. But this supposition cannot be adopted as certain; especially as the total of persons named is so large. The conjecture of Palmerius—*Μηθύμναιους*—has still less to recommend it. See the note of Wesseling.

Abakene territory on the northern coast. They gave to their new city the name of Tyndaris, admitted many new residents, and conducted their affairs so prudently, as presently to attain a total of 5000 citizens.¹ Neither here, nor at Messênê, do we find any mention made of the re-establishment of those inhabitants who had fled when Imilkon took Messênê, and who formed nearly all the previous population of the city, for very few are mentioned as having been slain. It seems doubtful whether Dionysius re-admitted them, when he re-constituted Messênê. Renewing with care the fortifications of the city, which had been demolished by Imilkon, he placed in it some of his mercenaries as garrison.²

Dionysius next undertook several expeditions against the Sikels in the interior of the island, who had joined Imilkon in his recent attack upon Syracuse. He conquered several of their towns, and established alliances with two of their most powerful princes, at Agyrium and Kentoripæ. Enna and Kephalaëdium were also betrayed to him, as well as the Carthaginian dependency of Solûs. By these proceedings, which appear to have occupied some time, he acquired powerful ascendancy in the central and north-east parts of the island, while his garrison at Messênê ensured to him the command of the strait between Sicily and Italy.³

His acquisition of this important fortified position was well understood to imply ulterior designs against Rhegium and the other Greecian cities in the south of Italy, among whom accordingly a lively alarm prevailed. The numerous exiles whom he had expelled, not merely from Syracuse, but also from Naxos, Katana, and the other conquered towns, having no longer any assured shelter in Sicily, had been forced to cross over into Italy, where they were favourably received both at Krôton and at Rhegium.⁴ One of these exiles, Helôris, once the intimate friend of Dionysius, was even appointed general of the forces

B.C. 394.

Conquests of Dionysius in the interior of Sicily.

B.C. 394-393.

Alarm at Rhegium—Dionysius attacks the Sikels town of Tauro-menium—desperate defence of the Sikels—Dionysius is repulsed and nearly slain.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 78.² Diodor. xiv. 87.³ Diodor. xiv. 78. εἰς τὴν τῶν Συρακῶν γῶρζι, πλεονάχις στρατεύσας, &c.

Wesseling shows in his note, that these words, and those which follow, must refer to Dionysius.

⁴ Diodor. xiv. 87-103.

of Rhegium; forces at that time not only powerful on land, but sustained by a fleet of 70 or 80 triremes.¹ Under his command, a Rhegine force crossed the strait for the purpose partly of besieging Messênê, partly of establishing the Naxian and Katanean exiles at Mylæ on the northern coast of the island, not far from Messênê. Neither scheme succeeded: Helôris was repulsed at Messênê with loss, while the new settlers at Mylæ were speedily expelled. The command of the strait was thus fully maintained to Dionysius; who, on the point of undertaking an aggressive expedition over to Italy, was delayed only by the necessity of capturing the newly established Sikel town on the hill of Taurus—or Tauromenium. The Sikels defended this position, in itself high and strong, with unexpected valour and obstinacy. It was the spot on which the primitive Grecian colonists who first came to Sicily had originally landed, and from whence therefore the successive Hellenic encroachments upon the pre-established Sikel population had taken their commencement. This fact, well known to both parties, rendered the capture on one side as much a point of honour as the preservation on the other. Dionysius spent months in the siege, even throughout midwinter, while the snow covered this hill-top. He made reiterated assaults, which were always repulsed. At last, on one moonless winter night, he found means to scramble over some almost inaccessible crags to a portion of the town less defended, and to effect a lodgment in one of the two fortified portions into which it was divided. Having taken the first part, he immediately proceeded to attack the second. But the Sikels, resisting with desperate valour, repulsed him, and compelled the storming party to flee in disorder, amidst the darkness of night and over the most difficult ground. Six hundred of them were slain on the spot, scarcely any escaped without throwing away their arms. Even Dionysius himself, being overthrown by the thrust of a spear on his cuirass, was with difficulty picked up and carried off alive; all his arms except the cuirass being left behind. He was obliged to raise the siege, and was long in recovering from his wound: the rather as his eyes also had suffered considerably from the snow.²

¹ Diodor. xiv. 8, 87, 106.

² Diodor. xiv. 88.

So manifest a reverse, before a town comparatively insignificant, lowered his military reputation, and encouraged his enemies throughout the island. The Agrigentines and others, throwing off their dependence upon him, proclaimed themselves autonomous; banishing those leaders among them who upheld his interest.¹ Many of the Sikels also, elate with the success of their countrymen at Tauromenium, declared openly against him; joining the Carthaginian general Magon, who now, for the first time since the disaster before Syracuse, again exhibited the force of Carthage in the field.

B.C. 393.
Agrigentum declares against Dionysius—re-appearance of the Carthaginian army under Magon.

Since the disaster before Syracuse, Magon had remained tranquil in the western or Carthaginian corner of the island, recruiting the strength and courage of his countrymen, and taking unusual pains to conciliate the attachment of the dependent native towns. Reinforced in part by the exiles expelled by Dionysius, he was now in a condition to assume the aggressive, and to espouse the cause of the Sikels after their successful defence of Tauromenium. He even ventured to overrun and ravage the Messenian territory; but Dionysius, being now recovered from his wound, marched against him, defeated him in a battle near Abakæna, and forced him again to retire westward, until fresh troops were sent to him from Carthage.²

Without pursuing Magon, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, from whence he presently set forth to execute his projects against Rhegium, with a fleet of 100 ships of war. So skilfully did he arrange or mask his movements, that he arrived at night at the gates and under the walls of Rhegium, without the least suspicion on the

B.C. 393-392.
Expedition of Dionysius against Rhegium—he fails in surprising

¹ Diodor. xiv. 88. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀτυχίαν ταύτην, Ἀκράγαντινοι καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ τοὺς τὰ Διονυσίου φρονούντας μεταστράμεινοι, τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀνταίχοντο, καὶ τῆς τοῦ τυράννου συμμάχιας ἀπέστησαν.

It appears to me that the words καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ in this sentence cannot be correct. The Messonians were a new population just established by Dionysius, and relying upon him for protection against

Rhegium; moreover they will appear, during the events immediately succeeding, constantly in conjunction with him, and objects of attack by his enemies.

I cannot but think that Diodorus has here inadvertently placed the word Μεσσηνιοὶ instead of a name belonging to some other community—what community, we cannot tell.

² Diodor. xiv. 90-95.

the town—
he con-
cludes a
truce for
one year.

part of the citizens. Applying combustibles to set fire to the gate (as he had once done successfully at the gate of Achradina),¹ he at the same time planted his ladders against the walls, and attempted an escalade. Surprised and in small numbers, the citizens began their defence; but the attack was making progress, had not the general Helôris, instead of trying to extinguish the flames, bethought himself of encouraging them by heaping on dry faggots and other matters. The conflagration became so violent, that even the assailants themselves were kept off until time was given for the citizens to mount the walls in force; and the city was saved from capture by burning a portion of it. Disappointed in his hopes, Dionysius was obliged to content himself with ravaging the neighbouring territory; after which, he concluded a truce of one year with the Rhegines, and then returned to Syracuse.²

This step was probably determined by news of the movements of Magon, who was in the field anew with a mercenary force reckoned at 50,000 men —Libyan, Sardinian, and Italian—obtained from Carthage, where hope of Sicilian success was again reviving. Magon directed his march through the Sikel population in the centre of the island, receiving the adhesion of many of their various townships. Agyrium, however, the largest and most important of all, resisted him as an enemy. Agyris, the despot of the place, who had conquered much of the neighbouring territory, and had enriched himself by the murder of several opulent proprietors, maintained strict alliance with Dionysius. The latter speedily came to his aid, with a force stated at 20,000 men, Syracusans and mercenaries. Admitted into the city, and cooperating with Agyris, who furnished abundant supplies, he soon reduced the Carthaginians to great straits. Magon was encamped near the river Chrysas, between Agyrium and Morgantinê; in an enemy's country, harassed by natives who perfectly knew the ground, and who cut off in detail all his parties sent out to obtain provisions. The Syracusans, indeed, disliking or mistrusting such tardy methods, impatiently demanded leave to make a vigorous attack: and when Dionysius refused, affirming that with a little patience the enemy

B.C. 392-391.

Magon
again takes
the field at
Agyrium—
is repulsed
by Diony-
sius—truce
concluded.

¹ Diodor xiv 119

² Diodor xiv 90

must be speedily starved out, they left the camp and returned home. Alarmed at their desertion, he forthwith issued a requisition for a large number of slaves to supply their places. But at this very juncture, there arrived a proposition from the Carthaginians to be allowed to make peace and retire; which Dionysius granted, on condition that they should abandon to him the Sikels and their territory—especially Tauromenium. Upon these terms peace was accordingly concluded, and Magon again returned to Carthage.¹

Relieved from these enemies, Dionysius was enabled to restore those slaves, whom he had levied under the recent requisition, to their masters. Having established his dominion fully among the Sikels, he again marched against Tauromenium, which on this occasion was unable to resist him. The Sikels, who had so valiantly defended it, were driven out, to make room for new inhabitants, chosen from among the mercenaries of Dionysius.²

Thus master both of Messênê and Tauromenium, the two most important maritime posts on the Italian side of Sicily, Dionysius prepared to execute his ulterior schemes against the Greeks in the south of Italy. These still powerful, though once far more powerful, cities were now suffering under a cause of decline common to all the Hellenic colonies on the continent. The indigenous population of the interior had been reinforced, or enslaved, by more warlike emigrants from behind, who now pressed upon the maritime Grecian cities with encroachment difficult to resist.

It was the Samnites, a branch of the hardy Sabellian race, mountaineers from the central portion of the Apennine range, who had been recently spreading themselves abroad as formidable assailants. About 420 B.C., they had established themselves in Capua and the fertile plains of Campania, expelling or dispossessing the previous Tuscan proprietors. From thence, about 416 B.C., they reduced the neighbouring city of Cumæ, the most ancient western

A.C. 391.

Dionysius again attacks Tauromenium—captures it, drives out the Sikels, and plants new inhabitants.

Plans of Dionysius against the Greek cities in Southern Italy—great pressure upon these cities from the Samnites and Lucanians of the interior.

¹ Diodor. iv. 95-96.

² Diodor. iv. 96.

colony of the Hellenic race.¹ The neighbouring Grecian establishments of Neapolis and Dikæarchia seem also to have come, like Cumæ, under tribute and dominion to the Campanian Samnites, and thus became partially dis-hellenised.² These Campanians, of Samnite race, have been frequently mentioned in the two preceding chapters, as employed on mercenary service both in the armies of the Carthaginians, and in those of Dionysius.³ But the great migration of this warlike race was farther to the south-east, down the line of the Apennines towards the Tarentine Gulf and the Sicilian strait. Under the name of Lucanians, they established a formidable power in these regions, subjugating the Ænotrian population there settled.⁴

¹ Livy, iv. 37-44; Strabo, v. p. 243-250. Diodorus (xii. 31-76) places the commencement of the Campanian nation in 438 B.C., and their conquest of Cumæ in 421 B.C. Skylax in his Periplus mentions both Cumæ and Neapolis as in Campania (sect. 10). Thucydides speaks of Cumæ as being ἐν Ὀρυζία (vi. 4).

² Strabo, v. p. 246.

³ Thucydides (vi. 53-57) does not mention *Campanians* (he mentions *Tyrhenians*) as serving in the besieging Athenian armament before Syracuse (414-413 B.C.). He does not introduce the name *Campanians* at all, though alluding to Iberian mercenaries as men whom Athens calculated on engaging in her service (vi. 90).

But Diodorus mentions, that 800 Campanians were engaged by the Chalkidian cities in Sicily for service with the Athenians under Nicias, and that they had escaped during the disasters of the Athenian army (xii. 44).

The conquest of Cumæ in 416 B.C. opened to these Campanian Samnites an outlet for hired military service beyond sea. Cumæ being in its origin Chalkidic, would naturally be in correspondence with the Chalkidic cities in Sicily. This forms the link of connexion, which

explains to us how the Campanians came into service in 413 B.C. under the Athenian general before Syracuse, and afterwards so frequently under others in Sicily (Diodor. xiii. 62-80, &c.).

⁴ Strabo, vi. p. 253, 254. See a valuable section on this subject in Niebuhr, *Römisch. Geschichte*, vol. i. p. 91 &c.

It appears that the Syracusan historian Antiochus made no mention either of Lucanians or of Bruttians, though he enumerated the inhabitants of the exact line of territory afterwards occupied by these two nations. After repeating the statement of Antiochus that this territory was occupied by Italians, Ænotrians, and Chouians, Strabo proceeds to say—Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀνέγνωσεν ἑρπεταὶ ἄρρηκτως, οὐδὲν διόρισεν περὶ τῶν Λευκανῶν καὶ τῶν Βρυττανῶν. The German translator Grosskurd understands these words as meaning, that Antiochus "did not distinguish the Lucanians from the Bruttians." But if we read the paragraph through, it will appear, I think, that Strabo means to say, that Antiochus had stated nothing positive respecting Lucanians or Bruttians. Niebuhr (p. 96 *ut supra*) affirms that Antiochus represented the Lucanians as

The Lucanian power seems to have begun and to have gradually increased from about 430 B.C. At its maximum (about 380-360 B.C.), it comprehended most part of the inland territory, and considerable portions of the coast, especially the southern coast—bounded by an imaginary line drawn from Metapontum on the Tarentine Gulf, across the breadth of Italy to Poseidonia or Pæstum, near the mouth of the river Silaris, on the Tyrrhenian or Lower sea. It was about 356 B.C. that the rural serfs called Bruttians¹ rebelled against the Lucanians, and robbed them of the southern part of this territory: establishing an independent dominion in the inland portion of what is now called the Farther Calabria—extending, from a boundary-line drawn across Italy between Thurii and Läsus, down to near the Sicilian strait. About 332 B.C., commenced the occasional intervention of the Epirotic kings from the one side, and the persevering efforts of Rome from the other, which, after long and valiant struggles, left Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, all Roman subjects.

At the period which we have now reached, these Lucanians, having conquered the Greek cities of Poseidonia (or Pæstum) and Läsus, with much of the territory lying between the Gulfs of Poseidonia and Tarentum, severely harassed the inhabitants of Thurii, and alarmed all the neighbouring Greek cities down to Rhegium. So serious was the alarm of these cities, that several of them contracted an intimate defensive alliance, strengthening for the occasion that feeble synodical band, and sense of Italiot communion,²

B.C. 392-391

Alliance contracted among the Italiot Greeks, for defence both against the Lucanians and against Dionysius.

having extended themselves as far as Läsus, which I cannot find.

The date of Antiochus seems not precisely ascertainable. His work on Sicilian history was carried down from early times to 424 B.C. (Diodor. xii. 71). His silence respecting the Lucanians goes to confirm the belief that the date of their conquest of the territory called Lucania was considerably later than that year.

Polyænus (ii. 10, 2-4) mentions war as carried on by the inhabitants of Thurii, under Kleandridas the other of Gylippus, against the Lu-

canians. From the age and circumstances of Kleandridas, this can hardly be later than 426 B.C.

¹ Strabo, vi. p. 256. The Periplus of Skylax (sect. 12, 13) recognizes Lucania as extending down to Rhegium. The date to which this Periplus refers appears to be about 370-360 B.C.; see an instructive article among Niebuhr's *Kleine Schriften*, p. 105-130. Skylax does not mention the Bruttians (Klausen, *Hekataeus und Skylax*, p. 274, Berlin, 1831).

² Diodor. xiv. 91-101. Compare

Dionysius
allies him-
self with
the Luca-
nians.

the form and trace of which seem to have subsisted without the reality, even under marked enmity between particular cities. The conditions of the newly-contracted alliance were most stringent; not only binding each city to assist at the first summons any other city invaded by the Lucanians, but also pronouncing, that if this obligation were neglected, the generals of the disobedient city should be condemned to death.¹ However, at this time the Italiot Greeks were not less afraid of Dionysius and his aggressive enterprises from the south, than of the Lucanians from the north; and their defensive alliance was intended against both. To Dionysius, on the contrary, the invasion of the Lucanians from landward was a fortunate incident for the success of his own schemes. Their concurrent designs against the same enemies speedily led to the formation of a distinct alliance between the two.² Among the allies of Dionysius, too, we must number the Epizephyrian Lokrians; who not only did not join the Italiot confederacy, but espoused his cause against it with ardour. The enmity of the Lokrians against their neighbours the Rhegines was ancient and bitter; exceeded only by that of Dionysius, who never forgave the refusal of the Rhegines to permit him to marry a wife out of their city, and was always grateful to the Lokrians for having granted to him the privilege which their neighbours had refused.

B.C. 390.

Dionysius
attacks
Rhegium—
the Rhegi-
nes save
the Kroto-
niate fleet
—fleet of
Dionysius
ruined by a
storm.

Wishing as yet, if possible, to avoid provoking the other members of the Italiot confederacy, Dionysius still professed to be revenging himself exclusively upon Rhegium; against which he conducted a powerful force from Syracuse. Twenty thousand foot, 1000 horse, and 120 ships of war, are mentioned as the total of his armament. Disembarking near Lokri, he marched across the lower part of the peninsula in a westerly direction, ravaged with fire and sword the Rhegian territory, and then encamped near the strait on the northern side of Rhegium. His fleet followed

Polybius, ii. 39. When Nikias, on his way to Sicily, came near to Rhegium and invited the Rhegines to cooperate against Syracuse, the Rhegines declined, replying, ὅτι

ἀν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ζυγὰς, τοῦτο ποιήσαι (Thucyd. vi. 44).

¹ Diodor. xiv. 101.

² Diodor. xiv. 100.

coastwise round Cape Zephyrium to the same point. While he was pressing the siege, the members of the Italian syndesmosis despatched from Kroton a fleet of 60 sail, to assist in the defence. Their ships, having rounded Cape Zephyrium, were nearing Rhegium from the south, when Dionysius himself approached to attack them, with fifty ships detached from his force. Though inferior in number, his fleet was probably superior in respect to size and equipment; so that the Krotoniate captains, not daring to hazard a battle, ran their ships ashore. Dionysius here attacked them, and would have towed off all the ships (without their crews) as prizes, had not the scene of action lain so near to Rhegium, that the whole force of the city could come forth in reinforcement, while his own army was on the opposite side of the town. The numbers and courage of the Rhegines baffled his efforts, rescued the ships, and hauled them all up upon the shore in safety. Obligated to retire without success, Dionysius was farther overtaken by a terrific storm, which exposed his fleet to the utmost danger. Seven of his ships were driven ashore; their crews, 1500 in number, being either drowned, or falling into the hands of the Rhegines. The rest, after great danger and difficulty, either rejoined the main fleet or got into the harbour of Messênê; where Dionysius himself in his quinquereme also found refuge, but only at midnight, and after imminent risk for several hours. Disheartened by this misfortune as well as by the approach of winter, he withdrew his forces for the present, and returned to Syracuse.¹

A part of his fleet, however, under Leptinês, was despatched northward along the south-western coast of Italy to the Gulf of Elea, to cooperate with the Lucanians; who from that coast and from inland were invading the inhabitants of Thurii on the Tarentine Gulf. Thurii was the successor, though with far inferior power, of the ancient Sybaris; whose dominion had once stretched across from sea to sea, comprehending the town of Lœus, now a Lucanian possession.² Immediately on the appearance of the Lucanians, the Thurians had despatched an urgent message to their allies, who were making all haste to arrive, pursuant to covenant. But before such junction could possibly

Defeat of the inhabitants of Thurii by the Lucanians. Leptinês with the fleet of Dionysius off Lœus—his conduct towards the survivors.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 100.

² Herodot. vi. 21, Strabo, vi. p. 233.

take place, the Thurians, confiding in their own native force of 14,000 foot, and 1000 horse, marched against the enemy single-handed. The Lucanian invaders retreated, pursued by the Thurians, who followed them even into that mountainous region of the Apennines which stretches between the two seas, and which presents the most formidable danger and difficulty for all military operations.¹ They assailed successfully a fortified post or village of the Lucanians, which fell into their hands with a rich plunder. By such partial advantage they were so elated, that they ventured to cross over all the mountain passes even to the neighbourhood of the southern sea, with the intention of attacking the flourishing town of Läsus²—once the dependency of their Sybaritan predecessors. But the Lucanians, having allured them into these impracticable paths, closed upon them behind with greatly increased numbers, forbade all retreat, and shut them up in a plain surrounded with high and precipitous cliffs. Attacked in this plain by numbers double their own, the unfortunate Thurians underwent one of the most bloody defeats recorded in Grecian history. Out of their 14,000 men, 10,000 were slain, under merciless orders from the Lucanians to give no quarter. The remainder contrived to flee to a hill near the sea-shore, from whence they saw a fleet of ships of war coasting along at no great distance. Distracted with terror, they were led to fancy, or to hope, that these were the ships expected from Rhegium to their aid; though the Rhegines would naturally send their ships, when demanded, to Thurii, on the Tarentine Gulf, not to the Lower sea near Läsus. Under this impression, 1000 of them swam off from the shore to seek protection on ship-board. But they found themselves, unfortunately, on board the fleet of Leptinês, brother and admiral of Dionysius, come for the express purpose of aiding the Lucanians. With a generosity not less unexpected than honourable, this officer saved

¹ See the description of this mountainous region between the

Tarentine Gulf and the Tyrrhenian Sea, in an interesting work by a French General employed in Calabria in 1809—Calabria during a military residence of Three Years, Letters, 17, 18, 19 (translated and published by Effingham Wilson.

London, 1832)

² Diodor. xiv. 101. βουλόμενοι Λᾶσιν, πόλιν εὐδαίμονα, πολιορκῆσαι. This appears the true reading: it is an acute conjecture proposed by Niebuhr (Römisch. Geschichte, i. p. 98) in place of the words—βουλόμενοι Λᾶσιν καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα πολιορκῆσαι.

their lives, and also, as it would appear, the lives of all the other defenceless survivors; persuading or constraining the Lucanians to release them, on receiving one mina of silver per man.¹

This act of Hellenic sympathy restored three or four thousand citizens on ransom to Thurii, instead of leaving them to be massacred or sold by the barbarous Lucanians, and procured the warmest esteem for Leptinês personally among the Thurians and other Italiot Greeks. But it incurred the strong displeasure of Dionysius, who now proclaimed openly his project of subjugating these Greeks, and was anxious to encourage the Lucanians as indispensable allies. Accordingly he dismissed Leptinês, and named as admiral his other brother Thearidês. He then proceeded to conduct a fresh expedition; no longer intended against Rhegium alone, but against all the Italiot Greeks. He departed from Syracuse with a powerful force—20,000 foot and 3000 horse, with which he marched by land in five days to Messênê; his fleet under Thearidês accompanying him—40 ships of war, and 300 transports with provisions. Having first successfully surprised and captured near the Lipari isles a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, the crews of which he constituted prisoners at Messênê, he transported his army across the strait into Italy, and laid siege to Kaulonia—on the eastern coast of the peninsula, and conterminous with the northern border of his allies the Lokrians. He attacked this place vigorously, with the best siege machines which his arsenal furnished.

B.C. 389.

Fresh expedition of Dionysius against the Italiot Greeks—his powerful armament—he besieges Kaulonia.

The Italiot Greeks, on the other hand, mustered their united force to relieve it. Their chief centre of action was Kroton, where most of the Syracusan exiles, the most forward of all champions in the cause, were now assembled. One of these exiles, Helôris (who had before been named general by the Rhegines), was entrusted with the command of the collective army; an arrangement neutralising all local jealousies. Under the cordial sentiment prevailing, an army was mustered at Kroton, estimated at 25,000 foot and 2000 horse;

United army of the Italiot Greeks advances to relieve the place—their advanced guard is defeated, and Helôris the general slain.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 102.

by what cities furnished, or in what proportions, we are unable to say.¹ At the head of these troops, Helôris marched southward from Kroton to the river Elleporus not far from Kaulonia; where Dionysius, raising the siege, met him.² He was about four miles and a half from the Krotoniate army, when he learnt from his scouts that Helôris with a chosen regiment of 500 men (perhaps Syracusan exiles like himself), was considerably in advance of the main body. Moving rapidly forward in the night, Dionysius surprised this advanced guard at break of day, completely isolated from the rest. Helôris, while he despatched instant messages to accelerate the coming up of the main body, defended himself with his small band against overwhelming superiority of numbers. But the odds were too great. After an heroic resistance, he was slain, and his companions nearly all cut to pieces, before the main body, though they came up at full speed, could arrive.

The hurried pace of the Italiot army, however, though it did not suffice to save the general, was of fatal efficacy in deranging their own soldierlike array. Confused and disheartened by finding that Helôris was slain, which left them without a general to direct the battle or restore order, the Italiots fought for some time against Dionysius, but were at length defeated with severe loss. They effected their retreat from the field of battle to a neighbouring eminence, very difficult to attack, yet destitute of water and provisions. Here Dionysius blocked them up, without attempting an attack, but keeping the strictest guard round the hill during the whole remaining day and the ensuing night. The heat of the next day, with total want of water, so subdued their courage, that they sent to Dionysius a herald with propositions, entreating to be allowed to depart on a stipulated ransom. But the terms were peremptorily refused; they were ordered to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. Against this terrible requisition they stood out yet awhile, until the increasing pressure of physical exhaustion and suffering drove them to surrender, about the eighth hour of the day.³

¹ Diodor. xiv. 103.

² Polybius (i. 6) gives us the true name of this river; Diodorus calls it the river *Helôris*.

³ Diodor. xiv. 106. παρῆλθον αὐ-
τοὺς περὶ ὀγδόην ὥραν, ἥδη τὰ σώματα
παρῆμνοι.

More than 10,000 disarmed Greeks descended from the hill and defiled before Dionysius, who numbered the companies as they passed with a stick. As his savage temper was well known, they expected nothing short of the harshest sentence. So much the greater was their astonishment and delight, when they found themselves treated not merely with lenity, but with generosity.¹ Dionysius released them all without even exacting a ransom; and concluded a treaty with most of the cities to which they belonged, leaving their autonomy undisturbed. He received the warmest thanks, accompanied by votes of golden wreaths, from the prisoners as well as from the cities; while among the general public of Greece, the act was hailed as forming the prominent glory of his political life.² Such admiration was well deserved, looking to the laws of war then prevalent.

With the Krotoniates and other Italiot Greeks (except Rhegium and Lokri) Dionysius had had no marked previous relations, and therefore had not contracted any strong personal sentiment either of antipathy or favour. With Rhegium and Lokri, the case was different. To the Lokrians he was strongly attached: against the Rhegines his animosity was bitter and implacable, manifesting itself in a more conspicuous manner by contrast with his recent dismissal of the Krotoniate prisoners: a proceeding which had been probably dictated, in great part, by his anxiety to have his hands free for the attack of isolated Rhegium. After having finished the arrangements consequent upon his victory, he marched against that city, and prepared to besiege it. The citizens, feeling themselves without hope of succour, and intimidated by the disaster of their Italiot allies, sent out heralds to beg for moderate terms, and imploring him to abstain from extreme or unmeasured rigour.³ For the moment, Dionysius seemed to comply with their request. He granted

Generous
lenity of
Dionysius
towards the
prisoners.

B.C. 388.

Dionysius
besieges
Rhegium—
he grants to
them peace
on severe
terms.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 105. Καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ὀπαπιεμένων τὸ θηριώδες, τὸναντίον ἐξάνη πάντων ἐπιεικέστατος.

² Diodor. xiv. 105. καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτ' εἶδος πρέττει, καὶ τῷ ζῆ, καλ-

λιστον.

Strabo, vi. p. 261.

³ Diodor. xiv. 106. καὶ παρακαλέσαι μὴδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν ἔπειρ' ἀνθρῶ-
πον βουλεύεσθαι.

them peace, on condition that they should surrender all their ships of war, seventy in number—that they should pay to him 300 talents in money—and that they should place in his hands 100 hostages. All these demands were strictly complied with; upon which Dionysius withdrew his army, and agreed to spare the city.¹

His next proceeding was, to attack Kaulonia and Hipponium; two cities which seem between them to have occupied the whole breadth of the Calabrian peninsula, immediately north of Rhegium and Lokri; Kaulonia on the eastern coast, Hipponium on or near the western. Both these cities he besieged, took, and destroyed: probably neither of them, in the hopeless circumstances of the case, made any strenuous resistance. He then caused the inhabitants of both of them, such at least as did not make their escape, to be transported to Syracuse, where he domiciliated them as citizens, allowing them five years of exemption from taxes.² To be a citizen of Syracuse meant, at this moment, to be a subject of his despotism, and nothing more: how he made room for these new citizens, or furnished them with lands and houses, we are unfortunately not informed. But the territory of both these towns, evacuated by its free inhabitants (though probably not by its slaves, or serfs), was handed over to the Lokrians and annexed to their city. That favoured city, which had accepted his offer of marriage, was thus immensely enriched both in lands and in collective property. Here again it would have been interesting to hear what measures were taken to appropriate or distribute the new lands; but our informant is silent.

Dionysius had thus accumulated into Syracuse, not only all Sicily³ (to use the language of Plato); but even no inconsiderable portion of Italy. Such wholesale changes of domicile and property must probably have occupied some months; during which time the army of Dionysius seems never to have quitted the Calabrian peninsula, though he himself may probably have gone for a time in person to Syracuse. It was soon seen that the depopulation of

B.C. 389.

He captures Kaulonia and Hipponium—inhabitants transported to Syracuse—territory made over to Lokri.

Artifices of Dionysius to impoverish and disarm the Rhegines.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 108.

² Diodor. xiv. 100, 107.

³ Plato, Epistol. v. p. 332 D.

Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν ἀθροίζας πᾶσαν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ πορείας, &c.

Hipponium and Kaulonia was intended only as a prelude to the ruin of Rhegium. Upon this Dionysius had resolved. The recent covenant into which he had entered with the Rhegines, was only a fraudulent device for the purpose of entrapping them into a surrender of their navy, in order that he might afterwards attack them at greater advantage. Marching his army to the Italian shore of the strait, near Rhegium, he affected to busy himself in preparations for crossing to Sicily. In the mean time, he sent a friendly message to the Rhegines, requesting them to supply him for a short time with provisions, under assurance, that what they furnished should speedily be replaced from Syracuse. It was his purpose, if they refused, to resent it as an insult, and attack them; if they consented, to consume their provisions, without performing his engagement to replace the quantity consumed; and then to make his attack after all, when their means of holding out had been diminished. At first the Rhegines complied willingly, furnishing abundant supplies. But the consumption continued, and the departure of the army was deferred—first on pretence of the illness of Dionysius, next on other grounds—so that they at length detected the trick, and declined to furnish any more. Dionysius now threw off the mask, gave back to them their hundred hostages, and laid siege to the town in form.¹

Regretting too late that they had suffered themselves to be defrauded of their means of defence, the Rhegines nevertheless prepared to hold out with all the energy of despair. Phyton was chosen commander, the whole population was armed, and all the line of wall carefully watched. Dionysius made vigorous assaults, employing all the resources of his battering machinery to effect a breach. But he was repelled at all points obstinately, and with much loss on both sides; several of his machines were also burnt or destroyed by opportune sallies of the besieged. In one of the assaults, Dionysius himself was seriously wounded by a spear thrust in the groin, from which he was long in recovering. He was at length obliged to

B.C. 388-387.
He besieges
Rhegium—
desperate
defence of
the town
under the
general
Phyton.
Surrender
of the place
from famine
after a
blockade of
eleven
months.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 107, 108. Polyænus relates this stratagem of Dionysius Himera, and not of Rhegium (Polyæn. v. 3, 10).

convert the siege into a blockade, and to rely upon famine alone for subduing these valiant citizens. For eleven months did the Rhegines hold out, against the pressure of want gradually increasing, and at last terminating in the agony and distraction of famine. We are told that a medimnus of wheat came to be sold for the enormous price of five minæ; at the rate of about 14*l.* sterling per bushel: every horse and every beast of burthen was consumed: at length hides were boiled and eaten, and even the grass on parts of the wall. Many perished from absolute hunger, while the survivors lost all strength and energy. In this intolerable condition, they were constrained, at the end of near eleven months, to surrender at discretion.

So numerous were these victims of famine, that Dionysius, on entering Rhegium, found heaps of unburied corpses, besides 6000 citizens in the last stage of emaciation. All these captives were sent to Syracuse, where those who could provide a mina (about 3*l.* 17*s.*) were allowed to ransom themselves, while the rest were sold as slaves. After such a period of suffering, the number of those who retained the means of ransom was probably very small. But the Rhegine general, Phyton, was detained with all his kindred, and reserved for a different fate. First, his son was drowned, by order of Dionysius: next, Phyton himself was chained to one of the loftiest siege-machines, as a spectacle to the whole army. While he was thus exhibited to scorn, a messenger was sent to apprise him, that Dionysius had just caused his son to be drowned. "He is more fortunate than his father by one day," was the reply of Phyton. After a certain time, the sufferer was taken down from this pillory, and led round the city, with attendants scourging and insulting him at every step; while a herald proclaimed aloud, "Behold the man who persuaded the Rhegines to war, thus signally punished by Dionysius!" Phyton, enduring all these torments with heroic courage and dignified silence, was provoked to exclaim in reply to the herald, that the punishment was inflicted because he had refused to betray the city to Dionysius, who would himself soon be overtaken by the divine vengeance. At length the prolonged outrages, combined with the noble demeanour and high reputation of the victim, excited compassion even among the soldiers of Dionysius himself. Their

Cruel treatment of
Phyton by
Dionysius.

murmurs became so pronounced, that he began to apprehend an open mutiny for the purpose of rescuing Phytou. Under this fear he gave orders that the torments should be discontinued, and that Phytou with his entire kindred should be drowned.¹

The prophetic persuasion under which this unhappy man perished, that divine vengeance would soon overtake his destroyer, was noway borne out by the subsequent reality. The power and prosperity of Dionysius underwent abatement by his war with the Carthaginians in 383 B.C., yet remained very considerable even to his dying day. And the misfortunes which fell thickly upon his son the younger Dionysius, more than thirty years afterwards, though they doubtless received a religious interpretation from contemporary critics, were probably ascribed to acts more recent than the barbarities inflicted on Phytou. But these barbarities, if not avenged, were at least laid to heart with profound sympathy by the contemporary world, and even commemorated with tenderness and pathos by poets. While Dionysius was composing tragedies (of which more presently) in hopes of applause in Greece, he was himself furnishing real matter of history, not less tragical than the sufferings of those legendary heroes and heroines to which he (in common with other poets) resorted for a subject. Among the many acts of cruelty, more or less aggravated, which it is the melancholy duty of an historian of Greece to recount, there are few so revolting as the death of the Rhégine general; who was not a subject, nor a conspirator, nor a rebel, but an enemy in open warfare—of whom the worst that even Dionysius himself could say, was, that he had persuaded his countrymen into the war. And even

¹ Diodor. xiv. 112. 'Ο δὲ Φύτων, κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς γεγεννημένος, καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλο, βίος, ἐπαινούμενος, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ὑπέμεινε τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς τιμωρίαν· ἀλλ' ἀκατάκλητον τὴν ψυχὴν φυλάξας, καὶ βούων, ὅτι τὴν πόλιν οὐ βουληθεὶς προδοῦναι Διονυσίῳ, τυγχάνει τῆς τιμωρίας, ἣν αὐτῷ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ἐκείνῳ αὐτόμῳ ἐπιστήσῃ· ὥστε τὴν ἀρετὴν τάνδρῳ καὶ πρὶν τοῖς στρατιωταῖς τοῦ Διονυσίου κατελεγεῖσθαι, καὶ τινὰς

ἤδη θορυβεῖν. 'Ο δὲ Διονύσιος, εὐλαβηθεὶς μὴ τις τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποτολήσῃσιν ἐξαρκέσειν τὸν Φύτωνα, παυσάμενος τῆς τιμωρίας, κατεπόντωσε τὸν ἀτυχῆ μετὰ τῆς αὐγενείας. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναξίως τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκνόμοις περιέπεσε τιμωρίαις, καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχε καὶ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἀλγέσαντας τῇ, αὐμυρόν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ποιητὰς τοὺς θρηνησόντας τὸ τῆς περιπετείας ἐλεεινόν.

this could not be said truly; since the antipathy of the Rhegines towards Dionysius was of old standing, traceable to his enslavement of Naxos and Katana, if not to causes yet earlier—though the statement of Phyton may very probably be true, that Dionysius had tried to bribe him to betray Rhegium (as the generals of Naxos and Katana had been bribed to betray their respective cities), and was incensed beyond measure at finding the proposition repelled. The Hellenic war-practice was in itself sufficiently cruel. Both Athenians and Lacedæmonians put to death prisoners of war by wholesale, after the capture of Melos, after the battle of Ægospotami, and elsewhere. But to make death worse than death by a deliberate and protracted tissue of tortures and indignities, is not Hellenic; it is Carthaginian and Asiatic. Dionysius had shown himself better than a Greek when he released without ransom the Krotoniate prisoners captured at the battle of Kaulonia; but he became far worse than a Greek, and worse even than his own mercenaries, when he heaped aggravated suffering, beyond the simple death-warrant, on the heads of Phyton and his kindred.

Dionysius caused the city of Rhegium to be destroyed¹ or dismantled. Probably he made over the lands to Lokri, like those of Kaulonia and Hipponium. The free Rhegine citizens had all been transported to Syracuse for sale; and those who were fortunate enough to save their liberty by providing the stipulated ransom, would not be allowed to come back to their native soil. If Dionysius was so zealous in enriching the Lokrians, as to transfer to them two other neighbouring town-domains, against the inhabitants of which he had no peculiar hatred—much more would he be disposed to make the like transfer of the Rhegine territory, whereby he would gratify at once his antipathy to the one state and his partiality to the other. It is true that Rhegium did not permanently continue incorporated with Lokri; but neither did Kaulonia nor Hipponium. The maintenance of all the three transfers depended on the ascendancy of Dionysius and his dynasty; but for the time immediately succeeding the capture of Rhegium, the Lokrians became masters of the Rhegine

Rhegium dismantled—all the territory of the southern Calabrian peninsula united to Lokri.

¹ Strabo, vi. p. 268. ἐπιφανῇ δ' οὖν πόλιν οὖσαν . . . κατασκάψαι Διονύσιος, &c.

territory as well as of the two other townships, and thus possessed all the Calabrian peninsula south of the Gulf of Squillace. To the Italiot Greeks generally, these victories of Dionysius were fatally ruinous, because the political union formed among them, for the purpose of resisting the pressure of the Lucanians from the interior, was overthrown, leaving each city to its own weakness and isolation.¹

The year 387, in which Rhegium surrendered, was also distinguished for two other memorable events; the general peace in Central Greece under the dictation of Persia and Sparta, commonly called the peace of Antalkidas; and the capture of Rome by the Gauls.²

The two great ascendent powers in the Grecian world were now, Sparta in Peloponnesus, and Dionysius in Sicily; each respectively fortified by alliance with the other. I have already in a former chapter³ described the position of Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas; how greatly she gained by making herself the champion of that Persian rescript—and how she purchased, by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Artaxerxēs, an empire on land equal to that which she had enjoyed before the defeat of Knidus, though without recovering the maritime empire forfeited by that defeat.

To this great imperial state, Dionysius in the west formed a suitable counterpart. His recent victories in Southern Italy had already raised his power to a magnitude transcending all the far-famed recollections of Gelon; but he now still farther extended it by sending an expedition against Kroton. This city, the largest in Magna Græcia, fell under his power; and he succeeded in capturing, by surprise or bribery, even its strong citadel, on a rock overhanging the sea.⁴ He seems also to have advanced

Peace of Antalkidas—ascendent position of Sparta and of Dionysius. Kroton conquered by Dionysius. Splendid robe taken from the temple of Hērē.

¹ Polybius, ii. 39, 67.

² Polybius, i. 6.

³ Chap. LXXVI.

⁴ Livy has preserved the mention of this important acquisition of Dionysius (xxiv. 3).

⁵ Sed arx Crotonis, unâ parte immixta mari, altiorâ vergente in agrum, situ tantum naturalis quondam munita, postea et muro cincta

est, quâ per aversas rupes ab Dionysio Siciliæ tyranno per dolum fuerat capta."

Justin also (xx. 5) mentions the attack of Dionysius upon Kroton.

We may, with tolerable certainty, refer the capture to the present part of the career of Dionysius.

See also Ælian, V. H. xii. 61.

yet farther with his fleet to attack Thurii; which city owed its preservation solely to the violence of the north winds. He plundered the temple of Hêrê near Cape Lakinium, in the domain of Kroton. Among the ornaments of this temple was one of pre-eminent beauty and celebrity, which at the periodical festivals was exhibited to admiring spectators; a robe wrought with the greatest skill, and decorated in the most costly manner, the votive offering of a Sybarite named Alkimenês. Dionysius sold this robe to the Carthaginians. It long remained as one of the permanent religious ornaments of their city, being probably dedicated to the honour of those Hellenic Deities recently introduced for worship: whom (as I have before stated) the Carthaginians were about this time peculiarly anxious to propitiate, in hopes of averting or alleviating the frightful pestilences wherewith they had been so often smitten. They purchased the robe from Dionysius at the prodigious price of 120 talents, or about 27,000*l.* sterling.¹ Incredible as this sum may appear, we must recollect that the honour done to the new Gods would be mainly estimated according to the magnitude of the sum laid out. As the Carthaginians would probably think no price too great to transfer an unrivalled vestment from the wardrobe of the Lakinian Hêrê to the newly established temple and worship of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê in their city—so we may be sure that the loss of such an ornament, and the spoliation of the holy place, would deeply humiliate the Krotoniates, and with them the crowd of Italiot Greeks who frequented the Lakinian festivals.

Thus master of the important city of Kroton, with a citadel near the sea capable of being held by a separate garrison, Dionysius divested the inhabitants of their southern possession of Skylletium, which he made over to aggrandize yet farther the town of Lokri.² Whether he pushed his conquests farther along the Tarentine Gulf so as to acquire the like hold on Thurii or Metapontum, we cannot say. But both of them must have been overawed by the rapid extension and near

¹ Aristotel. *Auscult. Mirab.* s. 96; Athenæus, xii. p. 541; Diodor. xiv. 77. *robe, in his work Περὶ τῶν ἐν Καρχηδόνι Περύλων . . .*

² Strabo, vi. p. 261.

Polemon specified this costly

approach of his power; especially Thurii, not yet recovered from her disastrous defeat by the Lucanians.

Profiting by his maritime command of the Gulf, Dionysius was enabled to enlarge his ambitious views even to distant ultramarine enterprises. To escape from his long arm, Syracusan exiles were obliged to flee to a greater distance, and one of their divisions either founded, or was admitted into, the city of Ancona, high up the Adriatic Gulf.¹ On the other side of that Gulf, in vicinity and alliance with the Illyrian tribes, Dionysius on his part sent a fleet, and established more than one settlement. To these schemes he was prompted by a dispossessed prince of the Epirotic Molossians, named Alketas, who, residing at Syracuse as an exile, had gained his confidence. He founded the town of Lissus (now Alessio) on the Illyrian coast, considerably north of Epidamnus: and he assisted the Parians in their plantation of two Grecian settlements, in sites still farther northward up the Adriatic Gulf—the islands of Issa and Pharos. His admiral at Lissus defeated the neighbouring Illyrian coast-boats, which harassed these newly-settled Parians: but with the Illyrian tribes near to Lissus, he maintained an intimate alliance, and even furnished a large number of them with Grecian paupers. It is affirmed to have been the purpose of Dionysius and Alketas to employ these warlike barbarians, first in invading Epirus and restoring Alketas to his Molossian principality; next in pillaging the wealthy temple of Delphi—a scheme far-reaching, yet not impracticable, and capable of being seconded by a Syracusan fleet, if circumstances favoured its execution. The invasion of Epirus was accomplished, and the Molossians were defeated in a bloody battle, wherein 15,000 of them are said to have been slain. But the ulterior projects against Delphi were arrested by the intervention of Sparta, who sent a force to the spot and prevented all farther march southward.² Alketas however seems to have remained prince of a portion of Epirus, in the territory nearly opposite to Korkyra;

¹ Strabo, v. p. 241. It would seem that the two maritime towns, said to have been founded on the coast of Apulia on the Adriatic by Dionysius the younger during the first years of his reign—according to

Diodorus (xvi. 5)—must have been really founded by the *elder* Dionysius, near about the time to which we have now reached.

² Diodor. xv. 13, 14.

where we have already recognised him, in a former chapter, as having become the dependent of Jason of Phæræ in Thessaly.

Another enterprise undertaken by Dionysius about this time was a maritime expedition along the coasts of Latium, Etruria, and Corsica; partly under colour of repressing the piracies committed from their maritime cities; but partly also, for the purpose of pillaging the rich and holy temple of Leukothea, at Agylla or its seaport Pyrgi. In this he succeeded, stripping it of money and precious ornaments to the amount of 1000 talents. The Agyllæans came forth to defend their temple, but were completely worsted, and lost so much both in plunder and in prisoners, that Dionysius, after returning to Syracuse and selling the prisoners, obtained an additional profit of 500 talents.¹

Such was the military celebrity now attained by Dionysius,² that the Gauls from Northern Italy, who had recently sacked Rome, sent to proffer their alliance and aid. He accepted the proposition; from whence perhaps the Gallic mercenaries, whom we afterwards find in his service as mercenaries, may take their date. His long arms now reached from Lissus on one side to Agylla on the other. Master of most of Sicily and much of Southern Italy, as well as of the most powerful standing army in Greece—the unscrupulous plunderer of the holiest temples everywhere³—he inspired much terror and dislike throughout Central Greece. He was the more vulnerable to this sentiment, as he was not only a triumphant prince, but also

a tragic poet; competitor, as such, for that applause and admiration which no force can extort. Since none of his tragedies have been preserved, we can form no judgement of our own respecting them. Yet when we learn that he had stood second or third, and that one of

¹ Diodor. xv. 14; Strabo, v. p. 226; Servius ad Virgil. *Æneid.* x. 184.

² Justin, xx. 5; Xenoph. *Hellen.* vii. 1, 20.

³ See Pseudo-Aristotel. *Æconomic.* ii. 20-41; Cicero, *De Natur. Deor.* iii. 34, 82, 85: in which pas-

sages, however, there must be several incorrect assertions as to the actual temples pillaged; for Dionysius could not have been in Peloponnesus to rob the temple of Zeus at *Olympia*, or of *Æsculapius* at *Epidaurus*.

his compositions gained even the first prize at the Lenæan festival at Athens,¹ in 368-367 B.C.—the favourable judgment of an Athenian audience affords good reason for presuming that his poetical talents were considerable.

During the years immediately succeeding 387 B.C., however, Dionysius the poet was not likely to receive an impartial hearing anywhere. For while on the one hand his own circle would applaud every word—on the other hand, a large proportion of independent Greeks would be biassed against what they heard by their fear and hatred of the author. If we believed the anecdotes recounted by Diodorus, we should conclude not merely that the tragedies were contemptible compositions, but that the irritability of Dionysius in regard to criticism was exaggerated even to silly weakness. The dithyrambic poet Philoxenus, a resident or visitor at Syracuse, after hearing one of these tragedies privately recited, was asked his opinion. He gave an unfavourable opinion, for which he was sent to prison:² on the next day the intercession of friends procured his release, and he contrived afterwards, by delicate wit and double-meaning phrases, to express an inoffensive sentiment without openly compromising truth. At the Olympic festival of 388 B.C., Dionysius had sent some of his compositions to Olympia, together with the best actors and chorists to recite them. But so contemptible were the poems (we are told), that in spite of every advantage of recitation, they were disgracefully hissed and ridiculed; moreover the actors in coming back to Syracuse were shipwrecked, and the crew of the ship ascribed all the suffering of their voyage to the badness of the poems entrusted to them. The flatterers of Dionysius, however (it is said), still continued to extol his genius, and to assure him that his ultimate success as a poet, though for a time interrupted by envy, was infallible; which Dionysius believed, and continued to compose tragedies without being disheartened.³

Athenæus (xv. p. 693) recounts an anecdote that Dionysius plundered the temple of Æsculapius at Syracuse of a valuable golden table; which is far more probable.

¹ Diodor. xv. 74. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fest. Helle ad ann*

387 B.C.

² See a different version of the story about Philoxenus in Pintarch, *De Fortun. Alexand. Magni*, p. 334 C.

³ Diodor. xiv. 109; xv. 6.

Amidst such malicious jests, circulated by witty men at the expense of the princely poet, we may trace some important matter of fact. Perhaps in the year 388 B.C., but certainly in the year 384 B.C. (both of them Olympic years), Dionysius sent tragedies to be recited, and chariots to run, before the crowd assembled in festival at Olympia. The year 387 B.C. was a memorable year both in Central Greece and in Sicily. In the former, it was signalised by the momentous peace of Antalkidas, which terminated a general war of eight years' standing: in the latter, it marked the close of the Italian campaign of Dionysius, with the defeat and humiliation of Kroton and the other Italiot Greeks, and subversions of three Grecian cities,—Hipponium, Kaulonia, and Rhegium—the fate of the Rhegines having been characterised by incidents most pathetic and impressive. The first Olympic festival which occurred after 387 B.C. was accordingly a distinguished epoch. The two festivals immediately preceding (those of 392 B.C. and 398 B.C.) having been celebrated in the midst of a general war, had not been visited by a large proportion of the Hellenic body; so that the next ensuing festival, the 99th Olympiad in 384 B.C., was stamped with a peculiar character (like the 90th Olympiad¹ in 420 B.C.) as bringing together in religious fraternity those who had long been separated.² To every ambitious Greek (as to Alkibiadês in 420 B.C.) it was an object of unusual ambition to make individual figure at such a festival. To Dionysius, the temptation was peculiarly seductive, since he was triumphant over all neighbouring enemies—at the pinnacle of his power—and disengaged from all war requiring his own personal command. Accordingly he sent thither his Theôry, or solemn legation for sacrifice, decked in the richest garments, furnished with abundant gold and silver plate, and provided with splendid tents to serve for their lodging on the sacred

¹ See Chap. LV. of this History.
² See above, in this work, Chap. LXXVII. I have already noticed the peculiarity of this Olympic festival of '84 B.C., in reference to the position and sentiment of the

Greeks in Peloponnesus and Asia. I am now obliged to notice it again, in reference to the Greeks of Sicily and Italy—especially to Dionysius.

ground of Olympia. He farther sent several chariots-and-four to contend in the regular chariot races: and lastly, he also sent reciters and chorists, skilful as well as highly trained, to exhibit his own poetical compositions before such as were willing to hear them. We must remember that poetical recitation was not included in the formal programme of the festival.

All this prodigious outfit, under the superintendence of Thearidês, brother of Dionysius, was exhibited with dazzling effect before the Olympic crowd. No name stood so prominently and ostentatiously before them as that of the despot of Syracuse. Every man, even from the most distant regions of Greece, was stimulated to inquire into his past exploits and character. There were probably many persons present, peculiarly forward in answering such inquiries—the numerous sufferers, from Italian and Sicilian Greece, whom his conquests had thrown into exile;—and their answers would be of a nature to raise the strongest antipathy against Dionysius. Besides the numerous depopulations and mutations of inhabitants which he had occasioned in Sicily, we have already seen that he had, within the last three years, extinguished three free Grecian communities—Rhegium, Kaulonia, Hippouium; transporting all the inhabitants of the two latter to Syracuse. In the case of Kaulonia, an accidental circumstance occurred to impress its recent extinction vividly upon the spectators. The runner who gained the great prize in the stadium, in 384 B.C., was Dikon, a native of Kaulonia. He was a man pre-eminently swift of foot, celebrated as having gained previous victories in the stadium, and always proclaimed (pursuant to custom) along with the title of his native city—"Dikon the Kauloniate." To hear this well-known runner now proclaimed as "Dikon the Syracusan,"¹ gave painful publicity to the fact, that

Feelings of the crowd at the festival—
Dikon of Kaulonia.

¹ Diodor. xv. 14. Παρά δ' Ἡλείοις Ὀλυμπιάς ἡχῇ ἐννενηκοντῇ εἰσάτη (B.C. 384), καθ' ἣν εἰσα στάδιοι Δίκων Συρακούσιος.

Pausanias, vi. 8, 5. Δίκων δὲ ὁ καλλιμβρότου πέντε μὲν Πυθοῖ ἐρόμου νίκας, τρεῖς δὲ ἀπέλετο Ἰσθμίων, τέσσαρας δὲ ἐν Νεμέῳ, καὶ Ὀλυμπιακάς μιν μὲν ἐν παιαί, δύο δὲ ἀλλας

ἀνδρῶν· καὶ οἱ καὶ ἀνδριότες ἴσαι ταῖς νίκαις εἰσιν ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ· παιδὶ μὲν δὲ ὅτι αὐτῷ Καυλωνιάτῃ, καθάπερ γε καὶ ἦν, ὁπῆρξεν ἀναγορευθῆναι· τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦτο Συρακούσιον αὐτὸν ἀνηγόρευσεν ἐπὶ χρέμασι.

Pausanias here states, that Dikon received a bribe to permit himself

the free community of Kaulonia no longer existed,—and to the absorptions of Grecian freedom effected by Dionysius.

In following the history of affairs in central Greece, I have already dwelt upon the strong sentiment excited among Grecian patriots by the peace of Antalkidas, wherein Sparta made herself the ostentatious champion and enforcer of a Persian rescript, purchased by surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King. It was natural that this emotion should manifest itself at the next ensuing Olympic festival in 384 B.C., wherein not only Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, and Corinthians, but also Asiatic and Sicilian Greeks, were reunited after a long separation. The emotion found an eloquent spokesman in the orator Lysias. Descended from Syracusan ancestors, and once a citizen of Thurii,¹ Lysias had peculiar grounds for sympathy with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. He delivered a public harangue upon the actual state of political affairs, in which he dwelt upon the mournful present and upon the serious dangers of the future. "The Grecian world (he said) is burning away at both extremities. Our eastern brethren have passed into slavery under the Great King, our western under the despotism of Dionysius.² These two are the great potentates, both in naval force and in money, the real instruments of dominion:³ if both of them combine,

to be proclaimed as a Syracusan, and not as a Kauloniate. Such corruption did occasionally take place (compare another case of similar bribery, attempted by Syracusan envoys, Pausan. vi. 2, 4), prompted by the vanity of the Grecian cities to appropriate to themselves the celebrity of a distinguished victor at Olympia. But in this instance, the blame imputed to Dikon is more than he deserves. Kaulonia had been already depopulated and incorporated with Lokri, the inhabitants being taken away to Syracuse and made Syracusan citizens (Diodor. xiv. 100). Dikon therefore could not have been proclaimed a Kauloniate, even had he desired it—when

the city of Kaulonia no longer existed. The city was indeed afterwards reestablished; and this circumstance doubtless contributed to mislead Pausanias, who does not seem to have been aware of its temporary subversion by Dionysius.

¹ Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 452, Reisk.

² Lysias, Fragm. Orat. 33. ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 621. ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχροῦς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράνων ἀναστάνους γεγενημένας.

³ Lysias, Fr. Or. 33 l. c. Ἐπιστοθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς θνητότης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιτεῦς τυμίζε· τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων

they will extinguish what remains of freedom in Greece. They have been allowed to consummate all this ruin unopposed, because of the past dissensions among the leading Grecian cities; but it is now high time that these cities should unite cordially to oppose farther ruin. How can Sparta, our legitimate president, sit still while the Hellenic world is on fire and consuming? The misfortunes of our ruined brethren ought to be to us as our own. Let us not lie idle, waiting until Artaxerxes and Dionysius attack us with their united force: let us check their insolence at once, while it is yet in our power."¹

Unfortunately we possess but a scanty fragment of this emphatic harangue (a panegyric harangue, in the ancient sense of the word) delivered at Olympia by Lysias. But we see the alarming picture of the time which he laboured to impress: Hellas already enslaved, both in the east and in the west, by the two greatest potentates of the age,² Artaxerxes and Dionysius—and now threatened in her centre by their combined efforts. To feel the full probability of so gloomy an anticipation, we must recollect that only in the preceding year, Dionysius, already master of Sicily and of a considerable fraction of Italian Greece, had stretched his naval force across to Illyria, armed a host of Illyrian barbarians, and sent them southward under Alketas against the Molossians, with the view of ultimately proceeding farther and pillaging the Delphian temple. The Lacedæmonians had been obliged to send a force to arrest their progress.³ No wonder then that Lysias should depict the despot of Syracuse as meditating ulterior projects against Central Greece; and as an object not only of hatred for what he had done, but

Hatred of the past, and fear of the future conquest of Dionysius, both prevalent.

σωματα τῷ, δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένῳ· ναὺς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτοῦς χελετήται, πολὺς δὲ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας.

¹ Lysias, Orat. Frag. l. c. Θυμᾶζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα, τῖνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, καίτοι μένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, &c.

Ὁ δὲ γὰρ ἄλλοτριᾶς δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλοτων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ' οἰκίσας· οὐδ' ἀναμείναι, ἕως ἂν

ἐπ' αὐτοῦς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἐλθωσιν, ἀλλ' ἕως ἔτι ἔξεσσι τὴν τοῦτων ὕβριν καλῶσαι.

I give in the text the principal points of what remains out of this discourse of Lysias, without confining myself to the words.

² Diodor. xv. 23. οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν τότε δυναστῶν, &c.

³ Diodor. xv. 13.

of terror for what he was about to do, in conjunction with the other great enemy from the east.¹

Of these two enemies, one (the Persian king) was out of reach. But the second—Dionysius—though not present in person, stood forth by his envoys and appurtenances conspicuous even to ostentation, beyond any man on the ground. His Theôry or solemn legation outshone every other by the splendour of its tents and decorations: his chariots to run in the races were magnificent: his horses were of rare excellence, bred from the Venetian stock, imported out of the innermost depths of the Adriatic Gulf;² his poems, recited by the best artists in Greece, solicited applause—by excellent delivery and fine choric equipments, if not by superior intrinsic merit. Now the antipathy against Dionysius was not only aggravated by all this display, contrasted with the wretchedness of impoverished exiles whom he had dispossessed—but was also furnished with something to strike at and vent itself upon. Of such opportunity for present action against a visible object, Lysias did not fail to avail himself. While he vehemently preached a crusade to dethrone Dionysius and liberate Sicily, he at the same time pointed to the gold and purple tent before them, rich and proud above all its fellows, which lodged the brother of the despot with his Syracusan legation. He exhorted his hearers to put forth at once an avenging hand, in partial retribution for the sufferings of free Greece, by plundering the tent which insulted them by its showy decorations. He

¹ Isokratês holds similar language, both about the destructive conquests of Dionysius, and the past sufferings and present danger of Hellas, in his Orat. IV. (Panegyric.), composed about 380 B.C., and (probably enough) read at the Olympic festival of that year (s. 197). ἴσω δ' αὖ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς εὐθυσίας πολλοὶ καταγελᾶσι, εἰ δυστυχίας ἀνδρῶν ὀδυρομένη ἐν τοσούτοις καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς Ἰταλία μὲν ἀνάστατος γέγονε, Σικελία δὲ καταδεδοῦλωται (compare s. 145), τραπεζῆται δὲ πόλεις τοῖς βεβήροις ἐκδοῦνται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μέρη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις και-

οῖς εἰσὶν.

Isokratês had addressed a letter to the elder Dionysius. He alludes briefly to it in his Orat. ad Philip-pam (Orat. v. s. 93), in terms which appear to indicate that it was bold and plain spoken (θρασύτερον τῶν ἄλλων). The first letter, among the ten ascribed to Isokratês, purports to be a letter to Dionysius; but it seems rather (to judge by the last words) to be the preface of a letter about to follow. Nothing distinct can be made out from it as it now stands.

² Strabo, v. p. 212.

adjoined them to interfere and prevent the envoys of this impious despot from sacrificing or entering their chariots in the lists, or taking any part in the holy Panhellenic festival.¹

We cannot doubt that a large proportion of the spectators on the plain of Olympia felt with greater or less intensity the generous Pan-hellenic patriotism and indignation to which Lysias gave utterance. To what extent his hearers acted upon the unbecoming violence of his practical recommendations—how far they actually laid hands on the tents, or tried to hinder the Syracusans from sacrificing, or impeded the bringing out of their chariots for the race—we are unable to say. We are told that some ventured to plunder the tents:² how much was effected we do not hear. It is certain that the superintending Eleian authorities would interfere most strenuously to check any such attempt at desecrating the festival, and to protect the Syracusan envoys in their tents, their regular sacrifice, and their chariot-running. And it is farther certain, as far as our account goes, that the Syracusan chariots actually did run on the lists; because they were, though by various accidents, disgracefully unsuccessful, or overturned and broken in pieces.³

To any one however who reflects on the Olympic festival, with all its solemnity and its competition for honours of various kinds, it will appear that the mere manifestation of so violent antipathy, even though restrained from breaking out into act, would be sufficiently galling to the Syracusan envoys. But the ease would be far worse, when the poems of Dionysius came to be recited. These were volunteer manifestations, delivered (like the harangue of Lysias) before such persons as chose to come and hear; not

Intense explosion of antipathy against the poems of Dionysius recited at Olympia—insults heaped upon his name and person.

¹ Dionys. Hal. p. 510. Jud. de Lysia. 'Ἐστὶ δὴ τις αὐτῶ πανηγυρικός λόγος, ἐν ᾧ πείθει τοὺς Ἑληνίας. . . . ἐκβάλλειν Διονύσιον τὸν τυράννον τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ Σικελίαν εἰσευεργῶσαι, ἀρῆσθαι τε τῆς ἐχθρᾶς αὐτοῖα μάλα, διαρπάσαντας τὴν τοῦ τυράννου ἀκτὴν χρυσῶν τε καὶ πορφύρεα καὶ ἄλλα πλούτη πολλὰ πικρῶς μνημεῖον, &c.

Diodor. xiv. 109. Αὐαλας . . . προερέπετο τὰ πλήθη μὴ προσδέχεσθαι τοῖς ἱεροῖς ὀργῶναι τοὺς ἐξ ἀσεβείας τῆς τυραννίδος ἀπεσταλμένους θεωροῦς.

Compare Plutarch, Vit. x. Orator. p. 836 D.

² Diodor. xiv. 109. ὥστε τινὰς τολμήσει διαρπάξαι τὰς σκηνάς.

³ Diodor. xiv. 109.

comprised in the regular solemnity, nor therefore under any peculiar protection by the Eleian authorities. Dionysius stood forward of his own accord to put himself upon his trial as a poet before the auditors. Here therefore the antipathy against the despot might be manifested by the most unreserved explosions. And when we are told that the badness of the poems¹ caused them to be received with opprobrious ridicule, in spite of the excellence of the recitation, it is easy to see that the hatred intended for the person of Dionysius was discharged upon his verses. Of course the hissers and hooters would make it clearly understood what they really meant, and would indulge in the full licence of heaping curses upon his name and acts. Neither the best reciters of Greece, nor the best poems even of Sophoklēs or Pindar, could have any chance against such predetermined antipathy. And the whole scene would end in the keenest disappointment and humiliation, inflicted upon the Syracusan envoys as well as upon the actors; being the only channel through which retributive chastisement of Hellas could be made to reach the author.

Excessive grief, wrath, and remorse of Dionysius on hearing of this manifestation against him — his suspicions and cruelties.

Though not present in person at Olympia, the despot felt the chastisement in his inmost soul. The mere narrative of what had passed plunged him into an agony of sorrow, which for some time seemed to grow worse by brooding on the scene, and at length drove him nearly mad. He was smitten with intolerable consciousness of the profound hatred borne towards him, even throughout a large portion of the distant and independent Hellenic world. He fancied that this hatred was shared by all around him, and suspected every one as plotting against his life. To such an excess of cruelty did this morbid excitement carry him, that he seized several of his best friends, under false accusations, or surmises, and caused them to be slain.² Even his brother Leptinēs, and his ancient partisan Philistus, men who had devoted

¹ Diodor. xiv. 109.

² Diodor. xv. 7. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων καταφρόνησιν, ἐπέπεσεν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν λύπης. Ἄελ δὲ μῦλλον τοῦ πάθους ἐπίστασι λαμβάνοντας, μακρωδῆς διαθήσεως κατερχετὴ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ φθορῇ, αὐτῷ φάσκει ἀπαντας, τούτους

φίλους ὑπώπτειν ὡς ἐπιβουλευόντας· καὶ πέρας, ἐπὶ τούτῳ κρηλθε λύπης καὶ παρακοπῆς, ὥστε τῶν φίλων πολλοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ ψευδέσιν αἰτίαις ἀνελεῖν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ἐφυγάδευσεν ἐν οἷς ἡ Φίλιππος, καὶ Δεκτινὴς ὁ ἀδελφός, &c.

their lives first to his exaltation, and afterwards to his service, did not escape. Having given umbrage to him by an intermarriage between their families made without his privity, both were banished from Syracuse, and retired to Thurii in Italy, where they received that shelter and welcome which Leptinês had peculiarly merited by his conduct in the Lucanian war. The exile of Leptinês did not last longer than (apparently) about a year, after which Dionysius relented, recalled him, and gave him his daughter in marriage. But Philistus remained in banishment more than sixteen years: not returning to Syracuse until after the death of Dionysius the elder, and the accession of Dionysius the younger.¹

Such was the memorable scene at the Olympic festival of 381 B.C., together with its effect upon the mind of Dionysius. Diodorus, while noticing all the facts, has cast an air of ridicule over them by recognising nothing except the vexation of Dionysius, at the ill success of his poem, as the cause of his mental suffering; and by referring to the years 388 B.C. and 386 B.C., that which

Marked and singular character of the manifestation against Dionysius.

¹ For the banishment, and the return, of Philistus and Leptinês, compare Diodor. xv. 7, and Plutarch, Dion. c. 11. Probably it was on this occasion that Polyxenus, the brother-in-law of Dionysius, took flight as the only means of preserving his life (Plutarch, Dion. c. 21).

Plutarch mentions the incident which offended Dionysius and caused both Philistus and Leptinês to be banished. Diodorus does not notice this incident; yet it is not irreconcilable with his narrative. Plutarch does not mention the banishment of Leptinês, but only that of Philistus.

On the other hand, he affirms (and Nepos also, Dion. c. 3) that Philistus did not return until after the death of the older Dionysius, while Diodorus states his return conjointly with that of Leptinês—not indicating any difference of time. Here I follow Plutarch's

statement as the more probable

There is however one point which is perplexing. Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 16) animadverts upon a passage in the history of Philistus, wherein that historian had dwelt with a pathos which Plutarch thinks childish and excessive, upon the melancholy condition of the daughters of Leptinês, "who had fallen from the splendour of a court into a poor and mean condition." How is this reconcilable with the fact stated by Diodorus, that Leptinês was recalled from exile by Dionysius after a short time, taken into favour again, and invested with command at the battle of Kronium, where he was slain? It seems difficult to believe that Philistus could have insisted with so much sympathy upon the privations endured by the daughters of Leptinês, if the exile of the father had lasted only a short time.

properly belongs to 384 B.C.¹ Now it is improbable, in the first place, that the poem of Dionysius,—himself a man of

¹ In a former chapter of this History (Ch. LXXVII), I have already shown grounds, derived from the circumstances of Central Greece and Persia, for referring the discourse of Lysias, just noticed, to Olympiad 99 or 384 B.C. I here add certain additional reasons, derived from what is said about Dionysius, towards the same conclusion.

In xiv. 109, Diodorus describes the events of 388 B.C., the year of Olympiad 98, during which Dionysius was still engaged in war in Italy, besieging Rhegium. He says that Dionysius made unparalleled efforts to send a great display to this festival; a splendid legation with richly decorated tents, several fine chariots—four, and poems to be recited by the best actors. He states that Lysias the orator delivered a strong invective against him, exciting those who heard it to exclude the Syracusan despot from sacrificing, and to plunder the rich tents. He then details how the purposes of Dionysius failed miserably on every point; the fine tents were assailed, the chariots all ran wrong or were broken, the poems were hissed, the ships returning to Syracuse were wrecked, &c. Yet in spite of this accumulation of misfortunes (he tells us), Dionysius was completely soothed by his flatterers (who told him that such envy always followed upon greatness), and did not desist from poetical efforts.

Again, in xv. 6, 7, Diodorus describes the events of 386 B.C. Here he again tells us, that Dionysius, persevering in his poetical occupations, composed verses which were very indifferent—that he was angry with and punished Philoxenus and others who criticised them freely—that he sent some of these

compositions to be recited at the Olympic festival, with the best actors and reciters—that the poems, in spite of these advantages, were despised and derided by the Olympic audience—that Dionysius was distressed by this repulse, even to anguish and madness, and to the various severities and cruelties against his friends which have been already mentioned in my text.

Now upon this we must remark:—

1. The year 386 B.C. is not an Olympic year. Accordingly, the proceedings described by Diodorus in xv. 6, 7, all done by Dionysius after his hands were free from war, must be transferred to the next Olympic year, 384 B.C. The year in which Dionysius was so deeply stung by the events of Olympia, must therefore have been 384 B.C., or Olympiad 99 (relating to 388 B.C.).

2. Compare Diod. xiv. 109 with xv. 7. In the first passage, Dionysius is represented as making the most prodigious efforts to display himself at Olympia in every way, by fine tents, chariots, poems, &c.—and also as having undergone the signal insult from the orator Lysias, with the most disgraceful failure in every way. Yet all this he is described to have borne with tolerable equanimity, being soothed by his flatterers. But, in xv. 7 (relating to 386 B.C., or more probably to 384 B.C.) he is represented as having merely failed in respect to the effect of his poems; nothing whatever being said about display of any other kind, nor about an harangue from Lysias, nor insult to the envoys or the tents. Yet the simple repulse of the poems is on this occasion affirmed to have thrown Dionysius into a paroxysm of sorrow and madness.

ability and having every opportunity of profiting¹ by good critics whom he had purposely assembled around him—should have been so ridiculously bad as to disgust an impartial audience: next, it is still more improbable that a simple poetical failure, though doubtless mortifying to him, should work with such fearful effect as to plunge him into anguish and madness. To unnerve thus violently a person like Dionysius—deeply stained with the great crimes of unscrupulous ambition, but remarkably exempt from infirmities—some more powerful cause is required; and that cause stands out conspicuously, when we conceive the full circumstances of the Olympic festival of 384 B.C. He had accumulated for this occasion all the means of showing himself off, like Krcesus in his interview with Solon, as the most prosperous and powerful man in the Hellenic

Now if the great and insulting treatmont, which Diodorus refers to 388 B.C., could be borne patiently by Dionysius—how are we to believe that he was driven mad by the far less striking failure in 384 B.C.? Surely it stands to reason that the violent invective of Lysias and the profound humiliation of Dionysius, are parts of one and the same Olympic phenomenon, the former as cause, or an essential part of the cause—the latter as effect. The facts will then read consistently and in proper harmony. As they now appear in Diodorus, there is no rational explanation of the terrible suffering of Dionysius described in xv. 7; it appears like a comic exaggeration of reality.

3. Again, the prodigious efforts and outlay, which Diodorus affirms Dinnysius to have made in 388 B.C. for display at the Olympic games—come just at the time when Dionysius, being in the middle of his Italian war, could hardly have had either leisure or funds to devote so much to the other purpose, whereas at the next Olympic festival, or 384 B.C., he was free from war, and had nothing to divert

him from preparing with great efforts all the means of Olympic success.

It appears to me that the facts which Diodorus has stated are nearly all correct, but that he has misdated them, referring to 388 B.C., or Olymp. 98—what properly belongs to 384 B.C., or Olymp. 99. Very possibly Dionysius may have sent one or more chariots to run in the former of the two Olympiads; but his signal efforts, with his insulting failure, brought about partly by Lysias, belong to the latter.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to whom we owe the citation from the oration of Lysias, does not specify to which of the Olympiads it belongs.

¹ Diodor. xv. 7. διὸ καὶ ποιήματα γράψαιν ἐπέπαισαντο μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις δοξάν ἔχοντας μεταπέμπετο, καὶ προτιμῶν αὐτοὺς συνδιδάσκειν, καὶ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπιστάτας καὶ διορθώτας εἶλεν.

The Syracusan historian Athenas (or Athenis) had noticed some peculiar phrases which appeared in the verses of Dieuysius; see Athenæus, iii. p. 98.

world;¹ means beyond the reach of any contemporary, and surpassing even Hiero or Thero of former days, whose praises in the odes of Pindar he probably had in his mind. He counted, probably with good reason, that his splendid legation, chariots, and outfit of acting and recitation for the poems, would surpass everything else seen on the holy plain; and he fully expected such reward as the public were always glad to bestow on rich men who exhausted their purses in the recognised vein of Hellenic pious ostentation. In this high-wrought state of expectation, what does Dionysius hear, by his messengers returning from the festival? That their mission had proved a total failure, and even worse than a failure; that the display had called forth none of the usual admiration, not because there were rivals on the ground equal or superior, but simply because it came from *him*; that its very magnificence had operated to render the explosion of antipathy against him louder and more violent; that his taunts in the sacred ground had been actually assailed, and that access to sacrifice, as well as to the matches, had been secured to him only by the interposition of authority. We learn indeed that his chariots failed in the field by unlucky accidents; but in the existing temper of the crowd, these very accidents would be seized as occasions for derisory cheering against him. To this we must add explosions of hatred, yet more furious, elicited by his poems, putting the reciters to utter shame. At the moment when Dionysius expected to hear the account of an unparalleled triumph, he is thus informed, not merely of disappointment, but of insults to himself, direct and personal, the most poignant ever offered by Greeks to a Greek, amidst the holiest and most frequented ceremony of the Hellenic world.² Never in any

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δόξαμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνομισαί, τῷ ἑμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος θεωρίας (speech of Alkibiadēs).

² See a striking passage in the discourse called *Archidamus* (Or. vi. s. 111, 112) of Isokratēs, in which the Spartans are made to feel keenly their altered position after the defeat of Leuktra—especially the insupportable pain of encountering, when they attended

the Olympic festivals slights or disparagement from the spectators, embittered by open taunts from the re-established Messenians—instead of the honour and reverence which they had become accustomed to expect.

This may help us to form some estimate of the painful sentiment of Dionysius, when his envoys returned from the Olympic festival of 364 B.C.

other case do we read of public antipathy, against an individual, being carried to the pitch of desecrating by violence the majesty of the Olympic festival.

Here then were the real and sufficient causes—not the mere ill-success of his poem—which penetrated the soul of Dionysius, driving him into anguish and temporary madness. Though he had silenced the *Vox Populi* at Syracuse, not all his mercenaries, ships, and forts in Ortygia, could save him from feeling its force, when thus emphatically poured forth against him by the free-spoken crowd at Olympia.

It was apparently shortly after the peace of 387 B.C., that Dionysius received at Syracuse the visit of the philosopher Plato.¹ The latter—having come to Sicily on a voyage of inquiry and curiosity,—especially to see Mount Ætna—was introduced by his friends the philosophers of Tarentum to Dion, then a young man, resident at Syracuse, and brother of Aristomachê, the wife of Dionysius. Of Plato and Dion I shall speak more elsewhere: here I notice the philosopher only as illustrating the history and character of Dionysius. Dion, having been profoundly impressed with the conversation of Plato, prevailed upon Dionysius to invite and talk with him also. Plato discoursed eloquently upon justice and virtue, enforcing his doctrine that wicked men were inevitably

Plato visits Syracuse—
is harshly
treated by
Dionysius
—acquires
great influ-
ence over
Dion.

¹ There are different statements about the precise year in which Plato was born: see Diogenes Laert. iii. 1-6. The accounts fluctuate between 429 and 428 B.C., and Hermodorus (ap. Diog. L. iii. 6) appears to have put it in 427 B.C.: see Corsini, *Fest. Attic.* iii. p. 230; Ast, *Platon's Leben.* p. 11. Plato (*Epistol.* vii. p. 324) states himself to have been about (ὀκτώων) forty years of age when he visited Sicily for the first time. If we accept as the date of his birth 428 B.C., he would be forty years of age in 388 B.C.

It seems improbable that the conversation of Plato with Dion at Syracuse (which was continued sufficiently long to exercise a

marked and permanent influence on the character of the latter), and his interviews with Dionysius, should have taken place while Dionysius was carrying on the Italian war or the siege of Rhegium. I think that the date of the interview must be placed after the capture of Rhegium in 387 B.C. And the expression of Plato (given in a letter written more than thirty years afterwards) about his own age, is not to be taken as excluding the supposition that he might have been forty-one or forty-two when he came to Syracuse.

Athenæus (xi. p. 507) mentions the visit of Plato.

miserable—that true happiness belonged only to the virtuous—and that despots could not lay claim to the merit of courage.¹ This meagre abstract does not at all enable us to follow the philosopher's argument. But it is plain that he set forth his general views on social and political subjects with as much freedom and dignity of speech before Dionysius as before any simple citizen; and we are farther told, that the by-standers were greatly captivated by his manner and language. Not so the despot himself. After one or two repetitions of the like discourse, he became not merely averse to the doctrine, but hostile to the person, of Plato. According to the statement of Diodorus, he caused the philosopher to be seized, taken down to the Syracusan slave-market, and there put up for sale as a slave at the price of 20 minæ; which his friends subscribed to pay, and thus released him. According to Plutarch, Plato himself was anxious to depart, and was put by Dion aboard a trireme which was about to convey home the Lacedæmonian envoy Pollis. But Dionysius secretly entreated Pollis to cause him to be slain on the voyage—or at least to sell him as a slave. Plato was accordingly lauded at Ægina, and there sold. He was purchased, or re-purchased, by Annikeris of Kyrênê, and sent back to Athens. This latter is the more probable story of the two; but it seems to be a certain fact that Plato was really sold, and became for a moment a slave.²

That Dionysius should listen to the discourse of Plato with repugnance, not less decided than that which the Emperor Napoleon was wont to show towards ideologists—was an event naturally to be expected. But that, not satisfied with dismissing the philosopher, he should seek to kill, maltreat, or disgrace him, illustrates forcibly the vindictive and irritable elements of his character, and shows how little he was likely to respect the lives of those who stood in his way as political opponents.

Dionysius was at the same time occupied with new constructions, military, civil, and religious at Syracuse. He enlarged the fortifications of the city by adding a new line of wall, extending along the southern cliff of Epipolæ, from Euryalus to the suburb called Neapolis; which suburb was now, it would appear, surrounded by a separate wall of

B.C. 387-388.

New constructions and improvements by Dionysius at Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Dion. c. 5.

² Plutarch, Dion. c. 5; Diodor.

HEN DEMOSTHENES ARRIVED.



SYR^a instructed by Dionysius before the commence-
and did not exist at the time when Imlikon,
Grote's Greece, Vol. X.

its own—or perhaps may have been so surrounded a few years earlier, though we know that it was unfortified and open during the attack of Imilkon in 396 B.C.¹ At the same time, probably, the fort at the Euryalus was enlarged and completed to the point of grandeur which its present remains indicate. The whole slope of Epipolæ became thus bordered and protected by fortifications, from its base at Achradina to its apex at Euryalus. And Syracuse now comprised five separately fortified portions,—Epipolæ, Neapolis, Tychê, Achradina, and Ortygia; each portion having its own fortification, though the four first were included within the same outer walls. Syracuse thus became the largest fortified city in all Greece; larger even than Athens in its then existing state, though not so large as Athens had been during the Peloponnesian war, while the Phaleric wall was yet standing.

Besides these extensive fortifications, Dionysius also enlarged the docks and arsenals so as to provide accommodation for 200 men of war. He constructed spacious gymnasia on the banks of the river Anapus, without the city walls; and he further decorated the city with various new temples in honour of different gods.²

Such costly novelties added grandeur as well as security to Syracuse, and conferred imposing celebrity on the despot himself. They were dictated by the same aspirations as had prompted his ostentatious legation to Olympia in 381 B.C.; a legation of which the result had been so untoward and intolerable to his feelings. They were intended to console, and doubtless did in part console, the

Intention of Dionysius to renew the war with Carthage.

xv. 7; Diogen. Laert. iii. 17; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2.

¹ Diodor. xiv. 63. It was in the construction of these extensive fortifications, seemingly, that Dionysius demolished the chapel which had been erected by the Syracusans in honour of Dioklès (Diodor. xiii. 635).

Serra di Falco (Antichità di Sicilia, vol. iv. p. 107) thinks that Dionysius constructed only the northern wall up the cliff of Epipolæ, not the southern. This latter

(in his opinion) was not constructed until the time of Hiero II.

I dissent from him on this point. The passage here referred to in Diodorus affords to my mind sufficient evidence that the elder Dionysius constructed both the southern wall of Epipolæ and the fortification of Neapolis. The same conclusion moreover appears to result from what we read of the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon afterwards.

² Diodor. xv. 13.

Syracusan people for the loss of their freedom. And they were further designed to serve as fuller preparations for the war against Carthage, which he was now bent upon renewing. He was obliged to look about for a pretext, since the Carthaginians had given him no just cause. But this, though an aggression, was a Pan-hellenic aggression,¹ calculated to win for him the sympathies of all Greeks, philosophers as well as the multitude. And as the war was begun in the year immediately succeeding the insult cast upon him at Olympia, we may ascribe it in part to a wish to perform exploits such as might rescue his name from the like opprobrium in future.

The sum of 1500 talents, recently pillaged from the temple at Agylla,² enabled Dionysius to fit out a large army for his projected war. Entering into intrigues with some of the disaffected dependencies of Carthage in Sicily, he encouraged them to revolt, and received them into his alliance. The Carthaginians sent envoys to remonstrate, but could obtain no redress; upon which they on their side prepared for war, accumulated a large force of hired foreign mercenaries under Magon, and contracted alliance with some of the Italian Greeks hostile to Dionysius. Both parties distributed their forces so as to act partly in Sicily, partly in the adjoining peninsula of Italy; but the great stress of war fell on Sicily, where Dionysius and Magon both commanded in person. After several combats partial and indecisive, a general battle was joined at a place called Kabala. The contest was murderous, and the bravery great on both sides; but at length Dionysius gained a complete victory. Magon himself and 10,000 men of his army were slain; 5000 were made prisoners; while the remainder were driven to retreat to a neighbouring eminence, strong, but destitute of water. They were forced to send envoys entreating peace: which Dionysius consented to grant, but only on condition that every Carthaginian should be immediately withdrawn from all the cities in the island, and that he should be reimbursed for the costs of the war.³

¹ See Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 333, 336—also some striking lines, addressed by the poet Theokritus to Hiero II. despot at Syracuse in the succeeding century: Theokrit.

xvi. 75-85.

Dionysius—ἐχέτω λαβεῖν πρόψαι, εὐλογον τοῦ πολέμου, &c.

² Diodor. xv. 15.

³ Diodor. xv. 15.

The Carthaginian generals affected to accept the terms offered, but stated (what was probably the truth), they could not pledge themselves for the execution of such terms, without assent from the authorities at home. They solicited a truce of a few days, to enable them to send thither for instructions. Persuaded that they could not escape, Dionysius granted their request. Accounting the emancipation of Sicily from the Punie yoke to be already a fact accomplished, he triumphantly exalted himself on a pedestal higher even than that of Gelon. But this very confidence threw him off his guard and proved ruinous to him; as it happened frequently in Grecian military proceeding. The defeated Carthaginian army gradually reeovered their spirits. In place of the slain general Magon, who was buried with magnificence, his son was named commander; a youth of extraordinary energy and ability, who so contrived to reassure and reorganise his troops, that when the truce expired, he was ready for a second battle. Probably the Syracusans were taken by surprise and not fully prepared. At least the fortune of Dionysius had fled. In this second action, fought at a spot called Kronium, he underwent a terrible and ruinous defeat. His brother Leptinês, who commanded on one wing, was slain gallantly fighting; those around him were defeated; while Dionysius himself, with his select troops on the other wing, had at first some advantage, but was at length beaten and driven back. The whole army fled in disorder to the camp, pursued with merciless vehemence by the Carthaginians, who, incensed by their previous defeat, neither gave quarter nor took prisoners. Fourteen thousand dead bodies, of the defeated Syracusan army, are said to have been picked up for burial; the rest were only preserved by night and by the shelter of their camp.¹

Second battle with the Carthaginians at Kronium, in which Dionysius is defeated with terrible loss

Such was the signal victory—the salvation of the army, perhaps even of Carthage herself—gained at Kronium by the youthful son of Magon. Immediately after it, he retired to Panormus. His army probably had been too much enfeebled by the former defeat to undertake further offensive operations; moreover he himself had as yet no

B.C. 383.

He concludes peace with Carthage, on terms very unfavourable to

¹ Diodor. iv. 16, 17.

himself all the territory west of the river Halykus is surrendered to Carthage he covenants to pay tribute to Carthage.

regular appointment as general. The Carthaginian authorities too had the prudence to seize this favourable moment for making peace, and sent to Dionysius envoys with full powers. But Dionysius only obtained peace by large concessions; giving up to Carthage Selinus with its territory, as well as half the Agrigentine territory—all that lay to the west of the river Halykus; and farther covenanting to pay to Carthage the sum of 1000 talents.¹ To these unfavourable conditions Dionysius was constrained to subscribe; after having but a few days before required the Carthaginians to evacuate all Sicily, and pay the costs of the war. As it seems doubtful whether Dionysius would have so large a sum ready to pay down at once, we may reasonably presume that he would undertake to liquidate it by annual instalments. And we thus find confirmation of the memorable statement of Plato, that Dionysius became tributary to the Carthaginians.²

Such are the painful gaps in Grecian history as it is transmitted to us, that we hear scarcely anything about Dionysius for thirteen years after the peace of 383-382 B.C. It seems that the Carthaginians (in 379 B.C.) sent an armament to the southern portion of Italy for the purpose of re-establishing the town of Hipponium and its inhabitants.³ But their attention appears to have been withdrawn from this enterprise by the recurrence of previous misfortunes—fearful pestilence, and revolt of their Libyan dependencies, which seriously threatened the safety of their city. Again, Dionysius also, during one of these years, undertook some operations, of which a faint echo reaches us, in this same Italian peninsula (now Calabria Ultra). He projected a line of wall across the narrowest portion or isthmus of the peninsula, from the Gulf of Skyletium to that of Hipponium, so as to separate

B.C. 382-380.

Affairs of Southern Italy: wall across the Calabrian peninsula projected, but not executed.

¹ Diodor. xv. 17.

² Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 A. After reciting the advice which Dion and he had given to Dionysius the younger, he proceeds to say—ἔτοιμον γὰρ εἶναι, τοῦτων γενομένης, τοῖς αὐτοῖς δουλωσάμεναι

Καρχηδονίους τῆς ἐπὶ Γέλωτος αὐτοῖς γενομένης δουλείας, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὡς περὶ νῦν τοῦ βασιλέως, οὐρατήρ αὐτοῦ φόρον σταῖζατο φέρειν τοῖς βαρβάροις, &c.

³ Diodor. xv. 24.

the territory of Lokri from the northern portion of Italy, and secure it completely to his own control. Professedly the wall was destined to repel the incursions of the Lucanians; but in reality (we are told) Dionysius wished to cut off the connexion between Lokri and the other Greeks in the Tarentine Gulf. These latter are said to have interposed from without, and prevented the execution of the scheme; but its natural difficulties would be in themselves no small impediment, nor are we sure that the wall was even begun.¹

During this interval, momentous events (recounted in my previous chapters) had occurred in Central Greece. In 382 B.C., the Spartans made themselves by fraud masters of Thebes, and placed a permanent garrison in the Kadmeia. In 380 B.C., they put down the Olynthian confederacy, thus attaining the maximum of their power. But in 379 B.C., there occurred the revolution at Thebes achieved by the conspiracy of Pelopidas, who expelled the Lacedæmonians from the Kadmeia. Involved in a burdensome war against Thebes and Athens, together with other allies, the Lacedæmonians gradually lost ground, and had become much reduced before the peace of 371 B.C., which left them to contend with Thebes alone. Then came the fatal battle of Leuktra which prostrated their military ascendancy altogether. These incidents have been already related at large in former chapters. Two years before the battle of Leuktra, Dionysius sent to the aid of the Lacedæmonians at Korkyra a squadron of ten ships, all of which were captured by Iphikratés; about three years after the battle, when the Thebans and their allies were pressing Sparta in Peloponnesus, he twice sent thither a military force of Gauls and Iberians to reinforce her army. But his troops neither stayed long, nor rendered any very conspicuous service.²

B.C. 382-369.
Relations of
Dionysius
with Central
Greece.

¹ Strabo, vi. p. 261; Pliny, H. N. iii. 10. The latter calls the isthmus twenty miles broad, and says that Dionysius wished (intercisam) to cut it through. Strabo says that

he proposed to wall it across (διὰ τὴν γέφυραν), which is more probable.

² Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 4, 33; vii. i. 20-28. Diodor. xv. 70.

In this year we hear of a fresh attack by Dionysius against the Carthaginians. Observing that they had been lately much enfeebled by pestilence and by mutiny of their African subjects, he thought the opportunity favourable for trying to recover what the peace of 383 B.C. had obliged him to relinquish. A false pretence being readily found, he invaded the Carthaginian possessions in the west of Sicily with a large land-force of 30,000 foot, and 3000 horse; together with a fleet of 300 sail, and store ships in proportion. After ravaging much of the open territory of the Carthaginians, he succeeded in mastering Selinus, Entella, and Eryx—and then laid siege to Lilybæum. This town, close to the western cape of Sicily,¹ appears to have arisen as a substitute for the neighbouring town of Motyé (of which we hear little more since its capture by Dionysius in 396 B.C.), and to have become the principal Carthaginian station. He began to attack it by active siege and battering machines. But it was so numerously garrisoned, and so well defended, that he was forced to raise the siege and confine himself to blockade. His fleet kept the harbour guarded, so as to intercept supplies from Africa. Not long afterwards, however, he received intelligence that a fire had taken place in the port of Carthage whereby all her ships had been burnt. Being thus led to conceive that there was no longer any apprehension of naval attack from Carthage, he withdrew his fleet from continuous watch off Lilybæum: keeping 130 men of war near at hand, in the harbour of Eryx, and sending the remainder home to Syracuse. Of this incautious proceeding the Carthaginians took speedy advantage. The conflagration in their port had been much overstated. There still remained to them 200 ships of war, which, after being equipped in silence, sailed across in the night to Eryx. Appearing suddenly in the harbour, they attacked the Syracusan ships completely by surprise; and succeeded, without serious resistance, in capturing and towing off nearly all of them. After so capital an advantage, Lilybæum became open to reinforcement and supplies by sea, so that Dionysius no longer thought it worth while to prosecute the blockade. On the approach

B.C. 368.
New war
undertaken
by Diony-
sius against
Carthage.
He is at
first suc-
cessful, but
is ulti-
mately de-
feated near
Lilybæum,
and forced
to return
home.

¹ Diodor. xxii. p. 304. .

of winter, both parties resumed the position which they had occupied before the recent movement.¹

The despot had thus gained nothing by again taking up arms, nor were the Sicilian dependencies of the Carthaginians at all cut down below that which they acquired by the treaty of 383 B.C. But he received (about January or February 367 B.C.) news of a different species of success, which gave him hardly less satisfaction than a victory by land or sea. In the Lenæan festival of Athens, one of his tragedies had been rewarded with the first prize. A chorist who had been employed in the performance—eager to convey the first intelligence of this success to Syracuse and to obtain the recompense which would naturally await the messenger—hasted from Athens to Corinth, found a vessel just starting for Syracuse, and reached Syracuse by a straight course with the advantage of favourable winds. He was the first to communicate the news, and received the full reward of his diligence. Dionysius was overjoyed at the distinction conferred upon him: for though on former occasions he had obtained the second or third place in the Athenian competitions, he had never before been adjudged worthy of the first prize. (Offering sacrifice to the gods for the good news, he invited his friends to a splendid banquet, wherein he indulged in an unusual measure of conviviality. But the joyous excitement, coupled with the effects of the wine, brought on an attack of fever, of which he shortly afterwards died, after a reign of 38 years.²

Thirty-eight years, of a career so full of effort, adventure, and danger, as that of Dionysius, must have left a constitution sufficiently exhausted to give way easily before acute disease. Throughout this long period he had never spared himself. He was a man of restless energy and activity, bodily as well as mental; always personally at the head of his troops in war—keeping a vigilant eye and a decisive hand upon all the details of his government at home—yet employing spare time (which Philip of Macedon was surprised that he could find³) in composing tragedies of his own, to compete for prizes fairly adjudged. His personal bravery was conspicuous, and he was twice severely wounded in leading

B.C. 366-367

Dionysius gains the prize of tragedy at the Lenæan festival at Athens.

His joy at the news. He dies of fever soon afterwards.

Character of Dionysius.

¹ Diodor. xv. 73; xvi. 5. ² Diodor. xv. 74. ³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 15.

his soldiers to assault. His effective skill as an ambitious politician—his military resource as a commander—and the long-sighted care with which he provided implements of offence as well as of defence before undertaking war,—are remarkable features in his character. The Roman Scipio Africanus was wont to single out Dionysius and Agathoklês (the history of the latter begins about fifty years after the death of the former), both of them despots of Syracuse, as the two Greeks of greatest ability for action known to him—men who combined, in the most memorable degree, daring with sagacity.¹ This criticism, coming from an excellent judge, is borne out by the biography of both, so far as it comes to our knowledge. No other Greek can be pointed out, who, starting from a position humble and unpromising, raised himself to so lofty a pinnacle of dominion at home, achieved such striking military exploits abroad, and preserved his grandeur unimpaired throughout the whole of a long life. Dionysius boasted that he bequeathed to his son an empire fastened by adamantine chains;² so powerful was his mercenary force—so firm his position in Ortygia—so completely had the Syracusans been broken in to subjection. There cannot be a better test of vigour and ability than the unexampled success with which Dionysius and Agathoklês played the game of the despot, and to a certain extent that of the conqueror. Of the two, Dionysius was the most favoured by fortune. Both indeed profited by one auxiliary accident, which distinguished Syracuse from other Grecian cities; the local speciality of Ortygia. That islet seemed expressly made to be garrisoned as a separate fortress,—apart from, as well as against, the rest of Syracuse,—having full command of the harbour, docks, naval force, and naval approach. But Dionysius had, besides, several peculiar interventions of the gods in his favour, sometimes at the most critical moments: such was the interpretation put by his enemies (and doubtless by his friends also) upon those repeated pestilences which smote the Carthaginian armies with a force far more deadly than the spear

¹ Polyb. xv. 35. Διὸ καὶ Πόπλιον Σίπιωνα φασί, τὸν πρῶτον καταπολεμήσαντα Καρχηδόνους, ἐρωτηθέντα, τίνας ὑπολαμβάνει πραγματικωτάτους ἀνθρώπους γαργεῖναι καὶ

σὺν νῶι τολμηροτάτους, εἰπεῖν, τοὺς περὶ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Διονύσιον τοὺς Σικελιωτάς.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 7.

of the Syracusan hoplite. On four or five distinct occasions, during the life of Dionysius, we read of this unseen foe as destroying the Carthaginians both in Sicily and in Africa, but leaving the Syracusans untouched. Twice did it arrest the progress of Imilkon, when in the full career of victory; once, after the capture of Gela and Kamarina—a second time, when, after his great naval victory off Katana, he had brought his numerous host under the walls of Syracuse, and was actually master of the open suburb of Achradina. On both these occasions the pestilence made a complete revolution in the face of the war; exalting Dionysius from impending ruin, to assured safety in the one, and to unmeasured triumph in the other. We are bound to allow for this good fortune (the like of which never befel Agathoklēs), when we contemplate the long prosperity of Dionysius,¹ and when we adopt, as in justice we must adopt, the panegyric of Scipio Africanus.

The preceding chapter has detailed the means whereby Dionysius attained his prize, and kept it; those employed by Agathoklēs—analagous in spirit but of still darker colouring in the details—will appear hereafter. That Hermokratēs—who had filled with credit the highest offices in the state and whom men had acquired the habit of following—should aspire to become despot, was no unusual phenomenon in Grecian politics; but that Dionysius should aim at mounting the same ladder, seemed absurd or even insane—to use the phrase of Isokratēs.² If, then, in spite of such disadvantage he succeeded in fastening round his countrymen, accustomed to a free constitution as their birthright, those “adamantine chains” which they were well known to abhor—we may be sure that his plan of proceeding must have been dexterously chosen, and prosecuted with consummate perseverance and audacity; but we may be also sure that it was nefarious in the extreme. The machinery of fraud whereby the people were to be cheated into a temporary submission, as a prelude

¹ The example of Dionysius—his long career of success and quiet death—is among those cited by Cotta in Cicero (*De Nat. Deor.* iii. 33, 81, 83) to refute the doctrine of Balbus as to the providence of the gods and the moral govern-

ment over human affairs.

² Isokratēs, *Or.* v. (Philipp.) §. 73. Διονύσιος . . . ἐπιθυμήσας μοναρχίας ἀλόγως καὶ μανικῶς, καὶ τολμήσας ἅπαντα πράττειν τὰ εἰρηπία πρὸς τῇ, δύνανται ταύτην, &c.

to the machinery of force whereby such submission was to be perpetuated against their consent—was the stock in trade of Grecian usurpers. But seldom does it appear prefaced by more impudent calumnies, or worked out with a larger measure of violence and spoliation, than in the case of Dionysius. He was indeed powerfully seconded at the outset by the danger of Syracuse from the Carthaginian arms. But his scheme of usurpation, far from diminishing such danger, tended materially to increase it, by disuniting the city at so critical a moment. Dionysius achieved nothing in his first enterprise for the relief of Gela and Kamarina. He was forced to retire with as much disgrace as those previous generals whom he had so bitterly vituperated; and apparently even with greater disgrace—since there are strong grounds for believing that he entered into traitorous collusion with the Carthaginians. The salvation of Syracuse, at that moment of peril, arose not from the energy or ability of Dionysius, but from the opportune epidemic which disabled Imilkon in the midst of a victorious career.

Dionysius had not only talents to organise, and boldness to make good, a despotism more formidable than anything known to contemporary Greeks, but also systematic prudence to keep it unimpaired for 38 years. He maintained carefully those two precautions which Thucydides specifies as the causes of permanence to the Athenian Hippias, under similar circumstances—intimidation over the citizens, and careful organization, with liberal pay among his mercenaries.¹ He was temperate in indulgences; never led by any of his appetites into the commission of violence.² This abstinence contributed materially to prolong his life.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 56. ἀλλ' ἂ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ζήλητες, τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερὸν, τοῖς δὲ ἐπικουροῖς ἀκριβεῖς, πολλὰ ὥς περιόντι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἐκτάτης (Hippias).

On the liberality of the elder Dionysius to his mercenaries, see an allusion in Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 348 A.

The extension and improvement of engines for warlike purposes, under Dionysius, was noticed as a sort of epoch (*Athenæus de Mechanis ap. Mathemat. Veteres*, ed.

Paris. p. 3).

² Cornelius Nepos, *De Regibus*, c. 2. "Dionysius prior, et manu fortis, et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minimus libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuæ imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Næm dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitæ, quem ejus insidiatorem puteret." To the same purpose Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 20.

since many a Grecian despot perished through desperate feelings of individual vengeance provoked by his outrages. With Dionysius, all other appetites were merged in the love of dominion, at home and abroad; and of money as a means of dominion. To the service of this master-passion all his energies were devoted, together with those vast military resources which an unscrupulous ability served both to accumulate and to recruit. How his treasury was supplied, with the large exigences continually pressing upon it, we are but little informed. We know however that his exactions from the Syracusans were exorbitant;¹ that he did not hesitate to strip the holiest temples; and that he left behind him a great reputation for ingenious tricks in extracting money from his subjects.² Besides the large garrison of foreign mercenaries by whom his orders were enforced, he maintained a regular body of spies, seemingly of both sexes, disseminated among the body of the citizens.³ The vast quarry-prison of Syracuse was his work.⁴ Both the vague general picture, and the fragmentary details which come before us, of his conduct towards the Syracusans, present to us nothing but an oppressive and extortionate tyrant, by whose fiat numberless victims perished; more than 10,000 according to the general language of Plutarch.⁵ He enriched largely his younger brothers and auxiliaries; among which latter, Hipparinus stood prominent, thus recovering a fortune equal to or larger than that which his profligacy had dissipated.⁶ But we hear also of acts of Dionysius, indicating a jealous and cruel temper, even towards near relatives. And it appears certain that he trusted no one.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 5.

² Pseudo-Aristotel. Economic. ii. c. 21, 42; Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, iii. 34, 83, 84; Valerius Maxim. i. 1.

³ Plutarch, Dion. c. 28; Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 523 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. The titles of these spies—*αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι*—as we read in Aristotle; or *οἱ ποταγωγεῖς*—as we find in Plutarch—may perhaps both be correct.

⁴ Cicero in Verrem, v. 55, 143.

⁵ Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri. Magni, p. 398 B. What were the

crimes of Dionysius which Pausanias had read and describes by the general words *Διονυσίου τὰ ἀνομιώτατα*—and which he accuses Philistinus of having intentionally omitted in his history—we cannot now tell (Pausan. i. 13, 2: compare Plutarch, Dion. c. 38). An author named Amyntianus, contemporary with Pausanias, and among those perused by Photius (Codex, 131), had composed parallel lives of Dionysius and the Emperor Domitian.

⁶ Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 332 A; Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 6.

not even them;¹ that though in the field he was a perfectly brave man, yet his suspicion and timorous anxiety as to every one who approached his person, were carried to the most tormenting excess, and extended even to his wives, his brothers, his daughters. Afraid to admit anyone with a razor near to his face, he is said to have singed his own beard with a burning coal. Both his brother and his son were searched for concealed weapons, and even forced to change their clothes in the presence of his guards, before they were permitted to see him. An officer of the guards named Marsyas, having dreamt that he was assassinating Dionysius, was put to death for this dream, as proving that his waking thoughts must have been dwelling upon such a project. And it has already been mentioned that Dionysius put to death the mother of one of his wives, on suspicion that she had by incantations brought about the barrenness of the other—as well as the sons of a Lokrian citizen named Aristeidês, who had refused, with indignant expressions, to grant to him his daughter in marriage.²

Such were the conditions of existence—perpetual mistrust, danger even from the nearest kindred, enmity both to and from every dignified freeman, and reliance only on armed barbarians or liberated slaves—which beset almost every Grecian despot, and from which the greatest despot of his age enjoyed no exemption. Though philosophers emphatically insisted that such a man must be miserable,³ yet Dionysius himself, as well as the great mass

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 332 D. Διονύσιος δὲ εἰς μίαν πόλιν αἰσχροῦ παύειν Σικελίαν ὑπὸ σφοδρῶς πιστεύων οὐδὲν, μὴ γίγνεσθαι, &c.

This brief, but significant expression of Plato, attests the excessive mistrust which haunted Dionysius, as a general fact; which is illustrated by the anecdotes of Cicero, *Tuseul. Disput.* v. 20, 23; and *De Officiis*, ii. 7; Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 9, *Diodor.* xiv. 2.

The well-known anecdote of Damoklês, and the sword which Dionysius caused to be suspended over his head by a horsehair, in the midst of the enjoyments of the banquet, as an illustration how

little was the value of grandeur in the midst of terror—is recounted by Cicero.

² Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 3; Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 6.

³ This sentiment, pronounced by Plato, Isokratês, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, &c., is nowhere so forcibly laid out as in the dialogue of Xenophon called *Hiero*—of which indeed it forms the text and theme. Whoever reads the picture of the position of a Grecian τύραννος, will see that it was scarcely possible for a man so placed to be other than a cruel and oppressive ruler.

of admiring spectators, would probably feel that the necessities of his position were more than compensated by its awe-striking grandeur, and by the full satisfaction of ambitious dreams; subject indeed to poignant suffering when wounded in the tender point, and when reaping insult in place of admiration, at the memorable Olympic festival of 354 B.C., above-described. But the Syracusans, over whom he ruled, enjoyed no such compensation for that which they suffered from his tax-gatherers—from his garrison of Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in Ortygia—from his spies—his prison—and his executioners.

Nor did Syracuse suffer alone. The reign of the elder Dionysius was desolating for the Hellenic population generally, both of Sicily and Italy. Syracuse became a great fortress, with vast military power in the hands of its governor, "whose policy¹ it was to pack all Sicily into it;" while the remaining free Hellenic communities were degraded, enslaved, and half-depopulated. On this topic, the mournful testimonies already cited from Lysias and Isokratēs, are borne out by the letters of the eye-witness Plato. In his advice, given to the son and successor of Dionysius, Plato emphatically presses upon him two points: first, as to the Syracusans, to transform his inherited oppressive despotism into the rule of a king, governing gently and by fixed laws: next, to reconstitute and repopulate, under free constitutions, the other Hellenic communities in Sicily, which at his accession had become nearly barbarised and half-deserted.²

¹ See the citation from Plato, in a note immediately preceding.

² Plato, *Epistol.* iii. p. 315 E (to the younger Dionysius). Φασί δ' οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρὸς τινὰς τῶν παρὰ σε τραπεζουμένων, ὡς ἀρα σοῦ τότε ἔργον· τὰς ἀλούσας ἐγὼ μᾶλλον τὰς τε Ἑλλησπιδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι, τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ' ἀρᾷ σέ μιν, τότε διεκώλυσα, σοῦ σφοδρὰ προθυμουμένου, νῦν, δὲ Διῶνα διδάσκωμι ὁρᾶν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῖς σοῖς τὴν σὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφαιροῦμεθά σε.

Ibid. p. 319 C. Μὴ με διαβάλλε

λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἶω, σε πόλεις Ἑλλησπιδας ἐξουόσας ὑπὲρ βαρβάρων οἰκίζειν, οὐδὲ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουφίσαι. . . . ὡς ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκέλευον, σὺ δ' οὐκ ἤθελες τράπτειν αὐτὰ.

Again, see *Epistol.* vii. p. 331 F. 332 B 334 D. 336 A.-D.—and the brief notice given by Photius (*Index*, 93) of the lost historical works of Arrian, respecting Dion and Timoleon.

Epistol. vii. p. 357 A. (What Dion intended to do, had he not been prevented by death)—Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα Σικελίαν ἄν τὴν ἑλληνιστάκιστα, τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους ἦν νῦν ἐγούσιν ἀφελόμενος,

The elder Dionysius had imported into Sicily large bodies of mercenaries, by means of whom he had gained his conquests, and for whom he had provided settlements at the cost of the subdued Hellenic cities. In Naxos, Katana, Leontini, and Messênê, the previous residents had been dispossessed and others substituted, out of Gallic and Iberian mercenaries. Communities thus transformed, with their former free citizens degraded into dependence or exile, not only ceased to be purely Hellenic, but also became far less populous and flourishing. In like manner Dionysius had suppressed, and absorbed into Syracuse and Lokri, the once autonomous Grecian communities of Rhegium, Hipponium, and Kaulonia, on the Italian side of the strait. In the inland regions of Italy, he had allied himself with the barbarous Lucanians, who, even without his aid, were gaining ground and pressing hard upon the Italian Greeks on the coast.

If we examine the results of the warfare carried on by Dionysius against the Carthaginians, from the commencement to the end of his career, we shall observe, that he began by losing Gela and Kamarina, and that the peace by which he was enabled to preserve Syracuse itself, arose, not from any success of his own, but from the pestilence which ruined his enemies; to say nothing about traitorous collusion with them, which I have already remarked to have been the probable price of their guarantee to his dominion. His war against the Carthaginians in 397 B.C., was undertaken with much vigour, recovered Gela, Kamarina, Agrigentum, and Selinus, and promised the most decisive success. But presently again the tide of fortune

δὲ οὐ μὴ ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας διεπολέμησαν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα, τοὺς δ' ἐμπροσθεν οἰκητὰς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τόπων εἰς τὰς ἀρχαίας καὶ πατρῷας οἰκῆσεις κατοικίσας. Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2. αἱ δὲ πλείστα πόλεις ὑπὸ βαρβάρων μιγάδι, καὶ στρατιωτῶν ἀμείθω, γετέχνητο.

The βαρβαροὶ to whom Plato alludes in this last passage, are not the Carthaginians (none of whom could be expected to come in and fight for the purpose of

putting down the despotism at Syracuse), but the Campanian and other mercenaries provided for by the elder Dionysius on the lands of the extruded Greeks. These men would have the strongest interest in upholding the despotism, if the maintenance of their own properties was connected with it. Dion thought it prudent to conciliate this powerful force by promising confirmation of their properties to such of them as would act upon the side of freedom.

turned against him. He sustained capital defeats, and owed the safety of Syracuse, a second time, to nothing but the terrific pestilence which destroyed the army of Imilkon. A third time, in 383 B.C., Dionysius gratuitously renewed the war against Carthage. After brilliant success at first, he was again totally defeated, and forced to cede to Carthage all the territory west of the river Halykus, besides paying a tribute. So that the exact difference between the Sicilian territory of Carthage—as it stood at the beginning of his command and at the end of his reign—amounts to this: that at the earlier period it reached to the river Himera—at the later period only to the river Halykus. The intermediate space between the two comprehends Agrigentum with the greater part of its territory; which represents therefore the extent of Hellenic soil rescued by Dionysius from Carthaginian dominion.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS—DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER—AND DION.

THE elder Dionysius, at the moment of his death, boasted of having left his dominion "fastened by chains of adamant;" that is, sustained by a large body of mercenaries,¹ well trained and well paid—by impregnable fortifications in the islet of Ortygia—by 400 ships of war—by immense magazines of arms and military stores—and by established intimidation over the minds of the Syracusans. These were really "chains of adamant"—so long as there was a man like Dionysius to keep them in hand. But he left no successor competent to the task; nor indeed an unobstructed succession. He had issue by two wives, whom he had married both at the same time, as has been already mentioned. By the Lokrian wife, Doris, he had his eldest son named Dionysius, and two others; by the Syracusan wife, Aristomachê, daughter of Hipparinus, he had two sons, Hipparinus and Nysæus—and two daughters, Sophrosynê and Aretê.² Dionysius the younger can hardly have been less than twenty-five years old at the death of his father and namesake. Hipparinus, the eldest son by the other wife, was considerably younger. Aristomachê his mother had long remained childless; a fact which the elder Dionysius

¹ Both Diodorus (xvi 9) and Cornelius Nepos (Dion, c. 5) speak of 100,000 foot and 10,000 horses. The former speaks of 400 ships of war; the latter, of 500.

The numbers of foot and horse appear evidently exaggerated. Both authors must have copied from the same original; possibly Ephorus.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 6, Theopom-

pus, Fr 204, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, x. p. 435; Diodor. xvi. 9; Cornel. Nepos (Dion, c. 1).

The Scholiast on Plato's fourth Epistle gives information respecting the personal relations and marriages of the elder Dionysius, not wholly agreeing with what is stated in the sixth chapter of Plutarch's Life of Dion.

ascribed to incantations wrought by the mother of the Lokrian wife, and punished by putting to death the supposed sorceress.¹

The offspring of Aristomachê, though the younger brood of the two, derived considerable advantage from the presence and countenance of her brother Dion. Hipparinus, father of Dion and Aristomachê, had been the principal abettor of the elder Dionysius in his original usurpation, in order to retrieve his own fortune,² ruined by profligate expenditure. So completely had that object been accomplished, that his son Dion was now among the richest men in Syracuse,³ possessing property estimated at above 100 talents (about 23,000*l.*). Dion was, besides, son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, who had given his daughter Sophrosynê in marriage to his son (by a different mother) the younger Dionysius; and his daughter Aretê, first to his brother Thearidês—next, on the death of Thearidês, to Dion. As brother of Aristomachê, Dion was thus brother-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and uncle both to Aretê his own wife and to Sophrosynê the wife of the younger Dionysius; as husband of Aretê, he was son-in-law to the elder Dionysius, and brother-in-law (as well as uncle) to the wife of the younger. Marriages between near relatives (excluding any such connection between uterine brother and sister) were usual in Greek manners. We cannot doubt that the despot accounted the harmony likely to be produced by such ties between the members of his two families and Dion, among the "adamantine chains" which held fast his dominion.

¹ Plutarch, *Dion*. c. 3. The age of the younger Dionysius is nowhere positively specified. But in the year 356 B.C.—or 355 B.C. at the latest—he had a son, Apollokrâtês, old enough to be entrusted with the command of Ortygia, when he himself evacuated it for the first time (Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 37). We cannot suppose Apollokrâtês to have been less than sixteen years of age at the moment when he was entrusted with such a function, having his mother and sisters under his charge (c. 50). Apollokrâtês

therefore must have been born at least as early as 372 B.C.; perhaps even earlier. Suppose Dionysius the younger to have been twenty years of age when Apollokrâtês was born; he would thus be in his twenty-fifth year in the beginning of 367 B.C., when Dionysius the older died. The expressions of Plato, as to the youth of Dionysius the younger at that juncture, are not unsuitable to such an age.

² Aristotel. *Polit.* v. 5, 6.

³ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 347 A

Apart from wealth and high position, the personal character of Dion was in itself marked and prominent. He was of an energetic temper, great bravery, and very considerable mental capacities. Though his nature was haughty and disdainful towards individuals, yet as to political communion, his ambition was by no means purely self-seeking and egoistic, like that of the elder Dionysius. Animated with vehement love of power, he was at the same time penetrated with that sense of regulated polity, and submission of individual will to fixed laws, which floated in the atmosphere of Grecian talk and literature, and stood so high in Grecian morality. He was moreover capable of acting with enthusiasm, and braving every hazard in prosecution of his own convictions.

Born about the year 408 B.C.,¹ Dion was twenty-one years of age in 387 B.C., when the elder Dionysius, having dismantled Rhegium and subdued Kroton, attained the maximum of his dominion, as master of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. Standing high in the favour of his brother-in-law Dionysius, Dion doubtless took part in the wars whereby this large dominion had been acquired; as well as in the life of indulgence and luxury which prevailed generally among wealthy Greeks in Sicily and Italy, and which to the Athenian Plato appeared alike surprising and repulsive.² That great philosopher visited Italy and Sicily about 387 B.C., as has been already mentioned. He was in acquaintance and fellowship with the school of philosophers called Pythagoreans; the remnant of that Pythagorean brotherhood, who had once exercised so powerful a political influence over the cities of those regions—and who still enjoyed considerable reputation, even after complete political downfall, through individual ability and rank of the members, combined with habits of recluse study, mysticism, and attachment among themselves. With these Pythagoreans

Compare the offer of Dion to maintain fifty triremes at his own expense (Plutarch, Dion, c. 6).

¹ Dion was fifty-five years of age at the time of his death, in the fourth year after his departure from Peloponnesus (Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10).

His death took place seemingly

about 354 B.C. He would thus be born about 408 B.C.

² Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 326 D. ἐλθόντα δὲ με ἐ τὰ αὐτῇ λεγόμενος αὐτοῖς εὐδαίμων, Ἰταλιωτικῶν τε καὶ Συρακουσίων τροπικῶν ἀλήρης, οὐδ' αὖτ' οὐδαμῶς ἤρεσκε, δις τε τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμπεπλῆμενον ζῆν καὶ μηδὲ ποτε κοιμώμενον μόνον νύκτωρ, &c.

Dion also, a young man of open mind and ardent aspirations, was naturally thrown into communication by the proceedings of the elder Dionysius in Italy.¹ Through them he came into intercourse with Plato, whose conversation made an epoch in his life.

The mystic turn of imagination, the sententious brevity, and the mathematical researches, of the Pythagoreans, produced doubtless an imposing effect upon Dion; just as Lysis, a member of that brotherhood, had acquired the attachment and influenced the sentiments of Epaminondas at Thebes. But Plato's power of working upon the minds of young men was far more impressive and irresistible. He possessed a large range of practical experience, a mastery of political and social topics, and a charm of eloquence, to which the Pythagoreans were strangers. The stirring effect of the Sokratic talk, as well as of the democratical atmosphere in which Plato had been brought up, had developed all the communicative aptitude of his mind; and great as that aptitude appears in his remaining dialogues, there is ground for believing that it was far greater in his conversation; greater perhaps in 357 B.C., when he was still mainly the Sokratic Plato—than it became in later days, after he had imbibed to a certain extent the mysticism of these Pythagoreans.² Brought up as Dion had been at the court of Dionysius—accustomed to see around him only slavish deference and luxurious enjoyment—unused to open speech or large philosophical discussion—he found in Plato a new man exhibited, and a new world opened before him.

The conception of a free community—with correlative rights and duties belonging to every citizen, determined

¹ Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. 20. *De Republica*, i. 10. Jamblichus (*Vit. Pythagoræ*, c. 149) calls Dion a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood, which may be doubted; but his assertion that Dion procured for Plato, though only by means of a large price (100 minæ), the possession of a book composed by the Pythagorean Philolaus, seems not improbable. The ancient Pythagoreans wrote nothing. Philolaus (seemingly about contemporary

with Sokratês) was the first Pythagorean who left any written memorial. That this book could only be obtained by the intervention of an influential Syracusan—and even by him only for a large price—is easy to believe.

See the instructive Dissertation of Gruppe, *Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas und der älteren Pythagoreer*, p. 24, 26, 48, &c.

² See a remarkable passage, Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 328 F.

by laws and protected or enforced by power emanating from the collective entity called the City—stood in the foreground of ordinary Grecian morality—reigned spontaneously in the bosoms of every Grecian festival crowd—and had been partially imbibed by Dion, though not from his own personal experience, yet from teachers, sophists, and poets. This conception, essential and fundamental with philosophers as well as with the vulgar, was not merely set forth by Plato with commanding powers of speech, but also exalted with improvements and refinements into an ideal perfection. Above all, it was based upon a strict, even an abstemious and ascetic, canon, as to individual enjoyment; and upon a careful training both of mind and body, qualifying each man for the due performance of his duties as a citizen; a subject which Plato (as we see by his dialogues) did not simply propound with the direct enforcement of a preacher, but touched with the quickening and pungent effect, and reinforced with the copious practical illustrations, of Sokratic dialogue.

As the stimulus from the teacher was here put forth with consummate efficacy, the predisposition of the learner enabled it to take full effect. Dion became an altered man both in public sentiment and in individual behaviour. He recollected that twenty years before, his country Syracuse had been as free as Athens. He learnt to abhor the iniquity of the despotism by which her liberty had been overthrown, and by which subsequently the liberties of so many other Greeks in Italy and Sicily had been trodden down also. He was made to remark, that Sicily had been half-barbarized through the foreign mercenaries imported as the despot's instruments. He conceived the sublime idea or dream of rectifying all this accumulation of wrong and suffering. It was his wish first to cleanse Syracuse from the blot of slavery, and to clothe her anew in the brightness and dignity of freedom; yet not with the view of restoring the popular government as it had stood prior to the usurpation, but of establishing an improved constitutional polity, originated by himself, with laws which should not only secure individual rights, but also educate and moralize the citizens.¹

Dion learns to hate the Dionysian despotism—he conceives large political and reformatory views.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 335 F. Διωνα γὰρ ἐγὼ παρῶς οἶδα, ὡς οἶόν τε περὶ ἀθροισμοῦ ἀθροισμοῦ διευθυρί-

ζεσθαι, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰ κατέσχευ, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε εἴη ἄλλο γε σῆμα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπράνετο, ἣ ἐπὶ τῷ—Σύρα-

The function which he imagined to himself, and which the conversation of Plato suggested, was not that of a despot like Dionysius, but that of a despotic legislator like Lykurgus,¹ taking advantage of a momentary omnipotence, conferred upon him by grateful citizens in a state of public confusion, to originate a good system; which, when once put in motion, would keep itself alive by fashioning the minds of the citizens to its own intrinsic excellence. After having thus both liberated and reformed Syracuse, Dion promised to himself that he would employ Syracusan force, not in annihilating, but in recreating, other free Hellenic communities throughout the island; expelling from thence all the barbarians—both the imported mercenaries and the Carthaginians.

Such were the hopes and projects which arose in the mind of the youthful Dion as he listened to Plato; hopes pregnant with future results which neither of them contemplated—and not unworthy of being compared with those enthusiastic aspirations which the young Spartan kings Agis and Kleomenés imbibed, a century afterwards, in part from the conversation of the philosopher Sphærus.² Never before had Plato met with a pupil who so quickly apprehended, so profoundly meditated, or so passionately laid to heart his lessons.³ Inflamed with his newly communicated impulse towards philosophy, as the supreme guide and directress of virtuous conduct, Dion altered his habits of life; exchanging the splendour and luxury of a Sicilian rich man for the simple fare and regulated application becoming a votary of the Academy. In this course he persisted without faltering, throughout all his residence at the court of Dionysius, in spite of the unpopularity contracted among his immediate companions.

Alteration of habits in Dion—he brings Plato into communication with Dionysius.

χοῦσας μὲν πρῶτον, τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὐτῆς ἀτήλασε καὶ φαεινῶς εὐεργετῶν ἐν ἀγῆματι κατεστήσας, ὃ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἂν πάσῃ μηχανῇ ἐκόσμησε νόμοις τοῖς προσήκουσι τε καὶ ἀρίστοις τοὺς πολίτας—τότε ἐφεξῆς τοῦτοις ἐρούθυμειτ' ἂν πράξει, πᾶσαν Σικελίαν κατὰκλιεῖν καὶ εὐεθέραιν ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ποιεῖν, τοὺς μὲν ἐκβάλλων, τοὺς δὲ γειροῦμενος ἄγων Ἰέρωνος, &c

Compare the beginning of the same epistle, p. 324 A.

¹ Plato, Epist. iv. p. 320 E. (addressed to Dion). . . . ὥς οὖν, ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος παρασκευάζου τον τε Λυκούργον ἐκείνον ἀρχαῖον ἀποδειξῶν, καὶ τὸν Κύρον καὶ εἰς ἄλλος πῶποτε ἐδοξεν ἦθαι καὶ πολιταίῃ διενεγκεῖν, &c.

² Plutarch. Kleomenés, c. 2-11.

³ Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 327 A.

His enthusiasm even led him to believe, that the despot himself, unable to resist that persuasive tongue by which he had been himself converted, might be gently brought round into an employment of his mighty force for beneficent and reformatory purposes. Accordingly Dion, inviting Plato to Syracuse, procured for him an interview with Dionysius. How miserably the speculation failed, has been recounted in my last chapter. Instead of acquiring a new convert, the philosopher was fortunate in rescuing his own person, and in making good his returning footsteps out of that lion's den, into which the improvident enthusiasm of his young friend had inveigled him.

The harsh treatment of Plato by Dionysius was a painful, though salutary, warning to Dion. Without sacrificing either his own convictions, or the philosophical regularity of life which he had thought fit to adopt—he saw that patience was imperatively necessary, and he so conducted himself as to maintain unabated the favour and confidence of Dionysius. Such a policy would probably be recommended to him even by Plato, in prospect of a better future. But it would be strenuously urged by the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy; among whom was Archytas, distinguished not only as a mathematician and friend of Plato, but also as the chief political magistrate of Tarentum. To these men, who dwelt all within the reach,² if not under the dominion, of this formidable Syracusan despot, it would be an unspeakable advantage to have a friend like Dion near him, possessing his confidence, and serving as a shield to them

Δίω, μὲν γὰρ δὴ μάλ' εὐμαθὴς ὦν
πρὸς τε τὰ λλά, γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τότε ὑπ'
εμοῦ λεγομένους λόγους, οὕτως ὁδεῖας
ὑπάρχουσι καὶ σφοδρὰ, ὥς οὐδεὶς πο-
ποτε ὦν ἐγὼ περὶ σέτυχοι, λέων, καὶ
τὸν ἐκίλοιπον βίον ζῆν ἡθελήσας δια-
φερόντως τῶν πολλῶν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ
Σικελιωτῶν, ἀρετὴν περὶ κλείνορος
ἡδονῆς τῆς τε ἄλλης τρυφῆς ποιού-
μενος· θύεν ἐπαχθέστερον τοῖς περὶ
τά τυραννικά νόμιμα ζῶσιν ἐβίω,
μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ περὶ Διονύσιου,
γεγεμέσθαι.

Plutarch, Dion, c. 4. ὡς πρῶτον
ἐβύστατο λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἤγε-

μονικῆς πρὸς ἀρετῇ, ἀνεφλέχθη τῇ
ψυχῇ, &c.

¹ See the story in Jamblichus (Vit. Pythagoræ, c. 189) of a company of Syracusan troops under Eurymenês the brother of Dion, sent to lie in ambuscade for some Pythagoreans between Tarentum and Metapontum. The story has not the air of truth; but the state of circumstances, which it supposes, illustrates the relation between Dionysius and the cities in the Tarentine Gulf.

against his displeasure or interference. Dion so far surmounted his own unbending nature as to conduct himself towards Dionysius with skill and prudence. He was employed by the despot in other important affairs, as well as in embassies to Carthage, which he fulfilled well, especially with conspicuous credit for eloquence; and also in the execution of various cruel orders, which his humanity secretly mitigated.¹ After the death of Thearidês, Dionysius gave to Dion in marriage the widow Aretê (his daughter), and continued until the last to treat him with favour, accepting from him a freedom of censure such as he would tolerate from no other adviser.

During the many years which elapsed before the despot died, we cannot doubt that Dion found opportunities of visiting Peloponnesus and Athens, for the great festivals and other purposes. He would thus keep up his friendship and philosophical communication with Plato. Being as he was minister and relative, and perhaps successor presumptive, of the most powerful prince in Greece, he would enjoy everywhere great importance, which would be enhanced by his philosophy and eloquence. The Spartans, at that time the allies of Dionysius, conferred upon Dion the rare honour of a vote of citizenship;² and he received testimonies of respect from other cities also. Such honours tended to exalt his reputation at Syracuse; while the visits to Athens and the cities of Central Greece enlarged his knowledge both of politicians and philosophers.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 5, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 1, 2.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 17, 49. Respecting the rarity of the vote of Spartan citizenship, see a remarkable passage of Herodotus, ix. 33-35.

Plutarch states that the Spartans voted their citizenship to Dion during his exile, while he was in Peloponnesus after the year 367 B.C., at enmity with the younger Dionysius then despot of Syracuse; whom (according to Plutarch) the Spartans took the risk of offending, in order that they might testify their extreme admiration for Dion.

I cannot but think that Plutarch is mistaken as to the time of this grant. In and after 367 B.C., the

Spartans were under great depression, playing the losing game against Thebes. It is scarcely conceivable that they should be imprudent enough to alienate a valuable ally for the sake of gratuitously honouring an exile whom he hated and had banished. Whereas if we suppose the vote to have been passed during the lifetime of the elder Dionysius, it would count as a compliment to him as well as to Dion, and would thus be an act of political prudence as well as of genuine respect. Plutarch speaks as if he supposed that Dion was never in Peloponnesus until the time of his exile, which is, in my judgement, highly improbable.

At length occurred the death of the elder Dionysius, occasioned by an unexpected attack of fever, after a few days' illness. He had made no special announcement about his succession. Accordingly, as soon as the physicians pronounced him to be in imminent danger, a competition arose between his two families: on the one hand Dionysius the younger, his son by the Lokrian wife Doris; on the other, his wife Aristomachê and her brother Dion, representing her children Hipparinus and Nysæus, then very young. Dion, wishing to obtain for these two youths either a partnership in the future power, or some other beneficial provision, solicited leave to approach the bedside of the sick man. But the physicians refused to grant his request without apprising the younger Dionysius; who, being resolved to prevent it, directed a soporific potion to be administered to his father, from the effects of which the latter never awoke so as to be able to see any one.¹ The interview with Dion being thus frustrated, and the father dying without giving any directions, Dionysius the younger succeeded as eldest son, without opposition. He was presented to that which was called an assembly of the Syracusan people,² and delivered some conciliatory phrases, requesting them to continue to him that goodwill which they had so long shown to his father. Consent and acclamation were of course not wanting, to the new master of the troops, treasures, magazines, and fortifications in Ortygia; those "adamantine chains" which were well known to dispense with the necessity of any real popular good-will.

Dionysius II. (or the younger), then about 25 years of age, was a young man of considerable natural capacity, and of quick and lively impulses;³ but weak and vain in his character, given to transitory caprices, and eager in his appetite for praise without being capable of any industrious or resolute efforts to earn it. As yet he was wholly unpractised in serious business of any

B.C. 367.
Death of
the elder
Dionysius
—diver-
gences of
interest be-
tween the
two lines
of family.

B.C. 367.
The
younger
Dionysius
succeeds
his father
—his
character.

¹ Cernelius Nepos, Dion, c. 2; Plutarch, Dion, c. 6. τὴν τοῦ μνησθέντος δύναμιν, φιλότιμος δὲ θαυματοῦς, &c. Compare p. 330

² Diodor xv. 74.

³ Plate, Epistol. vii. p. 338 E. A. p. 228 B, also Epist. iii. p. 316

C. p. 317 E. Ὁ δὲ οὕτως ἄλλως ἐστὶ, ἀφυγῆς πρὸς Plutarch, Dion, c. 7-9.

kind. He had neither seen military service nor mingled in the discussion of political measures; having been studiously kept back from both, by the extreme jealousy of his father. His life had been passed in the palace or aeropolis of Ortygia, amidst all the indulgences and luxuries belonging to a princely station, diversified with amateur carpenter's work and turuery. However, the tastes of the father introduced among the guests at the palace a certain number of poets, reciters, musicians, &c., so that the younger Dionysius had contracted a relish for poetical literature, which opened his mind to generous sentiments, and large conceptions of excellence, more than any other portion of his very confined experience. To philosophy, to instructive conversation, to the exercise of reason, he was a stranger.¹ But the very feebleness and indecision of his character presented him as impressible, perhaps improveable, by a strong will and influence brought to bear upon him from that quarter, at least as well as from any other.

Such was the novice who suddenly stepped into the place of the most energetic and powerful despot of the Grecian world. Dion—being as he was of mature age, known service and experience, and full enjoyment of the confidence of the elder Dionysius,—might have probably raised material opposition to the younger. But he attempted no such thing. He acknowledged and supported the young prince with cordial sincerity, dropping altogether those views, whatever they were, on behalf of the children of Aristomachê, which had induced him to solicit the last interview with the sick man. While exerting himself to strengthen and facilitate the march of the government, he tried to gain influence and ascendancy over the mind of the young Dionysius. At the first meeting of council which took place after the accession, Dion stood conspicuous not less for his earnest adhesion than for his dignified language and intelligent advice. The remaining counsellors—accustomed, under the self-determining despot who had just quitted the scene, to the simple function of

Conduct of Dion—he submits to the younger Dionysius—gives him frank and wholesome advice.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 332 E. ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ συνηβήκει οὕτως ἀνομιλήτω μὲν

παιδείας, ἀνομιλήτω δὲ συνουσιῶν τῶν προσηκουσῶν γεγονέαι, &c.

hearing, applauding, and obeying, his directions — exhausted themselves in phrases and compliments, waiting to catch the tone of the young prince before they ventured to pronounce any decided opinion. But Dion, to whose freedom of speech even the elder Dionysius had partially submitted, disdained all such tampering, entered at once into a full review of the actual situation, and suggested the positive measures proper to be adopted. We cannot doubt that, in the transmission of an authority which had rested so much on the individual spirit of the former possessor, there were many precautions to be taken, especially in regard to the mercenary troops both at Syracuse and in the outlying dependencies. All these necessities of the moment Dion set forth, together with suitable advice. But the most serious of all the difficulties arose out of the war with Carthage still subsisting, which it was foreseen that the Carthaginians were likely to press more vigorously, calculating on the ill-assured tenure and inexperienced management of the new prince. This difficulty Dion took upon himself. If the council should think it wise to make peace, he engaged to go to Carthage and negotiate peace — a task in which he had been more than once employed under the elder Dionysius. If, on the other hand, it were resolved to prosecute the war, he advised that imposing forces should be at once put in equipment, promising to furnish, out of his own large property, a sum sufficient for the outfit of fifty triremes.¹

The young Dionysius was not only profoundly impressed with the superior wisdom and suggestive resource of Dion, but also grateful for his generous offer of pecuniary as well as personal support.² In all probability Dion actually carried the offer into effect, for to a man of his disposition, money had little value except as a means of extending influence and acquiring reputation. The war with Carthage seems to have lasted at least throughout the next year,³ and to have been terminated not long

Dion
acquires
great influ-
ence and
estimation
from
Dionysius.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 6.
² Plutarch, Dion, c. 7. Ὁ μὲν οὖν
Διονύσιος ὑπερφυῶς τὴν μεγαλοφυῶν
ἐθαύμασε καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν ἠγάπησεν.

³ Dionysius II. was engaged in
war at the time when Plato first

visited him at Syracuse, within the
year immediately after his ac-
cession (Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 317
A). We may reasonably presume
that this was the war with Car-
thage.

afterwards. But it never assumed those perilous proportions which had been contemplated by the council as probable. As a mere contingency, however, it was sufficient to inspire Dionysius with alarm, combined with the other exigencies of his new situation. At first he was painfully conscious of his own inexperience; anxious about hazards which he now saw for the first time, and not merely open to advice, but eager and thankful for suggestions, from any quarter where he could place confidence. Dion, identified by an ancient connection as well as by marriage with the Dionysian family—trusted, more than any one else, by the old despot, and surrounded with that accessory dignity which ascetic strictness of life usually confers in excess—presented every title to such confidence. And when he was found not only the most trustworthy, but the most frank and fearless, of counsellors, Dionysius gladly yielded both to the measures which he advised and to the impulses which he inspired.

Such was the political atmosphere of Syracuse during the period immediately succeeding the new accession, while the splendid obsequies in honour of the departed Dionysius were being solemnized; coupled with a funeral pile so elaborate as to confer celebrity on Timæus the constructor—and commemorated by architectural monuments, too grand to be permanent,¹ immediately outside of Ortygia, near the

B.C. 367.

Recall of
Philistus
from exile.

Compare Diodorus (xvi. 5), who mentions that the younger Dionysius also carried on war for some little time, in a languid manner, against the Lucanians, and that he founded two cities on the coast of Apulia in the Adriatic. I think it probable that these two last-mentioned foundations were acts of Dionysius I., not of Dionysius II. They were not likely to be undertaken by a young prince of backward disposition, at his first accession.

¹ Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 49. "Othoni sepulcrum exstructum est, modicum, et mansurum."

A person named Timæus was immediately appointed constructor of

the funeral pile: see Athenæus, v. p. 206. Both Goller (*Timæi Fragm.* 95) and M. Didot (*Timæi Fr.* 126) have referred this passage to Timæus the historian, and have supposed it to relate to the description given by Timæus of the funeral pile. But the passage in Athenæus seems to me to indicate Timæus as the *builder*, not the *describer*, of this famous *συνήδριον*.

It is he who is meant, probably, in the passage of Cicero (*De Naturâ Deor.* iii. 35)—(Dionysius) "in suo lectulo mortuus in *Tympanidis rogum illatus est*, eamque potestatem quam ipse per scelus erat natus, quasi iustam et legitimam hereditatē loco *ἑοῦ* tradidit." This

Regal Gates leading to that citadel. Among the popular measures, natural at the commencement of a new reign, the historian Philistus was recalled from exile.¹ He had been one of the oldest and most attached partisans of the elder Dionysius; by whom, however, he had at last been banished, and never afterwards forgiven. His recall now seemed to promise a new and valuable assistant to the younger, whom it also presented as softening the rigorous proceedings of his father. In this respect, it would harmonise with the views of Dion, though Philistus afterwards became his great opponent.

Dion was now both the prime minister, and the confidential monitor, of the young Dionysius. He upheld the march of the government with undiminished energy, and was of greater political importance than Dionysius himself. But success in this object was not the end for which Dion laboured. He neither wished to serve a despot, nor to become a despot himself. The moment was favourable for resuming that project which he had formerly imbibed from Plato, and which, in spite of contemptuous disparagement by his former master, had ever since clung to him as the dream of his heart and life. To make Syracuse a free city, under a government, not of will, but of good laws, with himself as lawgiver in substance, if not in name—to enfranchise and re-plant the semi-barbarised Hellenic cities in Sicily—and to expel the Carthaginians—were schemes to which he now again devoted himself with unabated enthusiasm. But he

Dion tries to work upon the mind of Dionysius, towards a fiercer political government and mental improvement.

aceme at least the best way of explaining a passage which perplexes the editors see the note of Davis.

¹ Plutarch (*De Exilio*, p. 637) and Cornelius Nepos (*Dinn*, c. 3) represent that Philistus was recalled at the persuasion of the enemies of Dion, as a counterpoise and corrective to the ascendancy of the latter over Dionysius the younger. Though Philistus afterwards actually performed this part, I doubt whether such was the motive which caused him to be recalled. He seems to have come back *before* the obsequies of Dionysius the

elder; that is, very early after the commencement of the new reign. Philistus had described, in his history, these obsequies in a manner so elaborate and copious that this passage in his work excited the special notice of the ancient critics (see Philisti Fragment. 42, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, c. 34). I venture to think that this proves him to have been *present* at the obsequies; which would of course be very impressive to him, since they were among the first things which he saw after his long exile.

did not look to any other means of achieving them than the consent and initiative of Dionysius himself. The man who had been sanguine enough to think of working upon the iron soul of the father, was not likely to despair of shaping anew the more malleable metal of which the son was composed. Accordingly, while lending to Dionysius his best service as minister, he also took up the Platonic profession, and tried to persuade him to reform both himself and his government. He endeavoured to awaken in him a relish for a better and nobler private conduct than that which prevailed among the luxurious companions around him. He dwelt with enthusiasm on the scientific and soul-stirring conversation of Plato; specimens¹ of which he either read aloud or repeated, exalting the hearer not only to a higher intellectual range, but also to the full majesty of mind requisite for ruling others with honour and improvement. He pointed out the unrivalled glory which Dionysius would acquire in the eyes of Greece, by consenting to employ his vast power, not as a despot working on the fears of subjects, but as a king enforcing temperance and justice, by his own paternal example as well as by good laws. He tried to show that Dionysius, after having liberated Syracuse, and enrolled himself as a king limited and responsible amidst grateful citizens, would have far more real force against the barbarians than at present.²

Such were the new convictions which Dion tried to work into the mind of the young Dionysius, as a living faith and sentiment. Penetrated as he was with the Platonic idea—that nothing could be done for the improvement and happiness of mankind,³ until philosophy and ruling power came together in the same hands; but everything, if the two did so come together—he thought that he saw before him a chance of realizing the conjunction, in the case of the greatest among all Hellenic potentates. He already beheld in fancy his native country and fellow citizens liberated, moralised, ennobled, and conducted to happiness, without

His earnest exhortations produce considerable effect, inspiring Dionysius with a strong desire to see and converse with Plato.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 11. Ταῦτα πολλάκις τοῦ Διονύσιου παραινούντος, καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν Πλάτωνος ἔστι, οὕστινας ὑποσπείροντες, &c.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 10, 11; Plato,

Epist. vii. p. 327 C.

³ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 328 A. p. 335 E; Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 C. D.

murder or persecution,¹ simply by the well-meaning and instructed employment of power already organised. If accident had thrown the despotism into the hands of Dion himself, at this period of his life, the Grecian world would probably have seen an experiment tried, as memorable and generous as any event recorded in its history: what would have been its result, we cannot say. But it was enough to fire his inmost soul, to see himself separated from the experiment only by the necessity of persuading an impressible young man over whom he had much influence; and for himself, he was quite satisfied with the humbler position of nominal minister, but real originator and chief, in so noble an enterprise.² His persuasive powers, strengthened as they were by intense earnestness as well as by his imposing station and practical capacity, actually wrought a great effect upon Dionysius. The young man appeared animated with a strong desire of self-improvement, and of qualifying himself for such a use of the powers of government as Dion depicted. He gave proof of the sincerity of his feeling by expressing eagerness to see and converse with Plato, to whom he sent several personal messages, warmly requesting him to visit Syracuse.³

This was precisely the first step which Dion had been labouring to bring about. He well knew, and had personally felt, the wonderful magic of Plato's conversation when addressed to young men. To bring Plato to Syracuse, and to pour his eloquent language into the predisposed ears of Dionysius, appeared like realising the conjunction of philosophy and power. Accordingly he sent to Athens, along with the invitation from Dionysius, the most pressing and emphatic entreaties from himself. He represented the immense prize to be won—nothing less than the means of

¹ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E. ... 'Ο δὲ καὶ νῦν, εἰ διατράξαιτο ἐν Διονυσίῳ, ὡς ἐπεχειρήσει, μεγάλῃς ἐλπίδας εἶχεν, ἅντ' ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ θανάτων καὶ τῶν νῦν γεγυρότων κακῶν, βίον ἂν εὐδαίμονα καὶ ἀληθινόν, ἐν πάσῃ τῇ ζωῇ κατασκευάσαι.

² Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 333 B. Ταῦτόν γ' ὅτις Δίῳ καὶ Συρακούσιοι τότε ἐπαυθόν, ὅπερ καὶ Διονύσιος, ὅτε αὐτὸν ἐπεγείνοιτο παιδεύσας καὶ θεσπίας βασι-

λέα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄξιον, οὕτω κοινωσὶν αὐτῷ τοῦ βίου παντός.

³ Plato, Epist. vii. p. 327 E.; Plutarch, Dion, c. 11. ἔοχεν ἔρως τὸν Διονύσιον ὁξὺς καὶ περιμανῆς τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τῆς συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος. Εὐθύς οὖν Ἀθήναζε πολλὰ μὲν ἔφοιτα γράμματα παρὰ τοῦ Διονυσίου, πολλαὶ δ' ἐπισκλήψεις τοῦ Δίῳ, ἀλλ' αἱ δ' ἐξ Ἰταλίας παρὰ τῷ Πυθαγορικῶν, &c.

directing the action of an organised power, extending over all the Greeks of Italy and Sicily—provided only the mind of Dionysius could be thoroughly gained over. This (he said) was already half done; not only Dionysius himself, but also his youthful half-brothers of the other line, had been impressed with earnest mental aspirations, and longed to drink at the pure fountain of true philosophy. Everything presaged complete success, such as would render them hearty and active proselytes, if Plato would only come forthwith—before hostile influences could have time to corrupt them—and devote to the task his unrivalled art of penetrating the youthful mind. These hostile influences were indeed at work, and with great activity; if victorious, they would not only defeat the project of Dion, but might even provoke his expulsion, or threaten his life. Could Plato, by declining the invitation, leave his devoted champion and apostle to fight so great a battle, alone and unassisted? What could Plato say for himself afterwards, if by declining to come, he not only let slip the greatest prospective victory which had ever been opened to philosophy, but also permitted the corruption of Dionysius and the ruin of Dion?¹

Such appeals, in themselves emphatic and touching, reached Athens, reinforced by solicitations, hardly less strenuous, from Archytas of Tarentum and the other Pythagorean philosophers in the south of Italy; to whose personal well-being, over and above the interests of philosophy, the character of the future Syracusan government was of capital importance. Plato was deeply agitated and embarrassed. He was now 61 years of age. He enjoyed pre-eminent estimation, in the grove of Akadêmus near Athens, amidst admiring hearers from all parts of Greece. The Athenian democracy, if it accorded to him no influence on public affairs, neither molested him nor dimmed his intellectual glory. The proposed voyage to Syracuse carried him out of this enviable position into a new field of hazard and speculation; brilliant indeed and flattering, beyond anything which had ever been approached by philosophy, if it succeeded; but fraught with disgrace, and even with danger to all concerned, if it failed. Plato had already seen the elder Dionysius surrounded by his walls and mercenaries in

Hesitation of Plato—no reluctantly consents to visit Syracuse.

¹ Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 328.

Ortygia, and had learnt by cruel experience the painful consequences of propounding philosophy to an intractable hearer, whose displeasure passed so readily into act. The sight of contemporary despots nearer home, such as Euphron of Sikyon and Alexander of Phæræ, was by no means reassuring; nor could he reasonably stake his person and reputation on the chance, that the younger Dionysius might prove a glorious exception to the general rule. To outweigh such scruples, he had indeed the positive and respectful invitation of Dionysius himself; which however would have passed for a transitory, though vehement, caprice on the part of a young prince, had it not been backed by the strong assurances of a mature man and valued friend like Dion. To these assurances, and to the shame which would be incurred by leaving Dion to fight the battle and incur the danger alone, Plato sacrificed his own grounds for hesitation. He went to Syracuse, less with the hope of succeeding in the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence—as fit only for the discussions of the school, shrinking from all application to practice, betraying the interest of his Pythagorean friends, and basely deserting that devoted champion who had half opened the door to him for triumphant admission.¹

Such is the account which the philosopher gives of his own state of mind in going to Syracuse. At the same time, he intimates that his motives were differently interpreted by others.² And as the account which we possess was written fifteen years after the event—when Dion had perished, when the Syracusan enterprise had realised nothing like what was expected and when Plato looked back upon it with the utmost grief and aversion,³ which must have

Plato visits
Syracuse—
unbounded
deference
and
admiration
manifested
towards
him at first
by Diony-
sius. Fear
and hatred

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 328. Ταύτη μὲν τῇ διαβολῇ καὶ τὸλμῃ ἀπῆρα οἶκοθεν, οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς ἐδόξαζον, ἀλλ' αἰσχυρόμενος μὲν ἐμαυτὸν τὸ μέγιστον, μὴ δοῖμαι ποτε ἐμαυτῷ παντάπασι λόγος μόνον ἀτιγνῶς εἶναι τις, ἔργου δὲ οὐδενός ἢ ποτε ἐκὼν ἀνθίστασθαι, κινδυνεύειν δὲ προσδύναμι πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Δίωνα ἐμίαν ἐν κινδύνοις ὄντως γεγονότος

οὐ μικροῖς εἴτ' οὖν πάθοι τι, εἴτ' ἐκπεῶν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐχθρῶν, εἶθαι παρ' ἡμᾶς φεύγων, καὶ ἀνέροιτο, εἰπὼν, &c.

² This is contained in the words οὐχ ᾗ τινὲς ἐδόξαζον—before cited.

³ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 350 B. ταῦτα εἶπον μεμνηστικῶς τὴν περὶ Σικελίαν πλάνην καὶ ἀτυχίαν, &c.

poisoned the last three or four years of his life —we may fairly suspect that he partially transfers back to 367 B.C. the feelings of 352 B.C.; and that at the earlier period, he went to Syracuse, not merely because he was ashamed to decline, but because he really flattered himself with some hopes of success.

felt by
Philistus
and other
courtiers.

However desponding he may have been before, he could hardly fail to conceive hopes from the warmth of his first reception. One of the royal carriages met him at his landing, and conveyed him to his lodging. Dionysius offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods for his safe arrival. The banquets at the acropolis became distinguished for their plainness and sobriety. Never had Dionysius been seen so gentle in answering suitors or transacting public business. He began immediately to take lessons in geometry from Plato. Every one around him, of course, was suddenly smitten with a taste for geometry;¹ so that the floors were all spread with sand, and nothing was to be seen except triangles and other figures inscribed upon it, with expositors and a listening crowd around them. To those who had been inmates of the acropolis under the reign of the former despot, this change was surprising enough. But their surprise was converted into alarm, when, at a periodical sacrifice just then offered, Dionysius himself arrested the herald in pronouncing the customary prayer to the gods—"That the despotism might long remain unshaken." "Stop! (said Dionysius to the herald) imprecate no such curse upon us!"² To the ears of Philistus, and the old politicians, these words portended nothing less than revolution to the dynasty, and ruin to Syracusan power. A single Athenian sophist (they exclaimed), with no other force than his tongue and his reputation, had achieved the conquest of Syracuse; an attempt in which thousands of his countrymen had miserably perished half a century before.³ Ineffably were they disgusted to see Dionysius abdicate in favour of Plato, and exchange the

Xenokratēs seems to have accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diogen. Laert. iv. 2, 1).

¹ Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amici Discrimin. p. 52 C.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 13. Οὐ πάύσῃ καταρώμενος ἡμῖν;

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 14. Ἐνοι δὲ προσποιούτο δυσχεραίνειν, εἰ πρότε-

ρον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ναυτικάς καὶ περὶ καὶ συνάμειν δεῦρο πλεῖσαντες ἀπώλοντο καὶ διεφθάρησαν πρότερον ἢ λαβεῖν Συρακούσας, νυνὶ δὲ δι' ἐνός σοφιστοῦ καταλύουσα τὴν Διονυσίου τυραννίδα, &c.

Plato is here described as a *Sophist*, in the language of those who did not like him. Plato, the great

care of his vast force and dominion for geometrical problems and discussions on the *summum bonum*.

For a moment Plato seemed to be despot of Syracuse; so that the noble objects for which Dion had laboured were apparently within his reach, either wholly or in part. And as far as we can judge, they really were to a great degree within his reach—had this situation, so interesting and so fraught with consequences to the people of Sicily, been properly turned to account. With all reverence for the greatest philosopher of antiquity, we are forced to confess that upon his own showing, he not only failed to turn the situation to account, but contributed even to spoil it by an unseasonable rigour. To admire philosophy in its distinguished teachers, is one thing; to learn and appropriate it, is another stage, rarer and more difficult, requiring assiduous labour, and no common endowments; while that which Plato calls “the philosophical life,”¹ or practical predominance of a well-trained intellect and well-chosen ethical purposes, combined with the minimum of personal appetite—is a third stage, higher and rarer still. Now Dionysius had reached the first stage only. He had contracted a warm and profound admiration for Plato. He had imbibed this feeling from the exhortations of Dion; and we shall see by his subsequent conduct that it was really a feeling both sincere and durable. But he admired Plato without having either inclination or talent to ascend higher, and to acquire what Plato called philosophy. Now it was an unexpected good fortune, and highly creditable to the persevering enthusiasm of Dion, that Dionysius should have been wound up so far as to admire Plato, to invoke his presence, and to instal him as a sort of spiritual power by the side of the temporal. Thus much was more than could have been expected; but to demand more, and to

authority who is always quoted in disparagement of the persons called *Sophists*, is as much entitled to the name as they, and is called so equally by unfriendly commentators. I drew particular attention to this fact in my sixty-eighth chapter, where I endeavoured to show that there was no school, sect, or body of persons distinguished by uniformity of doctrine

or practice, properly called *Sophists*; and that the name was common to all literary men or teachers, when spoken of in an unfriendly spirit.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 330 B. Ἐγὼ δὲ πάντα ὑπέμενον, τὴν πρῶτην διάνοιαν φυλάττων ἥπερ ἀφικόμεν, εἰπω εἰς πειθομένην ἔλθοι τῆς φιλοσοφίας (Dionysius)—ὁ δ' ἐνι-
κλεῖν ἀντιτείνων.

insist that Dionysius should go to school and work through a course of mental regeneration—was a purpose hardly possible to attain, and positively mischievous if it failed. Unfortunately, it was exactly this error which Plato, and Dion in deference to Plato, seem to have committed. Instead of taking advantage of the existing ardour of Dionysius to instigate him at once into active political measures beneficial to the people of Syracuse and Sicily, with the full force of an authority which at that moment would have been irresistible—instead of heartening him up against groundless fear or difficulties of execution, and seeing that full honour was done to him for all the good which he really accomplished, meditated, or adopted—Plato postponed all these as matters for which his royal pupil was not yet ripe. He and Dion began to deal with Dionysius as a confessor treats his penitent; to probe the interior man¹—to expose to him his own unworthiness—to show that his life, his training, his companions, had all been vicious—to insist upon repentance and amendment upon these points, before he could receive absolution, and be permitted to enter upon active political life—to tell him that he must reform himself, and become a rational and temperate man, before he was fit to enter seriously on the task of governing others.

Strenuous exhortations addressed by Plato and Dion to Dionysius, to reform himself, and correct his own deep-seated mental imperfections,

Such was the language which Plato and Dion held to Dionysius. They well knew indeed that they were treading on delicate ground—that while irritating a spirited horse in the sensitive part, they had no security against his kicks.² Accordingly, they resorted to many circumlocutory and equivocal expressions, so as to soften the offence

Plato damps the inclination of Dionysius towards political good.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 332 F. "Α δὴ καὶ Διονυσίου συμβουλεύομεν ἐγὼ καὶ Δίων, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ξυμβεβήκει, οὕτως ἀνομιλήτην μὲν παιδείαν, ἀνομιλήτην δὲ συνουσίων τῷ προσήκουσάν γε γινέσθαι, πρῶτον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὁρμήσασθαι φίλους ἄλλους αὐτοῦ τῶν οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ ἡλικιωτῶν, καὶ ἀμειψόμενος τῆς ἀρετῇ κατὰ φύσιν, μάλα σταθεῖ αὐτόν, ὡς αὐτὸς, τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτόν, ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐνδεῶς γέγονεν αἰσθάναι."

λέγοντες οὐκ ἐν τῇ γῇ οὕτως—οὐ γὰρ ἦν σφοδρὴς—ὡς οὕτως μὲν πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτόν τε καὶ ἐκείνους ὧν ἂν ἡγεμὼν γένηται αἰσθάναι, μὴ ταύτῃ δὲ τραπόμενος τὰναντία πάντα ἀποτελεῖ πορευθεὶς δὲ ὡς λέγομεν, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔμφορον καὶ σωφρονα ποιησάμενος, εἰ τὰς ἐξηγηματικὰς Σικελίας πόλεις κατοικίσει νόμοις τε ἐξουσίαις καὶ πολιτείαις, &c.

Compare also p. 331 F.

² Horat. *Satir.* ii. 1, 17.

given. But the effect was not the less produced, of disgusting Dionysius with his velleities towards political good. Not only did Plato decline entering upon political recommendations of his own, but he damped, instead of enforcing, the positive good resolutions which Dion had already succeeded in infusing. Dionysius announced freely, in the presence of Plato, his wish and intention to transform his despotism at Syracuse into a limited kingship, and to replant the dis-hellenised cities in Sicily. These were the two grand points to which Dion had been labouring so generously to bring him, and which he had invoked Plato for the express purpose of seconding. Yet what does Plato say when this momentous announcement is made? Instead of bestowing any praise or encouragement, he drily remarks to Dionysius,—“First go through your schooling, and then do all these things; otherwise leave them undone.”¹ Dionysius afterwards complained, and with good show of reason (when Dion was in exile, menacing attack upon Syracuse, under the favourable sympathies of Plato), that the great philosopher had actually deterred him (Dionysius) from executing the same capital improvements which he was now encouraging Dion to accomplish by an armed invasion. Plato was keenly sensitive to this reproach afterwards; but even his own exculpation proves it to have been in the main not undeserved.

Plutarch observes that Plato felt a proud consciousness of philosophical dignity in disdaining respect to persons, and in refusing to the defects of Dionysius any greater

“Haud mihi deero
Cum res ipsa feret. Nisi dextro
tempore, Flacci
Verba per attentam non ibunt
Cæsaris aurem
Cui male si palpare, recalcitrat
undique tutus.”

¹ Plato, *Epist.* iii. 315 E. Φάσι δε οὐκ ὀλίγοι λέγειν σε πρὸς τινας τῶν παρὰ σε ῥεπουθούντων, ὡς ἄρα σοῦ κατὰ λόγοντος ἀνεύσας ἐγὼ μέλλοντος τάς τε Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἰκίζειν, καὶ Συρακουσίους ἐπικουρῆσαι, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀντὶ τυραννίδος εἰς βασιλείαν μεταστήσαντα, ταῦτ' ἄρα σὲ μὲν τότε, ὡς σὺ

φῆς, διεκώλυσα—γῆ, δὲ Δίωνα διδάσκειται ὅρῳ αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς διανοήμασι τοῦ σοῦ τῆς σῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφαιρούμενά σε. . . .

Ibid. p. 319 B. εἶπερ δὲ καὶ μάλ' ἀνίσταται γελῶν, εἰ μέμνηται, ὡς Παιδευσθέντα μὲ ἐπέλευσεν ποιεῖν πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν Ἐφ' ἣν ἐγὼ Κάλλιστα μνημονεύσαι σε.

Cornelius Nepos (*Dion*, c. 3) gives to Plato the credit, which belongs altogether to Dion, of having inspired Dionysius with these ideas.

measure of indulgence than he would have shown to an ordinary pupil of the Academy.¹ If we allow him credit for a sentiment in itself honourable, it can only be at the expense of his fitness for dealing with practical life; by admitting (to quote a remarkable phrase from one of his own dialogues) that "he tried to deal with individual men without knowing those rules of art or practice which bear on human affairs."² Dionysius was not a common pupil, nor could Plato reasonably expect the like unmeasured docility from one for whose ears so many hostile influences were competing. Nor were Plato and Dionysius the only parties concerned. There was, besides, in the first place, Dion, whose whole position was at stake—next, and of yet greater moment, the relief of the people of Syracuse and Sicily. For them, and on their behalf, Dion had been labouring with such zeal, that he had inspired Dionysius with readiness to execute the two best resolves which the situation admitted; resolves not only pregnant with benefit to the people, but also ensuring the position of Dion—since if Dionysius had once entered upon this course of policy, Dion would have been essential to him as an auxiliary and man of execution.

It is by no means certain, indeed, that such schemes could have been successfully realised, even with full sincerity on the part of Dionysius, and the energy of Dion besides. With all governments, to do evil is easy—to effect beneficial change, difficult; and with a Grecian despot, this was true in a peculiar manner. Those great mercenary forces and other instruments, which had been strong as adamant for the oppressive rule of the elder

If Plato had tried to impel Dionysius towards a good practical use of his power, Dionysius would at that time have obeyed him, with the aid of Dion.

Difficulties which they would have encountered in trying to realise beneficent projects.

¹ Plutarch, *De Adulatore et Amici Discrimine*, p. 52 E. We may set against this, however, a passage in one of the other treatises of Plutarch (*Philosophand. cum Principibus*, p. 779 *ad finem*), in which he observes, that Plato, coming to Sicily with the hope of converting his political doctrines into laws through the agency of Dionysius, found the latter already corrupted

by power, unsusceptible of cure, and deaf to admonition.

² Plato, *Phædon*, c. 88. p. 89 D. Οὐκοῦν ἀσχερον; καὶ δὴλον, ὅτι ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰν ἀνθρώπων οὐ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις;

He is expounding the causes and growth of misanthropic dispositions; one of the most striking passages in his dialogues.

Dionysius, would have been found hardly manageable, perhaps even obstructive, if his son had tried to employ them for more liberal purposes. But still the experiment would have been tried, with a fair chance of success—if only Plato, during his short-lived spiritual authority at Syracuse, had measured more accurately the practical influence which a philosopher might reasonably hope to exercise over Dionysius. I make these remarks upon him with sincere regret; but I am much mistaken if he did not afterwards hear them in more poignant language from the banished Cion, upon whom the consequences of the mistake mainly fell.

Speedily did the atmosphere at Syracuse become overclouded. The conservative party—friends of the old despotism, with the veteran Philistus at their head—played their game far better than that of the reformers was played by Plato, or by Dion since the arrival of Plato. Philistus saw that Dion, as the man of strong patriotic impulses and of energetic execution, was the real enemy to be aimed at. He left no effort untried to calumniate Dion, and to set Dionysius against him. Whispers and misrepresentations from a thousand different quarters beset the ear of Dionysius, alarming him with the idea that Dion was usurping to himself the real authority in Syracuse, with the view of ultimately handing it over to the children of Aristomachê, and of reigning in their name. Plato had been brought thither (it was said) as an agent in the conspiracy, for the purpose of winning over Dionysius into idle speculations, enervating his active vigour, and ultimately setting him aside; in order that all serious political agency might fall into the hands of Dion.¹ These hostile intrigues were no secret to Plato himself, who, even shortly after his arrival, began to see evidence of their poisonous activity. He tried sincerely to counterwork them;² but unfortunately the language which he himself

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 14; Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 338 C. 'Ο δὲ (Dionysius) τοῖς διαβήλλουσι (ἐπίστευε) καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς ἐπιβουλεύω, τῇ τυραννίδι Δίων πρᾶττοι πάντα ὅσα ἐπραττεν ἐν τῇ τότε χρόνῳ, ἵνα ὁ μὲν, (Dionysius) παιδείᾳ δὴ τὸν νοῦν

πληθύνει ἀμελοῖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιτρέψας ἐκείνῳ, ὁ δὲ (Dion) σφιγτερίσῃται, καὶ Διονύσιον ἐκβάλοι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὅλῳ.

² Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 329 C. ἔλθων δὲ, οὗ γὰρ δεῖ μηχανῆναι, εὖρον στάσιν; τὰ περὶ Διονύσιον μεστὰ

addressed to Dionysius was exactly such as to give them the best chance of success. When Dionysius recounted to Philistus or other courtiers, how Plato and Dion had humiliated him in his own eyes, and told him that he was unworthy to govern until he had undergone a thorough purification—he would be exhorted to resent it as presumption and insult; and would be assured that it could only arise from a design to dispossess him of his authority, in favour of Dion, or perhaps of the children of Aristomachê with Dion as regent.

It must not be forgotten that there was a real foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius towards Dion; who was not merely superior to him in age, in dignity, and in ability, but also personally haughty in his bearing, and rigid in his habits, while Dionysius relished conviviality and enjoyments. At first, this jealousy was prevented from breaking out—partly by the consciousness of Dionysius that he needed some one to lean upon—partly by what seems to have been great self-command on the part of Dion, and great care to carry with him the real mind and goodwill of Dionysius. Even from the beginning, the enemies of Dion were doubtless not sparing in their calumnies, to alienate Dionysius from him; and the wonder only is, how, in spite of such intrigues and in spite of the natural causes of jealousy, Dion could have implanted his political aspirations, and maintained his friendly influence over Dionysius until the arrival of Plato. After that event, the natural causes of antipathy tended to manifest themselves more and more powerfully, while the counteracting circumstances all disappeared.

Relations between Dionysius and Dion—natural foundation for jealousy on the part of Dionysius

Three important months thus passed away, during which those precious public inclinations, which Plato found instilled by Dion into the bosom of Dionysius, and which he might have fanned into life and action—to liberalize the government of Syracuse, and to restore the other free Grecian cities—disappeared never to return. In place of them, Dionysius imbibed an antipathy, more and more rancorous, against the friend and relative with whom these sentiments had originated. The

Dionysius loses his inclinations towards political improvements—comes to hate Dion.

ἐμπαντα καὶ διαβολῶν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα Δίωνος πέρι· ἤμουν μὲν, οὖν καὶ ἔσον ἡδυνάμην, σμικρὰ δ' οἷός τε ἦ, &c.

charges against Dion, of conspiracy and dangerous designs, circulated by Philistus and his cabal, became more audacious than ever. At length in the fourth month, Dionysius resolved to get rid of him.

The proceedings of Dion being watched, a letter was detected which he had written to the Carthaginian commanders in Sicily (with whom the war still subsisted, though seemingly not in great activity), inviting them, if they sent any proposition for peace to Syracuse, to send it through him, as he would take care that it should be properly discussed. I have already stated, that even in the reign of the elder Dionysius, Dion had been the person to whom the negotiations with Carthage were habitually entrusted. Such a letter from him, as far as we make out from the general description, implied nothing like a treasonable purpose. But Dionysius, after taking counsel with Philistus, resolved to make use of it as a final pretext. Inviting Dion into the acropolis, under colour of seeking to heal their growing differences,—and beginning to enter into an amicable conversation,—he conducted him unsuspectingly down to the adjacent harbour, where lay moored, close in shore, a boat with the rowers aboard, ready for starting. Dionysius then produced the intercepted letter, handed it to Dion, and accused him to his face of treason. The latter protested against the imputation, and eagerly sought to reply. But Dionysius stopped him from proceeding, insisted on his going aboard the boat, and ordered the rowers to carry him off forthwith to Italy.¹

This abrupt and ignominious expulsion, of so great a person as Dion, caused as much consternation among his numerous friends, as triumph to Philistus and the partisans of the despotism. All consummation of the liberal projects conceived by Dion was now out of the question; not less from the incompetency of Dionysius to execute them alone, than from his indisposition to any such attempt. Aristomachê the sister, and Aretê the wife of Dion (the latter half-

B.C. 367-366.

Dionysius retains Plato in the acropolis, but treats him well, and tries to conciliate his esteem.

¹ The story is found in Plutarch (Dion, c. 14), who refers to Timæus as his authority. It is confirmed in the main by Plato, *Epistol. vii*

p. 329 D. μὴνὶ δὲ σχῆδόν, ὥσως τὰ τάρῃ Δίωνα Διοῦσιος, αἰτωμένους ἐπιβουλεύει, τῇ τυραννίδι, σμικρὸν εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβιβάζας, ἐξέβαλεν ἀτίμως.

sister of Dionysius himself), gave vent to their sorrow and indignation; while the political associates of Dion, and Plato beyond all others, trembled for their own personal safety. Among the mercenary soldiers, the name of Plato was particularly odious. Many persons instigated Dionysius to kill him, and rumours even gained footing that he had been killed, as the author of the whole confusion.¹ But the despot, having sent away the person whom he most hated and feared, was not disposed to do harm to any one else. While he calmed the anxieties of Aretê by affirming that the departure of her husband was not to be regarded as an exile, but only as a temporary separation, to allow time for abating the animosity which prevailed—he at the same time ordered two triremes to be fitted out, for sending to Dion his slaves and valuable property, and everything necessary to personal dignity as well as to his comfort. Towards Plato—who was naturally agitated in the extreme, thinking only of the readiest means to escape from so dangerous a situation—his manifestations were yet more remarkable. He soothed the philosopher's apprehensions—entreated him to remain, in a manner gentle indeed but admitting no denial—and conveyed him at once into his own residence the acropolis, under colour of doing him honour. From hence there was no possibility of escaping, and Plato remained there for some time. Dionysius treated him well, communicated with him freely and intimately, and proclaimed everywhere that they were on the best terms of friendship. What is yet more curious—he displayed the greatest anxiety to obtain the esteem and approbation of the sage, and to occupy a place in his mind higher than that accorded to Dion; shrinking nevertheless from philosophy, or the Platonic treatment and training, under the impression that there was a purpose to ensnare and paralyse him, under the auspices of Dion.² This is a strange account, given by Plato himself; but it reads like a real picture of a vain and weak prince, admiring the

Diodorus (xvi. 6) states that Dionysius sought to put Dion to death, and that he only escaped by flight. But the version of Plato and Plutarch is to be preferred.

Justin (xxi. 1, 2) gives an account, different from all, of the reign and proceedings of the

younger Dionysius. I cannot imagine what authority he followed. He does not even name Dion.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* iii. p. 315 F.; *Epist.* vii. p. 329 D. p. 340 A. Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 16.

² Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 329, 330.

philosopher—coquetting with him, as it were—and anxious to captivate his approbation, so far as it could be done without submitting to the genuine Platonic discipline.

During this long and irksome detention, which probably made Plato sensible of the comparative comforts of Athenian liberty, he obtained from Dionysius one practical benefit. He prevailed upon him to establish friendly and hospitable relations with Archytas and the Tarentines, which to these latter was a real increase of security and convenience.¹ But in the point which he strove most earnestly to accomplish, he failed. Dionysius resisted all entreaties for the recall of Dion. Finding himself at length occupied with a war (whether the war with Carthage previously mentioned, or some other, we do not know), he consented to let Plato depart; agreeing to send for him again as soon as peace and leisure should return, and promising to recall Dion at the same time; upon which covenant, Plato, on his side, agreed to come back. After a certain interval, peace arrived, and Dionysius re-invited Plato; yet without recalling Dion—whom he required still to wait another year. But Plato, appealing to the terms of the covenant, refused to go without Dion. To himself personally, in spite of the celebrity which his known influence with Dionysius tended to confer, the voyage was nothing less than repugnant, for he had had sufficient experience of Syracuse and its despotism. Nor would he even listen to the request of Dion himself; who, partly in the view of promoting his own future restoration, earnestly exhorted him to go. Dionysius besieged Plato with solicitations to come,² promising that all which he might insist upon in favour of Dion should be granted, and putting in motion a second time Archytas and the Tarentines to prevail upon him. These men through their companion and friend Archidêmus, who came to Athens in a Syracusan trireme, assured Plato that Dionysius was now ardent in the study of philosophy, and had even made considerable progress in it. By their earnest entreaties, coupled with those of Dion, Plato was at length induced to go to Syracuse. He was received, as before, with signal

He dismisses Plato—then recalls him—second visit of Plato to Syracuse—his dissatisfaction—Dionysius refuses to recall Dion.

¹ Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 338 C.

² Plato, *Epistol.* i. p. 317 B. C.

tokens of honour. He was complimented with the privilege, enjoyed by no one else, of approaching the despot without having his person searched; and was affectionately welcomed by the female relatives of Dion. Yet this visit, prolonged much beyond what he himself wished, proved nothing but a second splendid captivity, as the companion of Dionysius in the acropolis at Ortygia.¹

Dionysius the philosopher obtained abundance of flatterers—as his father Dionysius the poet had obtained before him—and was even emboldened to proclaim himself as the son of Apollo.² It is possible that even an impuissant embrace of philosophy, on the part of so great a potentate, may have tended to exalt the reputation of philosophers in the contemporary world. Otherwise the dabbings of Dionysius would have merited no attention; though he seems to have been really a man of some literary talent³ —retaining to the end a sincere admiration of Plato, and jealously pettish because he could not prevail upon Plato to admire *him*. But the second visit of Plato to him at Syracuse—very different from his first—presented no chance of benefit to the people of Syracuse, and only deserves notice as it bore upon the destiny of Dion. Here, unfortunately, Plato could accomplish nothing; though his zeal on behalf of his friend was unwearied. Dionysius broke all his promises of kind dealing, became more rancorous in his hatred, impatient of the respect which Dion enjoyed even as an exile, and fearful of the revenge which he might one day be able to exact.

When expelled from Syracuse, Dion had gone to Peloponnesus and Athens, where he had continued for some years to receive regular remittances of his property. But at length, even while Plato was residing at Syracuse, Dionysius thought fit to withhold one-half of the property, on pretence of reserving it for Dion's son. Presently he took steps yet more violent, threw off all disguise, sold

Dionysius confiscates the property of Dion—mortification of Plato, who with difficulty obtains leave to depart from Syracuse.

¹ Plato, *Epist.* vii. p. 338-346; Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 19. *Æschinês*, the companion of *Sokratês* along with Plato, is said to have passed a long time at Syracuse with Dionysius, until the expulsion of that

despot (*Diogen. Laert.* ii. 63).

² Plutarch, *De Fortuna Alex. Magn.* p. 338. B. Δωριδὸς ἐκ μητρὸς Φοῖβου κοινωνήσας βλαστῶν.

³ See a passage in Plato, *Epistol.* ii. p. 314 E.

the whole of Dion's property, and appropriated or distributed among his friends the large proceeds, not less than 100 talents.¹ Plato, who had the mortification to hear this intelligence while in the palace of Dionysius, was full of grief and displeasure. He implored permission to depart. But though the mind of Dionysius had now been thoroughly set against him by the multiplied insinuations of the calumniators,² it was not without difficulty and tiresome solicitations that he obtained permission; chiefly through the vehement remonstrances of Archytas and his companions, who represented to the despot that they had brought him to Syracuse, and that they were responsible for his safe return. The mercenaries of Dionysius were indeed so ill-disposed to Plato, that considerable precautions were required to bring him away in safety.³

It was in the spring of 360 B.C. that the philosopher appears to have returned to Peloponnesus from this, his second visit to the younger Dionysius, and third visit to Syracuse. At the Olympic festival of that year, he met Dion, to whom he recounted the recent proceedings of Dionysius.⁴ Incensed at the seizure of the property, and hopeless of any permission to return, Dion was now meditating enforcement of his restoration at the point of the sword. But there occurred yet another insult on the part of Dionysius, which infused a more deadly exasperation into the quarrel. Aretê, wife of Dion and half-sister of Dionysius, had continued to reside at Syracuse ever since the exile of her husband. She formed a link between the two, the continuance of which Dionysius could no longer tolerate, in his present hatred towards Dion. Accordingly he took upon him to pronounce her divorced, and to remarry her, in spite of her own decided repugnance, with one of his friends named Timokratês.⁵ To this, he added another cruel injury, by

B.C. 360-357.

Resolution of Dion to avenge himself on Dionysius, and to force his way back to Syracuse by arms.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* iii. p. 318 A.; vii. p. 346, 347. Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 15, 16.

² Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 15—on the authority of Aristoxenus.

³ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 350 A. B.

⁴ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 350 C. The return of Plato and his first meeting with Dion is said to have

excited considerable sensation among the spectators at the festival (*Diogenes Laert.* iii. 25).

The Olympic festival here alluded to, must be (I conceive) that of 360 B.C.: the same also in *Epistol.* ii. p. 310 D.

⁵ Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 21; Corn. Nepos, *Dion*, c. 4.

intentionally corrupting and brutalizing Dion's eldest son, a youth just reaching puberty.

Outraged thus in all the tenderest points, Dion took up with passionate resolution the design of avenging himself on Dionysius, and of emancipating Syracuse from despotism into liberty. During the greater part of his exile he had resided at Athens, in the house of his friend Kallippus, enjoying the society of Spensippus and other philosophers of the Academy, and the teaching of Plato himself when returned from Syracuse. Well supplied with money, and strict as to his own personal wants, he was able largely to indulge his liberal spirit towards many persons, and among the rest towards Plato, whom he assisted towards the expense of a choric exhibition at Athens.¹ Dion also visited Sparta and various other cities; enjoying a high reputation, and doing himself credit everywhere; a fact not unknown to Dionysius, and aggravating his displeasure. Yet Dion was long not without hope that that displeasure would mitigate, so as to allow of his return to Syracuse on friendly terms. Nor did he cherish any purposes of hostility, until the last proceedings with respect to his property and his wife at once cut off all hope and awakened vindictive sentiments.² He began therefore to lay a train for attacking Dionysius and enfranchising Syracuse by arms, invoking the countenance of Plato; who gave his approbation, yet not without mournful reserves; saying that he was now seventy years of age—that though he admitted the just wrongs of Dion and the bad conduct of Dionysius, armed conflict was nevertheless repugnant to his feelings, and he could anticipate little good from it—that he had laboured long in vain to reconcile the two exasperated kinsmen, and could not now labour for an opposite end.³

n.c. 360.
Plato
rejoins
Dion in
Peloponnesus—exas-
peration of
Dion—
Dionysius
gives his
sister Arete
the wife of
Dion, in
marriage to
Timokratès.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 17; Athenæus, xi. p. 508. Plato appears also to have received, when at Athens, pecuniary assistance remitted by Dionysius from Syracuse, towards expenses of a similar kind, as well as towards furnishing a dowry for certain poor nieces. Dion and Dionysius had both aided him (Plato,

Epistol. xiii. p. 361).

An author named Onâtor affirmed that Dionysius had given to Plato the prodigious sum of 80 talents; a story obviously exaggerated (Diogenes Laert. iii. 9).

² Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 F.

³ Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350. This is the account which Plato gives

But though Plato was lukewarm, his friends and pupils at the Academy cordially sympathised with Dion. Speusippus especially, his intimate friend and relative, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse, had communicated much with the population in the city, and gave encouraging reports of their readiness to aid Dion, even if he came with ever so small a force against Dionysius. Kallippus, with Eudemus (the friend of Aristotle), Timonidēs, and Miltas—all three members of the society at the Academy, and the last a prophet also—lent him aid and embarked in his enterprise. There were a numerous body of exiles from Syracuse, not less than 1000 altogether; with most of whom Dion opened communication inviting their fellowship. He at the same time hired mercenary soldiers in small bands, keeping his measures as secret as he could.¹ Alkimenēs, one of the leading Achæans in Peloponnesus, was warm in the cause (probably from sympathy with the Achæan colony Kroton, then under the dependence of Dionysius), conferring upon it additional dignity by his name and presence. A considerable quantity of spare arms, of every description, was got together, in order to supply new unarmed partisans on reaching Sicily. With all these aids Dion found himself in the island of Zakynthus, a little after Midsummer 357 B.C.: mustering 800 soldiers of tried experience and bravery, who had been directed to come thither silently and in small parties, without being informed whither they were going. A little squadron was prepared, of no more than five merchantmen, two of them vessels of thirty oars, with victuals adequate to the direct passage across the sea from Zakynthus to Syracuse; since the ordinary passage, across from Korkyra and along the Tarentine Gulf, was impracticable, in the face of the maritime power of Dionysius.²

after the death of Dion, when affairs had taken a disastrous turn, about the extent of his own interference in the enterprise. But Dionysius supposed him to have been more decided in his countenance of the expedition; and Plato's letter addressed to Dion himself, after the victory of the latter at

Syracuse, seems to bear out that supposition.

Compare Epistol. iii. p. 315 E.; iv. p. 320 A.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Eudemus was afterwards slain in one of the combats at Syracuse (Aristotle apud Ciceron. Tusc. Disp. i. 26, 53).

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 23-25.

Such was the contemptible force with which Dion ventured to attack the greatest of all Grecian potentates in his own stronghold and island. Dionysius had now reigned as despot at Syracuse between ten and eleven years. Inferior as he personally was to his father, it does not seem that the Syracusan power had yet materially declined in his hands. We know little about the political facts of his reign; but the veteran Philistus, his chief adviser and officer, appears to have kept together the larger part of the great means bequeathed by the elder Dionysius. The disparity of force, therefore, between the assailant and the party assailed, was altogether extravagant. To Dion, personally, indeed, such disparity was a matter of indifference. To a man of his enthusiastic temperament, so great was the heroism and sublimity of the enterprise,—combining liberation of his country from a despot, with revenge for gross outrages to himself,—that he was satisfied if he could only land in Sicily with no matter how small a force, accounting it honour enough to perish in such a cause.¹ Such was the emphatic language of Dion, reported to us by Aristotle; who (being then among the pupils of Plato) may probably have heard it with his own ears. To impartial contemporary spectators, like Demosthenês, the attempt seemed hopeless.²

B.C. 357.
Small force
of Dion
against the
prodigious
power of
Dionysius.
Resolution
of Dion to
conquer or
perish.

But the intelligent men of the Academy who accompanied Dion, would not have thrown their lives away in contemplation of a glorious martyrdom; nor were either they or he ignorant, that there existed circumstances, not striking the eye of the ordinary spectator, which materially weakened the great apparent security of Dionysius.

Circum-
stances
which told
against
Dionysius
—discon-
tent at
Syracuse.

First, there was the pronounced and almost unanimous discontent of the people of Syracuse. Though prohibited from all public manifestations, they had been greatly agitated by the original project of Dion to grant liberty to the city—by the inclinations even of Dionysius himself towards the same end, so soon unhappily extinguished—

¹ See Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 17.

² See Orat. adv. Leptinem, s. 179.
p. 506: an oration delivered about
two years afterwards; not long

after the victory of Dion.

Compare Diodor. xvi. 9; Plutarch,
Timoleon, c. 2.

by the dissembling language of Dionysius, the great position of Dion's wife and sister, and the second visit of Plato, all of which favoured the hope that Dion might be amicably recalled. At length such chance disappeared, when his property was confiscated and his wife re-married to another. But as his energetic character was well known, the Syracusans now both confidently expected, and ardently wished that he would return by force, and help them to put down one who was alike his enemy and theirs. Speusippus, having accompanied Plato to Syracuse and mingled much with the people, brought back decisive testimonies of their disaffection towards Dionysius, and of their eager longing for relief by the hands of Dion. It would be sufficient (they said) if he even came alone; they would flock around him, and arm him at once with an adequate force.¹

There were doubtless many other messages of similar tenor sent to Peloponnesus; and one Syracusan exile, Herakleidês, was in himself a considerable force. Though a friend of Dion,² he had continued high in the service of Dionysius, until the second visit of Plato. At that time he was disgraced, and obliged to save his life by flight, on account of a mutiny among the mercenary troops, or rather of the veteran soldiers among them, whose pay Dionysius had cut down. The men so curtailed rose in arms, demanding continuance of the old pay; and when Dionysius shut the gates of the acropolis, refusing attention to their requisitions, they raised the furious barbaric pæan or war shout, and rushed up to scale the walls.³ Terrible were the voices of these Gauls, Iberians, and Campanians, in the ears of Plato, who knew himself to be the object of their hatred, and who happened to be then in the garden of the acropolis. But Dionysius, no less terrified than Plato, appeased the mutiny, by conceding all that was asked, and even more. The blame of this misadventure was thrown upon Herakleidês, towards

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 22. Speusippus, from Athens, corresponded both with Dion and with Dionysius at Syracuse; at least there was a correspondence between them, read as genuine by Diogenes Laertius (iv. 1, 2, 5).

² Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 318 C.

³ Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 348 B. Οἱ δ' ἐπύρροντο εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ τείχη, παῖδ' ἄν' ἀναβόησαντες βάρβαρον καὶ πολέμικόν· οὗ δὲ περιεβέηε Διονύσιος γέλομας, &c.

whom Dionysius conducted himself with mingled injustice and treachery—according to the judgement both of Plato and of all around him.¹ As an exile, Herakleidēs now brought word to Dion that Dionysius could not even rely upon the mercenary troops, whom he treated with a parsimony the more revolting as they contrasted it with the munificence of his father.² Herakleidēs was eager to cooperate in putting down the despotism at Syracuse. But he waited to equip a squadron of triremes, and was not ready so soon as Dion; perhaps intentionally, as the jealousy between the two soon broke out.³

The second source of weakness to Dionysius lay in his own character and habits. The commanding energy of the father, far from being of service to the son, had been combined with a jealousy which intentionally kept him down and cramped his growth. He had always been weak, petty, destitute of courage or foresight, and unfit for a position like that which his father had acquired and maintained. His personal incompetency was recognized by all, and would probably have manifested itself even more conspicuously, had he not found a minister of so much ability, and so much devotion to the dynasty, as Philistus. But in addition to such known incompetency, he had contracted recently habits which inspired every one around him with contempt. He was perpetually intoxicated and plunged in dissipation. To put down such a chief, even though surrounded by walls, soldiers, and armed ships, appeared to Dion and his confidential companions an enterprise noway impracticable.⁴

Nevertheless these causes of weakness were known only to close observers; while the great military force of Syracuse was obvious to the eyes of every one. When the soldiers mustered by Dion at Zakynthos, were first informed that they were destined to strike straight across the sea against Syracuse, they shrank from the proposition as an act of insanity. They complained of their leaders for not having before

Weakness
of char-
acter—
dissolute
and
drunken
habits—of
Dionysius
himself.

Alarm of
the soldiers
of Dion at
Zakynthos,
when first
informed
that they
were going
against
Dionysius.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* iii. p. 318; vii. p. 348, 349. &c.

² Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 348 A.

... ἐπευρίρηται, ὁ ἰγυμιασθεύς ποιεῖν παρὰ τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἶδη,

³ Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 32; Diodor. xvi. 6-16.

⁴ Aristotol. *Politic.* v. 8, 14; Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 7. These habits must

told them what was projected; just as the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of Cyrus, on reaching Tarsus, complained of Klearchus for having kept back the fact that they were marching against the Great King. It required all the eloquence of Dion, with his advanced age,¹ his dignified presence, and the quantity of gold and silver plate in his possession, to remove their apprehensions. How widely these apprehensions were felt is shown by the circumstance, that out of 1000 Syracusan exiles, only twenty-five or thirty dared to join him.²

After a magnificent sacrifice to Apollo, and an ample banquet to the soldiers in the stadium at Zakyntus, Dion gave orders for embarkation in the ensuing morning. On that very night the moon was eclipsed. We have already seen what disastrous consequences turned upon the occurrence of this same phenomenon fifty-six years before, when Nikias was about to conduct the defeated Athenian fleet away from the harbour of Syracuse.³ Under the existing apprehensions of Dion's band, the eclipse might well have induced them to renounce the enterprise; and so it probably would, under a general like Nikias. But Dion had learnt astronomy; and what was of not less consequence, Miltas, the prophet of the expedition, besides his gift of prophecy, had received instruction in the Academy also. When the affrighted soldiers inquired what new resolution was to be adopted in consequence of so grave a sign from the gods, Miltas rose and assured them that they had mistaken the import of the sign, which promised them good fortune and victory. By the eclipse of the moon, the gods intimated that something very brilliant was about to be darkened over: now there was nothing in Greece so brilliant as the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse; it was Dionysius who was about to suffer eclipse, to be brought on by the victory of Dion.⁴ Reassured by such consoling words, the soldiers got on board. They

have probably grown upon him since the second departure of Plato, who does not notice them in his letters.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 23. ἀνὴρ πρῶτος; ἡδῆ, &c.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 22; Diodor. xvi. 10.

³ Thucyd. vii. 50. See Chap. LX. of this History.

⁴ Plutarch, Dion, c. 24.

had good reason at first to believe that the favour of the gods waited upon them, for a gentle and steady Etesian breeze carried them across midsea without accident or suffering, in twelve days, from Zakynthus to Cape Pachynus, the south-eastern corner of Sicily and nearest to Syracuse. The pilot Protus, who had steered the course so as exactly to hit the cape, urgently recommended immediate disembarkation, without going farther along the south-western coast of the island; since stormy weather was commencing, which might hinder the fleet from keeping near the shore. But Dion was afraid of landing so near to the main force of the enemy. Accordingly the squadron proceeded onward, but were driven by a violent wind away from Sicily towards the coast of Africa, narrowly escaping shipwreck. It was not without considerable hardship and danger that they got back to Sicily, after five days; touching the island at Herakleia Minoa westward of Agrigentum, within the Carthaginian supremacy. The Carthaginian governor of Minoa, Synalus (perhaps a Greek in the service of Carthage), was a personal acquaintance of Dion, and received him with all possible kindness; though knowing nothing beforehand of his approach, and at first resisting his landing through ignorance.

Thus was Dion, after ten years of exile, once more on Sicilian ground. The favourable predictions of Miltas had been completely realised. But even that prophet could hardly have been prepared for the wonderful tidings now heard, which ensured the success of the expedition. Dionysius had recently sailed from Syracuse to Italy, with a fleet of 80 triremes.¹ What induced him to commit so capital a mistake, we cannot make out; for Philistus was already with a fleet in the Gulf of Tarentum, waiting to intercept Dion, and supposing that the invading squadron would naturally sail along the coast of Italy to Syracuse, according to the practice almost universal in that day.² Philistus did not commit the same mistake as Nikias had made in reference to Gylippus,³—that of despising Dion because of the smallness of his force. He watched in the usual waters, and was only disappointed because Dion, venturing

B.C. 357.

Dion lands at Herakleia—he learns that Dionysius with a large fleet has just quitted Syracuse for Italy.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 26; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 26.

³ Thucyd. vi. 104.

on the bold and unusual straight course, was greatly favoured by wind and weather. But while Philistus watched the coast of Italy, it was natural that Dionysius himself should keep guard with his main force at Syracuse. The despot was fully aware of the disaffection which reigned in the town, and of the hopes excited by Dion's project; which was generally well known, though no one could tell how or at what moment the deliverer might be expected. Suspicious now to a greater degree than ever, Dionysius had caused a fresh search to be made in the city for arms, and had taken away all that he could find.¹ We may be sure too that his regiment of habitual spies were more on the alert than ever, and that unusual rigour was the order of the day. Yet at this critical juncture, he thought proper to quit Syracuse with a very large portion of his force, leaving the command to Timokratēs, the husband of Dion's late wife; and at this same critical juncture Dion arrived at Minoa.

Nothing could exceed the joy of the Dionian soldiers on hearing of the departure of Dionysius, which left Syracuse open and easy of access. Eager to avail themselves of the favourable instant, they called upon their leader to march thither without delay, repudiating even that measure of rest which he recommended after the fatigues of the voyage. Accordingly Dion, after a short refreshment provided by Synalus—with whom he deposited his spare arms, to be transmitted to him when required—set forward on his march towards Syracuse. On entering the Agrigentine territory, he was joined by 200 horsemen near Eknomon.² Farther on, while passing through Gela and Kamarina, many inhabitants of these towns, together with some neighbouring Sikans and Sikels, swelled his band. Lastly, when he approached the Syracusan border, a considerable proportion of the rural population came to him also, though without arms; making the reinforcements which joined him altogether about 5000 men.³ Having armed these volunteers in the best manner he could, Dion continued his progress as far as Akraë, where he made a short evening

¹ Diodor. xvi. 10.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 26, 27; Diodor. xvi. 9.

³ Plutarch (Dion, c. 27) gives the

numbers who joined him at about 5000 men, which is very credible. Diodorus gives the number exaggerated, at 20,000 (xvi. 9).

halt. From thence, receiving good news from Syracuse, he recommenced his march during the latter half of the night, hastening forward to the passage over the river Anapus; which he had the good fortune to occupy without any opposition, before daybreak.

Dion was now within no more than a mile and a quarter of the walls of Syracuse. The rising sun disclosed his army to the view of the Syracusan population, who were doubtless impatiently watching for him. He was seen offering sacrifice to the river Anapus, and putting up a solemn prayer to the God Helios, then just showing himself above the horizon. He wore the wreath habitual with those who were thus employed; while his soldiers, animated by the confident encouragement of the prophets, had taken wreaths also.¹ Elate and enthusiastic, they passed the Anapus (seemingly at the bridge which formed part of the Helorine way), advanced at a running pace across the low plain which divided the southern cliff of Epipolæ from the Great Harbour, and approached the gates of the quarter of Syracuse called Neapolis—the Temenitid Gates, near the chapel of Apollo Temenites.² Dion was at their head, in resplendent armour, with a body-guard near him composed of 100 of his Peloponnesians. His brother Megaklés was on one

Dion crosses the river Anapus, and approaches the gates of Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 27. These picturesque details about the march of Dion are the more worthy of notice, as Plutarch had before him the narrative of Timonidês, a companion of Dion, and actually engaged in the expedition. Timonidês wrote an account of what passed to Spousippus at Athens, doubtless for the information of Plato and their friends in the Academy (Plutarch, Dion, c. 31-35).

Diogenês Laertius mentions also a person named *Simonidês* who wrote to Speusippus, τὰς ιστορίας ἐν αἷς κατ'εταράξει τὰς πράξεις Διωνὸς τε καὶ Μιωνος (iv. 1, 5). Probably *Simonidês* may be a misnomer for *Timonidês*.

Arman, the author of the Ana-

basis of Alexander, had written narratives of the exploits both of Dion and Timoleon. Unfortunately these have not been preserved; indeed Photius himself seems never to have seen them (Photius, Codex, 92).

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 29. 'Ἐκεὶ δ' εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Δίων κατὰ τὰς Μενιτιδᾶς πύλας, &c.

Most of the best critics here concur in thinking, that the reading ought to be τὰς Τεμενιτιδᾶς πύλας. The statue and sacred ground of Apollo Temenitês was the most remarkable feature in this portion of Syracuse, and would naturally be selected to furnish a name for the gates. No meaning can be assigned for the phrase Μενιτιδᾶς.

side of him, his friend the Athenian Kallippus on the other; all three, and a large proportion of the soldiers also, still crowned with their sacrificial wreaths, as if marching in a joyous festival procession, with victory already assured.¹

As yet Dion had not met with the smallest resistance. Timokratês (left at Syracuse with the large mercenary force as viceregent), while he sent an express to apprise Dionysius, kept his chief hold on the two military positions or horns of the city; the island of Ortigia at one extremity, and Epipolæ with Euryalus on the other. It has already been mentioned that Epipolæ was a triangular slope, with walls bordering both the northern and southern cliffs, and forming an angle on the western apex, where stood the strong fort of Euryalus. Between Ortigia and Epipolæ lay the populous quarters of Syracuse, wherein the great body of citizens resided. As the disaffection of the Syracusans was well known, Timokratês thought it unsafe to go out of the city, and meet Dion on the road, for fear of revolt within. But he perhaps might have occupied the important bridge over the Anapus, had not a report reached him that Dion was directing his attack first against Leontini. Many of the Campanian mercenaries under the command of Timokratês, having properties in Leontini, immediately quitted Epipolæ to go thither and defend them.² This rumour—false, and perhaps intentionally spread by the invaders—not only carried off much of the garrison elsewhere, but also misled Timokratês; insomuch that Dion was allowed to make his night march, to reach the Anapus, and to find it unoccupied.

It was too late for Timokratês to resist, when the rising sun had once exhibited the army of Dion crossing the Anapus. The effect produced upon the Syracusans in the populous quarters was electric. They rose like one man to welcome their deliverer, and to put down the dynasty which had hung about their necks for forty-

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 27, 28, 29. Diodorus (xvi. 10) also mentions the striking fact of the wreaths worn by this approaching army.
² Plutarch, Dion, c. 27.

Mistake of Timokratês left as governor of Syracuse in the absence of Dionysius.
 General rising of the Syracusans to welcome and assist Dion.
 Timokratês

eight years. Such of the mercenaries of Dionysius as were in these central portions of the city were forced to seek shelter in Epipolæ, while his police and spies were pursued and seized, to undergo the full terrors of a popular vengeance.¹ Far from being able to go forth against Dion, Timokratês could not even curb the internal insurrection. So thoroughly was he intimidated by the reports of his terrified police, and by the violent and unanimous burst of wrath among a people whom every Dionysian partisan had long been accustomed to treat as disarmed slaves—that he did not think himself safe even in Epipolæ. But he could not find means of getting to Ortygia, since the intermediate city was in the hands of his enemies, while Dion and his troops were crossing the low plain between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour. It only remained for him therefore to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to escape from Epipolæ either by the northern or the western side. To justify his hasty flight, he spread the most terrific reports respecting the army of Dion, and thus contributed still farther to paralyse the discouraged partisans of Dionysius.²

Already had Dion reached the Temenitid gate, where the principal citizens, clothed in their best attire, and the multitude pouring forth loud and joyous acclamations, were assembled to meet him. Halting at the gate, he caused his trumpet to sound, and entreated silence; after which he formally proclaimed, that he and his brother Megaklês were come for the purpose of putting down the Dionysian despotism, and of giving liberty both to the Syracusans and the other Sicilian Greeks. The acclamations redoubled as he and his soldiers entered the city, first through Neapolis, next by the ascent up to Achradina; the main street of which (broad, continuous, and straight, as was rare in a Grecian city³) was decorated as on a day of jubilee, with victims under sacrifice to the gods, tables,

is obliged to evacuate the city, leaving Ortygia and Epipolæ garrisoned.

Entry of Dion into Achradina—joy of the citizens—he proclaims liberty.

¹ Plutarch, *De Curiositate*, p. 523 A.

² Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 28; Diodor. xvi. 10.

³ Cicero in *Verr.* iv. 53. "Altera autem est urbs Syracusis, cui nomen Acradina est: in qua forum

maximum, pulcherrimæ porticus, ornatissimum prytaneum, amplissima est curia, templumque egregium Jovis Olympii; cæteraque urbis partes, unâ totâ viâ perpetuâ, multisque transversis, divisæ, privatis ædificiis continentur."

and bowls of wine ready prepared for festival. As Dion advanced at the head of his soldiers through a lane formed in the midst of this crowd, from each side wreaths were cast upon him as upon an Olympic victor, and grateful prayers addressed to him as it were to a god.¹ Every house was a scene of clamorous joy, in which men and women, freemen and slaves, took part alike; the outburst of feelings long compressed and relieved from the past despotism with its inquisitorial police and garrison.

It was not yet time for Dion to yield to these pleasing but passive impulses. Having infused courage into his soldiers as well as into the citizens by his triumphant procession through Achradina, he descended to the level ground in front of Ortygia. That stronghold was still occupied by the Dionysian garrison, whom he thus challenged to come forth and fight. But the flight of Timokratēs had left them without orders, while the imposing demonstration and unanimous rising of the people in Achradina—which they must partly have witnessed from their walls, and partly learnt through fugitive spies and partisans—struck them with discouragement and terror; so that they were in no disposition to quit the shelter of their fortifications. Their backwardness was hailed as a confession of inferiority by the insurgent citizens, whom Dion now addressed as an assembly of freemen. Hard by, in front of the acropolis with its Pentapyla or five gates, there stood a lofty and magnificent sun-dial, erected by the elder Dionysius. Mounting on the top of this edifice, with the muniments of the despot on one side and the now liberated Achradina on the other, Dion addressed² an animated harangue to the Syracusans

Dion presents himself at the Pentapyla in front of Ortygia—challenges the garrison of Ortygia to come out and fight—is chosen general by the Syracusans, with his brother Megaklēs and several others.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 11. Compares the manifestations of the inhabitants of Skione towards Brasidas (Thucyd. iv. 121).

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 10, 11. The description which Plutarch gives of this position of this sun-dial is distinct, and the harangue which Dion delivered while standing upon it, is an impressive fact:—Ἦν δ' ὑπὸ τῇν

ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ παντάπλου, Διονυσίου κατασκευάσαντος, ἡλιοτρόκιον καταφανὲς καὶ ὕψηλόν. Ἐπὶ τοῦτω προεβίβας ἐδημηγόρησας, καὶ παρώρμησας τοὺς πολίτας ἀντάγειν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐλευθερίας.

The sun-dial was thus *under* the acropolis, that is, in the low ground, immediately adjoining to Ortygia; near the place where the elder Dionysius is stated to have

around, exhorting them to strenuous efforts in defence of their newly acquired rights and liberties, and inviting them to elect generals for the command, in order to accomplish the total expulsion of the Dionysian garrison. The Syracusans, with unanimous acclamations, named Dion and his brother Megaklès generals with full powers. But both the brothers insisted that colleagues should be elected along with them. Accordingly twenty other persons were chosen besides, ten of them being from that small band of Syracusan exiles who had joined at Zakynthus.

Such was the entry of Dion into Syracuse, on the third day¹ after his landing in Sicily; and such the first public act of renewed Syracusan freedom; the first after that fatal vote which, forty-eight years before, had elected the elder Dionysius general plenipotentiary, and placed in his hands the sword of state, without foresight of the consequences. In the hands of Dion, that sword was vigorously employed against the common enemy. He immediately attacked Epipolæ; and such was the consternation of the garrison left in it by the fugitive Timokratès, that they allowed him to acquire possession of it, together with the strong fort of Euryalus, which a little courage and devotion might long have defended. This acquisition, made suddenly in the tide of success on one side

Dion captures Epipolæ and Euryalus. He erects a cross-wall from sea to sea, to block up Ortygia.

placed his large porticoes and market-house (Diodor. xiv. 7), and where the younger Dionysius erected the funereal monument to his father (xv. 74). In order to arrive at the sun-dial, Dion must have descended from the height of Achradina. Now Plutarch mentions that Dion went up through Achradina (ἀνέει δὴ διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς). It is plain that he must have come down again from Achradina, though Plutarch does not specially mention it. And if he brought his men close under the walls of the enemy's garrison, this can hardly have been for any other reason than that which I have assigned in the text.

Plutarch indicates the separate localities with tolerable clearness, but he does not give a perspicuous description of the whole march.

Thus, he says that Dion, "wishing to harangue the people himself, went up through Achradine" (Βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ προσαγορεύσαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀνέει διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς), while the place from which Dion did harangue the people was down under the acropolis of Ortygia.

Diodorus is still less clear about the localities, nor does he say anything about the sun-dial or the exact spot from whence Dion spoke, though he mentions the march of Dion through Achradina.

It seems probable that what Plutarch calls τὰ πεντάκυλα are the same as what Diodorus (xv. 74) indicates in the words ταῖς βεστιάταις καλουμέναις πόλαις.

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

and discouragement on the other, was of supreme importance, and went far to determine the ultimate contest. It not only reduced the partisans of Dionysius within the limits of Ortygia, but also enabled Dion to set free many state prisoners,¹ who became ardent partisans of the revolution. Following up his success, he lost no time in taking measures against Ortygia. To shut it up completely on the land-side, he commenced the erection of a wall of blockade, reaching from the Great Harbour at one extremity, to the sea on the eastern side of the Portus Lakkius, at the other.² He at the same time provided arms as well as he could for the citizens, sending for those spare arms which he had deposited with Synalus at Minoa. It does not appear that the garrison of Ortygia made any sally to impede him; so that in the course of seven days, he had not only received his arms from Synalus, but had completed, in a rough way, all or most of the blockading cross-wall.³

At the end of these seven days, but not before (having been prevented by accident from receiving the express sent to him), Dionysius returned with his fleet to Ortygia.⁴ Fatally indeed was his position changed. The islet was the only portion of the city which he possessed, and that too was shut up on the land-side by a blockading wall nearly completed. All the rest of the city was occupied by bitter enemies instead of by subjects. Leontini also, and probably many of his other dependences out of Syracuse, had taken the opportunity of revolting.⁵ Even with the large fleet which he had brought home, Dionysius did not think himself strong enough to face his enemies in the field, but resorted to stratagem. He first tried to open a private intrigue with Dion; who, however, refused to receive any separate propositions, and desired him to address them

Return of
Dionysius
to Syracuse.
He tries to
negotiate
with Dion
and the
Syracusans
—deceives
them by
fallacious
proposi-
tions.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 29; Diodor. xvi. 12. Plutarch says, τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ πόλιν ἀπετείχισεν—Diodorus is more specific—Τῷ δὲ Συρακούσων κατεσκευάστων ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν διατείχισματι, &c. These are valuable words as indicating the line and the two terminations of Dion's

blockading cross-wall.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 29.

⁴ This return of Dionysius, seven days after the coming of Dion, is specified both by Plutarch and Diodorus (Plutarch, Dion, c. 28-29; Diodor. xvi. 11).

⁵ Diodor. xvi. 16.

publicly to the freemen, citizens of Syracuse. Accordingly, he sent envoys tendering to the Syracusans what in the present day would be called a constitution. He demanded only moderate taxation, and moderate fulfilments of military service, subject to their own vote of consent. But the Syracusans laughed the offer to scorn, and Dion returned in their name the peremptory reply,—that no proposition from Dionysius could be received, short of total abdication; adding in his own name, that he would himself, on the score of kindred, procure for Dionysius, if he did abdicate, both security and other reasonable concessions. These terms Dionysius affected to approve, desiring that envoys might be sent to him in Ortygia to settle the details. Both Dion and the Syracusans eagerly caught at his offer, without for a moment questioning his sincerity. Some of the most eminent Syracusans, approved by Dion, were despatched as envoys to Dionysius. A general confidence prevailed, that the retirement of the despot was now assured; and the soldiers and citizens employed against him, full of joy and mutual congratulations, became negligent of their guard on the cross-wall of blockade; many of them even retiring to their houses in the city.

This was what Dionysius expected. Contriving to prolong the discussion, so as to detain the envoys in Ortygia all night, he ordered at day-break a sudden sally of all his soldiers, whom he had previously stimulated both by wine and by immense promises in case of victory.¹ The sally was well-timed and at first completely successful. One half of Dion's soldiers were encamped to guard the cross-wall (the other half being quartered in Achradina), together with a force of Syracusan citizens. But so little were they prepared for hostilities, that the assailants, rushing out with shouts and at a run, carried the wall at the first onset, slew the sentinels, and proceeded to demolish the wall (which was probably a rough and hasty structure) as well as to charge the troops on the outside of it. The Syracusans, surprised and terrified, fled with little or no resistance. Their flight

Sudden sally made by Dionysius to surprise the blockading wall—he is nearly successful—great bravery, efforts, and danger of Dion—he at length repulses the attack and recovers the wall.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 30. ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπέρου. It is rare that we read of this proceeding with soldiers in antiquity. Diodor. xvi. 11, 12. τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαιγμένων.

partially disordered the stouter Dionian soldiers, who resisted bravely, but without having had time to form their regular array. Never was Dion more illustrious, both as an officer and as a soldier. He exerted himself to the utmost to form the troops, and to marshal them in ranks essential to the effective fighting of the Grecian hoplite. But his orders were unheard in the clamour, or disregarded in the confusion: his troops lost courage, the assailants gained ground, and the day seemed evidently going against him. Seeing that there was no other resource, he put himself at the head of his best and most attached soldiers, and threw himself, though now an elderly man, into the thickest of the fray. The struggle was the more violent as it took place in a narrow space between the new blockading wall on one side, and the outer wall of Neapolis on the other. Both the armour and the person of Dion being conspicuous, he was known to enemies as well as friends, and the battle around him was among the most obstinate in Grecian history.¹ Darts rattled against both his shield and his helmet, while his shield was also pierced through by several spears which were kept from his body only by the breastplate. At length he was wounded through the right arm or hand, thrown on the ground, and in imminent danger of being made prisoner. But this forwardness on his part so stimulated the courage of his own troops, that they both rescued him, and made redoubled efforts against the enemy. Having named Timonidēs commander in his place, Dion with his disabled hand mounted on horseback, rode into Achradina, and led forth to the battle that portion of his troops which were there in garrison. These men, fresh and good soldiers, restored the battle. The Syracusans came back to the field, all joined in strenuous conflict, and the Dionysian assailants were at length again driven within the walls of Ortygia. The loss on both sides was severe; that of Dionysius 800 men; all of whom he caused to be picked up from the field

¹ Diodor. xvi. 12. 'Ο δὲ Δίων ἀνελπιστώως παρεσπονδημένος, μετὰ τῶν ἄριστων στρατιωτῶν ἀπὸ πάντα τοῖς πολεμίοις· καὶ συνάψας μάχην, πολλὸν ἐποίει φόνον ἐν σταδίῳ. Ὅλιγῳ δὲ διασπόμενῳ, τῆς διατειγίου ἔσω, μάχης ὄψης, συνέδραμε πλεῖθος στρατιωτῶν

εἰς στένον τόπον.

The text here is not quite clear (see Wesseling's note); but we gather from the passage information about the topography of Syracuse.

(under a truce granted on his request by Dion), and buried with magnificent obsequies, as a means of popularising himself with the survivors.¹

When we consider how doubtful the issue of this battle had proved, it seems evident that had Timokratēs maintained himself in Epipolæ, so as to enable Dionysius to remain master of Epipolæ as well as of Ortygia, the success of Dion's whole enterprise in Syracuse would have been seriously endangered.

Great was the joy excited at Syracuse by the victory. The Syracusan people testified their gratitude to the Dionian soldiers by voting a golden wreath to the value of 100 minæ; while these soldiers, charmed with the prowess of their general, voted a golden wreath to him. Dion immediately began the re-establishment of the damaged cross-wall, which he repaired, completed, and put under effective guard for the future.² Dionysius no longer tried to impede it by armed attack. But as he was still superior at sea, he transported parties across the harbour to ravage the country for provisions, and despatched vessels to bring in stores also by sea. His superiority at sea was presently lessened by the arrival of Herakleidēs from Peloponnesus,³ with twenty triremes, three smaller vessels, and 1500 soldiers. The Syracusans, now beginning to show themselves actively on shipboard, got together a tolerable naval force. All the docks and wharfs lay concentrated in and round Ortygia, within the grasp of Dionysius, who was master of the naval force belonging to the city. But it would seem that the crews of some of the ships (who were mostly native Syracusans,⁴

Ortygia is again blocked up by land—efforts of Dionysius with his fleet—arrival of Herakleidēs from Peloponnesus with a fleet, to co-operate against Dionysius.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 30; Diodor. xvi. 12, 13.

² Diodor. xvi. 13.

³ Diodor. xvi. 18. Plutarch states that Herakleidēs brought only seven triremes. But the force stated by Diodorus (given in my text) appears more probable. It is difficult otherwise to explain the number of ships which the Syracusans presently appear as possessing. Moreover the great im-

portance, which Herakleidēs steps into, as opposed to Dion, is more easily accounted for.

⁴ Plutarch, Dion, c. 35. About the Athenian seamen in Ortygia, see a remarkable passage of Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 350 A. When Plato was at Syracuse, in danger from the mercenaries, the Athenian seamen, there employed, gave warning to him as their countryman.

with an intermixture of Athenians, doubtless of democratical sentiments) must have deserted from the despot to the people, carrying over their ships, since we presently find the Syracusans with a fleet of sixty triremes,¹ which they could hardly have acquired otherwise.

Dionysius was shortly afterwards reinforced by Philistus, who brought to Ortygia, not only his fleet from the Tarentine Gulf, but also a considerable regiment of cavalry. With these latter, and some other troops besides, Philistus undertook an expedition against the revolted Leontini. But though he made his way into the town by night, he was presently expelled by the defenders, seconded by reinforcements from Syracuse.² To keep Ortygia provisioned, however, it was yet more indispensable for Philistus to maintain his superiority at sea against the growing naval power of the Syracusans, now commanded by Herakleidês.³ After several partial engagements, a final battle, desperate and decisive, at length took place between the two admirals. Both fleets were sixty triremes strong. At first Philistus, brave and forward, appeared likely to be victorious. But presently the fortune of the day turned against him. His ship was run ashore, and himself, with most part of his fleet, overpowered by the enemy. To escape captivity, he stabbed himself. The wound however was not mortal; so that he fell alive, being now about 78 years of age, into the hands of his enemies,—who stripped him naked, insulted him brutally, and at length cut off his head, after which they dragged his body by the leg through the streets of Syracuse.⁴ Revolting as this treatment is, we must recollect that it was less horrible than that which the elder Dionysius had inflicted on the Rhegine general Phyton.

The last hopes of the Dionysian dynasty perished with Philistus, the ablest and most faithful of its servants. He had been an actor in its first day of usurpation—its eighteenth Brumaire: his timely, though miserable death, saved him from sharing in its last day of exile—its St. Helena.

The Dionysian dynasty almost perished with Philistus.

¹ Diodor. xvi. 16.

² Diodor. xvi. 16.

³ See a fragment of the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theo-

pompas) Theopomp. Fragm. 212, ed. Didot), which seems to refer to this point of time.

⁴ Diod. xvi. 16; Plut., Dion c. 35

Even after the previous victory of Dion, Dionysius had lost all chance of overcoming the Syracusans by force. But he had now farther lost, through the victory of Herakleidês, his superiority at sea, and therefore his power even of maintaining himself permanently in Ortygia. The triumph of Dion seemed assured, and his enemy humbled in the dust. But though thus disarmed, Dionysius was still formidable by his means of raising intrigue and dissension in Syracuse. His ancient antipathy against Dion became more vehement than ever. Obligated to forego empire himself, yet resolved at any rate that Dion should be ruined along with him—he set on foot a tissue of base manoeuvres; availing himself of the fears and jealousies of the Syracusans, the rivalry of Herakleidês, the defects of Dion, and what was more important than all—the relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty.

Intiguos of Dionysius against Dion in Syracuse.

Dion had displayed devoted courage, and merited the signal gratitude of the Syracusans. But he had been nursed in the despotism, of which his father had been one of the chief founders; he was attached by every tie of relationship to Dionysius, with whom his sister, his former wife, and his children, were still dwelling in the acropolis. The circumstances therefore were such as to suggest to the Syracusans apprehensions, noway unreasonable, that some private bargain might be made by Dion with the acropolis, and that the eminent services which he had just rendered might only be made the stepping-stone to a fresh despotism in his person. Such suspicions received much countenance from the infirmities of Dion, who combined, with a masculine and magnanimous character, manners so haughty as to be painfully felt even by his own companions. The friendly letters from Syracuse, written to Plato or to others at Athens (possibly those from Timonidês to Speusippus) shortly after the victory, contained much complaint of the repulsive demeanour of Dion; which defeat the philosopher exhorted his friend to amend.¹ All those, whom Dion's

Relationship of Dion to the Dionysian dynasty—suspicions entertained against him by the Syracusans—his haughty manners. Rivalry of Herakleidês.

¹ Plato. Epist. iv. p. 321 B.
ἐνθυμοῦ δὲ καὶ ὅτι δοκεῖς τισὶν ἐνδε-
στέρως τοῦ προσήκοντος θεραπευτικῶς
εἶναι· μὴ οὖν λανθανέ-ω σε ὅτι διὰ

τοῦ ἀρεσχεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ
πράττειν ἐστίν, ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια ἐρμὴ
ξήνοισι.

arrogance offended, were confirmed in their suspicion of his despotic designs, and induced to turn for protection to his rival Herakleidēs. This latter—formerly general in the service of Dionysius, from whose displeasure he had only saved his life by flight—had been unable or unwilling to cooperate with Dion in his expedition from Zakynthos, but had since brought to the aid of the Syracusans a considerable force, including several armed ships. Though not present at the first entry into Syracuse, nor arriving until Ortygia had already been placed under blockade, Herakleidēs was esteemed the equal of Dion in abilities and in military efficiency; while with regard to ulterior designs, he had the prodigious advantage of being free from connexion with the despotism and of raising no mistrust. Moreover his manners were not only popular, but according to Plutarch,¹ more than popular—smooth, insidious, and dexterous in criminatory speech, for the ruin of rivals and for his own exaltation.

As the contest presently came to be carried on rather at sea than on land, the equipment of a fleet became indispensable; so that Herakleidēs, who had brought the greatest number of triremes, naturally rose in importance. Shortly after his arrival, the Syracusan assembly passed a vote to appoint him admiral. But Dion, who seems only to have heard of this vote after it had passed, protested against it as derogating from the full powers which the Syracusans had by their former vote conferred upon himself. Accordingly the people, though with reluctance, cancelled their vote, and deposed Herakleidēs. Having then gently rebuked Herakleidēs for raising discord at a season when the common enemy was still dangerous, Dion convened another assembly; wherein he proposed, from himself, the appointment of Herakleidēs as admiral, with a guard equal to his own.² The right of

Herakleidēs is named admiral. Dion causes him to be deposed, and then moves himself for his re-appointment.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 33. It would seem that this Herakleidēs is the person alluded to in the fragment from the fortieth Book of the Philippica of Theopompus (Theop. Fr. 212, ed. Didot) —

Προσάται δὲ τῇ πόλει ἦσαν τῷ μέγιστον Σαρακυσίων, Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἡρακλει-

δης, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Λυμαίος.

Probably also Athenis is the same person named as *Athanis* or *Athanas* by Diodorus and Plutarch (Diodor. xv. 84; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23-37). He wrote a history of Syracusan affairs during the period of Dion and Timoleon, beginning from

nomination thus assumed displeased the Syracusans, humiliated Herakleidēs, and exasperated his partisans as well as the fleet which he commanded. It gave him power—together with provocation to employ that power for the ruin of Dion; who thus laid himself doubly open to genuine mistrust from some, and to intentional calumny from others.

It is necessary to understand this situation, in order to appreciate the means afforded to Dionysius for personal intrigue directed against Dion. Though the vast majority of Syracusans were hostile to Dionysius, yet there were among them many individuals connected with those serving under him in Ortygia, and capable of being put in motion to promote his views. Shortly after the complete defeat of his sally, he renewed his solicitations for peace; to which Dion returned the peremptory answer, that no peace could be concluded until Dionysius abdicated and retired. Next, Dionysius sent out heralds from Ortygia with letters addressed to Dion from his female relatives. All these letters were full of complaints of the misery endured by these poor women; together with prayers that he would relax in his hostility. To avert suspicion, Dion caused the letters to be opened and read publicly before the Syracusan assembly; but their tenor was such, that suspicion, whether expressed or not, unavoidably arose, as to the effect on Dion's sympathies. One letter there was, bearing on its superscription the words "Hipparinus (the son of Dion) to his father." At first many persons present refused to take cognizance of a communication so strictly private; but Dion insisted, and the letter was publicly read. It proved to come, not from the youthful Hipparinus, but from Dionysius himself, and was insidiously worded for the purpose of discrediting Dion in the minds of the Syracusans. It began by reminding him of the long service which he had rendered to the despotism. It implored him not to bury that great power, as well as his own relatives, in one common ruin, for the sake of a people who would turn round and sting him, so soon as he had given them freedom. It offered, on the part of Dionysius himself, immediate retirement, provided Dion

Intrigues and calumnies raised against Dion in Syracuse, by the management of Dionysius.

would consent to take his place. But it threatened, if Dion refused, the sharpest tortures against his female relatives and his son.¹

This letter, well-turned as a composition for its own purpose, was met by indignant refusal and protestation on the part of Dion. Without doubt his refusal would be received with cheers by the assembly; but the letter did not the less instil its intended poison into their minds. Plutarch displays² (in my judgement) no great knowledge of human nature, when he complains of the Syracusans for suffering the letter to impress them with suspicions of Dion, instead of admiring his magnanimous resistance to such touching appeals. It was precisely the magnanimity required for the situation, which made them mistrustful. Who could assure them that such a feeling, to the requisite pitch, was to be found in the bosom of Dion? or who could foretell which, among painfully conflicting sentiments, would determine his conduct? The position of Dion forbade the possibility of his obtaining full confidence. Moreover his enemies, not content with inflaming the real causes of mistrust, fabricated gross falsehoods against him as well as against the mercenaries under his command. A Syracusan named Sôsis, brother to one of the guards of Dionysius, made a violent speech in the Syracusan assembly, warning his countrymen to beware of Dion, lest they should find themselves saddled with a strict and sober despot in place of one who was always intoxicated. On the next day Sôsis appeared in the assembly with a wound on the head, which he said that some of the soldiers of Dion had inflicted upon him in revenge for his speech. Many persons present, believing the story, warmly espoused his cause; while Dion had great difficulty in repelling the allegation, and in obtaining time for the investigation of its truth. On inquiry, it was discovered that the wound was a superficial cut inflicted by Sôsis himself with a razor, and that the whole tale was an infamous calumny which he had been bribed to propagate.³ In this particular instance, it was found practicable to convict the delinquent of shameless falsehood. But there were numerous other

Mistrust of
Dion by
the Syra-
cusans,
mainly in
conse-
quence of
his rela-
tionship to
the Diony-
sian family.
Calumnies
of Sôsis.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 31.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 32.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 34.

attacks and perversions less tangible, generated by the same hostile interests, and tending towards the same end. Every day the suspicion and unfriendly sentiment of the Syracusans, towards Dion and his soldiers, became more embittered.

The naval victory gained by Herakleidês and the Syracusan fleet over Philistus, exalting both the spirit of the Syracusans and the glory of the admiral, still further lowered the influence of Dion. The belief gained ground that even without him and his soldiers, the Syracusans could defend themselves, and gain possession of Ortygia. It was now that the defeated Dionysius sent from thence a fresh embassy to Dion, offering to surrender to him the place with its garrison, magazine of arms, and treasure equivalent to five months' full pay—on condition of being allowed to retire to Italy, and enjoy the revenues of a large and productive portion (called Gyarta) of the Syracusan territory. Dion again refused to reply, desiring him to address the Syracusan public, yet advising them to accept the terms.¹ Under the existing mistrust towards Dion, this advice was interpreted as concealing an intended collusion between him and Dionysius. Herakleidês promised, that if the war were prosecuted, he would keep Ortygia blocked up until it was surrendered at discretion with all in it as prisoners. But in spite of his promise, Dionysius contrived to elude his vigilance and sail off to Lokri in Italy, with many companions and much property, leaving Ortygia in command of his eldest son Apollokratês.

Though the blockade was immediately resumed and rendered stricter than before, yet this escape of the despot brought considerable discredit on Herakleidês. Probably the Diomian partisans were not sparing in their reproach. To create for himself fresh popularity, Herakleidês warmly espoused the proposition of a citizen named Hippo, for a fresh division of landed property; a proposition, which, considering the sweeping alteration of landed property made by the Dionysian dynasty, we may well conceive to have been recommended upon specious grounds of

Farther propositions of Dionysius. He goes away from Ortygia to Italy, leaving his son Apollokratês in command of the garrison.

B.C. 356. Increased dissension between Dion and Herakleidês.—Dion is deposed and his soldiers deprived of the pay due to them—new generals are named.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. xvi. 17.

retributive justice, as well as upon the necessity of providing for poor citizens. Dion opposed the motion strenuously, but was outvoted. Other suggestions also, yet more repugnant to him, and even pointedly directed against him, were adopted. Lastly, Herakleidês, enlarging upon his insupportable arrogance, prevailed upon the people to decree that new generals should be appointed, and that the pay due to the Dionian soldiers, now forming a large arrear, should not be liquidated out of the public purse.¹

It was towards Midsummer that Dion was thus divested of his command, about nine months after his arrival at Syracuse.² Twenty-five new generals were named, of whom Herakleidês was one.

The measure, scandalously ungrateful and unjust, whereby the soldiers were deprived of the pay due to them, was dictated by pure antipathy against Dion: for it does not seem to have been applied to those soldiers who had come with Herakleidês; moreover the new generals sent private messages to the Dionian soldiers, inviting them to desert their leader and join the Syracusans, in which case the grant of citizenship was promised to them.³ Had the soldiers complied, it is obvious, that either the pay due, or some equivalent, must have been assigned to satisfy them. But one and all of them scorned the invitation, adhering to Dion with unshaken fidelity. The purpose of Herakleidês was, to expel him alone. This however was prevented by the temper of the soldiers; who, indignant at the treacherous ingratitude of the Syracusans, instigated Dion to take a legitimate revenge upon them, and demanded only to be led to the assault. Refusing to employ force, Dion calmed their excitement, and put himself at their head to conduct them out of the city; not without remonstrances addressed to the generals and the people of Syracuse upon their proceedings, imprudent as well as wicked, while the enemy were still masters of Ortygia. Nevertheless, the new generals, chosen as the most violent enemies of Dion, not only turned a deaf ear to his appeal,

n.c. 356.

Dion is forced to retreat from Syracuse—had conduct of the new generals and of the people towards his soldiers—he defends himself, but refuses to employ any more force than was essential to defence.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 37; Diodor. μέσσηντος, &c.

xvi. 17.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 38.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 38. θίπους

but inflamed the antipathies of the people, and spurred them on to attack the soldiers on their march out of Syracuse. Their attack, though repeated more than once, was vigorously repulsed by the soldiers—excellent troops, 3000 in number; while Dion, anxious only to ensure their safety, and to avoid bloodshed on both sides, confined himself strictly to the defensive. He forbade all pursuit, giving up the prisoners without ransom as well as the bodies of the slain for burial.¹

In this guise Dion arrived at Leontini, where he found the warmest sympathy towards himself, with indignant disgust at the behaviour of the Syracusans. Allied with the newly-enfranchised Syracuse against the Dionysian dynasty, the Leontines not only received the soldiers of Dion into their citizenship, and voted to them a positive remuneration, but sent an embassy to Syracuse insisting that justice should be done to them. The Syracusans, on their side, sent envoys to Leontini, to accuse Dion before an assembly of all the allies there convoked. Who these allies were, our defective information does not enable us to say. Their sentence went in favour of Dion and against the Syracusans; who nevertheless stood out obstinately, refusing all justice or reparation,² and fancying themselves competent to reduce Ortygia without Dion's assistance—since the provisions therein were exhausted, and the garrison was already suffering from famine. Despairing of reinforcement, Apollokratês had already resolved to send envoys and propose a capitulation, when Nypsius, a Neapolitan officer, despatched by Dionysius from Lokri, had the good fortune to reach Ortygia at the head of a reinforcing fleet, conveying numerous transports with an abundant stock of provisions. There was now no farther talk of surrender. The garrison of Ortygia was reinforced to 10,000 mercenary troops of considerable merit, and well provisioned for some time.³

The Syracusan admirals, either from carelessness or ill-fortune, had not been able to prevent the entry of Nypsius. But they made a sudden attack upon him while his ships were in the

Dion reaches Leontini—the Leontines stand by him against the Syracusans—arrival of Nypsius with a reinforcement to the Dionysian garrison in Ortygia.

Advantage gained by Herakleidês

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 39; Diodor. xvi. 17. ² Plutarch, Dion, c. 40. ³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 18, 19.

and the
Syracusans
over Nyp-
sius as he
came in to
Ortygia—
extrava-
gant confi-
dence in
Syracuse—
Nypsius
sallies forth
from
Ortygia,
masters the
blockading
wall, and
forces his
way into
the Neapo-
lis and
Achradina.

harbour, and while the crews, thinking themselves safe from an enemy, were interchanging salutations or aiding to disembark the stores. This attack was well-timed and successful. Several of the triremes of Nypsius were ruined—others were towed off as prizes, while the victory, gained by Herakleidês without Dion, provoked extravagant joy throughout Syracuse. In the belief that Ortygia could not longer hold out, the citizens, the soldiers, and even the generals gave loose to mad revelry and intoxication, continued into the ensuing night. Nypsius, an able officer, watched his opportunity, and made a vigorous night-sally. His troops, issuing forth in good order, planted their scaling-ladders, mounted the blockading wall, and slew the sleeping or drunken sentinels without any resistance. Master of this important work, Nypsius employed a part of his men to pull it down, while he pushed the rest forward against the city. At daybreak the affrighted Syracusans saw themselves vigorously attacked even in their own stronghold, when neither generals nor citizens were at all prepared to resist. The troops of Nypsius first forced their way into Neapolis, which lay the nearest to the wall of Ortygia; next into Tycha, the other fortified suburb. Over these they ranged victorious, vanquishing all the detached parties of Syracusans which could be opposed to them. The streets became a scene of bloodshed—the houses, of plunder; for as Dionysius had now given up the idea of again permanently ruling at Syracuse, his troops thought of little else except satiating the revenge of their master and their own rapacity. The soldiers of Nypsius stripped the private dwellings in the town, taking away not only the property, but also the women and children, as booty into Ortygia. At last (it appears) they got also into Achradina, the largest and most populous portion of Syracuse. Here the same scene of pillage, destruction, and bloodshed, was continued throughout the whole day, and on a still larger scale; with just enough resistance to pique the fury of the victors, without restraining their progress.

It soon became evident to Herakleidês and his colleagues, as well as to the general body of citizens, that there was no hope of safety except in invoking the aid of Dion

and his soldiers from Leontini. Yet the appeal to one whom they not only hated and feared, but had ignominiously maltreated, was something so intolerable, that for a long time no one would speak out to propose what every one had in his mind. At length some of the allies present, less concerned in the political parties of the city, ventured to broach the proposition, which ran from man to man, and was adopted under a press of mingled and opposite emotions. Accordingly two officers of the allies, and five Syracusan horsemen, set off at full speed to Leontini, to implore the instant presence of Dion. Reaching the place towards evening, they encountered Dion himself immediately on dismounting, and described to him the miserable scenes now going on at Syracuse. Their tears and distress brought around them a crowd of hearers, Leontines as well as Peloponnesians; and a general assembly was speedily convened, before which Dion exhorted them to tell their story. They described, in the tone of men whose all was at stake, the actual sufferings and the impending total ruin of the city; entreating oblivion for their past misdeeds, which were already but too cruelly expiated.

Danger and distress of the Syracusans—they send to Leontini to invoke the aid of Dion.

Their discourse, profoundly touching to the audience, was heard in silence. Every one waited for Dion to begin, and to determine the fate of Syracuse. He rose to speak; but for a time tears checked his utterance, while his soldiers around cheered him with encouraging sympathy. At length he found voice to say: "I have convened you, Peloponnesians and allies, to deliberate about your own conduct. For me, deliberation would be a disgrace, while Syracuse is in the hands of the destroyer. If I cannot save my country, I shall go and bury myself in its flaming ruins. For you, if, in spite of what has happened, you still choose to assist us, misguided and unhappy Syracusans, we shall owe it to you that we still continue a city. But if, in disdainful sense of wrong endured, you shall leave us to our fate, I here thank you for all your past valour and attachment to me, praying that the gods may reward you for it. Remember Dion, as one who neither deserted you when you were wronged, nor his own fellow-citizens when they were in misery."

Assembly at Leontini—pathetic address of Dion.

This address, so replete with pathos and dignity, went home to the hearts of the audience, filling them with passionate emotion and eagerness to follow him. Universal shouts called upon him to put himself at their head instantly and march to Syracuse; while the envoys present fell upon his neck, invoking blessings both upon him and upon the soldiers. As soon as the excitement had subsided, Dion gave orders that every man should take his evening meal forthwith, and return in arms to the spot, prepared for a night-march to Syracuse.

Emotion of the soldiers of Dion and of the Leontines—their eagerness to go to the aid of Syracuse.

By daybreak, Dion and his band were within a few miles of the northern wall of Epipolæ. Messengers from Syracuse here met him, inducing him to slacken his march and proceed with caution. Herakleidês and the other generals had sent a message forbidding his nearer approach, with notice that the gates would be closed against him; yet at the same time, counter-messages arrived from many eminent citizens, entreating him to persevere, and promising him both admittance and support. Nypsius, having permitted his troops to pillage and destroy in Syracuse throughout the preceding day, had thought it prudent to withdraw them back into Ortygia for the night. His retreat raised the courage of Herakleidês and his colleagues; who, fancying that the attack was now over, repented of the invitation which they had permitted to be sent to Dion. Under this impression they despatched to him the second message of exclusion; keeping guard at the gate in the northern wall to make their threat good. But the events of the next morning speedily undeceived them. Nypsius renewed his attack with greater ferocity than before, completed the demolition of the wall of blockade before Ortygia, and let loose his soldiers with merciless hand throughout all the streets of Syracuse. There was on this day less of pillage, but more of wholesale slaughter. Men, women, and children perished indiscriminately, and nothing was thought of by these barbarians except to make Syracuse a heap of ruins and dead bodies. To accelerate the process, and to forestal Dion's arrival, which they fully expected—they set fire to the city in several places, with

Reluctance of Herakleidês to let Dion into Syracuse—renewed assault and increased danger from Nypsius—unanimous prayers now sent to invite Dion.

torches and fire-bearing arrows. The miserable inhabitants knew not where to flee, to escape the flames within their houses, or the sword without. The streets were strewed with corpses, while the fire gained ground perpetually, threatening to spread over the greater part of the city. Under such terrible circumstances, neither Herakleidês, himself wounded, nor the other generals, could hold out any longer against the admission of Dion; to whom even the brother and uncle of Herakleidês were sent, with pressing entreaties to accelerate his march, since the smallest delay would occasion ruin to Syracuse.¹

Dion was about seven miles from the gates when these last cries of distress reached him. Immediately hurrying forward his soldiers, whose ardour was not inferior to his own, at a running pace, he reached speedily the gates called Hexapyla, in the northern wall of Epipolæ. When once within these gates, he halted in an interior area called the Hekatompedon.² His light-armed were sent forward at once to arrest the destroying enemy, while he kept back the hoplites until he could form them into separate columns under proper captains, along with the citizens who crowded round him with demonstrations of grateful reverence. He distributed them so as to enter the interior portion of Syracuse, and attack the troops of Nysius, on several points at once.³ Being now within the exterior fortification formed by the wall of Epipolæ, there lay before him the tripartite interior city—Tycha, Neapolis, Achradina. Each of these parts had its separate fortification; between Tycha and Neapolis lay an unfortified space, but each of them joined on to Achradina, the western wall of which formed their eastern wall. It is probable that these interior fortifications had been partially neglected since the construction of the outer walls along Epipolæ, which comprised them all within, and formed the principal defence against a foreign enemy. Moreover the troops of Nysius, having been masters of the three towns, and roving as destroyers around them, for several

Entrance of Dion into Syracuse—he draws up his troops on Epipolæ. Frightful condition of the city.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 45.

² Diodor. xvi. 20. διανύσας ὁξέως τῇ εἰς Συρακούσας ὁδῷ, ἤκα πρὸς τὰ Ἑξάπυλα, &c. Plutarch, Dion, c. 45 εἰσέβαλε διὰ τῶν πυλῶν εἰς τὴν Ἑκα-

τομπεδὸν λεγομένην, &c.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 45. ὀρθοῦς λόγους ποιῶν καὶ διαιρῶν τὰς ἡγεμονίας, ὅπως ὁμοῦ πολλαχόθεν ἅμα προσηύρετο φοβερωτερον.

hours, had doubtless broken down the gates and in other ways weakened the defences. The scene was frightful, and the ways everywhere impeded by flame and smoke, by falling houses and fragments, and by the numbers who lay massacred around. It was amidst such horrors that Dion and his soldiers found themselves—while penetrating in different divisions at once into Neapolis, Tycha, and Achradrina.

Dion drives back Nypsius and his troops into Ortygia—he extinguishes the flames and preserves Syracuse.

His task would probably have been difficult, had Nypsius been able to control the troops under his command, in themselves brave and good. But these troops had been for some hours dispersed throughout the streets, satiating their licentious and murderous passions, and destroying a town which Dionysius now no longer expected to retain. Recalling as many soldiers as he could from this brutal disorder, Nypsius marshalled them along the interior fortification, occupying the entrances and exposed points where Dion would seek to penetrate into the city.¹ The battle was thus not continuous, but fought between detached parties at separate openings, often very narrow, and on ground sometimes difficult to surmount, amidst the conflagration blazing everywhere around.² Disorganised by pillage, the troops of Nypsius could oppose no long resistance to the forward advance of Dion, with soldiers full of ardour and with the Syracusans around him stimulated by despair. Nypsius was overpowered, compelled to abandon his line of defence, and to retreat with his troops into Ortygia, which the greater number of them reached in safety. Dion and his victorious troops, after having forced the entrance into the city, did not attempt to pursue them. The first and most pressing necessity was to extinguish the flames; but no inconsiderable number of the soldiers of Nypsius were

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. *πρὸς τεταγμένῳ παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος χαλεπῇ, ἔχον καὶ δυσεχρίστον τὴν πρόσδον.*

To a person who, after penetrating into the interior of the wall of Epipolæ, stood on the slope, and looked down eastward, the outer wall of Tycha, Achradrina, and Neapolis, might be said to form

one *τείχος*; not indeed in one and the same line or direction, yet continuous from the northern to the southern brink of Epipolæ.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 46. *Ὡς δὲ προέμειζεν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐν χειρὶ μὲν ὀλίγων πρὸς ὀλίγους ἐγένετο μάχη, διὰ τὴν στενότητα καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τοῦ τόπου, &c.*

found dispersed through the streets and houses, and slain while actually carrying off plunder on their shoulders. Long after the town was cleared of enemies, however, all hands within it were employed in stopping the conflagration; a task in which they hardly succeeded, even by unremitting efforts throughout the day and the following night.¹

On the morrow Syracuse was another city; disfigured by the desolating trace of flame and of the hostile soldiery, yet still refreshed in the hearts of its citizens, who felt that they had escaped much worse; and above all, penetrated by a renewed political spirit, and a deep sense of repentant gratitude towards Dion. All those generals, who had been chosen at the last election from their intense opposition to him, fled forthwith; except Herakleidès and Theodotès. These two men were his most violent and dangerous enemies; yet it appears that they knew his character better than their colleagues, and therefore did not hesitate to throw themselves upon his mercy. They surrendered, confessed their guilt, and implored his forgiveness. His magnanimity (they said) would derive a new lustre, if he now rose superior to his just resentment over misguided rivals, who stood before him humbled and ashamed of their former opposition, entreating him to deal with them better than they had dealt with him.

Universal
gratitude
and admira-
tion on
the part of
the Syra-
cusans, to-
wards Dion.
Heraklei-
dès and
Theodotès
throw
themselves
upon his
mercy, and
entreat his
forgiveness

If Dion had put their request to the vote, it would have been refused by a large majority. His soldiers, recently defrauded of their pay, were yet burning with indignation against the authors of such an injustice. His friends, reminding him of the bitter and unscrupulous attacks which he as well as they had experienced from Herakleidès, exhorted him to purge the city of one who abused the popular forms to purposes hardly less mischievous than despotism itself. The life of Herakleidès now hung upon a thread. Without pronouncing any decided opinion, Dion had only to maintain an equivocal silence, and suffer the popular sentiment to manifest itself in a verdict invoked by one party, expected even by the opposite. The more was every one astonished when he took upon himself the

Dion par-
dons Heraklei-
dès—his exposi-
tion of
motives.

¹ Plutarch. Dion, c. 45, 46; Diodor. xvi. 20.

responsibility of pardoning Herakleidês; adding, by way of explanation and satisfaction¹ to his disappointed friends—

"Other generals have gone through most of their training with a view to arms and war. My long training in the Academy has been devoted to aid me in conquering anger, envy, and all malignant jealousies. To show that I have profited by such lessons, it is not enough that I do my duty towards my friends and towards honest men. The true test is, if, after being wronged, I show myself placable and gentle towards the wrong-doer. My wish is to prove myself superior to Herakleidês more in goodness and justice, than in power and intelligence. Successes in war, even when achieved single-handed, are half owing to fortune. If Herakleidês has been treacherous and wicked through envy, it is not for Dion to dishonour a virtuous life in obedience to angry sentiment. Nor is human wickedness, great as it often is, ever pushed to such an excess of stubborn brutality, as not to be amended by gentle and gracious treatment, from steady benefactors."²

We may reasonably accept this as something near the genuine speech of Dion, reported by his companion Timonidês, and thus passing into the biography of Plutarch. It lends a peculiar interest, as an exposition of motives, to the act which it accompanies. The sincerity of the exposition admits of no doubt, for all the ordinary motives of the case counselled an opposite conduct; and had Dion been in like manner at the feet of his rival, his life would assuredly not have been spared. He took pride (with a sentiment something like that of Kallikratidas³ on liberating the prisoners taken at Methymna) in realising by a conspicuous act the lofty morality which he had imbibed from the Academy; the rather, as the case presented every temptation to depart from it. Persuading himself that he could by an illustrious example put to shame and soften the mutual cruelties so frequent in Grecian party-warfare, and regarding the amnesty towards Herakleidês as a proper sequel to the generous impulse which had led him to march from Leontini to Syracuse, —he probably gloried in both, more than in the victory itself. We shall presently have

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 47. 'Ο δὲ Δίων παραμυθούμενος αὐτοὺς ἔλεγεν, &c.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 47.

³ See Chap. LXIV. of this History.

the pain of discovering that his anticipations were totally disappointed. And we may be sure that at the time, the judgement passed on his proceeding towards Herakleidês was very different from what it now receives. Among his friends and soldiers, the generosity of the act would be forgotten in its imprudence. Among his enemies, it would excite surprise, perhaps admiration—yet few of them would be conciliated or converted into friends. In the bosom of Herakleidês himself, the mere fact of owing his life to Dion would be a new and intolerable humiliation, which the Erinnyes within would goad him on to avenge. Dion would be warned, by the criticism of his friends, as well as by the instinct of his soldiers, that in yielding to a magnanimous sentiment, he overlooked the reasonable consequences; and that Herakleidês continuing at Syracuse would only be more dangerous both to him and them, than he had been before. Without taking his life, Dion might have required him to depart from Syracuse; which sentence, having regard to the practice of the time, would have been accounted generosity.

It was Dion's next business to renew the wall of blockade constructed against Ortygia, and partially destroyed in the late sally of Nypsins. Every Syracusan citizen was directed to cut a stake, and deposit it near the spot; after which, during the ensuing night, the soldiers planted a stockade so as to restore the broken parts of the line. Protection being thus ensured to the city against Nypsins and his garrison, Dion proceeded to bury the numerous dead who had been slain in the sally, and to ransom the captives, no less than 2000 in number, who had been carried off into Ortygia.¹ A trophy, with sacrifice to the gods for the victory, was not forgotten.²

A public assembly was now held to elect new generals in place of those who had fled. Here a motion was made by Herakleidês himself, that Dion should be chosen general with full powers both by land and sea. The motion was received with great favour by the principal citizens; but the poorer men were attached to Herakleidês, especially the seamen; who preferred serving under his command and loudly required that he

Dion re-establishes the blockade of Ortygia, and ransoms the captives taken.

Dion named general on land, at the motion of Herakleidês, who is continued in his command of the fleet.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

² Diodor. xvi. 20.

should be named admiral, along with Dion as general on land. Forced to acquiesce in this nomination, Dion contented himself with insisting and obtaining that the resolution, which had been previously adopted for redistributing lands and houses, should be rescinded.¹

The position of affairs at Syracuse was now pregnant with mischief and quarrel. On land, Dion enjoyed a dictatorial authority; at sea, Herakleidês, his enemy not less than ever, was admiral, by separate and independent nomination. The undefined authority of Dion—exercised by one self-willed, though magnanimous, in spirit, and extremely repulsive in manner—was sure to become odious after the feelings arising out of the recent rescue had worn off; and abundant opening would thus be made for the opposition of Herakleidês, often on just grounds. That officer indeed was little disposed to wait for just pretences. Conducting the Syracusan fleet to Messênê in order to carry on war against Dionysius at Lokri, he not only tried to raise the seamen in arms against Dion, by charging him with despotic designs, but even entered into a secret treaty with the common enemy Dionysius; through the intervention of the Spartan Pharax, who commanded the Dionysian troops. His intrigues being discovered, a violent opposition was raised against them by the leading Syracusan citizens. It would seem (as far as we can make out from the scanty information of Plutarch) that the military operations were frustrated, and that the armament was forced to return to Syracuse. Here again the quarrel was renewed—the seamen apparently standing with Herakleidês, the principal citizens with Dion—and carried so far, that the city suffered not only from disturbance, but even from irregular supply of provisions.² Among the mortifications of Dion, not the least was that which he experienced from his own friends or soldiers, who reminded him of their warnings and predictions when he consented to spare Herakleidês. Meanwhile Dionysius had sent into Sicily a body of troops under Pharax, who were encamped at Neapolis in the Agrigentine territory. In what scheme of operations this movement forms a part, we cannot make out; for Plutarch tells us

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 48.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 48. καὶ δι'

αὐτῶν, ἀπορία καὶ σπάνις ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις, &c.

nothing except what bears immediately on the quarrel between Dion and Herakleidês. To attack Phrax, the forces of Syracuse were brought out; the fleet under Herakleidês, the soldiers on land under Dion. The latter, though he thought it imprudent to fight, was constrained to hazard a battle by the insinuation of Herakleidês and the clamour of the seamen; who accused him of intentionally eking out the war for the purpose of prolonging his own dictatorship. Dion accordingly attacked Phrax, but was repulsed. Yet the repulse was not a serious defeat, so that he was preparing to renew the attack, when he was apprised that Herakleidês with the fleet had departed and were returning at their best speed to Syracuse; with the intention of seizing the city, and barring out Dion with his troops. Nothing but a rapid and decisive movement could defeat this scheme. Leaving the camp immediately with his best horsemen, Dion rode back to Syracuse as fast as possible; completing a distance of 700 stadia (about 92 miles) in a very short time, and forestalling the arrival of Herakleidês.¹

Thus disappointed and exposed, Herakleidês found means to direct another manœuvre against Dion, through the medium of a Spartan named Gæsy-lus; who had been sent by the Spartans, informed of the dissensions in Syracuse, to offer himself (like Gylippus) for the command. Herakleidês eagerly took advantage of the arrival of this officer; pressing the Syracusans to accept a Spartan as their commander-in-chief. But Dion replied that there were plenty of native Syracusans qualified for command; moreover, if a Spartan was required, he was himself a Spartan, by public grant. Gæsy-lus, having ascertained the state of affairs, had the virtue and prudence not merely to desist from his own pretensions, but also to employ his best efforts in reconciling Dion and Herakleidês. Sensible that the wrong had been on the side of the latter, Gæsy-lus constrained him to bind himself by the strongest oaths to better conduct in future. He engaged his own guarantee for the observance of the covenant; but the better to ensure such observance, the greater part of the Syracusan fleet (the chief instrument

Attempt to
supersede
Dion
through
Gæsy-lus
the Spartan
—good con-
duct of
Gæsy-lus.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 49.

of Herakleidês) was disbanded, leaving only enough to keep Ortygia under blockade.¹

The capture of that islet and fortress, now more strictly watched than ever, was approaching. What had become of Pharax, or why he did not advance, after the retreat of Dion, to harass the Syracusans and succour Ortygia—we know not. But no succour arrived; provisions grew scarce; and the garrison became so discontented, that Apollokratês the son of Dionysius could not hold out any longer. Accordingly, he capitulated with Dion; handing over to him Ortygia with its fort, arms, magazines and everything contained in it—except what he could carry away in five triremes. Aboard of these vessels, he placed his mother, his sisters, his immediate friends, and his chief valuables, leaving everything else behind for Dion and the Syracusans, who crowded to the beach in multitudes to see him depart. To them the moment was one of lively joy and mutual self-congratulation—promising to commence a new era of freedom.²

On entering Ortygia, Dion saw, for the first time after a separation of about twelve years, his sister Aristomachê, his wife Aretê, and his family. The interview was one of the tenderest emotion and tears of delight to all. Aretê, having been made against her own consent the wife of Timokratês, was at first afraid to approach Dion. But he received and embraced her with unabated affection.³ He conducted both her and his son away from the Dionysian acropolis, in which they had been living since his absence, into his own house; having himself resolved not to dwell in the acropolis, but to leave it as a public fort or edifice belonging to Syracuse. However this renewal of his domestic happiness was shortly afterwards embittered by the death of his son; who having imbibed from Dionysius drunken and dissolute habits, fell from the roof of the house, in a fit of intoxication or frenzy, and perished.⁴

Dion was now at the pinnacle of power as well as of glory. With means altogether disproportionate he had achieved the expulsion of the greatest despot in Greece, even from an impregnable stronghold. He had combated danger and difficulty

Surrender
of Ortygia
by Apollo-
kratês to
Dion.

Entry of
Dion into
Ortygia—
restoration
of his wife
—speedy
death of
his son.

Conduct of
Dion in the
hour of
triumph.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 60.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 50.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 51.

⁴ Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 5.

with conspicuous resolution, and had displayed almost chivalrous magnanimity. Had he "breathed out his soul" at the instant of triumphant entry into Ortygia, the Academy would have been glorified by a pupil of first-rate and unsullied merit. But that cup of prosperity, which poisoned so many other eminent Greeks, had now the fatal effect of exaggerating all the worst of Dion's qualities, and damping all the best.

Plutarch indeed boasts, and we may perfectly believe, that he maintained the simplicity of his table, his raiment, and his habits of life, completely unchanged—now that he had become master of Syracuse, and an object of admiration to all Greece. In this respect, Plato and the Academy had reason to be proud of their pupil.² But the public mistakes, now to be recounted, were not the less mischievous to his countrymen as well as to himself.

From the first moment of his entry into Syracuse from Peloponnesus, Dion had been suspected and accused of aiming at the expulsion of Dionysius, only in order to transfer the despotism to himself. His haughty and repulsive manners, raising against him personal antipathies overywhere, were cited as confirming the charge. Even at moments when Dion was labouring for the genuine good of the Syracusans, this suspicion had always more or less crossed his path; robbing him of well-merited gratitude—and at the same time discrediting his opponents, and the people of Syracuse, as guilty of mean jealousy towards a benefactor.

The time had now come when Dion was obliged to act in such a manner as either to confirm, or to belie, such unfavourable auguries. Unfortunately both his words and his deeds confirmed them in the strongest manner. The proud and repulsive external demeanour, for which he had always been notorious, was rather aggravated than softened. He took pride in showing, more plainly than ever, that he despised everything which looked like courting popularity.³

¹ Juvenal, Satir. x. 381.

"Quid illo cive (Marine) tulisset
Imperium in terris, quid Roma beatus
unquam,
Si circumducto captivorum agmine,
et omni

Bellorum pompâ, animam exhalasset
opimam,
Cum de Teutonico vellet descendere curru?"

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 52. Τοῦ μέγας

Suspicion
previously
entertained
respecting
Dion—that
he was aim-
ing at the
despotism
for himself
—confirmed
by his
present
conduct.

If the words and manner of Dion were thus significant, both what he did, and what he left undone, was more significant still. Of that great boon of freedom, which he had so loudly promised to the Syracusans, and which he had directed his herald to proclaim on first entering their walls, he conferred absolutely nothing. He retained his dictatorial power unabated, and his military force certainly without reduction, if not actually reinforced; for as Apollokratês did not convey away with him the soldiers in Ortygia, we may reasonably presume that a part of them at least remained to embrace the service of Dion. He preserved the acropolis and fortifications of Ortygia just as they were, only garrisoned by troops obeying his command instead of that of Dionysius. His victory made itself felt in abundant presents to his own friends and soldiers; but to the people of Syracuse, it produced nothing better than a change of masters.

It was not indeed the plan of Dion to constitute a permanent despotism. He intended to establish himself king, but to grant to the Syracusans what in modern times would be called a constitution. Having imbibed from Plato and the Academy as well as from his own convictions and tastes, aversion to a pure democracy, he had resolved to introduce a Lacedæmonian scheme of mixed government, combining king, aristocracy, and people, under certain provisions and limitations. Of this general tenor are the recommendations addressed both to him, and to the Syracusans after his death, by Plato; who however seems to contemplate, along with the political scheme, a Lykurgæan reform of manners and practice. To aid in framing and realising his scheme, Dion had sent to Corinth to invite counsellors and auxiliaries; for Corinth was suitable to his views, not simply as mother city of Syracuse, but also as a city thoroughly oligarchical.²

περί τὰς ὁμιλίας δῆκου καὶ τοῦ πρὸ
τὸν δῆμον ἀπενθοῦς ἐπιλονεῖκε
μηδὲν ὑπερβαίνειν μηδὲ χαλάσαι
αἱτοὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν χάριτο
γυῖων ὄντων, καὶ Πλάτωνος ἐπιτι

μῶντος, &c.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 52.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Plato, Epistol. vii. p. 334, 336; viii. p. 356.

That these intentions on the part of Dion were sincere, we need not question. They had been originally conceived without any views of acquiring the first place for himself, during the life of the elder Dionysius, and were substantially the same as those which he had exhorted the younger Dionysius to realise, immediately after the death of the father. They are the same as he had intended to further by calling in Plato,—with what success, has been already recounted. But Dion made the fatal mistake of not remarking, that the state of things, both as to himself and as to Syracuse, was totally altered during the interval between 367 B.C. and 354 B.C. If at the former period, when the Dionysian dynasty was at the zenith of power, and Syracuse completely prostrated, the younger Dionysius could have been persuaded spontaneously and without contest or constraint to merge his own despotism in a more liberal system, even dictated by himself—it is certain that such a free, though moderate concession, would at first have provoked unbounded gratitude, and would have had a chance (though that is more doubtful) of giving long-continued satisfaction. But the situation was totally different in 354 B.C., when Dion, after the expulsion of Apollokratês, had become master in Ortygia; and it was his mistake that he still insisted on applying the old plans when they had become not merely unsuitable, but mischievous. Dion was not in the position of an established despot, who consents to renounce, for the public good, powers which every one knows that he can retain, if he chooses; nor were the Syracusans any longer passive, prostrate, and hopeless. They had received a solemn promise of liberty, and had been thereby inflamed into vehement action, by Dion himself; who had been armed by them with delegated powers, for the special purpose of putting down Dionysius. That under these circumstances Dion, instead of laying down his trust, should constitute himself king—even limited king—and determine how much liberty he would consent to allot to the Syracusans who had appointed him—this was a proceeding which they could not but resent as a flagrant usurpation, and which he could only hope to maintain by force.

The real conduct of Dion, however, was worse even than this. He manifested no evidence of realising even that fraction of popular liberty which had entered into

Mistake of
Dion as to
his position.

his original scheme. What exact promise he made, we do not know. But he maintained his own power, the military force, and the despotic fortifications, provisionally undiminished. And who could tell how long he intended to maintain them?

That he really had in his mind purposes such as Plato¹ gives him credit for, I believe to be true. But he took no practical step towards them. He had resolved to accomplish them, not through persuasion of the Syracusans, but through his own power. This was the excuse which he probably made to himself, and which pushed him down that inclined plane from whence there was afterwards no escape.

It was not likely that Dion's conduct would pass without a protest. That protest came loudest from Herakleidēs; who, so long as Dion had been acting in the real service of Syracuse, had opposed him in a culpable and traitorous manner—and who now again found himself in opposition to Dion, when opposition had become the side of patriotism as well as of danger. Invited by Dion to attend the council, he declined, saying that he was now nothing more than a private citizen, and would attend the public assembly along with the rest; a hint which implied, plainly as well as reasonably, that Dion also ought to lay down his power, now that the common enemy was put down.² The surrender of Ortygia had produced strong excitement among the Syracusans. They were impatient to demolish the dangerous stronghold erected in that islet by the elder Dionysius; they both hoped and expected, moreover, to see the destruction of that splendid funereal monument which his son had built in his honour, and the urn with its ashes cast out. Now of these two measures, the first was one of pressing and undeniable necessity, which Dion ought to have consummated without a moment's delay; the second was compliance with a popular antipathy at that time natural, which would have served as an evidence that the old despotism stood condemned. Yet Dion did neither. It was Herakleidēs who censured him, and moved for the demolition of the Dionysian Bastile; thus having the glory of attaching his

Opposition raised against Dion by Herakleidēs—impatience of the Syracusans to see the demolition of the Dionysian strongholds and funereal monument.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 335 F. p. 351 A.; *Epistol.* viii. p. 357 A.

² Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 53.

name to the measure eagerly performed by Timoleon eleven years afterwards, the moment that he found himself master of Syracuse. Not only Dion did not originate the overthrow of this dangerous stronghold, but when Herakleidês proposed it, he resisted him and prevented it from being done.¹ We shall find the same den serving for successive despots—preserved by Dion for them as well as for himself, and only removed by the real liberator Timoleon.

Herakleidês gained extraordinary popularity among the Syracusans by his courageous and patriotic conduct. But Dion saw plainly that he could not, consistently with his own designs, permit such free opposition any longer. Many of his adherents, looking upon Herakleidês as one who ought not to have been spared on the previous occasion, were ready to put him to death at any moment; being restrained only by a special prohibition which Dion now thought it time to remove. Accordingly, with his privy, they made their way into the house of Herakleidês, and slew him.²

This dark deed abolished all remaining hope of obtaining Syracusan freedom from the hands of Dion, and stamped him as the mere successor of the Dionysian despotism. It was in vain that he attended the obsequies of Herakleidês with his full military force, excusing his well-known crime to the people, on the plea, that Syracuse could never be at peace while two such rivals were both in active political life. Under the circumstances of the case, the remark was an insulting derision; though it might have been advanced with pertinence as a reason for sending Herakleidês away, at the moment when he before spared him. Dion had now conferred upon his rival the melancholy honour of dying as a martyr to Syracusan freedom; and in that light he was bitterly mourned by the people. No man after this murder could think himself secure. Having once employed the soldiers as executioners of his own political antipathies, Dion proceeded to lend himself more and more to their exigences. He provided for them

Dion causes Herakleidês to be privately slain.

Increased oppressions of Dion—hatred entertained against him in Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 53. Ἐπειτα κατηγορεῖ τοῦ Δίωνος ὅτι τὴν ἄκραν οὐ κατέσκαψε, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν Διονυσίου τάφον ὠρμημένῳ λῦσαι καὶ τὸ νεκρὸν ἐκβαλεῖν οὐκ ἐκέτρεψε, &c.

Compare Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 53; Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 6.

pay and largesses, great in amount, first at the cost of his opponents in the city, next at that of his friends, until at length discontent became universal. Among the general body of the citizens, Dion became detested as a tyrant, and the more detested because he had presented himself as a liberator; while the soldiers also were in great part disaffected to him.¹

The spies and police of the Dionysian dynasty not having been yet re-established, there was ample liberty at least of speech and censure; so that Dion was soon furnished with full indications of the sentiment entertained towards him. He became disquieted and irritable at this change of public feeling;² angry with the people, yet at the same time ashamed of himself. The murder of Herakleidês sat heavy on his soul. The same man whom he had spared before when in the wrong, he had now slain when in the right. The maxims of the Academy which had imparted to him so much self-satisfaction in the former act, could hardly fail to occasion a proportionate sickness of self-reproach in the latter. Dion was not a mere power-seeker, nor prepared for all that endless apparatus of mistrustful precaution, indispensable to a Grecian despot. When told that his life was in danger, he replied that he would rather perish at once by the hands of the first assassin, than live in perpetual diffidence, towards friends as well as enemies.³

One thus too good for a despot, and yet unfit for a popular leader, could not remain long in the precarious position occupied by Dion. His intimate friend, the Athenian Kallippus, seeing that the man who could destroy him would become popular with the Syracusans as well as with a large portion of the soldiery, formed a conspiracy accordingly. He stood high in the confidence of Dion,

¹ Cornel. Nepos, Dion, c. 7.

² Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 7.
"Insuetus male audiendi," &c.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 56. 'Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Δίων, ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἀγθόμενος, καὶ τὸν φόνον κτείνον, ὡς τινὰ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν ποσάξων αὐτοῦ κηλίδα προκειμένην,

δυσχεραίνων αἱ καὶ βαρυνόμενος εἶπεν, ὅτι πολλάκις ἤδη θήσκειν ἔτοιμός ἐστι καὶ παρέχειν τῇ βουλομένῳ σφάττειν αὐτόν, εἰ ἔξῃ δεήσει μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φίλους φυλαττόμενον.

Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 176 F.

had been his companion during his exile at Athens, had accompanied him to Sicily, and entered Syracuse by his side. But Plato, anxious for the credit of the Academy, is careful to inform us, that this inauspicious friendship arose, not out of fellowship in philosophy, but out of common hospitalities, and especially common initiation in the Eleusinian mysteries.¹ Brave and forward in battle, Kallippus enjoyed much credit with the soldiery. He was conveniently placed for tampering with them, and by a crafty stratagem, he even ensured the unconscious connivance of Dion himself. Having learnt that plots were formed against his life, Dion talked about them to Kallippus, who offered himself to undertake the part of spy, and by simulated partnership to detect as well as to betray the conspirators. Under this confidence, Kallippus had full licence for carrying on his intrigues unimpeded, since Dion disregarded the many warnings which reached him.² Among the rumours raised out of Dion's new position, and industriously circulated by Kallippus—one was, that he was about to call back Apollokratès, son of Dionysius, as his partner and successor in the despotism—as a substitute for the youthful son who had recently perished. By these and other reports, Dion became more and more discredited, while Kallippus secretly organised a wider circle of adherents. His plot however did not escape the penetration of Aristomachê and Aretê; who having first addressed unavailing hints to Dion, at last took upon them to question Kallippus himself. The latter not only denied the charge, but even confirmed his denial, at their instance, by one of the most solemn and terrific oaths recognised in Grecian religion; going into the sacred grove of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, touching the purple robe of the goddess, and taking in his hand a lighted torch.³

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 333 F, compare *Plutarch*, *Dion*, c. 17, 28, 64.

Athenæus, on the contrary, states that Kallippus was a pupil of Plato, and fellow pupil with Dion in the school (*Athenæus*, xi. p. 508).

The statement of Plato hardly goes so far as to negative the supposition that Kallippus may have frequented his school and received

instruction there, for a time greater or less. But it refutes the idea, that the friendship of Dion and Kallippus arose out of these philosophical tastes common to both; which Athenæus seems to have intended to convey.

² *Plutarch*, *Dion*, c. 54; *Cornelius Nepos*, *Dion*, c. 8.

³ *Plutarch*, *Dion*, c. 56.

Inquiry being thus eluded, there came on presently the day of the Koreia:—the festival of these very two goddesses in whose name and presence Kallippus had forsworn. This was the day which he had fixed for execution. The strong points of defence in Syracuse were confided beforehand to his principal adherents, while his brother Philostrate¹ kept a trireme manned in the harbour ready for flight in case the scheme should miscarry. While Dion, taking no part in the festival, remained at home, Kallippus caused his house to be surrounded by confidential soldiers, and then sent into it a select company of Zakynthians, unarmed, as if for the purpose of addressing Dion on business. These men, young and of distinguished muscular strength, being admitted into the house, put aside or intimidated the slaves, none of whom manifested any zeal or attachment. They then made their way up to Dion's apartment, and attempted to throw him down and strangle him. So strenuously did he resist, however, that they found it impossible to kill him without arms; which they were perplexed how to procure, being afraid to open the doors, lest aid might be introduced against them. At length one of their number descended to a back-door, and procured from a Syracusan without, named Lykon, a short sword; of the Laconian sort, and of peculiar workmanship. With this weapon they put Dion to death.² They then seized Aristomachê and Aretê, the sister and wife of Dion. These unfortunate women were cast into prison, where they were long detained, and where the latter was delivered of a posthumous son.

Thus perished Dion, having lived only about a year after his expulsion of the Dionysian dynasty from Syracuse—but a year too long for his own fame. Notwithstanding the events of those last months, there is no doubt that he was a man essentially differing from the class of Grecian despots;

¹ Plato alludes to the two brothers whom Dion made his friends at Athens, and who ultimately slew him; but without mentioning the name of either (Plato, *Epistol. vii.* p. 333 F.).

The third Athenian—whose fidel-

ity he emphatically contrasts with the falsehood of these two—appears to mean, himself—Plato. Compare pp. 333 and 334.

² Plutarch, *Dion*, c. 57; Cornélius Nepos, *Dion*, c. 9; Diodor. xvi. 31.

a man, not of aspirations purely personal, nor thirsting merely for multitudes of submissive subjects and a victorious army—but with large public-minded purposes attached as coordinate to his own ambitious views. He wished to perpetuate his name as the founder of a polity, cast in something of the general features of Sparta; which, while it did not shock Hellenic instincts, should reach farther than political institutions generally aim to do, so as to remodel the sentiments and habits of the citizens, on principles suited to philosophers like Plato. Brought up as Dion was from childhood at the court of the elder Dionysius, unused to that established legality, free speech, and habit of active citizenship, from whence a large portion of Hellenic virtue flowed—the wonder is, how he acquired so much public conviction and true magnanimity of soul—not how he missed acquiring more. The influence of Plato during his youth stamped his mature character; but that influence (as Plato himself tells us) found a rare predisposition in the pupil. Still, Dion had no experience of the working of a free and popular government. The atmosphere in which his youth was passed, was that of an energetic despotism; while the aspiration which he imbibed from Plato was, to restrain and regularize that despotism, and to administer to the people a certain dose of political liberty, yet reserving to himself the task of settling how much was good for them, and the power of preventing them from acquiring more.

How this project—the natural growth of Dion's mind, for which his tastes and capacities were suited—was violently thrust aside through the alienated feelings of the younger Dionysius—has been already recounted. The position of Dion was now completely altered. He became a banished, ill-used man, stung with contemptuous antipathy against Dionysius, and eager to put down his despotism over Syracuse. Here were new motives apparently falling in with the old project. But the conditions of the problem had altogether changed. Dion could not overthrow Dionysius without "taking the Syracusan people into partnership" (to use the phrase of Herodotus¹ respecting the Athenian Kleisthenês)—without promising them full freedom, as an inducement for their hearty cooperation—without giving them arms, and awakening in them the

¹ Herodotus v. 66. ἐπαισόμενος δ' ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσετίριζεν.

stirring impulses of Grecian citizenship, all the more violent because they had been so long trodden down.¹ With these new allies he knew not how to deal. He had no experience of a free and jealous popular mind: in persuasion he was utterly unpractised: his manners were haughty and displeasing. Moreover, his kindred with the Dionysian family exposed him to antipathy from two different quarters. Like the Duke of Orleans (*Egalité*) at the end of 1792, in the first French Revolution—he was hated both by the royalists, because, though related to the reigning dynasty, he had taken an active part against it—and by sincere democrats, because they suspected him of a design to put himself in its place. To Dion, such coalition of antipathies was a serious hindrance; presenting a strong basis of support for all his rivals, especially for the unscrupulous Herakleidês. The bad treatment which he underwent both from the Syracusans and from Herakleidês, during the time when the officers of Dionysius still remained masters in Ortygia, has been already related. Dion however behaved, though not always with prudence, yet with so much generous energy against the common enemy, that he put down his rival, and maintained his ascendancy unshaken, until the surrender of Ortygia.

That surrender brought his power to a maximum. It was the turning-point and crisis of his life. A splendid opportunity was now opened, of earning for himself fame and gratitude. He might have attached his name to an act as sublime and impressive as any in Grecian history, which, in an evil hour, he left to be performed in after days by Timoleon—the razing of the Dionysian stronghold, and the erection of courts of justice on its site. He might have taken the lead in organising, under the discussion and consent of the people, a good and free government, which, more or less exempt from defect as it might have been, would at least have satisfied them, and would have spared Syracuse those ten years of suffering which intervened until Timoleon came to make the possibility a fact. Dion might have done all that Timoleon did—and might have done it more easily, since he was less embarrassed both by the other towns in Sicily and by the Carthaginians. Unfortunately he still thought himself strong enough to resume

¹ Cicero de Officiis, ii 7. "Acriores morsus intermissæ libertatis quam

his original project. In spite of the spirit, kindled partly by himself, among the Syracusans—in spite of the repugnance, already unequivocally manifested, on the mere suspicion of his despotic designs—he fancied himself competent to treat the Syracusans as a tame and passive herd; to carve out for them just as much liberty as he thought right, and to require them to be satisfied with it; nay, even worse, to defer giving them any liberty at all, on the plea, or pretence, of full consultation with advisers of his own choice.

Through this deplorable mistake, alike mischievous to Syracuse and to himself, Dion made his government one of pure force. He placed himself in a groove wherein he was fatally condemned to move on from bad to worse, without possibility of amendment. He had already made a martyr of Herakleidès, and he would have been compelled to make other martyrs besides, had his life continued. It is fortunate for his reputation that his career was arrested so early, before he had become bad enough to forfeit that sympathy and esteem with which the philosopher Plato still mourns his death, appeasing his own disappointment by throwing the blame of Dion's failure on every one but Dion himself.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS DOWN TO THE CLOSE OF THE
EXPEDITION OF TIMOLEON. B.C. 353—336.

THE assassination of Dion, as recounted in my last chapter, appears to have been skilfully planned and executed for the purposes of its contriver, the Athenian Kallippus. Succeeding at once to the command of the soldiers, among whom he had before been very popular,—and to the mastery of Ortygia,—he was practically supreme at Syracuse. We read in Cornelius Nepos, that after

B.C. 353.

Position
and pro-
spects of
Kallippus,
after the as-
sassination
of Dion.

the assassination of Dion there was deep public sorrow, and a strong reaction in his favour, testified by splendid obsequies attended by the mass of the population.¹ But this statement is difficult to believe; not merely because Kallippus long remained undisturbed master, but because he also threw into prison the female relatives of Dion—his sister Aristomachê and his pregnant wife Aretê, avenging by such act of malignity the false oath which he had so lately been compelled to take, in order to satisfy their suspicions.² Aretê was delivered of a son in the prison. It would seem that these unhappy women were kept in confinement during all the time, more than a year, that Kallippus remained master. On his being deposed, they were released; when a Syracusan named Hiketas, a friend of the deceased Dion, affected to take them under his protection. After a short period of kind treatment, he put them on board a vessel to be sent to Peloponnesus, but caused them to be slain on the voyage, and their bodies to be sunk in the sea. To this cruel deed he is said to have been instigated by the enemies of Dion; and the act shows but too plainly how implacable those enemies were.³

¹ Cornelius Nepos, Dion, c. 10. ² Plutarch, Dion, c. 56, 57.

³ Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

How Kallippus maintained himself in Syracuse—by what support, or violences, or promises—and against what difficulties he had to contend—we are not permitted to know. He seems at first to have made promises of restoring liberty; and we are even told, that he addressed a public letter to his country, the city of Athens;¹ wherein he doubtless laid claim to the honours of tyrannicide; representing himself as the liberator of Syracuse. How this was received by the Athenian assembly, we are not informed. But to Plato and the frequenters of the Academy, the news of Dion's death occasioned the most profound sorrow, as may still be read in the philosopher's letters.

He continues master of Syracuse more than a year. His misrule. Return of Hipparinus son of Dionysius to Syracuse. Expulsion of Kallippus.

Kallippus maintained himself for a year in full splendour and dominion. Discontents had then grown up; and the friends of Dion—or perhaps the enemies of Kallippus assuming that name—showed themselves with force in Syracuse. However, Kallippus defeated them, and forced them to take refuge in Leontini;² of which town we presently find Hiketas despot. Encouraged probably by this success, Kallippus committed many enormities, and made himself so odious,³ that the expelled Dionysian family began to conceive hopes of recovering their dominion. He had gone forth from Syracuse on an expedition against Katana; of which absence Hipparinus took advantage to effect his entry into Syracuse, at the head of a force sufficient, combined with popular discontent, to shut him out of the city. Kallippus speedily returned, but was defeated by Hipparinus, and compelled to content himself with the unprofitable exchange of Katana in place of Syracuse.⁴

Hipparinus and Nysæus were the two sons of Dionysius the elder, by Aristomachê, and were therefore nephews of Dion. Though Hipparinus probably became master of Ortygia, the strongest portion of Syracuse, yet it would appear that in the other portions of Syracuse, there were opposing parties who contested his rule; first, the partisans

Miserable condition of Syracuse and Sicily, as described by Plato.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 58.

² Plutarch, Dion, c. 58; Diodor. xvi. 31-36.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Plutarch, Compar. Timoleon and Paul.

Emil. c. 2.

⁴ This seems to result from Plutarch, Dion, c. 58, compared with Diodor. xvi. 36.

a triple coordinate kingship, passing by hereditary transmission in the families of the three persons just named; and including the presidency of religious ceremonies with an ample measure of dignity and veneration, but very little active political power. Advising that impartial arbitrators, respected by all, should be invoked to settle terms for the compromise, he earnestly implores each of the combatants to acquiesce peaceably in their adjudication.¹

To Plato,—who saw before him the double line of Spartan kings, the only hereditary kings in Greece,—the proposition of three coordinate kingly families did not appear at all impracticable; nor indeed was it so, considering the small extent of political power allotted to them. But amidst the angry passions which then raged, and the mass of evil which had been done and suffered on all sides, it was not likely that any pacific arbitrator, of whatever position or character, would find a hearing, or would be enabled to effect any such salutary adjustment as had emanated from the Mantineaian Dêmônax at Kyrênê—between the discontented Kyreneans and the dynasty of the Battiad princes.² Plato's recommendation passed unheeded. He died in 348-347 B.C., without seeing any mitigation of those Sicilian calamities which saddened the last years of his long life. On the contrary, the condition of Syracuse grew worse instead of better. The younger Dionysius contrived to effect his return, expelling Hipparinus and Nysæus from Ortygia, and establishing himself there again as master. As he had a long train of past humiliation to avenge, his rule was of that oppressive character which the ancient proverb recognised as belonging to kings restored from exile.³

Of all these princes descended from the elder Dionysius, not one inherited the sobriety and temperance which had contributed so much to his success. All of them are said to have been of drunken and dissolute habits⁴—Dionysius the younger, and his son Apollokratês, as well as Hipparinus

Plato's recommendations fruitless—state of Syracuse grows worse Dionysius returns to Ortygia, expelling Hipparinus.

Drunken habits of the Dionysian princess.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* viii. p. 356.

² Herodot. iv. 161.

³ Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 1.

..... Regnahit sanguine multo

Ad regnum quisquis venit ab exilio.

⁴ Aristotle and Theopompus, ap. Athenæum, x. p. 436, 436; Theopomp. *Fragm.* 146, 204, 213, ed. Didot.

and Nysæus. Hipparinus was assassinated while in a fit of intoxication; so that Nysæus became the representative of this family, until he was expelled from Ortygia by the return of the younger Dionysius.

That prince, since his first expulsion from Syracuse, had chiefly resided at Lokri in Italy, of which city his mother Doris was a native. It has already been stated that the elder Dionysius had augmented and nursed up Lokri by every means in his power, as an appurtenance of his own dominion at Syracuse. He had added to its territory all the southernmost peninsula of Italy (comprehended within a line drawn from the Gulf of Terina to that of Skylletium), once belonging to Rhegium, Kaulonia, and Hipponium. But though the power of Lokri was thus increased, it had ceased to be a free city, being converted into a dependency of the Dionysian family.¹ As such, it became the residence of the second Dionysius, when he could no longer maintain himself in Syracuse. We know little of what he did; though we are told that he revived a portion of the dismantled city of Rhegium under the name of Phœbia.² Rhegium itself reappears shortly afterwards as a community under its own name, and was probably reconstituted at the complete downfall of the second Dionysius.

The season between 356-346 B.C. was one of great pressure and suffering for all the Italian Greeks, arising from the increased power of the inland Lucanians and Bruttians. These Bruttians, who occupied the southernmost Calabria, were a fraction detached from the general body of Lucanians and self-emancipated; having consisted chiefly of indigenous rural serfs in the mountain communities, who threw off the sway of their Lucanian masters and formed an independent aggregate for themselves. These men especially in the energetic effort which marked their early independence, were formidable enemies of the Greeks on the coast, from Tarentum to the Sicilian strait; and more than a match even for the Spartans and Epirots invited over by the Greeks as auxiliaries.

Sufferings
of the
Italian
Greeks
from the
Lucanians
and Brut-
tians of the
interior.

¹ Aristotle *Politic.* v. 6, 7.

² Strabo, vi. p. 260.

It appears that the second Dionysius, when he retired to Lokri after the first loss of his power at Syracuse, soon found his rule unacceptable and his person unpopular. He maintained himself, seemingly from the beginning, by means of two distinct citadels in the town, with a standing army under the command of the Spartan Pharak, a man of profligacy and violence.¹ The conduct of Dionysius became at last so odious, that nothing short of extreme force could keep down the resentment of the citizens. We read that he was in the habit of practising the most licentious outrage towards the marriageable maidens of good family in Lokri. The detestation thus raised against him was repressed by his superior force—not, we may be sure, without numerous cruelties perpetrated against individual persons who stood on their defence—until the moment arrived when he and his son Apollokratês effected their second return to Orygia. To ensure so important an acquisition, Dionysius diminished his military force at Lokri, where he at the same time left his wife, his two daughters, and his youthful son. But after his departure, the Lokrians rose in insurrection, overpowered the reduced garrison, and took captive these unfortunate members of his family. Upon their guiltless heads fell all the terrors of retaliation for the enormities of the despot. It was in vain that both Dionysius himself, and the Tarentines² supplicated permission to redeem the captives at the highest ransom. In vain was Lokri besieged, and its territory desolated. The Lokrians could neither be seduced by bribes, nor deterred by threats, from satiating the full extremity of vindictive fury. After multiplied cruelties and brutalities, the wife

Dionysius at Lokri—his unpopularity and outrageous misrule—cruel retaliation of the Lokrians upon his female relatives.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11; Compare Timoleon and Paul. Emil. c. 2; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 536; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 821 D. About the two citadels in Lokri, see Livy xxix. 6.

It may have been probably a preparatory fleet in the service of the younger Dionysius, which Livy mentions to have been ravaging about this time the coast of Latium, co-operating with the Gauls against

portions of the Roman territory (Livy, vii. 25, 26).

² It would appear that relations of amity, or amicable dependence, still subsisted between Dionysius the younger and the Tarentines. There was seen, in the prytæneum or government house of Tarentum, a splendid chandelier with 36 burners, a present from Dionysius (Euphorion, ap. Athenæum, xv. p. 700)

and family of Dionysius were at length relieved from farther suffering by being strangled.¹ With this revolting tragedy terminated the inauspicious marital connection begun between the elder Dionysius and the oligarchy of Lokri.

By the manner in which Dionysius exercised his power at Lokri, we may judge how he would behave at Syracuse. The Syracusans endured more evil than ever, without knowing where to look for help. Hiketas the Syracusan (once the friend of Dion, ultimately the murderer of the slain Dion's widow and sister) had now established himself as despot at Leontini. To him they turned as an auxiliary, hoping thus to obtain force sufficient for the expulsion of Dionysius. Hiketas gladly accepted the proposition, with full purpose of reaping the reward of such expulsion, when achieved, for himself. Moreover, a formidable cloud was now gathering from the side of Carthage.

What causes had rendered Carthage inactive for the last few years, while Sicily was so weak and disunited—we do not know: but she had become once more aggressive, extending her alliance among the despots of the island, and pouring in a large force and fleet, so as to menace the independence both of Sicily and of Southern Italy.² The appearance of this new enemy drove the Syracusans to despair, and left them no hope of safety except in assistance from Corinth. To that city they sent a pathetic and urgent appeal, setting forth both the actual suffering and approaching peril from without. And such indeed was the peril, that even to a calm observer, it might well seem as if the mournful prophecy of Plato was on the point of receiving fulfilment—Hellenism as well as freedom becoming extinct on the island.

To the invocation of Corinthian aid, Hiketas was a party; yet an unwilling party. He had made up his mind, that for his purpose, it was better to join the Carthaginians, with whom he had already opened negotiations—and to employ their forces, first in expelling Dionysius, next in ruling Syracuse for himself. But these were schemes not to be yet divulged: accordingly, Hiketas affected to concur in the pressing entreaty sent by the

Distress of the Syracusans—fresh danger from Carthage. They invoke the aid of Hiketas—in concert with Hiketas, they send to entreat aid from Corinth.

Secret alliance of Hiketas with the Carthaginians—he conspires to defeat the application to Corinth.

¹ Strabo, vi. p. 259, 260; Athenæus, xii. p. 541. ² Diodor. xvi. 67.

Syracusans to Corinth, intending from the beginning to frustrate its success.¹ He expected indeed that the Corinthians would themselves decline compliance: for the enterprise proposed to them was full of difficulty; they had neither injury to avenge, nor profit to expect; while the force of sympathy, doubtless not inconsiderable, with a suffering colony, would probably be neutralized by the unsettled and degraded condition into which all Central Greece was now rapidly sinking, under the ambitious strides of Philip of Macedon.

The Syracusan envoys reached Corinth at a favourable moment. But it is melancholy to advert to the aggregate diminution of Grecian power, as compared with the time when (seventy years before) their forefathers had sent thither to solicit aid against the besieging armament of Athens; a time when Athens, Sparta, and Syracuse herself, were all in exuberant vigour as well as unimpaired freedom. However, the Corinthians happened at this juncture to have their hands as well as their minds tolerably free, so that the voice of genuine affliction, transmitted from the most esteemed of all their colonies, was heard with favour and sympathy. A decree was passed, heartily and unanimously, to grant the aid solicited.²

The next step was to choose a leader. But a leader was not easily found. The enterprise presented little temptation, with danger and difficulty abundant as well as certain. The hopeless discord of Syracuse for years past, was well known to all the leading Corinthian politicians or generals. Of all or most of these, the names were successively put up by the archons; but all with one accord declined. At length, while the archons hesitated whom to fix upon, an unknown voice in the crowd pronounced the name of Timoleon, son of Timodæmus. The mover seemed prompted by divine inspiration;³ so little obvious was the choice, and so pre-eminently excellent did it prove. Timoleon was named—without difficulty, and without much intention of doing him honour—to a post which all the other leading men declined.

B.C. 344
Application from Syracuse favourably received by the Corinthians—vote passed to grant aid.

Difficulty in finding a Corinthian leader—most of the leading citizens decline—Timoleon is proposed and chosen

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. ἀλλὰ

θεοῦ τινος, ὡς εἰσικεν, εἰς νοῦν ἐμβαλόντος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, &c.

Some points must be here noticed in the previous history of this remarkable man. He belonged to an illustrious family in Corinth, and was now of mature age—perhaps about fifty. He was distinguished no less for his courage than for the gentleness of his disposition. Little moved either by personal vanity or by ambition, he was devoted in his patriotism, and unreserved in his hatred of despots as well as of traitors.¹ The government of Corinth was, and always had been, oligarchical; but it was a regular, constitutional, oligarchy; while the Corinthian antipathy against despots was of old standing²—hardly less strong than that of democratical Athens. As a soldier in the ranks of Corinthian hoplites, the bravery of Timoleon, and his submission to discipline, were alike remarkable.

These points of his character stood out the more forcibly from contrast with his elder brother Timophanês; who possessed the soldierlike merits of bravery and energetic enterprise, but combined with them an unprincipled ambition, and an unscrupulous prosecution of selfish advancement at all cost to others. The military qualities of Timophanês, however, gained for him so much popularity, that he was placed high as an officer in the Corinthian service. Timoleon, animated with a full measure of brotherly attachment, not only tried to screen his defects as well as to set off his merits, but also incurred the greatest perils for the purpose of saving his life. In a battle against the Argerians and Kleonæus, Timophanês was commanding the cavalry, when his horse, being wounded, threw him on the ground, very near to the enemy. The remaining horsemen fled, leaving their commander to what seemed certain destruction; but Timoleon, who was serving among the hoplites, rushed singly forth from the ranks with his utmost speed, and covered Timophanês with his shield, when the enemy were just about to pierce him. He made head single-handed against them warding off numerous spears and darts, and successfully protected his fallen brother until succour arrived; though at the cost of several wounds to himself.³

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 3. φιλόπατρις ὥς καὶ πρὸς διαφερόντως, ὥσα μὴ σπουδὴν μισοτύραννος εἴηαι καὶ

μισοπόνηρος.

² Herodot. v. 92.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. At

This act of generous devotion raised great admiration towards Timoleon. But it also procured sympathy for Timophanês, who less deserved it. The Corinthians had recently incurred great risk of seeing their city fall into the hands of their Athenian allies, who had laid a plan to seize it, but were disappointed through timely notice given at Corinth.¹ To arm the people being regarded as dangerous to the existing oligarchy,² it was judged expedient to equip a standing force of 400 paid foreign soldiers, and establish them as a permanent garrison in the strong and lofty citadel. The command of this garrison, with the mastery of the fort, was entrusted to Timophanês. A worse choice could not have been made. The new commander—seconded not only by his regiment and his strong position, but also by some violent partisans whom he took into his pay and armed, among the poorer citizens—speedily stood forth as despot, taking the whole government into his own hands. He seized numbers of the chief citizens, probably all the members of the oligarchical councils who resisted his orders, and put them to death without even form of trial.³ Now, when it was too late, the Corinthians repented of the mistaken vote which had raised up a new Periander among them. But to Timoleon, the crimes of his brother occasioned an agony of shame and sorrow. He first went up to the acropolis⁴ to remonstrate with him; conjuring him emphatically, by the most sacred motives public as well as private, to renounce his disastrous projects. Timophanês repudiated the appeal with contempt. Timoleon had now to choose between his brother and his country. Again he went to the acropolis,

Timophanês makes himself despot, and commits gross oppression—Timoleon with two companions puts him to death.

what time this battle took place cannot be made out.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. 'Ἐκεί δ' οἱ Κορινθιοί, δεδιότες μὴ πάθωσιν οἷα καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πόλιν, &c.

The Corinthians were carrying on war, in conjunction with Athens and Sparta, against Thebes, when (in 366 B.C.) the Athenians laid their plan for seizing the city. The Corinthians, having heard of it in

time, took measures to frustrate it. See Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 4, 4-5.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 5, 9.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. οὐκ-
νοὺς ἀνελών ἀκρίτους τῶν πρώτων
πολιτῶν, ἀνέδειξεν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τυ-
ραννον.

Diodorus (xvi. 85) coincides in the main fact—but differs in several details.

⁴ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4. αὐθις
ἀνέβη πρὸς τὸν ἀκρόπολιν, &c.

accompanied by Æschylus, brother of the wife of Timophanês—by the prophet Orthagoras, his intimate friend—perhaps also by another friend named Telekleidês. Admitted into the presence of Timophanês, they renewed their prayers and supplications; urging him even yet to recede from his tyrannical courses. But all their pleading was without effect. Timophanês first laughed them to scorn; presently, he became exasperated, and would hear no more. Finding words unavailing, they now drew their swords and put him to death. Timoleon lent no hand in the deed, but stood a little way off, with his face hidden, and in a flood of tears.¹

With the life of Timophanês passed away the despotism which had already begun its crushing influence upon the Corinthians. The mercenary force was either dismissed, or placed in safe hands; the acropolis became again part of a free city; the Corinthian constitution was revived as before. In what manner this change was accomplished, or with what measure of violence it was accompanied, we are left in ignorance; for Plutarch tells us hardly anything except what personally concerns Timoleon. We learn however that the expressions of joy among the citizens, at the death of Timophanês and the restoration of the constitution, were vehement and universal. So strongly did this tide of sentiment run, as to carry along with it, in appearance, even those who really regretted the departed despotism. Afraid to say what they really felt about the deed, these men gave only the more abundant utterance to their hatred of the doer. Though it was good that Timophanês should be killed (they said), yet that he should

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4, Cornelius Nepos, Timol. c. 1; Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 808 A. That Telekleidês was present and took part in the deed—though Plutarch directly names only Æschylus and Orthagoras—seems to be implied in an indirect allusion afterwards (c. 7), where Telekleidês says to Timoleon after his nomination to the Sicilian command, "ἂν οὖν κατ'ὧς ἀγωνίσῃς, τύρηνον ἀντιπράττειν δεξομεν· ἂν δὲ φυλῶς, ἀβελφόν."

The presence of the prophet seems to show, that they had just been offering sacrifice, to ascertain the will of the gods respecting what they were about to do.

Nepos says that Timoleon was not actually present at the moment of his brother's death, but stood out of the room to prevent assistance from arriving.

Diodorus (xvi. 65) states that Timoleon slew his brother in the market-place. But the account of Plutarch appears preferable.

he killed by his brother, and his brother-in-law, was a deed which tainted both the actors with inexpressible guilt and abomination. The majority of the Corinthian public, however, as well as the most distinguished citizens, took a view completely opposite. They expressed the warmest admiration as well for the doer as for the deed. They extolled the combination of warm family affection with devoted magnanimity and patriotism, each in its right place and properly balanced, which marked the conduct of Timoleon. He had displayed his fraternal affection by encountering the greatest perils in the battle, in order to preserve the life of Timophanès. But when that brother, instead of an innocent citizen, became the worst enemy of Corinth, Timoleon had then obeyed the imperative call of patriotism, to the disregard not less of his own comfort and interest than of fraternal affection.¹

Such was the decided verdict pronounced by the majority—a majority as well in value as in number—respecting the behaviour of Timoleon. In his mind, however, the general strain of encomium was not sufficient to drown, or even to compensate, the language of reproach, in itself so much more pungent, which emanated from the minority. Among that minority too was found one person whose single voice told with profound impression—his mother Demaristè, another also of the slain Timophanès. Demaristè not only thought of her murdered son with the keenest maternal sorrow, but felt intense horror and execration for the authors of the deed. She imprecated curses on the head of Timoleon, refused even to see him again, and shut her doors against his visits, in spite of earnest supplications.

There wanted nothing more to render Timoleon thoroughly miserable, amidst the almost universal gratitude of Corinth. Of his strong fraternal affection for Timophanès, his previous conduct leaves no doubt. Such affection had to be overcome before he accompanied his tyrannicidal friends to the acropolis, and doubtless flowed back with extreme bitterness upon his soul, after the deed was done. But when to this internal source of distress, was added the sight of persons who shrank from contact with him as a fratricide, together with the sting of

Bitter reproach of Timoleon by his mother.

Intense mental distress of Timoleon. He shuts himself up and retires from public life.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 5.

the maternal Erinnyes—he became agonised even to distraction. Life was odious to him; he refused for some time all food, and determined to starve himself to death. Nothing but the pressing solicitude of friends prevented him from executing the resolve. But no consoling voice could impart to him spirit for the duties of public life. He fled the city and the haunts of men, buried himself in solitude amidst his fields in the country, and refrained from seeing or speaking to any one. For several years he thus hid himself like a self-condemned criminal; and even when time had somewhat mitigated the intensity of his anguish, he still shunned every prominent position, performing nothing more than his indispensable duties as a citizen. An interval of twenty years¹ had now elapsed from the death of Timophanês, to the arrival of the Syracusan application for aid. During all this time, Timoleon, in spite of the sympathy and willingness of admiring fellow-citizens, had never once chosen to undertake any important command or office. At length the *vox Dei* is heard, unexpectedly, amidst the crowd; dispelling the tormenting nightmare which had so long oppressed his soul, and restoring him to healthy and honourable action.

There is no doubt that the conduct of Timoleon and Æschylus in killing Timophanês was in the highest degree tutelary to Corinth. The despot had already imbrued his hands in the blood of his countrymen, and would have been condemned, by fatal necessity, to go on from bad to worse, multiplying the number of victims, as a condition of preserving his own power. To say that the deed ought not to have been done by near relatives, was tantamount to saying, that it ought not to have been done at all; for none but near relatives could have obtained that easy access which enabled them to effect it. And even Timoleon and Æschylus could not make the attempt without the greatest hazard to themselves. Nothing was more likely than that the death of Timophanês would be avenged on the spot; nor are we told how they escaped such vengeance from the soldiers at hand. It has been already stated that the contemporary sentiment towards Timoleon was divided between admiration of the heroic patriot, and abhorrence of the fratricide; yet with a large preponderance

Different
judgements
of modern
and ancient
minds on
the act of
Timoleon.
Comments
of Plutarch.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

on the side of admiration, especially in the highest and best minds. In modern times the preponderance would be in the opposite scale. The sentiment of duty towards family covers a larger proportion of the field of morality, as compared with obligations towards country, than it did in ancient times; while that intense antipathy against a despot who overtops and overrides the laws, regarding him as the worst of criminals—which stood in the foreground of the ancient virtuous feeling—has now disappeared. Usurpation of the supreme authority is regarded generally among the European public as a crime, only where it displaces an established king already in possession; where there is no king, the successful usurper finds sympathy rather than censure; and few readers would have been displeased with Timoleon, had he even seconded his brother's attempt. But in the view of Timoleon and of his age generally, even neutrality appeared in the light of treason to his country, when no other man but he could rescue her from the despot. This sentiment is strikingly embodied in the comments of Plutarch; who admires the fraternal tyrannicide, as an act of sublime patriotism, and only complains that the internal emotions of Timoleon were not on a level with the sublimity of the act; that the great mental suffering which he endured afterwards, argued an unworthy weakness of character; that the conviction of imperative patriotic duty, having been once deliberately adopted, ought to have steeled him against scruples, and preserved him from that after-shame and repentance which spoiled half the glory of an heroic act. The antithesis, between Plutarch and the modern European point of view, is here pointed; though I think his criticisms unwarranted. There is no reason to presume that Timoleon ever felt ashamed and repentant for having killed his brother. Placed in the mournful condition of a man agitated by conflicting sentiments, and obeying that which he deemed to carry the most sacred obligation, he of necessity suffered from the violation of the other. Probably the reflection that he had himself saved the life of Timophanês, only that the latter might destroy the liberties of his country—contributed materially to his ultimate resolution, a resolution, in which Æschylus, another near relative, took even a larger share than he.

It was in this state of mind that Timoleon was called

Timoleon is appointed commander to Syracuse—he accepts the command—admonition of Telekleidês.

cides.¹

He immediately commenced his preparation of ships and soldiers. But the Corinthians, though they had resolved on the expedition, were not prepared either to vote any considerable subsidy, or to serve in large number as volunteers. The means of Timoleon were so extremely limited, that he was unable to equip more than seven triremes, to which the Korkyræans (animated by common sympathy for Syracuse, as of old in the time of the despot Hippokratês²) added two more, and the Leukadians one. Nor could he muster more than 1000 soldiers, reinforced afterwards on the voyage to 1200. A few of the principal Corinthians—Eukleides, Telemachus and Neon, among them—accompanied him. But the soldiers seem to have been chiefly miscellaneous mercenaries, —some of whom had served under the Phokians in the Sacred war (recently brought to a close), and had incurred so much odium as partners in the spoliation of the Delphian temple, that they were glad to take foreign service anywhere.³

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7. Diodorus (xvi. 65) states this striking antithesis as if it was put by the senate to Timoleon, on conferring upon him the new command. He represents the application from Syracuse as having come to Corinth shortly after the death of Timophanês, and while the trial of Timoleon was yet pending. He says that the senate nominated Timoleon to the command, in order to escape the necessity of pronouncing sentence one way or the other.

I follow the account of Plutarch, as preferable, in recognizing a long interval between the death of Timophanês and the application from Syracuse, an interval of much mental suffering to Timoleon.

² Herodot. vii. 155.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8, 11, 12, 30; Diodor. xvi. 66; Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 562. In the Aristotelian treatise, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, s. 9, Timoleon is said to have had nine ships.

Some enthusiasm was indeed required to determine volunteers in an enterprise of which the formidable difficulties, and the doubtful reward, were obvious from the beginning. But even before the preparations were completed, news came which seemed to render it all but hopeless. Hiketas sent a second mission, retracting all that he had said in the first, and desiring that no expedition might be sent from Corinth. Not having received Corinthian aid in time (he said), he had been compelled to enter into alliance with the Carthaginians, who would not permit any Corinthian soldiers to set foot in Sicily. This communication, greatly exasperating the Corinthians against Hiketas, rendered them more hearty in votes to put him down. Yet their zeal for active service, far from being increased, was probably even abated by the aggravation of obstacles thus revealed. If Timoleon even reached Sicily, he would find numberless enemies, without a single friend of importance:—for without Hiketas, the Syracusan people were almost helpless. But it now seemed impossible that Timoleon with his small force could ever touch the Sicilian shore, in the face of a numerous and active Carthaginian fleet.¹

Bad promise of the expedition—second message from Hiketas, withdrawing himself from the Corinthian alliance, and desiring that no troops might be sent to Sicily.

While human circumstances thus seemed hostile, the gods held out to Timoleon the most favourable signs and omens. Not only did he receive an encouraging answer at Delphi, but while he was actually in the temple, a fillet with intertwined wreaths and symbols of victory fell from one of the statues upon his head. The priestesses of Persephonê learnt from the goddess in a dream, that she was about to sail with Timoleon for Sicily, her own favourite island. Accordingly he caused a new special trireme to be fitted out, sacred to the Two goddesses (Dêmêtêr and Persephonê) who were to accompany him. And when, after leaving Korkyra, the squadron struck across for a night voyage to the Italian coast, this sacred trireme was seen illumined by a blaze of light from heaven; while a burning torch on high, similar to that which was usually carried in the Eleusinian mysteries, ran along with the ship and guided the pilot to the proper

Timoleon sets out for Sicily with a small squadron—favourable omens and oracular answers from the gods.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 7.

landing place at Metapontum. Such manifestations of divine presence and encouragement, properly certified and commented upon by the prophets, rendered the voyage one of universal hopefulness to the armament.¹

These hopes, however, were sadly damped, when after disregarding a formal notice from a Carthaginian man-of-war, they sailed down the coast of Italy and at last reached Rhegium. This city, having been before partially revived under the name of Phœbia, by the younger Dionysius, appears now as reconstituted under its old name and with its full former autonomy, since the overthrow of his rule at Lokri and in Italy generally. Twenty Carthaginian triremes, double the force of Timoleon, were found at Rhegium awaiting his arrival—with envoys from Hiketas aboard. These envoys came with what they pretended to be good news. "Hiketas had recently gained a capital victory over Dionysius, whom he had expelled from most part of Syracuse; and was now blocking up in Ortygia; with hopes of soon starving him out, by the aid of a Carthaginian fleet. The common enemy being thus at the end of his resources, the war could not be prolonged. Hiketas therefore trusted that Timoleon would send back to Corinth his fleet and troops, now become superfluous. If Timoleon would do this, he (Hiketas) would be delighted to see him personally at Syracuse, and would gladly consult him in the resettlement of that unhappy city. But he could not admit the Corinthian armament into the island; moreover, even had he been willing, the Carthaginians peremptorily forbade it, and were prepared, in case of need, to repel it with their superior naval force now in the strait."²

The game which Hiketas was playing with the Carthaginians now stood plainly revealed, to the vehement indignation of the armament. Instead of being their friend, or even neutral, he was nothing less than a pronounced enemy, emancipating Syracuse from Dionysius only to divide it between himself and the Carthaginians. Yet with all the ardour of the armament, it was impossible to cross the strait in opposition to an enemy's fleet of double

Timoleon arrives at Rhegium—is prevented from reaching Sicily by a Carthaginian fleet of superior force—in-sidious message from Hiketas.

Stratagem of Timoleon to get across to Sicily, in collusion with the Rhegines.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 8; Diodor. xvi. 66.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 9, Diodor. xvi. 68.

force. Accordingly Timoleon resorted to a stratagem in which the leaders and people of Rhegium, eagerly sympathising with his projects of Sicilian emancipation, cooperated. In an interview with the envoys of Hiketas as well as with the Carthaginian commanders, he affected to accept the conditions prescribed by Hiketas; admitting at once that it was useless to stand out. But he at the same time reminded them, that he had been entrusted with the command of the armament for Sicilian purposes, —and that he should be a disgraced man, if he now conducted it back without touching the island; except under the pressure of some necessity not merely real, but demonstrable to all and attested by unexceptionable witnesses. He therefore desired them to appear, along with him, before the public assembly of Rhegium, a neutral city and common friend of both parties. They would then publicly repeat the communication which they had already made to him, and they would enter into formal engagement for the good treatment of the Syracusans, as soon as Dionysius should be expelled. Such proceeding would make the people of Rhegium witnesses on both points. They would testify on his (Timoleon's) behalf, when he came to defend himself at Corinth, that he had turned his back only before invincible necessity, and that he had exacted everything in his power in the way of guarantee for Syracuse: they would testify also on behalf of the Syracusans, in case the guarantee now given should be hereafter evaded.¹

Neither the envoys of Hiketas, nor the Carthaginian commanders, had any motive to decline what seemed to them an unmeaning ceremony. Both of them accordingly attended, along with Timoleon, before the public assembly of Rhegium formally convened. The gates of the city were closed (a practice usual during the time of a public assembly): the Carthaginian men of war lay as usual near at hand, but in no state for immediate movement, and perhaps with many of the crews ashore; since all chance of hostility seemed to be past. What had been already communicated to Timoleon from Hiketas and the Carthaginians was now repeated in formal deposition before the assembly; the envoys of Hiketas

Public meeting in Rhegium—Timoleon and the Carthaginians both present at it—long speeches, during which Timoleon stals away, contriving to send his fleet over to Sicily.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10.

probably going into the case more at length, with certain flourishes of speech prompted by their own vanity. Timoleon stood by as an attentive listener; but before he could rise to reply, various Rhegine speakers came forward with comments or questions, which called up the envoys again. A long time was thus insensibly wasted, Timoleon often trying to get an opportunity to speak, but being always apparently constrained to give way to some obtrusive Rhegine. During this long time, however, his triremes in the harbour were not idle. One by one, with as little noise as possible, they quitted their anchorage and rowed out to sea, directing their course towards Sicily. The Carthaginian fleet, though seeing this proceeding, neither knew what it meant, nor had any directions to prevent it. At length the other Grecian triremes were all afloat and in progress; that of Timoleon alone remaining in the harbour. Intimation being secretly given to him as he sat in the assembly, he slipped away from the crowd, his friends concealing his escape—and got aboard immediately. His absence was not discovered at first, the debate continuing as if he were still present, and intentionally prolonged by the Rhegine speakers. At length the truth could no longer be kept back. The envoys and the Carthaginians found out that the assembly and the debate were mere stratagems, and that their real enemy had disappeared. But they found it out too late. Timoleon with his triremes was already on the voyage to Tauromenium in Sicily, where all arrived safe and without opposition. Overreached and humiliated, his enemies left the assembly in vehement wrath against the Rhegines, who reminded them that Carthaginians ought to be the last to complain of deception in others.¹

The well-managed stratagem, whereby Timoleon had overcome a difficulty to all appearance insurmountable, exalted both his own fame and the spirits of his soldiers. They were now safe in Sicily, at Tauromenium, a recent settlement near the site of the ancient Naxos, receiving hearty welcome from Andromachus, the leading citizen of the place—whose influence was so mildly exercised, and gave such complete satisfaction, that it continued through and after the

Timoleon
at Tauromenium in
Sicily—
formidable
strength of
his enemies
—despots
in Sicily—
despondency at
Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 10, 11.

reform of Timoleon, when the citizens might certainly have swept it away if they had desired. Andromachus, having been forward in inviting Timoleon to come, now prepared to cooperate with him, and returned a spirited reply to the menaces sent over from Rhegium by the Carthaginians, after they had vainly pursued the Corinthian squadron to Tauromenium.

But Andromachus and Tauromenium were but petty auxiliaries, compared with the enemies against whom Timoleon had to contend; enemies now more formidable than ever. For Hiketas, incensed with the stratagem practised at Rhegium, and apprehensive of interruption to the blockade which he was carrying on against Ortygia, sent for an additional squadron of Carthaginian men-of-war to Syracuse; the harbour of which place was presently completely beset.¹ A large Carthaginian land-force was also acting under Hanno in the western regions of the island, with considerable success against the Campanians of Entella and others.² The Sicilian towns had their native despots, Mamerkus at Katana—Leptinês at Apollonia³—Nikodêmus at Kentoripa—Apolloniadês at Agyrum⁴—from whom Timoleon could expect no aid, except in so far as they might feel predominant fear of the Carthaginians. And the Syracusans, even when they heard of his arrival at Tauromenium, scarcely ventured to indulge hopes of serious relief from such a handful of men, against the formidable array of Hiketas and the Carthaginians under their walls. Moreover what guarantee had they that Timoleon would turn out better than Dion, Kallippus, and others before him? seductive promisers of emancipation, who, if they succeeded, forgot the words by which they had won men's hearts, and thought only of appropriating to themselves the sceptre of the previous despot, perhaps even aggravating all that was bad in his rule? Such was the question asked by many a suffering citizen of Syracuse, amidst that despair and sickness of heart which made the name of an armed liberator sound only like a new deceiver and a new scourge.⁵

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

Diodor. xvi. 72.

² Diodor. xvi. 67.

³ Diodor. xvi. 82.

⁴ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13-24;

⁵ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 11.

It was by acts alone that Timoleon could refute such well-grounded suspicions. But at first, no one believed in him; nor could he escape the baneful effects of that mistrust which his predecessors had everywhere inspired. The messengers whom he sent round were so coldly received, that he seemed likely to find no allies beyond the walls of Tauromenium.

Success of
Timoleon
at Adra-
num. He
surprises
and defeats
the troops
of Hiketas,
superior in
number.

At length one invitation, of great importance, reached him—from the town of Adranum, about forty miles inland from Tauromenium; a native Sikel town, seemingly in part hellenised, inconsiderable in size, but venerated as sacred to the god Adranus, whose worship was diffused throughout all Sicily. The Adranites being politically divided, at the same time that one party sent the invitation to Timoleon, the other despatched a similar message to Hiketas. Either at Syracuse or Leontini, Hiketas was nearer to Adranum than Timoleon at Tauromenium; and lost no time in marching thither, with 5000 troops, to occupy so important a place. He arrived there in the evening, found no enemy, and established his camp without the walls, believing himself already master of the place. Timoleon, with his inferior numbers, knew that he had no chance of success except in surprise. Accordingly, on setting out from Tauromenium, he made no great progress the first day, in order that no report of his approach might reach Adranum; but on the next morning he marched with the greatest possible effort, taking the shortest, yet most rugged paths. On arriving within about three miles of Adranum, he was informed that the troops from Syracuse, having just finished their march, had encamped near the town, not aware of any enemy near. His officers were anxious that the men should be refreshed after their very fatiguing march, before they ventured to attack an army four times superior in number. But Timoleon earnestly protested against any such delay, entreating them to follow him at once against the enemy, as the only chance of finding them unprepared. To encourage them, he at once took up his shield and marched at their head, carrying it on his arm (the shield of the general was habitually carried for him by an orderly), in spite of the fatiguing march, which he had himself performed on foot as well as they. The

soldiers obeyed, and the effort was crowned by complete success. The troops of Hiketas, unarmed and at their suppers, were taken so completely by surprise, that in spite of their superior number, they fled with scarce any resistance. From the rapidity of their flight, 300 of them only were slain. But 600 were made prisoners, and the whole camp, including its appurtenances, was taken, with scarcely the loss of a man. Hiketas escaped with the rest to Syracuse.¹

This victory, so rapidly and skilfully won—and the acquisition of Adranum which followed it—produced the strongest sensation throughout Sicily. It counted even for more than a victory; it was a declaration of the gods in favour of Timoleon. The inhabitants of the holy town, opening their gates and approaching him with awe-stricken reverence, recounted the visible manifestations of the god Adranus in his favour. At the moment when the battle was commencing, they had seen the portals of their temple spontaneously burst open, and the god brandishing his spear, with profuse perspiration on his face.² Such facts,—verified and attested in a place of peculiar sanctity, and circulated from thence throughout the neighbouring communities,—contributed hardly less than the victory to exalt the glory of Timoleon. He received offers of alliance from Tyndaris and several other towns, as well as from Mamerkus despot of Katana, one of the most warlike and powerful princes in the island.³ So numerous were the reinforcements thus acquired, and so much was his confidence enhanced by recent success, that he now ventured to march even under the walls of Syracuse, and defy Hiketas; who did not think it prudent to hazard a second engagement with the victor of Adranum.⁴

Improved position and alliances of Timoleon—he marches up to the walls of Syracuse.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Diodor. xvi. 68. Diodorus and Plutarch agree in the numbers both of killed and of prisoners on the side of Hiketas.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 69.

⁴ Diodor. xvi. 68, 69. That Timoleon marched up to Syracuse, is stated by Diodorus, though not by

Plutarch. I follow Diodorus so far; because it makes the subsequent proceedings in regard to Dionysius more clear and intelligible.

But Diodorus adds two farther matters, which cannot be correct. He affirms that Timoleon pursued Hiketas at a running pace (δρομαίον) immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse; and that

Hiketas was still master of all Syracuse—except Ortygia, against which he had constructed lines of blockade, in conjunction with the Carthaginian fleet occupying the harbour. Timoleon was in no condition to attack the place, and would have been obliged speedily to retire, as his enemies did not choose to come out. But it was soon seen that the manifestations of the Two goddesses, and of the god Adranus, in his favour, were neither barren nor delusive. A real boon was now thrown into his lap, such as neither skill nor valour could have won. Dionysius, blocked up in Ortygia with a scanty supply of provisions, saw from his walls the approaching army of Timoleon, and heard of the victory of Adranum. He had already begun to despair of his own position of Ortygia;¹ where indeed he might perhaps hold out by bold effort and steady endurance, but without any reasonable chance of again becoming master of Syracuse; a chance which Timoleon and the Corinthian intervention cut off more decidedly than ever. Dionysius was a man not only without the energetic character and personal ascendancy of his father, which might have made head against such difficulties—but indolent and drunken in his habits, not relishing a sceptre when it could only be maintained by hard fighting, nor stubborn enough to stand out to the last merely as a cause of war.² Under these dispositions, the arrival of Timoleon both suggested to him the idea, and furnished him with the means, of making his resignation subservient to the purchase of a safe asylum and comfortable future maintenance: for to a Grecian

he then got possession of the portion of Syracuse called Epipolæ.

Now it was with some difficulty that Timoleon could get his troops even up to the field of battle at Adranum, without some previous repose, so long and fatiguing was the march which they had undergone from Tauromentum. It is therefore impossible that they can have been either inclined or competent to pursue (at a rapid pace) Hiketas immediately from the field of battle at Adranum to Syracuse.

Next, it will appear from sub-

sequent operations, that Timoleon did not, on this occasion, get possession of any other portion of Syracuse than the Islet Ortygia, surrendered to him by Dionysius. He did not enter Epipolæ until afterwards.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13. δυνάμει ἥδη ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπολιπὼν ἐκπολιορκεῖσθαι, &c.

² Tacitus, *Histor.* iii. 70. Respecting the last days of the Emperor Vindex, "Ipse, neque jubendi neque vetandi potens, non jam Imperator, sed tantum belli causa erat."

despot, with the odium of past severities accumulated upon his head, abnegation of power was hardly ever possible, consistent with personal security.¹ But Dionysius felt assured that he might trust to the guarantee of Timoleon and the Corinthians for shelter and protection at Corinth, with as much property as he could carry away with him; since he had the means of purchasing such guarantee by the surrender of Ortygia—a treasure of inestimable worth. Accordingly, he resolved to propose a capitulation, and sent envoys to Timoleon for the purpose.

There was little difficulty in arranging terms. Dionysius stipulated only for a safe transit with his moveable property to Corinth, and for an undisturbed residence in that city; tendering in exchange the unconditional surrender of Ortygia with all its garrison, arms, and magazines. The convention was concluded forthwith, and three Corinthian officers—Telemachus, Eukleîdês and Neon—were sent in with 400 men to take charge of the place. Their entrance was accomplished safely, though they were obliged to elude the blockade by stealing in at several times, and in small companies. Making over to them the possession of Ortygia with the command of his garrison, Dionysius passed, with some money and a small number of companions, into the camp of Timoleon; who conveyed him away, leaving at the same time the neighbourhood of Syracuse.²

Timoleon sends troops to occupy Ortygia, receiving Dionysius into his camp.

Conceive the position and feelings of Dionysius, a prisoner in the camp of Timoleon, traversing that island over which his father as well as himself had reigned all-powerful, and knowing himself to be the object of either hatred or contempt to every one—except so far as the immense boon which he had conferred, by surrendering Ortygia, purchased for him an indulgent forbearance! He was doubtless eager for immediate departure to Corinth, while Timoleon was no less anxious to

Timoleon sends news of his success to Corinth, with Dionysius himself in a triumph.

¹ See, among other illustrations of this fact, the striking remark of Solon (Plutarch, Solon, c. 14).

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13; Diodor. xvi. 70. Diodorus appears to me to misdate these facts, placing the capitulation of Dionysius and

the surrender of Ortygia to Timoleon, after the capture of the other portion of Syracuse by Timoleon. I follow Plutarch's chronology, which places the capitulation of Ortygia first.

send him thither, as the living evidence of triumph accomplished. Although not fifty days¹ had yet elapsed since Timoleon's landing in Sicily, he was enabled already to announce a decisive victory, a great confederacy grouped around him, and the possession of the inexpugnable position of Ortygia, with a garrison equal in number to his own army; the despatches being accompanied by the presence of that very despot, bearing the terrific name of Dionysius, against whom the expedition had been chiefly aimed! Timoleon sent a special trireme² to Corinth, carrying Dionysius, and communicating these important events, together with the convention which guaranteed to the dethroned ruler an undisturbed residence in that city.

The impression produced at Corinth by the arrival of this trireme and its passengers was powerful beyond all parallel. Astonishment and admiration were universal; for the expedition of Timoleon had started as a desperate venture, in which scarcely one among the leading Corinthians had been disposed to embark; nor had any man conceived the possibility of success so rapid as well as so complete. But the victorious prospect in Sicily, with service under the fortunate general, was now the general passion of the citizens. A reinforcement

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

² Theopompus stated that Dionysius had gone from Sicily to Corinth in a merchant-ship (ναὶ σπογγύς). Timæus contradicted this assertion, seemingly with his habitual asperity, and stated that Dionysius had been sent in a ship of war (ναὶ μιστρὶς). See Timæus, Fragment 133; Theopompus, Fragment 216, ed. Didot.

Diodorus (xvi. 70) copies Theopompus.

Polybius (xii. 4 a) censures Timæus for cavilling at such small inaccuracies, as if the difference between the two were not worth noticing. Probably the language of Timæus may have deserved blame as ill-mannered; but the matter of fact appears to me to have been

perfectly worth correcting. To send Dionysius in a trireme, was treating him as prisoner in a respectful manner, which Timoleon was doubtless bound to do; and which he would be inclined to do on his own account—seeing that he had a strong interest in making the entry of Dionysius as a captive into Corinth, an impressive sight. Moreover the trireme would reach Corinth more speedily than the merchantmen.

That Dionysius should go in a merchant-ship, was one additional evidence of fallen fortune; and this seems to have been the reason why it was taken up by Theopompus—from the passion, prevalent among so many Greek authors, for exaggerating contrasts.

of 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry was immediately voted and equipped.¹

If the triumph excited wonder and joy, the person of Dionysius himself appealed no less powerfully to other feelings. A fallen despot was a sight denied to Grecian eyes; whoever aspired to despotism, put his all to hazard, forfeiting his chance of retiring to a private station. By a remarkable concurrence of circumstances, the exception to this rule was presented just where it was least likely to take place; in the case of the most formidable and odious despotism which had ever overriden the Grecian world. For nearly half a century prior to the expedition of Dion against Syracuse, every one had been accustomed to pronounce the name of Dionysius with a mixture of fear and hatred—the sentiment of prostration before irresistible force. How much difficulty Dion himself found, in overcoming this impression in the minds of his own soldiers, has been already related. Though dissipated by the success of Dion, the antecedent alarm became again revived, when Dionysius recovered his possession of Ortygia, and when the Syracusans made pathetic appeal to Corinth for aid against him. Now, on a sudden, the representative of this extinct greatness, himself bearing the awful name of Dionysius, enters Corinth under a convention, suing only for the humble domicile and unpretending security of a private citizen.² The Greek mind was keenly sensitive to such contrasts, which entered largely into every man's views of human affairs, and were reproduced in a thousand forms by writers and speakers. The affluence of visitors—who crowded to gaze upon and speak to Dionysius, not merely from Corinth, but from other cities of Greece—was immense; some in simple curiosity, others with compassion, a few even with insulting derision. The anecdotes which are recounted seem intended to convey a

Sight of the fallen Dionysius at Corinth—impression made upon the Greeks—numerous visitors to see him. Conversation with Aristoxenus.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13, 14, 15

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14, Diodor. xvi. 70. The remarks of Tacitus upon the last hours of the Emperor Vitellius how their application to the Greek feeling on this occasion (Histor. iii. 68) —“Nec

quisquam adeo rerum humanarum immemor, quem non commoveret illa facies; Romanum principem, et generis humani paulo ante dominum, relicta fortune sue sodo, exire de imperio. *Nihil tale viderant, nihil audierant,*” &c.

degrading impression of this last period of his career. But even the common offices of life—the purchase of unguents and condiments at the tavern¹—the nicety of criticism displayed respecting robes and furniture²—looked degrading when performed by the ex-despot of Syracuse. His habit of drinking largely, already contracted, was not likely to become amended in these days of mortification; yet on the whole his conduct seems to have had more dignity than could have been expected. His literary tastes, manifested during the time of his intercourse with Plato, are implied even in the anecdotes intended to disparage him. Thus he is said to have opened a school for teaching boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in the art of singing or reciting poetry.³ His name served to subsequent writers, both Greek and Roman,—as those of Cræsus, Polykratês, and Xerxes, serve to Herodotus—for an instance to point a moral on the mutability of human events. Yet the anecdotes recorded about him can rarely be verified, nor can we distinguish real matters of fact from those suitable and impressive myths which so pregnant a situation was sure to bring forth.

Among those who visited him at Corinth was Aristoxenus of Tarentum: for the Tarentine leaders, first introduced by Plato, had maintained their correspondence with Dionysius even after his first expulsion from Syracuse to Lokri, and had vainly endeavoured to preserve his unfortunate wife and daughters from the retributive vengeance of the Lokrians. During the palmy days of Dionysius, his envoy Polyarchus had been sent on a mission to Tarentum, where he came into conversation with the chief magistrate Archytas.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 14, Theopomp Fragm. 217, ed. Didot, Justin, xxi. 5.

² Timæus, ap. Palybium, xii. 24.

³ Plutarch, Timol. c. 14, Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 12, 7. His remark, that Dionysius opened the school from anxiety still to have the pleasure of exercising authority, can hardly be meant as serious.

We cannot suppose that Dionysius in his exile at Corinth suffered under any want of a comfortable

income, for it is mentioned, that all his moveable furniture (ἐκκευρή) was bought by his namesake Dianysius, the fortunate despot of the Pontic Herakleia; and this furniture was so magnificent, that the acquisition of it is counted among the peculiar marks of ornament and dignity to the Herakleotic dynasty:—see the Fragments of the historian Memnon of Herakleia, ch. iv. p. 10, ed. Orell, apud Photium, Cod. 224.

This conversation Aristoxenus had recorded in writing; probably from the personal testimony of Archytas, whose biography he composed. Polyarchus dwelt upon wealth, power, and sensual enjoyments, as the sole objects worth living for; pronouncing those who possessed them in large masses, as the only beings deserving admiration. At the summit of all stood the Persian King, whom Polyarchus extolled as the most enviable and admirable of mortals. "Next to the Persian King (said he), though with a very long interval, comes our despot of Syracuse."¹ What had become of Polyarchus, we do not know; but Aristoxenus lived to see the envied Dionysius under the altered phase of his life at Corinth, and probably to witness the ruin of the Persian Kings also. On being asked, what had been the cause of his displeasure against Plato, Dionysius replied, in language widely differing from that of his former envoy Polyarchus, that amidst the many evils which surrounded a despot, none was so mischievous as the unwillingness of his so-called friends to tell him the truth. Such false friends had poisoned the good feeling between him and Plato.² This anecdote bears greater mark of being genuine, than others which we read more witty and pungent. The Cynic philosopher Diogenês treated Dionysius with haughty scorn for submitting to live in private station after having enjoyed so overruling an ascendancy. Such was more or less the sentiment of every visitor who saw him: but the matter to be lamented is, that he had not been in a private station from the beginning. He was by nature unfit to tread, even with profit to himself, the perilous and thorny path of a Grecian despot.

The reinforcements decreed by the Corinthians, though equipped without delay and forwarded to Thurii in Italy, were prevented from proceeding farther on shipboard by the Carthaginian squadron at the strait, and were

¹ Aristoxenus, *Fragm.* 16, ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, p. 546. δῆ-
τερον δὲ, φησι, τὸν ἡμέτερον τύραννο.
ἵσται τις ἄν, ναίειν πολὺ λειπόμενον.

One sees that the word *τύραννος* was used even by those who intended no unfriendly sense—applied by an admiring envoy to his master.

² Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 15. Aris-

toxenus heard from Dionysius at Corinth the remarkable anecdote about the faithful attachment of the two Pythagorean friends, Damon and Phintias. Dionysius had been strongly impressed with the incident, and was fond of relating it (πολλὰ δὲ τις ἡμῖν ἀγγεῖτο, Aristoxenus, *Fragm.* 9, ed. Didot; apud Jamblichum *Vit. Pythag.* s. 233).

condemned to wait for a favourable opportunity.¹ But the greatest of all reinforcements to Timoleon was, the acquisition of Ortygia. It contained not merely a garrison of 2000 soldiers—who passed (probably much to their own satisfaction) from the declining cause of Dionysius to the victorious banner of Timoleon—but also every species of military stores. There were horses, engines for siege and battery, missiles of every sort, and above all, shields and spears to the amazing number of 70,000—if Plutarch's statement is exact.² Having dismissed Dionysius, Timoleon organized a service of small craft from Katana to convey provisions by sea to Ortygia, eluding the Carthaginian guard squadron. He found means to do this with tolerable success,³ availing himself of winds or bad weather, when the ships of war could not obstruct the entrance of the lesser harbour. Meanwhile he himself returned to Adranum, a post convenient for watching both Leontini and Syracusæ. Here two assassins, bribed by Hiketas, were on the point of taking his life, while sacrificing at a festival; and were only prevented by an incident so remarkable, that every one recognized the visible intervention of the gods to protect him.⁴

Meanwhile Hiketas, being resolved to acquire possession of Ortygia, invoked the aid of the full Carthaginian force under Magon. The great harbour of Syracuse was presently occupied by an overwhelming fleet of 150 Carthaginian ships of war, while a land-force, said to consist of 60,000 men, came also to join Hiketas, and were quartered by him within the walls of Syracuse. Never before had any Carthaginian troops got footing within those walls. Syracusan liberty, perhaps Syracusan Hellenism, now appeared extinct. Even Ortygia, in spite of the bravery of its garrison under the Corinthian Neon, seemed not long tenable, against repeated attack and battery of the walls, combined with strict blockade to keep out supplies by sea. Still, however, though the garrison was distressed, some small craft with provisions from Katana contrived to slip in; a fact

Immense advantage derived by Timoleon from the possession of Ortygia—numerous stores found in it.

Large Carthaginian army under Magon arrives to aid in attacking Ortygia. Defeated by Neon, during the absence of Magon and Hiketas. Neon acquires Achradina and joins it by a line of wall to Ortygia.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18.

⁴ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 16.

which induced Hiketas and Magon to form the plan of attacking that town, thinking themselves strong enough to accomplish this by a part of their force, without discontinuing the siege of Ortygia. Accordingly they sailed forth from the harbour, and marched from the city of Syracuse, with the best part of their armament, to attack Katana, leaving Ortygia still under blockade. But the commanders left behind were so negligent in their watch, that Neon soon saw, from the walls of Ortygia, the opportunity of attacking them with advantage. Making a sudden and vigorous sally, he fell upon the blockading army unawares, routed them at all points with serious loss, and pressed his pursuit so warmly, that he got possession of Achradina, expelling them from that important section of the city. The provisions and money, acquired herein at a critical moment, rendered this victory important. But what gave it the chief value was, the possession of Achradina, which Neon immediately caused to be joined on to Ortygia by a new line of fortifications, and thus held the two in combination.¹ Ortygia had been before (as I have already remarked) completely distinct from Achradina. It is probable that the population of Achradina, delighted to be liberated from the Carthaginians, lent zealous aid to Neon both in the defence of their own walls, and in the construction of the new connecting lines towards Ortygia; for which the numerous intervening tombs would supply materials.

This gallant exploit of Neon permanently changed the position of the combatants at Syracuse. A horseman started instantly to convey the bad news to Hiketas and Magon near Katana. Both of them returned forthwith; but they returned only to occupy half of the city—Tyche, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. It became extremely difficult to prosecute a successful siege or blockade of Ortygia and Achradina united: besides that, Neon had now obtained abundant supplies for the moment.

Return of
Magon and
Hiketas to
Syracuse—
increased
difficulty of
their pro-
ceedings,
since the
victory of
Neon.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 18. 'Ο δὲ Κορίνθιος Νέων, κατιδὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας τοὺς ὑπολειπόμενους τῷ πολέμῳ ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς φυλάττοντας, ἐξαίφνης ἐπέπεσε δισοπαρμένους αὐτοῖς· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνελών, τοὺς δὲ τρεψάμενος, ἐκράτησε καὶ κατέουε

τῇ, λεγομένῃ Ἀχραδινῇ, ὃ νῦν ἵσταντο ἔδοκε καὶ ἀνερυστοτάτο, ὑπάρχει τῆς Συρακοσίῳ μέρος πόλεως, τρέποντινα συγκαίμενης καὶ συνηρμοσμένης ἐκ πλείονων πόλεων. Εὐκορῆσας δὲ καὶ οἴτου καὶ χρημάτων οὐκ ἀφῆκε τὸν τόπον, οὐδ' ἀνεχωρησε πάλιν ἐπὶ

Meanwhile Timoleon too was approaching, reinforced by the new Corinthian division; who, having been at first detained at Thurii, and becoming sick of delay, had made their way inland, across the Bruttian territory, to Rhegium. They were fortunate enough to find the strait unguarded: for the Carthaginian admiral Hanno—having seen their ships laid up at Thurii, and not anticipating their advance by land—had first returned with his squadron to the Strait of Messina, and next, hoping by a stratagem to frighten the garrison of Ortygia into surrender, had sailed to the harbour of Syracuse with his triremes decorated as if after a victory. His seamen, with wreaths round their heads, shouted as they passed into the harbour under the walls of Ortygia, that the Corinthian squadron approaching the strait had been all captured, and exhibited as spoils of the victory certain Grecian shields hung up aboard. By this silly fabrication, Hanno produced a serious dismay among the garrison of Ortygia. But he purchased such temporary satisfaction at the cost of leaving the strait unguarded, and allowing the Corinthian division to cross unopposed from Italy into Sicily. On reaching Rhegium, these Corinthians not only found the strait free, but also a complete and sudden calm, succeeding upon several days of stormy weather. Embarking immediately on such ferry boats and fishing craft as they could find, and swimming their horses alongside by the bridle, they reached the Sicilian coast without loss or difficulty.

Thus did the gods again show their favour towards Timoleon by an unusual combination of circumstances, and by smiting the enemy with blindness. So much did the tide of success run along with him, that the important town of Messênê declared itself among his allies, admitting the new Corinthian soldiers immediately on their landing. With little delay, they proceeded forward to join Timoleon: who thought himself strong enough, notwithstanding that even with this reinforcement he could only command 4000 men, to march up to the vicinity of Syracuse, and there to confront the immeasurably superior

Messênê declares in favour of Timoleon—he establishes his camp near Syracuse.

πολιν, διεφύλαττε.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 19.

τὴν ἀκρὴν, ἀλλὰ ὀρξάμενος τὸν περίβολον τῆς Ἀρχαδονίδος καὶ ἀνὰ ψαζαυτοὺς ἐρύμασι πρὸς τὴν ἀκρό

force of his enemies.¹ He appears to have encamped near the Olympieion, and the bridge over the river Anapus.

Though Timoleon was sure of the cooperation of Neon and the Corinthian garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, yet he was separated from them by the numerous force of Hiketas and Magon, who occupied Epipolæ, Neapolis, and Tyeha, together with the low ground between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour; while the large Carthaginian fleet filled the Harbour itself. On a reasonable calculation, Timoleon seemed to have little chance of success. But suspicion had already begun in the mind of Magon, sowing the seeds

Magon distrusts Hiketas and his position at Syracuse—he suddenly withdraws his army and fleet, leaving Syracuse altogether

of disunion between him and Hiketas. The alliance between Carthaginians and Greeks was one unnatural to both parties, and liable to be crossed, at every mischance, by mutual distrust, growing out of antipathy which each party felt in itself and knew to subsist in the other. The unfortunate scheme of marching to Katana, with the capital victory gained by Neon in consequence of that absence, made Magon believe that Hiketas was betraying him. Such apprehensions were strengthened, when he saw in his front the army of Timoleon, posted on the river Anapus—and when he felt that he was in a Greek city generally disaffected to him, while Neon was at his rear in Ortygia and Achradina. Under such circumstances, Magon conceived the whole safety of his Carthaginians as depending on the zealous and faithful cooperation of Hiketas, in whom he had now ceased to confide. And his mistrust, once suggested, was aggravated by the friendly communication which he saw going on between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas. These soldiers, all Greeks and mercenaries fighting for a country not their own, encountered each other, on the field of battle, like enemies,—but conversed in a pacific and amicable way, during intervals, in their respective camps. Both were now engaged, without disturbing each other, in catching eels amidst the marshy and watery ground between Epipolæ and the Anapus. Interechanging remarks freely, they were admiring the splendour and magnitude of Syracuse with its great maritime convenience,—when one of Timoleon's soldiers observed to the opposite party—"And this magnificent

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

city, you, Greeks as you are, are striving to barbarise, planting these Carthaginian cut-throats nearer to us than they now are; though our first anxiety ought to be, to keep them as far off as possible from Greece. Do you really suppose that they have brought up this host from the Atlantic and the Pillars of Heraklès, all for the sake of Hiketas and his rule? Why if Hiketas took measure of affairs like a true ruler, he would not thus turn out his brethren, and bring in an enemy to his country; he would ensure to himself an honourable sway, by coming to an understanding with the Corinthians and Timoleon.¹ Such was the colloquy passing between the soldiers of Timoleon and those of Hiketas, and speedily made known to the Carthaginians. Having made apparently strong impression on those to whom it was addressed, it justified alarm in Magon; who was led to believe that he could no longer trust his Sicilian allies. Without any delay, he put all his troops aboard the fleet, and in spite of the most strenuous remonstrances from Hiketas, sailed away to Africa.¹

On the next day, when Timoleon approached to the attack, he was amazed to find the Carthaginian army and fleet withdrawn. His soldiers, scarcely believing their eyes, laughed to scorn the cowardice of Magon. Still however Hiketas determined to defend Syracuse with his own troops, in spite of the severe blow inflicted by Magon's desertion. That desertion had laid open both the Harbour, and the lower ground near the Harhour; so that Timoleon was enabled to come into direct communication with his own garrison in Ortygia and Achradina, and to lay plans for a triple simultaneous onset. He himself undertook to attack the southern front of Epipolæ towards the river Anapus, where the city was strongest; the Corinthian Isias was instructed to make a vigorous assault from Achradina, or the eastern side; while Deinarchus and Demaretus, the generals who had conducted the recent reinforcement from Corinth, were ordered to attack the northern wall of Epipolæ, or the Hexapylon;² they were probably

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20.

Leon's attack is very intelligible

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. The account given by Plutarch of Timo-

He states that the side of Epipolæ fronting southwards or towards the

sent round from Ortygia, by sea, to land at Trogilus. Hiketas, holding as he did the aggregate consisting of Epipolæ, Tycha, and Neapolis, was assailed on three sides at once. He had a most defensible position, which a good commander, with brave and faithful troops, might have maintained against forces more numerous than those of Timoleon. Yet in spite of such advantages, no effective resistance was made, nor even attempted. Timoleon not only took the place, but took it without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded. Hiketas and his followers fled to Leontini.¹

The desertion of Magon explains of course a great deal of discouragement among the soldiers of Hiketas. But when we read the astonishing facility of the capture, it is evident that there must have been something more than discouragement. The soldiers on defence were really unwilling to use their arms for the purpose of repelling Timoleon, and keeping up the dominion of Hiketas in Syracuse. When we find this sentiment so powerfully manifested, we cannot but discern that the aversion of these men to serve, in what they looked upon as a Carthaginian cause, threw into the hands of Timoleon an easy victory, and that the mistrustful retreat of Magon was not so absurd and cowardly as Plutarch represents.²

The Grecian public, however, not minutely scrutinising preliminary events, heard the easy capture as a fact, and heard it with unbounded enthusiasm. From Sicily and Italy the news rapidly spread to Corinth and other parts of Greece. Everywhere the sentiment was the same; astonishment and admiration, not merely at the magnitude of the conquest, but also at the ease and rapidity with which it had been achieved. The arrival of the captive Dionysius at Corinth had been in itself a most impressive event. But now the Corinthians learnt the disappearance of the large

Languid
defence
made by
the troops
of Hiketas.

Great effect
produced
by the news
that Timoleon
was
master of
Syracuse.

river Anapns was the strongest.

Saverio Cavallari (Zur Topographie von Syrakus, p. 22) confirms this, by remarking that the northern side of Epipolæ, towards Trogilus, is the weakest, and easiest for access or attack.

We thus see that Epipolæ was

the last portion of Syracuse which Timoleon mastered—not the first portion, as Diodorus states (xvi. 69).

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 20, 21. Diodorus also implies the same verdict (xvi. 69), though his account is brief as well as obscure.

Carthaginian host and the total capture of Syracuse, without the loss of a man; and that too before they were even assured that their second reinforcement, which they knew to have been blocked up at Thurii, had been able to touch the Sicilian shore.

Such transcendent novelties excited even in Greece, and much more in Sicily itself, a sentiment towards Timoleon such as hardly any Greek had ever yet drawn to himself. His bravery, his skilful plans, his quickness of movement, were indeed deservedly admired. But in this respect, others had equalled him before; and we may remark that even the Corinthian Neon, in his capture of Achradina, had rivalled anything performed by his superior officer. But that which stood without like or second in Timoleon—that which set a peculiar stamp upon all his meritorious qualities—was, his superhuman good fortune; or—what in the eyes of most Greeks was the same thing in other words—the unbounded favour with which the gods had cherished both his person and his enterprise. Though greatly praised as a brave and able man, Timoleon was still more affectionately hailed as an enviable man.¹ “Never had the gods been seen so manifest in their dispensations of kindness towards any mortal.”² The issue, which Telekleidēs had announced as being upon trial when Timoleon was named, now stood triumphantly determined. After the capture of Syracuse, we may be sure that no one ever denounced Timoleon as a fratricide;—every one extolled him as a tyrannicide. The great exploits of other eminent men, such as Agesilaus and Epaminondas, had been achieved at

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 21. Τὸ μέν, ἀλῶναι τὴν πόλιν, (Syracuse) κατ’ ἄκρας καὶ γενέσθαι ταχέως ὑποχρίριον ἐκπεσόντων τῶν πολέμων, ὅλκιον ἀναβῆναι τῇ τῶν μαχημένων ἀνδραγαθίᾳ καὶ τῇ δεινότητι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν τινα μηδὲ τραῦσθαι τῶν Κορινθίων, ἴδιον ἔργον αὐτῆς ἢ Τιμόλεοντος ἐπιδείξατο τύχη, καθάπερ διαμύλων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀρετῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἵνα τῶν ἐπαίνουμένων αὐτοῦ τὰ μαχαρίζόμενα μᾶλλον οἱ πυθανόμενοι θαυ-

μάζωσιν.

² Homer, *Odyss.* iii. 219 (Nestor addressing Telomachus).

Εἰ γάρ σ’ ὡς ἔθελοι φιλεῖν γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,

‘Ὡς τότ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς περικηδετο κυδαλίμοιο

Δῆμψ ἐνὶ Τρώεσσιν, οὐδ’ ἀσχομεν ἄλγε’ Ἀχαιοί—

Οὐ γάρ πω ἴδοι, ὥδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας,

‘Ὡς κτεῖν ἀναφανδὰ παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

the cost of hardship, severe fighting, wounds and death to those concerned, &c., all of which counted as so many deductions from the perfect mental satisfaction of the spectator. Like an oration or poem smelling of the lamp, they bore too clearly the marks of preliminary toil and fatigue. But Timoleon, as the immortal gods descending to combat on the plain of Troy, accomplished splendid feats,—overthrew what seemed insuperable obstacles—by a mere first appearance, and without an effort. He exhibited to view a magnificent result, executed with all that apparent facility belonging as a privilege to the inspirations of first-rate genius.¹ Such a spectacle of virtue and good fortune combined—glorious consummation with graceful facility—was new to the Grecian world.

For all that he had done, Timoleon took little credit to himself. In the despatch which announced to the Corinthians his *Veni, Vidi, Vici*, as well as in his discourses at Syracuse, he ascribed the whole achievement to fortune or to the gods. Timoleon ascribes all his successes to the gods. whom he thanked for having inscribed his name as nominal mover of their decree for liberating Sicily.² We need not doubt that he firmly believed himself to be a favoured instrument of the divine will, and that he was even more astonished than others at the way in which locked gates flew open before him. But even if he had not believed it himself, there was great prudence in putting this colouring on the facts; not simply because he thereby deadened the attacks of envy, but because, under the pretence of modesty, he really exalted himself much higher. He purchased for himself a greater hold on men's minds towards his future achievements, as the beloved of the gods, than he would ever have possessed as only a highly endowed mortal. And though what he had already done was prodigious, there still remained much undone; new difficulties, not the same in kind, yet hardly less in magnitude, to be combated.

It was not only new difficulties, but also new temptations, which Timoleon had to combat. Now began for him that moment of trial, fatal to so many eminent Greeks

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38. μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ πολὺ τὸ βραδίως ἔχουσα (ἡ Τιμόλ) ὄντος στρατηγία φαίνεται, τοῖς εὖ καὶ δικαίως λογιζομένοις, οὐ τύχης

ἔργου, ἀλλ' ἀρετῆς εὐτυχούσης.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36; Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 642 E.

before him. Proof was to be shown, whether he could swallow, without intoxication or perversion, the cup of success administered to him in such overflowing fulness. He was now complete master of Syracuse; master of it too with the fortifications of Ortygia yet standing,—with all the gloomy means of despotic compression, material and moral, yet remaining in his hand. In respect of personal admiration and prestige of success, he stood greatly above Dion, and yet more above the elder Dionysius in the early part of his career. To set up for himself as despot at Syracuse, burying in oblivion all that he had said or promised before, was a step natural and feasible; not indeed without peril or difficulty, but carrying with it chances of success equal to those of other nascent despotisms, and more than sufficient to tempt a leading Greek politician of average morality. Probably most people in Sicily actually expected that he would avail himself of his unparalleled position to stand forth as a new Dionysius. Many friends and partisans would strenuously recommend it. They would even deride him as an idiot (as Solon had been called in his time¹) for not taking the boon which the gods set before him, and for not hauling up the net when the fish were already caught in it. There would not be wanting other advisers, to insinuate the like recommendation under the pretence of patriotic disinterestedness, and regard for the people whom he had come to liberate. The Syracusans (it would be contended), unfit for a free constitution, must be supplied with liberty in small doses, of which Timoleon was the best judge: their best interests required that Timoleon should keep in his hands the anti-popular power with little present diminution, in order to restrain their follies, and ensure to them benefits which they would miss if left to their own free determination.

Considerations of this latter character had doubtless greatly weighed with Dion in the hour of his victory, over and above mere naked ambition, so as to plunge him into

¹ Solon, *Fragm.* 26, ed. Schneid.; *Plutarch*, *Solon*, c. 14.

Οὐκ ἔφω Σόλῳ, βελύφρωι, οὐδὲ
βουλῆεις ἀνὴρ.

¹ Εὐθὺς γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος, αὐτός

οὐκ ἐδέξατο.

Περιβαλὼν δ' ἄγαν, ἀγαθoίς οὐκ
ἀνέσπασεν μέγα
Δίκτυον, θυμοῦ θ' ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρε-
νῶν ἀποστροφῇς.

that fatal misjudgement and misconduct out of which he never recovered. But the lesson deducible from the last sad months of Dion's career was not lost upon Timoleon. He was found proof, not merely against seductions within his own bosom, but against provocations or plausibilities from without. Neither for self-regarding purposes, nor for beneficent purposes, would he be persuaded to grasp and perpetuate the anti-popular power. The moment of trial was that in which the genuine heroism and rectitude of judgement, united in his character, first shone forth with its full brightness.

Master as he now was of all Syracuse, with its fivefold aggregate, Ortygia, Achradina, Tycha, Neapolis, and Epipolæ—he determined to strike down at once that great monument of servitude which the elder Dionysius had imposed upon his fellow citizens. Without a moment's delay, he laid his hand to the work. He invited by proclamation every Syracusan who chose, to come with iron instruments, and cooperate with him in demolishing the separate stronghold, fortification, and residence, constructed by the elder Dionysius in Ortygia; as well as the splendid funereal monument erected to the memory of that despot by his son and successor.¹ This was the first public act executed in Syracuse by his order; the first manifestation of the restored sovereignty of the people; the first outpouring of sentiment, at once free, hearty, and unanimous, among men trodden down by half a century of servitude; the first fraternising cooperation of Timoleon and his soldiers with them, for the purpose of converting the promise of liberation into an assured fact. That the actual work of demolition was executed by the hands and crowbars of the Syracusans themselves, rendered the whole proceeding an impressive

Timoleon invites the Syracusans to demolish the Dionysian stronghold in Ortygia.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 22. Γενόμενος δὲ τῆς γαρυῶς κύριος, οὐκ ἔπαθε Δίῳ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, οὐδ' ἐφείσαστο τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου διαβαλοῦσαν, εἴτ' ἀπολίσσαν, ὑποψίαν φυλάττοντες, ἐκέρυττε τῶν Συρακούσων τὸν βουλόμενον παρῆναι μετὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεπάπτεσθαι τῶν τυραννικῶν ἐρυμάτων. Ὡς δὲ πάρετε ἀνέβησαν, ἀργῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ τοιγὰρ

μενοι βεβαιοτάτην τὸ κήρυγμα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄκρην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰ μνημεῖα τῶν τυραννῶν ἀνέτρεψαν καὶ κατέκαψαν. Εὐθὺς δὲ τὸν τύπον συνημαλῶς, ἐνφοδομήσας τὰ δικαστήρια, χρηρίζοντες τοῖς πολίταις, καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑπερτέρων ποιῶν τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

Compare Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 3.

compact between them and Timoleon. It cleared away all mistake, all possibility of suspicion, as to his future designs. It showed that he had not merely forsworn despotism for himself, but that he was bent on rendering it impossible for anyone else, when he began by overthrowing what was not only the conspicuous memento, but also the most potent instrument, of the past despots. It achieved the inestimable good of inspiring at once confidence in his future proceedings, and disposing the Syracusans to listen voluntarily to his advice. And it was beneficial, not merely in smoothing the way to farther measures of pacific reconstruction, but also in discharging the reactionary antipathies of the Syracusans, inevitable after so long an oppression, upon unconscious stones; and thus leaving less of it to be wreaked on the heads of political rivals, compromised in the former proceedings.

This important act of demolition was farther made subservient to a work of new construction, not less significant of the spirit in which Timoleon had determined to proceed. Having cleared away the obnoxious fortress, he erected upon the same site, and probably with the same materials, courts for future judicature. The most striking symbol and instrument of popular government thus met the eye as a local substitute for that of the past despotism.

Deep was the gratitude of the Syracusans for these proceedings—the first fruits of Timoleon's established ascendancy. And if we regard the intrinsic importance of the act itself—the manner in which an emphatic meaning was made to tell as well upon the Syracusan eye as upon the Syracusan mind—the proof evinced not merely of disinterested patriotism, but also of prudence in estimating the necessities of the actual situation—lastly, the foundation thus laid for accomplishing farther good—if we take all these matters together, we shall feel that Timoleon's demolition of the Dionysian Bastile, and erection in its place of a building for the administration of justice, was among the most impressive phenomena in Grecian history.

The work which remained to be done was indeed such as to require the best spirit, energy and discretion, both on his part and on that of the Syracusans. Through long oppression and suffering, the city was so impoverished and desolate, that

He erects
courts of
justice on
the site.

Desolate
condition
of Syracuse
and other
cities in

the market-place (if we were to believe what must be an exaggeration of Plutarch) served as pasture for horses, and as a place of soft repose for the grooms who attended them. Other cities of Sicily exhibited the like evidence of decay, desertion, and poverty. The manifestations of city life had almost ceased in Sicily. Men were afraid to come into the city, which they left to the despot and his mercenaries, retiring themselves to live on their fields and farms, and shrinking from all acts of citizenship. Even the fields were but half cultivated, so as to produce nothing beyond bare subsistence. It was the first anxiety of Timoleon to revive the once haughty spirit of Syracuse out of this depth of insecurity and abasement; to which revival no act could be more conducive than his first proceedings in Ortygia. His next step was to bring together, by invitations and proclamations everywhere circulated, those exiles who had been expelled, or forced to seek refuge elsewhere, during the recent oppression. Many of these who had found shelter in various parts of Sicily and Italy, obeyed his summons with glad readiness.¹ But there were others, who had fled to Greece or the Ægean islands, and were out of the hearing of any proclamations from Timoleon. To reach persons thus remote, recourse was had, by him and by the Syracusans conjointly, to Corinthian intervention. The Syracusans felt so keenly how much was required to be done for the secure reorganization of their city as a free community, that they eagerly concurred with Timoleon in entreating the Corinthians to undertake, a second time, the honourable task of founders of Syracuse.²

Two esteemed citizens, Kephalus and Dionysius, were sent from Corinth to cooperate with Timoleon and the Syracusans, in constituting the community anew, on a free and popular basis, and in preparing an amended legislation.³ These commissioners adopted, for their main text and theme, the democratical constitution and laws as established by Dioklès about seventy years before, which the usurpation of Dionysius had subverted when they were not more than seven years old. Kephalus professed to do nothing more than revive the laws of Dioklès, with such

Sicily.
Recall of
exiles. Ap-
plication
on the part
of Timo-
leon and
the Syra-
cusans to
Corinth.

Com-
missioners
sent from
Corinth to
Syracuse—
they revive
the laws
and demo-
cracy
enacted by
Dioklès—
but with
various
changes and
additions

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23, Dio-
dor. xvi. 88.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

comments, modifications, and adaptations, as the change of times and circumstances had rendered necessary.¹ In the laws respecting inheritance and property he is said to have made no change at all; but unfortunately we are left without any information what were the laws of Dioklès, or how they were now modified. It is certain, however, that the political constitution of Dioklès was a democracy, and that the constitution as now re-established was democratical also.² Beyond this general fact we can assert nothing.

Though a free popular constitution, however, was absolutely indispensable, and a good constitution a great boon—it was not the only pressing necessity for Syracuse. There was required, no less an importation of new citizens; and not merely of poor men bringing with them their arms and their industry, but also of persons in affluent or easy circumstances, competent to purchase lands and houses. Besides much land ruined or gone out of cultivation, the general poverty of the residents was extreme; while at the same time the public exigences were considerable, since it was essential, among other things, to provide pay for those very soldiers of Timoleon to whom they owed their liberation. The extent of poverty was painfully attested by the fact that they were constrained to sell those public statues which formed the ornaments of Syracuse and its temples; a cruel wound to the sentiments of every Grecian community. From this compulsory auction, however, they excepted by special vote the statue of Gelon, in testimony of gratitude for his capital victory at Himera over the Carthaginians.³

For the renovation of a community thus destitute, new funds as well as new men were wanted; and the Corinthians exerted themselves actively to procure both. Their first proclamation was indeed addressed specially to Syracusan exiles, whom they invited to resume their residence at Syracuse as free and autonomous citizens under a just allotment of lands. They caused such proclamation to be publicly made at all the Pan-hellenic and local festivals; prefaced by a certified assurance that the Corinthians had already

Poverty at
Syracuse—
necessity
for inviting
new
colonists.

Large body
of new
colonists
assembled
at Corinth
for Sicily.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 35, xvi. 81.

² Diodor. xvi. 70.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23; Dion.

Chrysostom, Orat. xxxvii. p. 460.

overthrown both the despotism and the despot—a fact which the notorious presence of Dionysius himself at Corinth contributed to promulgate more widely than any formal announcement. They farther engaged, if the exiles would muster at Corinth, to provide transports, convoy, and leaders, to Syracuse, free of all cost. The number of exiles, who profited by the invitation and came to Corinth, though not inconsiderable, was still hardly strong enough to enter upon the proposed Sicilian renovation. They themselves therefore entreated the Corinthians to invite additional colonists from other Grecian cities. It was usually not difficult to find persons disposed to embark in a new settlement, if founded under promising circumstances, and effected under the positive management of a powerful presiding city.¹ There were many opulent persons anxious to exchange the condition of metics in an old city for that of full citizens in a new one. Hence the more general proclamation now issued by the Corinthians attracted numerous applicants, and a large force of colonists was presently assembled at Corinth; an aggregate of 10,000 persons, including the Syracusan exiles.²

When conveyed to Syracuse, by the fleet and under the formal sanction of the Corinthian government, these colonists found a still larger number there assembled, partly Syracusan exiles, yet principally emigrants from the different cities of Sicily and Italy. The Italian Greeks, at this time hard pressed by the constantly augmenting force of the Lucanians and Bruttians, were becoming so unable to defend themselves without foreign aid, that several were probably disposed to seek other homes. The invitation of Timoleon counted even more than that of the Corinthians as an allurements to new-comers—from the unbounded admiration and confidence which he now inspired; more especially as he was actually present at Syracuse. Accordingly, the total of immigrants from all

Influx of
new colo-
nists into
Sicily from
all
quarters.

¹ Compare the case of the Corinthian proclamation respecting Epidamnus, Thucyd. i. 27; the Lacedæmonian foundation of Herakleia, Thucyd. iii. 93; the proclamation of the Battiad Arkesilaus at

Samos, for a new body of settlers to Kyrênê (Herodot. iv. 163).

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. Diodorus states only 5000 (xvi. 92) as coming from Corinth.

quarters (restored exiles as well as others) to Syracuse in its renovated freedom, was not less than 60,000.¹

Nothing can be more mortifying than to find ourselves without information as to the manner in which Timoleon and Kephalaus dealt with this large influx. Such a state of things, as it produces many new embarrassments and conflicting interests, so it calls for a degree of resource and original judgement which furnishes good measure of the capacity of all persons concerned, rendering the juncture particularly interesting and instructive. Unfortunately we are not permitted to know the details. The land of Syracuse is said to have been distributed, and the houses to have been sold for 1000 talents—the large sum of 230,000*l*. A right of preemption was allowed to the Syracusan exiles for repurchasing the houses formerly their own. As the houses were sold, and that too for a considerable price—so we may presume that the lands were sold also, and that the incoming settlers did not receive their lots gratuitously. But how they were sold, or how much of the territory was sold, we are left in ignorance. It is certain, however, that the effect of the new immigration was not only to renew the force and population of Syracuse, but also to furnish relief to the extreme poverty of the antecedent residents. A great deal of new money must thus have been brought in.²

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23. To justify his statement of this large total, Plutarch here mentions (I wish he did so oftener) the author from whom he copied it—Athanis, or Athanas. That author was a native Syracusan, who wrote a history of Syracusan affairs from the termination of the history of Philistus in 363 or 362 B.C., down to the death of Timoleon in 337 B.C.; thus including all the proceedings of Dion and Timoleon. It is deeply to be lamented that nothing remains of his work (Diod. xv. 94; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 81). His name seems to be mentioned in Theopompus (Fr. 212, ed. Didot) as joint commander of the Syracusan

troops, along with Herakleidēs.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 23 καὶ γενομένοις οὗτοις ἐξακισμυρίοις τὸ πλῆθος, ὡς Ἀθάνιος εἶρηκε, τὴν μὲν χωρὰν διέειπε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ὁπέδοτο χιλίων τάλαντων, ἅμα μὲν ὑπολειπόμενος ταῖς ἀρχαῖαις Συρακουαίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὐτῶν, ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δῆμῳ μηχανωμένος οὕτως περιέειπε καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον, ὥστε, &c.

Diodorus (xvi. 82) affirms that 40,000 new settlers were admitted εἰς τὴν Συρακουαίαν τὴν ἀδιαίρετον, and that 10,000 were settled in the fine and fertile territory of Agyrum. This latter measure was taken, certainly, after the despot of Agyrum had been put down by Timoleon. We should have been

Such important changes doubtless occupied a considerable time, though we are not enabled to arrange them in months or years. In the mean time Timoleon continued to act in such a manner as to retain, and even to strengthen, the confidence and attachment of the Syracusans. He employed his forces actively in putting down and expelling the remaining despots throughout the island. He first attacked Hiketas, his old enemy, at Leontini; and compelled him to capitulate, on condition of demolishing the fortified citadel, abdicating his rule, and living as a private citizen in the town. Leptinês, despot of Apollonia and of several other neighbouring townships, was also constrained to submit, and to embrace the offer of a transport to Corinth.¹

Successes
of Timoleon
against
Hiketas,
Leptinês,
and other
despots in
Sicily.

It appears that the submission of Hiketas was merely a feint, to obtain time for strengthening himself by urging the Carthaginians to try another invasion of Sicily.² They were the more disposed to this step, as Timoleon, anxious to relieve the Syracusans, sent his soldiers under the Corinthian Deinarchus to find pay and plunder for themselves in the Carthaginian possessions near the western corner of Sicily. This invasion, while it abundantly supplied the wants of the soldiers, encouraged Entella and several other towns to revolt from Carthage. The indignation among the Carthaginians had been violent, when Magon returned after suddenly abandoning the harbour of Syracuse to Timoleon. Unable to make his defence satisfactory, Magon only escaped a worse death by suicide, after which his dead body was crucified by public order.³

Hiketas
invites the
Carthaginians
again to
invade
Sicily.

And the Carthaginians now resolved on a fresh effort, to repair their honour as well as to defend their territory. The effort was made on a vast scale, and with long previous preparations. An army said to consist of 70,000 men, under Hasdrubal and Hamilkar, was disembarked at

glad to have an explanation of τῆς Συρακουσίων τῆς ἀδελφείας in the absence of information, conjecture as to the meaning is vain.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Diodorus (xvi. 72) does not mention that Hiketas submitted at all. He

states that Timoleon was repulsed in attacking Leontini; and that Hiketas afterwards attacked Syracuse, but was repulsed with loss, during the absence of Timoleon in his expedition against Leptinês.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 24; Diodor. xvi. 73.

Lilybæum, on the western corner of the island; besides which there was a fleet of 200 triremes, and 1000 attendant

vessels carrying provisions, warlike stores, engines for sieges, war-chariots with four horses, &c.¹ But the most conspicuous proof of earnest effort, over and above numbers and expense, was furnished by the presence of no less than 10,000 native infantry from Carthage; men clothed with panoplies costly, complete, and far heavier than ordinary—carrying white shields and wearing elaborate breastplates besides. These

men brought to the campaign ample private baggage; splendid goblets and other articles of gold and silver, such as becomed the rich families of that rich city. The *élite* of the division—2500 in number, or one-fourth part—formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage.² It has been already stated, that in general, the Carthaginians caused their military service to be performed by hired foreigners, with few of their own citizens. Hence this army stood particularly distinguished, and appeared the more formidable on their landing; carrying panic, by the mere report, all over Sicily, not excepting even Syracuse. The Corinthian troops ravaging the Carthaginian province were obliged to retreat in haste, and sent to Timoleon for reinforcement.

The miscellaneous body of immigrants recently domiciliated at Syracuse, employed in the cares inseparable from new settlement, had not come prepared to face so terrible a foe. Though Timoleon used every effort to stimulate their courage, and though his exhortations met with full apparent response, yet such was the panic prevailing, that comparatively few would follow him to the field. He could assemble no greater total than 12,000 men; including about 3000 Syracusan citizens—the paid force which he had round him at Syracuse—that other paid force under Deinarchus, who had been just compelled by the invaders to evacuate the Carthaginian province—and finally such

Timoleon marches from Syracuse against the Carthaginians—mutiny of a portion of his mercenaries under Thræsius.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor xvi. 77. They agree in the main about the numerical items, and seem to have copied from the

same authority.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25; Diodor. xvi. 80.

allies as would join.¹ His cavalry was about 1000 in number. Nevertheless, in spite of so great an inferiority, Timoleon determined to advance and meet the enemy in their own province, before they should have carried ravage over the territory of Syracuse and her allies. But when he approached near to the border, within the territory of Agrigentum, the alarm and mistrust of his army threatened to arrest his farther progress. An officer among his mercenaries, named Thrasius, took advantage of the prevalent feeling to raise a mutiny against him, persuading the soldiers that Timoleon was madly hurrying them on to certain ruin, against an enemy six times superior in number, and in a hostile country eight days' march from Syracuse; so that there would be neither salvation for them in a case of reverse, nor interment if they were slain. Their pay being considerably in arrear, Thrasius urged them to return to Syracuse for the purpose of extorting the money, instead of following a commander, who could not or would not requite them, upon such desperate service. Such was the success and plausibility of these recommendations, under the actual discouragement, that they could hardly be counterworked by all the efforts of Timoleon. Nor was there ever any conjuncture in which his influence, derived as well from unbounded personal esteem as from belief in his favour with the gods, was so near failing. As it was, though he succeeded in heartening up and retaining the large body of his army, yet Thrasius, with 1000 of the mercenaries, insisted upon returning, and actually did return, to Syracuse. Moreover Timoleon was obliged to send an order along with them to the authorities at home, that these men must immediately, and at all cost, receive their arrears of pay. The wonder is, that he succeeded in his efforts to retain the rest, after ensuring to the mutineers a lot which seemed so much safer and more enviable. Thrasius, a brave man, having engaged in

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 25. Diodor. xvi. 78. Diodorus gives the total of Timoleon's force at 12,000 men; Plutarch at only 6000. The larger total appears to me most probable, under the circumstances. Plutarch seems to have taken account only of the paid force who were with Timoleon at Syracuse,

and not to have enumerated that other division, which, having been sent to ravage the Carthaginian province, had been compelled to retire and rejoin Timoleon when the great Carthaginian host landed.

Diodorus and Plutarch follow in the main the same authorities respecting this campaign.

the service of the Phokians Philomêlus and Onomarchus, had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, which drew upon him the aversion of the Grecian world.¹ How many of the 1000 seceding soldiers, who now followed him to Syracuse, had been partners in the same sacrilegious act, we cannot tell. But it is certain that they were men who had taken service with Timoleon in hopes of a period, not merely of fighting, but also of lucrative license, such as his generous regard for the settled inhabitants would not permit.

Having succeeded in keeping up the spirits of his remaining army, and affecting to treat the departure of so many cowards as a positive advantage, Timoleon marched on westward into the Carthaginian province, until he approached within a short distance of the river Krimêsus, the parsley. a stream which rises in the mountainous region south of Panormus (Palermo), runs nearly southward, and falls into the sea near Selinus. Some mules, carrying loads of parsley, met him on the road; a fact which called forth again the half-suppressed alarm of the soldiers, since parsley was habitually employed for the wreaths deposited on tombstones. But Timoleon, taking a handful of it and weaving a wreath for his own head, exclaimed, "This is our Corinthian symbol of victory: it is the sacred herb with which we decorate our victors at the Isthmian festival. It comes to us here spontaneously, as an earnest of our approaching success." Insisting emphatically on this theme, and crowning himself as well as his officers with the parsley, he rekindled the spirits of the army, and conducted them forward to the top of the eminence, immediately above the course of the Krimêsus.²

It was just at that moment that the Carthaginian army were passing the river, on their march to meet him. The confused noise and clatter of their approach were plainly heard; though the mist of a May morning,³ overhanging

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30.

² The anecdote about the parsley is given both in Plutarch (Timol. c. 26) and Diodorus (xvi. 79).

The upper portion of the river Krimêsus, near which this battle was fought, was in the mountainous region called by Diodorus ἡ Σελι-

νοῦρια δρυγῶπια: through which lay the road between Selinus and Panormus (Diodor. xiii. Frag. p. 333, ed. Wees.).

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. ἱσταμένου θέρους ὥραν—λήγοντι μῆτι θαργῆλαιον, &c.

the valley, still concealed from the eye the army crossing. Presently the mist ascended from the lower ground to the hill tops around, leaving the river and the Carthaginians beneath in conspicuous view. Formidable was the aspect which they presented. The war-chariots-and-four,¹ which formed their front, had already crossed the river, and appear to have been halting a little way in advance. Next to them followed the native Carthaginians, 10,000 chosen hoplites with white shields, who had also in part crossed and were still crossing; while the main body of the host, the foreign mercenaries, were pressing behind in a disorderly mass to get to the bank, which appears to have been in part rugged. Seeing how favourable was the moment for attacking them, while thus disarrayed and bisected by the river, Timoleon, after a short exhortation, gave orders immediately to charge down the hill.² His Sicilian allies, with some mercenaries intermingled, were on the two wings; while he himself, with the Syracusans and the best of the mercenaries, occupied the centre. Demaretus with his cavalry was ordered to assail the Carthaginians first, before they could form regularly. But the chariots in their front, protecting the greater part of the line, left him only the power of getting at them partially through the vacant intervals. Timoleon, soon perceiving that his cavalry accomplished little, recalled them and ordered them to charge on the flanks, while he himself, with all the force of his infantry, undertook to attack in front. Accordingly, seizing his shield from the attendant, he marched forward in advance, calling aloud to the infantry around to be of good cheer and follow. Never had his voice been heard so predominant and heart-stirring: the effect of it was powerfully felt on the spirits of all around, who even believed that they heard a god speaking along with him.³

He encounters the Carthaginian army while passing the Krimerus War-chariots in their front—Timoleon orders his cavalry to charge.

¹ Of these war-chariots they are said to have had not less than 2000, in the unsuccessful battle which they fought against Agathoklès in Africa, near Carthage (Diodor. xx. 10).

After the time of Pyrrhus, they came to employ tame elephants trained for war.

² It appears from Polybius that Timæus ascribed to Timoleon, immediately before this battle, an harangue which Polybius pronounces to be absurd and unsuitable (Timæus, Fr. 134, ed. Didot; Polyb. xii. 26 a).

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27. Ἀνταλάβω, τῇ ἀσπίδι καὶ βράχῃ ἐκρούει

Re-echoing his shout emphatically, they marched forward to the charge with the utmost alacrity—in compact order, and under the sound of trumpets.

The infantry were probably able to evade or break through the bulwark of interposed chariots with greater ease than the cavalry, though Plutarch does not tell us how this was done. Timoleon and his soldiers then came into close and furious contest with the chosen Carthaginian infantry who resisted with a courage worthy of their reputation. Their vast shields, iron breastplates, and brazen helmets (forming altogether armour heavier than was worn usually even by Grecian hoplites), enabled them to repel the spear-thrusts of the Grecian assailants, who were compelled to take to their swords, and thus to procure themselves admission within the line of Carthaginian spears, so as to break their ranks. Such use of swords is what we rarely read of in a Grecian battle. Though the contest was bravely maintained by the Carthaginians, yet they were too much loaded with armour to admit of anything but fighting in a dense mass. They were already losing their front rank warriors, the picked men of the whole, and beginning to fight at a disadvantage—when the gods, yet farther befriending Timoleon, set the seal to their discomfiture by an intervention manifest and terrific.¹ A storm of the most violent character began. The hill tops were shrouded in complete darkness; the wind blew a hurricane; rain and hail poured abundantly, with all the awful accompaniments of thunder and lightning. To the Greeks, this storm was of little inconvenience, because it came on their backs. But to the Carthaginians, pelting as it did directly in their faces, it occasioned both great suffering and soul-subduing alarm. The rain and hail beat, and the lightning flashed, in their faces, so that they could not see to deal with hostile combatants; the noise of the wind, and of hail rattling against their armour, prevented the orders of their

καὶ θάρρει, τοῖς πέλοις ἔδοξεν ὑπερ-
ρῶν φωνῇ καὶ μείζονι κερήσθαι τοῦ
συνήθους, εἴτε τῇ πάθει παρὰ τὸν
ἀγῶνα καὶ τὸν ἐβουσιασμόν οὕτω
διακινῶμενος, εἴτε δαιμονίου τι-
νός, ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς τότε πα-

ρέστη, συνεκίφθη ἑξαμένον.

¹ Diodor. xvi. 79. Περιεγένοντο
γὰρ ἀνελεπίστωες τῶν τοῖς μάλιν, οὐ
μόνον διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἀνδραγαθίας, ἀλλὰ
καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν συνεργίαν.

officers from being heard: the folds of their voluminous military tunics were surcharged with rain water, so as to embarrass their movements: the ground presently became so muddy that they could not keep their footing; and when they once slipped, the weight of their equipment forbade all recovery. The Greeks, comparatively free from inconvenience, and encouraged by the evident disablement of their enemies, pressed them with redoubled energy. At length, when the four hundred front rank men of the Carthaginians had perished by a brave death in their places, the rest of the Whiteshields turned their backs and sought relief in flight. But flight, too, was all but impossible. They encountered their own troops in the rear advancing up, and trying to cross the Krimêsus; which river itself was becoming every minute fuller and more turbid, through the violent rain. The attempt to recross was one of such unspeakable confusion, that numbers perished in the torrent. Dispersing in total rout, the whole Carthaginian army thought only of escape, leaving their camp and baggage a prey to the victors, who pursued them across the river and over the hills on the other side, inflicting prodigious slaughter. In this pursuit the cavalry of Timoleon, not very effective during the battle, rendered excellent service; pressing the fugitive Carthaginians one over another in mass, and driving them, overloaded with their armour, into mud and water, from whence they could not get clear.¹

No victory in Grecian history was ever more complete than that of Timoleon at the Krimêsus. Ten thousand Carthaginians are said to have been slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners. Upon these numbers no stress is to be laid; but it is certain that the total of both must have been very great. Of the war-chariots, many were broken during the action, and all that remained, 200 in number, fell into the hands of the victors. But that which rendered the loss most serious, and most painfully felt at Carthage, was, that it fell chiefly upon the native Carthaginian troops, and much less upon the foreign mercenaries. It is even said that the Sacred Battalion of Carthage, comprising 2500 soldiers belonging to the most considerable families in Carthage, were all slain to a man; a statement, doubtless, exaggerated,

Severe loss of the Carthaginians in the battle, especially of their native troops. Immense booty collected by the soldiers of Timoleon.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27, 28; Diodor. xvi. 79, 80.

yet implying a fearful real destruction. Many of these soldiers purchased safe escape by throwing away their ornamented shields and costly breastplates, which the victors picked up in great numbers—1000 breastplates, and not less than 10,000 shields. Altogether, the spoil collected was immense—in arms, in baggage, and in gold and silver from the plundered camp; occupying the Greeks so long in the work of pursuit and capture, that they did not find time to erect their trophy until the third day after the battle. Timoleon left the chief part of the plunder, as well as most part of the prisoners, in the hands of the individual captors, who enriched themselves amply by the day's work. Yet there still remained a large total for the public Syracusan chest; 5000 prisoners, and a miscellaneous spoil of armour and precious articles, piled up in imposing magnificence around the general's tent.¹

The Carthaginian fugitives did not rest until they reached Lilybæum. And even there, such was their discouragement—so profound their conviction that the wrath of the gods was upon them—that they could scarcely be induced to go on shipboard for the purpose of returning to Carthage; persuaded as they were that if once caught out at sea, the gods in their present displeasure would never let them reach land.² At Carthage

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29, Diodor. xvi. 80, §1.

² Diodor. xvi. §1. Τεταρτὴ δ' αὖ τοῦς ἀντιπληγῆς καὶ ὁδὸς κατεΐχετο, ὥστε μὴ τοῖς μὲν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβῆναι, μηδ' ἀντιπλεῖν εἰς τῇ Λιβύῃ. ὡς δὲ αὖ τῇ τῶν θεῶν ἀλλοτρίοις τα πρὸς αὐτοῦς ὄντος τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πελάγους γαταπεσθῆσόμενοι. Compare the account of the religious terror of the Carthaginians, after their defeat by Agathoklès (Diodor. xx. 14).

So, in the argument between Andokidès and his accusers, before the Dikastery at Athens—the accusers contend that Andokidès clearly does not believe in the gods, because after the great impiety which he has committed, he has still not been afraid afterwarde

to make sea voyages (Lysias, cont. Andokid s. 19).

On the other hand, Andokidès himself argues triumphantly, from the fact of his having passed safely through sea voyages in the winter, that he is not an object of displeasure to the gods.

'If the gods thought that I had wronged them, they would not have omitted to punish me, when they caught me in the greatest danger. For what danger can be greater than a sea voyage in winter-time? The gods had then both my life and my property in their power; and yet they preserved me. Was it not then open to them so to manage, as that I should not even obtain interment for my body? Have the gods then

itself also, the sorrow and depression were unparalleled: sorrow private as well as public, from the loss of so great a number of principal citizens. It was even feared that the victorious Timoleon would instantly cross the sea and attack Carthage on her own soil. Immediate efforts were however made to furnish a fresh army for Sicily, composed of foreign mercenaries with few or no native citizens. Giskon, the son of Hanno, who passed for their most energetic citizen, was recalled from exile, and directed to get together this new armament.

The subduing impression of the wrath of the gods, under which the Carthaginians laboured, arose from the fact that their defeat had been owing not less to the terrific storm, than to the arms of Timoleon. Conversely, in regard to Timoleon himself, the very same fact produced an impression of awe-striking wonder and envy. If there were any sceptics who doubted before either the reality of special interventions by the gods, or the marked kindness which determined the gods to send such interventions to the service of Timoleon—the victory of the Krimêsus must have convinced them. The storm, alike violent and opportune, coming at the back of the Greeks and in the faces of the Carthaginians, was a manifestation of divine favour scarcely less conspicuous than those vouchsafed to Diomêdes or Æneas in the Iliad.¹ And the

Great increase of glory to Timoleon—favour of the gods shown to him in the battle.

preserved me from the dangers of sea and pirates, merely to let me perish at Athens by the act of my villainous accuser Kephisius? No, Diaksts; tho dangers of accusation and trial are human; but the dangers encountered at sea are divine. If therefore we are to surmise about the sentiments of the gods, I think they will be extremely displeased and angry, if they see a man, whom they themselves have preserved, destroyed by others" (Andokides, *De Mysteriis*, s. 137-139). ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡγοῦμαι χρῆναι νομίζειν τοὺς τοιαύτους κινδύνους ἀνθρώπων, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν θεῶν. Εἴπερ οὖν οἶσι τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὑπονοεῖν, πολὺ ἂν αὐτοῦς εἶμαι ἐγὼ ὀφίλ' εἶναι καὶ ἀγαγεῖσθαι, εἰς

τοὺς ἐν' ἐκιντῶν συζόμενους, ὅπ' ἄλλω ἀπολλυμένους ὀρώμεν.

Compare Plutarch, *Paul. Emil.* c. 36. μάλιστα κατὰ πλοῦν ἐξέλει, τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ ἐξιμένου, &c.

¹ Claudian, *De Tertio Consulatu Honorii*, v. 93.

"Te propter, gelidus Aquilo de monte procellis

Obruit adversas acies, revolutaque tsia

Vertit in auctoree, et turbino reppulit haetas.

O nimium dilsete Deo, cui fundit ab antris

Æolus armatas hyemes; cui militat æther,

Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti."

Compare a passage in the *speculi*

sentiment thus raised towards Timoleon—or rather previously raised, and now yet farther confirmed—became blended with that genuine admiration which he had richly earned by his rapid and well-conducted movements, as well as by a force of character striking enough to uphold, under the most critical circumstances, the courage of a desponding army. His victory at the Krimêsus, like his victory at Adranum, was gained mainly by that extreme speed in advance, which brought him upon an unprepared enemy at a vulnerable moment. And the news of it which he despatched at once to Corinth,—accompanied with a cargo of showy Carthaginian shields to decorate the Corinthian temples,—diffused throughout Central Greece both joy for the event and increased honour to his name, commemorated by the inscription attached—"The Corinthians and the general Timoleon, after liberating the Sicilian Greeks from the Carthaginians, have dedicated these shields as offerings of gratitude to the gods."¹

Leaving most of his paid troops to carry on war in the Carthaginian province, Timoleon conducted his Syracusans home. His first proceeding was, at once to dismiss Thrasius with the 1000 paid soldiers who had deserted him before the battle. He commanded them to quit Sicily, allowing them only twenty-four hours to depart from Syracuse itself. Probably under the circumstances, they were not less anxious to go away than he was to dismiss them. But they went away only to destruction; for having crossed the Strait of Messina and taken possession of a maritime site in Italy on the Southern sea, the Bruttians of the inland entrapped them by professions of simulated friendship, and slew them all.²

Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies —Hiketas and Mamerkus—the despots of Leontini and Katana. By the extraordinary rapidity of his movements, he had crushed the great invading host of Carthage, before it came into cooperation with these two allies. Both now wrote in terror to Carthage, soliciting a new armament, as indispensable

Timoleon returns to Syracuse—he dismisses Thrasius and the mercenaries who had deserted him—he sends them out of Sicily—their fate.

Success of Timoleon against Hiketas and Mamerkus.

of Thrasybulus, Xenoph. Hellen. dor. xvi. 80.

ii. 4, 14.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30; Dio-

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Dio- dor. xvi. 82.

for their security not less than for the Carthaginian interest in the island; Timoleon being the common enemy of both. Presently Giskon son of Hanno, having been recalled on purpose out of banishment, arrived from Carthage with a considerable force—seventy triremes, and a body of Grecian mercenaries. It was rare for the Carthaginians to employ Grecian mercenaries; but the battle of the Krimêsus is said to have persuaded them that there were no soldiers to be compared to Greeks. The force of Giskon was apparently distributed partly in the Carthaginian province at the western angle of the island—partly in the neighbourhood of Mylæ and Messênê on the north-east, where Mamerkus joined him with the troops of Katana. Messênê appears to have recently fallen under the power of a despot named Hippon, who acted as their ally. To both points Timoleon despatched a portion of his mercenary force, without going himself in command; on both, his troops at first experienced partial defeats; two divisions of them, one comprising four hundred men, being cut to pieces. But such partial reverses were, in the religious appreciation of the time, proofs more conspicuous than ever of the peculiar favour shown by the gods towards Timoleon. For the soldiers thus slain had been concerned in the pillage of the Delphian temple, and were therefore marked out for the divine wrath; but the gods suspended the sentence during the time when the soldiers were serving under Timoleon in person, in order that he might not be the sufferer; and executed it now in his absence, when execution would occasion the least possible inconvenience to him.¹

Mamerkus and Hiketas, however, not adopting this interpretation of their recent successes against Timoleon, were full of hope and confidence. The former dedicated the shields of the slain mercenaries to the gods, with an inscription of insolent triumph: the latter—taking advantage of the absence of Timoleon, who had made an expedition against a place not far off called Kalauria—undertook an inroad into the Syracusan territory. Not

Victory
gained by
Timoleon
over Hike-
tas, at the
river
Damurias.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 30. Ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Τιμολέοντος εὐτυχίαν συνέβη γενέσθαι διώρυγον Τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς Τιμολέοντα τῶν θεῶν εὐμένειν, οὐχ ἥττον ἐν αἰς προσ-

έχρουσε πράξεις η̄ περὶ αἷς κατωρθου, θαυμάζεσθαι συνέβαιεν.

Compare Plutarch, De Sera Num. Vind. p. 552 F.

content with inflicting great damage and carrying off an ample booty, Hiketas, in returning home, insulted Timoleon and the small force along with him by passing immediately under the walls of Kalauria. Suffering him to pass by, Timoleon pursued, though his force consisted only of cavalry and light troops, with few or no hoplites. He found Hiketas posted on the farther side of the Damurias; a river with rugged banks and a ford of considerable difficulty. Yet notwithstanding this good defensive position, the troops of Timoleon were so impatient to attack, and each of his cavalry officers was so anxious to be first in the charge, that he was obliged to decide the priority by lot. The attack was then valiantly made, and the troops of Hiketas completely defeated. One thousand of them were slain in the action, while the remainder only escaped by flight and throwing away of their shields.¹

It was now the turn of Timoleon to attack Hiketas in his own domain of Leontini. Here his usual good fortune followed him. The soldiers in garrison—either discontented with the behaviour of Hiketas at the battle of the Damurias, or awe-struck with that divine favour which waited on Timoleon—mutinied and surrendered the place into his hands; and not merely the place, but also Hiketas himself in chains, with his son Eupolemus, and his general Euthymus, a man of singular bravery as well as a victorious athlete at the games. All three were put to death; Hiketas and his son as despots and traitors; and Euthymus, chiefly in consequence of insulting sarcasms against the Corinthians, publicly uttered at Leontini. The wife and daughters of Hiketas were conveyed as prisoners to Syracuse, where they were condemned to death by public vote of the Syracusan assembly. This vote was passed in express revenge for the previous crime of Hiketas, in putting to death the widow, sister, and son, of Dion. Though Timoleon might probably have saved the unfortunate women by a strong exertion of influence, he did not interfere. The general feeling of the people accounted this cruel, but special retaliation, right under the circumstances; and Timoleon, as he could not have convinced them of the contrary, so he did not think it right to urge them to put

Timoleon attacks Hiketas at Leontini. Both the place and Hiketas in person are surrendered to Timoleon by the garrison. Hiketas and his family are put to death.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

their feeling aside as a simple satisfaction to him. Yet the act leaves a deserved stain upon a reputation such as his.¹ The women were treated on both sides as adjective beings, through whose lives revenge was to be taken against a political enemy.

Next came the turn of Mamerkus, who had assembled near Katana a considerable force, strengthened by a body of Carthaginian allies under Giskon. He was attacked and defeated by Timoleon near the river Abolus, with a loss of 2000 men, many of them belonging to the Carthaginian division. We know nothing but the simple fact of this battle; which probably made serious impression upon the Carthaginians, since they speedily afterwards sent earnest propositions for peace, deserting their Sicilian allies. Peace was accordingly concluded; on terms however which left the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily much the same as it had been at the end of the reign of the elder Dionysius, as well as at the landing of Dion in Sicily.² The line of separation was fixed at the river Halykus, or Lykus, which flows into the southern sea near Herakleia Minoa, and formed the western boundary of the territory of Agrigentum. All westward of the Halykus was recognised as Carthaginian; but it was stipulated that if any Greeks within that territory desired to emigrate and become inmates of Syracuse, they should be allowed freely to come with their families and their property. It was farther covenanted that all the territory eastward of the Halykus should be considered not only as Greek, but as free Greek, distributed among so many free cities, and exempt from despots. And the Carthaginians formally covenanted that they would neither aid, nor adopt as ally, any Grecian despot in Sicily.³ In the first treaty concluded by the elder Dionysius with the Carthaginians, it had been stipulated by an express article that the Syracusans should be subject to him.⁴ Here is one of the many contrasts between Dionysius and Timoleon.

Timoleon gains a victory over Mamerkus—he concludes peace with the Carthaginians.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 33.

² Diodor. xv. 17. Minoa (Herakleia) was a Carthaginian possession when Dion landed (Plutarch, Dion, c. 25).

Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2)

states erroneously, that the Carthaginians were completely expelled from Sicily by Timoleon.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34; Diodor. xvi. 82.

⁴ Diodor. xiii. 114.

Having thus relieved himself from his most formidable enemy, Timoleon put a speedy end to the war in other parts of the island. Mamerkus in fact despaired of farther defence without foreign aid. He crossed over with a squadron into Italy to ask for the introduction of a Lucanian army into Sicily;¹ which he might perhaps have obtained, since that warlike nation were now very powerful—had not his own seamen abandoned him, and carried back their vessels to Katana, surrendering both the city and themselves to Timoleon. The same thing, and even more, had been done a little before by the troops of Hiketas at Leontini, who had even delivered up Hiketas himself as prisoner; so powerful, seemingly, was the ascendancy exercised by the name of Timoleon, with the prestige of his perpetual success. Mamerkus could now find no refuge except at Messênê, where he was welcomed by the despot Hippon. But Timoleon speedily came thither with a force ample enough to besiege Messênê by land and by sea. After a certain length of resistance,² the town was surrendered to him, while Hippon tried to make his escape secretly on shipboard. But he was captured and brought back into the midst of the Mesenian population, who, under a sentiment of bitter hatred and vengeance, planted him in the midst of the crowded theatre and there put him to death with insult, summoning all the boys from school into the theatre to witness what was considered an elevating scene. Mamerkus, without attempting escape, surrendered himself prisoner to Timoleon; only stipulating that his fate should be determined by the Syracusan assembly after a fair hearing, but that Timoleon himself should say nothing to his disfavour. He was accordingly brought to Syracuse, and placed on his trial before the assembled people, whom he addressed in an elaborate discourse; probably skilfully composed, since he is said to have possessed considerable talent as a poet.³ But no eloquence could surmount the rooted aversion

¹ Cornelius Nepos (Timoleon, c. 2) calls Mamerkus an Italian general who had come into Sicily to aid the despots. It is possible enough that he may have been an Italian Greek, for he must have

been a Greek, from the manner in which Plutarch speaks of his poetical compositions.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 31.

entertained by the Syracusans for his person and character. Being heard with murmurs, and seeing that he had no chance of obtaining a favourable verdict, he suddenly threw aside his garment, and rushed with violent despair against one of the stone seats, head foremost, in hopes of giving himself a fatal blow. But not succeeding in this attempted suicide, he was led out of the theatre and executed like a robber.¹

Timoleon had now nearly accomplished his confirmed purpose of extirpating every despotism in Sicily. There remained yet Nikodémus as despot at Kentoripa, and Apolloniadês at Agyrum. Both of these he speedily dethroned or expelled, restoring the two cities to the condition of free communities. He also expelled from the town of Ætna those Campanian mercenaries who had been planted there by the elder Dionysius.² In this way did he proceed until there remained only free communities, without a single despot, in the Grecian portion of Sicily.

Of the details of his proceedings our scanty information permits us to say but little. But the great purpose with which he had started from Corinth was now achieved. After having put down all the other despots in Sicily, there remained for him but one farther triumph—the noblest and rarest of all—to lay down his own. This he performed without any delay, immediately on returning to Syracuse from his military proceedings. Congratulating the Syracusans on the triumphant consummation already attained, he entreated them to dispense with his farther services as sole commander; the rather as his eyesight was now failing.³ It is probable enough that his demand was at first refused, and that he was warmly requested to retain his functions; but if such was the fact, he did not the less persist, and the people, willing or not, acceded. We ought farther to note, that not only did he resign his generalship, but he resigned it at once and immediately, after the complete execution of his proclaimed purpose, to emancipate the Sicilian Greeks from foreign enemies as well as from

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 34.

² Diodor. xvi. 82

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. Ὡς δὲ ἀναγῆσθαι εἰς Συρακῶνας, εὐθὺς

ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν καὶ παραι-
τεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας, τῷ πραγμάτων
εἰς τὸ κάλλιστον ἤκοντων, τέλος.

despot-enemies: just as, on first acquiring possession of Syracuse, he had begun his authoritative career, without a moment's delay, by ordering the demolition of the Dionysian stronghold, and the construction of a court of justice in its place.¹ By this instantaneous proceeding he forestalled the growth of that suspicion which delay would assuredly have raised, and for which the free communities of Greece had in general such ample reason. And it is not the least of his many merits, that while conscious of good intentions himself, he had also the good sense to see that others could not look into his bosom; that all their presumptions, except what were created by his own conduct, would be derived from men worse than he—and therefore unfavourable. Hence it was necessary for him to be prompt and forward, even to a sort of ostentation, in exhibiting the amplest positive proof of his real purposes, so as to stifle beforehand the growth of suspicion.

He was now a private citizen of Syracuse, having
Gratitude and reward to him by the Syracusans. neither paid soldiers under his command nor any other public function. As a reward for his splendid services, the Syracusans voted to him a house in the city, and a landed property among the best in the neighbourhood. Here he fixed his residence, sending for his wife and family to Corinth.²

Yet though Timoleon had renounced every species
Great influence of Timoleon, even after he had laid down his power. of official authority, and all means of constraint, his influence as an adviser over the judgement, feelings, and actions, not only of Syracusans, but of Sicilians generally, was as great as ever; perhaps greater—because the fact of his spontaneous resignation gave him one title more to confidence. Rarely is it allowed to mortal man, to establish so transcendent a claim to confidence and esteem as Timoleon now presented; upon so many different grounds, and with so little of alloy or abatement. To possess a counsellor whom every one revered, without suspicions or fears of any kind—who had not only given conspicuous proofs of uncommon energy combined with skilful management, but enjoyed besides, in a peculiar degree, the favour of the gods—was a benefit unspeakably precious to the Sicilians at this juncture. For it was now the time when

¹ Plutarch, l. c. εὐθὺς ἀποθέσθαι τὴν μοναρχίαν compare c. 22.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

not merely Syracuse, but other cities of Sicily also, were aiming to strengthen their reconstituted free communities by a fresh supply of citizens from abroad. During the sixty years which had elapsed since the first formidable invasion wherein the Carthaginian Hannibal had conquered Selinus, there had been a series of causes all tending to cripple and diminish, and none to renovate, the Grecian population of Sicily. The Carthaginian attacks, the successful despotism of the first Dionysius, and the disturbed reign of the second,—all contributed to the same result. About the year 352-351 B.C., Plato (as has been already mentioned) expresses his fear of an extinction of Hellenism in Sicily, giving place before Phenician or Campanian force.¹ And what was a sad possibility, even in 352-351 B.C.—had become nearer to a probability in 344 B.C., before Timoleon landed, in the then miserable condition of the island.

His unparalleled success and matchless personal behaviour, combined with the active countenance of Corinth without—had completely turned the tide. In the belief of all Greeks, Sicily was now a land restored to Hellenism and freedom, but requiring new colonists as well to partake, as to guard, these capital privileges. The example of colonization, under the auspices of Corinth, had been set at Syracuse, and was speedily followed elsewhere, especially at Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. All these three cities had suffered cruelly during those formidable Carthaginian invasions which immediately preceded the despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse. They had had no opportunity, during the continuance of the Dionysian dynasty, even to make up what they had then lost; far less to acquire accessions from without. At the same time all three (especially Agrigentum) recollected their former scale of opulence and power, as it had stood prior to 407 B.C. It was with eagerness therefore that they availed themselves of the new life and security imparted to Sicily by the career of Timoleon, to replenish their exhausted numbers; by recalling those whom former suffering had driven away, and by inviting fresh colonists besides. Megellus and Pheristus, citizens of Elea on the southern coast of Italy (which was

Immigra-
tion of
new Greek
settlers
into Sicily,
to Gela,
Agrigen-
tum, Kama-
rina, &c.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* viii. p. 353 F.

probably at this time distressed by the pressure of Lucanians from the interior), conducted a colony to Agrigentum: Gorgus, from Keos, went with another band to Gela: in both cases, a proportion of expatriated citizens returned among them. Kamarina, too, and Agyrium received large accessions of inhabitants. The inhabitants of Leontini are said to have removed their habitations to Syracuse; a statement difficult to understand, and probably only partially true, as the city and its name still continued to exist.¹

Unfortunately the proceedings of Timoleon come before us (through Diodorus and Plutarch) in a manner so vague and confused, that we can rarely trace the sequence or assign the date of particular facts.² But about the general circumstances, with their character and bearing, there is no room either for mistake or doubt. That which rhetors and sophists like Lysias had preached in their panegyrical harangues³—that for which Plato sighed, in the epistles of his old age—commending it, after Dion's death, to the surviving partisans of Dion, as having been the unexecuted purpose of their departed leader—the renewal of freedom and Hellenism throughout the island—was now made a reality under the auspices of Timoleon. The houses, the temples, the walls, were rescued from decay; the lands from comparative barrenness. For it was not merely his personal reputation and achievements which constituted the main allurements to new colonists, but also his superintending advice which regulated their destination when they arrived. Without the least power of constraint, or even official dignity, he was consulted as a sort of general Cæsar or Patron-Founder, by the affectionate regard of the settlers in every part of Sicily. The distribution or sale of

¹ Diodor. xvi. 65, 82; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

² Eight years elapsed from the time when Timoleon departed with his expedition from Corinth to the time of his death; from 345-344 B.C. to 337-336 B.C. (Diodorus, xvi. 90; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37).

The battle of the Krimæsus is assigned by Diodorus to 340 B.C.

But as to the other military achievements of Timoleon in Sicily, Diodorus and Plutarch are neither precise, nor in accordance with each other.

³ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37. μόνος, ἐφ' ᾧ οἱ σπουδάζοντες διὰ τῶν λόγων τῶν πανηγυρικῶν αἰεὶ παρεχόμενον πρᾶξις τοῦς Ἕλληνας, ἐν αὐταῖς ἀριστέως, &c.

lands, the modification required in existing laws and customs, the new political constitutions, &c. were all submitted to his review. No settlement gave satisfaction, except such as he had pronounced or approved; none which he had approved, was contested.¹

In the situation in which Sicily was now placed, it is clear that numberless matters of doubt and difficulty would inevitably arise; that the claims and interests of pre-existing residents, returning exiles and new immigrants, would often be conflicting; that the rites and customs of different fractions composing the new whole, might have to be modified for the sake of mutual harmony; that the settlers, coming from oligarchies as well as democracies, might bring with them different ideas as to the proper features of a political constitution; that the apportionment or sale of lands, and the adjustment of all debts, presented but too many chances of angry dispute; that there were, in fact, a thousand novelties in the situation, which could not be determined either by precedent, or by any peremptory rule, but must be left to the equity of a supreme arbitrator. Here then the advantages were unspeakable of having a man like Timoleon to appeal to; a man not only really without sinister bias, but recognised by every one as being so; a man whom every one loved, trusted, and was grieved to offend; a man who sought not to impose his own will upon free communities, but addressed them as freemen, building only upon their reason and sentiments, and carrying out in all his recommendations of detail those instincts of free speech, universal vote, and equal laws, which formed the germ of political obligation in the minds of Greeks generally. It would have been gratifying to know how Timoleon settled the many new and difficult questions which must have been submitted to him as referee. There is no situation in human society so

Numerous difficulties which he would be called upon to adjust.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 35. Οἱς οὐ μόνον ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ πολέμου τοσούτου καὶ γαλήνην ἰδρυμένοις παρεῖχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰλλα παρασκευάσας καὶ συμπεροθυμηθεὶς ὥσπερ οἰκιστὴς ἡγά-
ατο. Καὶ τῶν ἀλλων δὲ δικαιομέ-
νωι, ὁμοίως πρὸς αὐτόν, οὐ πολέμου
τις ὕψις, οὐ νομῶι θέαις, οὐ γῶσας

κατοικισμῶς, ὅδὲ πολιτείας διατάξεις,
εἰδοὺς καλῶς ἔχον, ἥς ἐνεῖνος μὴ
προσέφαιτο μηδὲ γαττοσμήσειν,
ὥσπερ ἐργῇ συντελουμένην δημοκρα-
τίαν ἐτιθέει τινα χάριι, θεοφιλή καὶ
ἀρεπούσαν.

Comptai e Cornelius Nepos, Timo-
leon, c. 3.

valuable to study, as that in which routine is of necessity broken through, and the constructive faculties called into active exertion. Nor was there ever perhaps throughout Grecian history, a simultaneous colonization, and simultaneous recasting of political institutions, more extensive than that which now took place in Sicily. Unfortunately we are permitted to know only the general fact, without either the charm or the instruction which would have been presented by the details. Timoleon was, in Sicily, that which Epaminondas had been at the foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis, though with far greater power: and we have to deplore the like ignorance respecting the detail proceedings of both these great men.

But though the sphere of Timoleon's activity was co-
 Residence of Timoleon at Syracuse—chapel to the goddess Automatia.
 extensive with Sicily, his residence, his citizenship, and his peculiar interests and duties were at Syracuse. That city, like most of the other Sicilian towns, had been born anew, with a numerous body of settlers and altered political institutions. I have already mentioned that Kephalus and others, invited from Corinth by express vote of the Syracusans, had re-established the democratical constitution of Dioklès, with suitable modifications. The new era of liberty was marked by the establishment of a new sacred office, that of Amphipolus or Attendant Priest of Zeus Olympius; an office changed annually, appointed by lot (doubtless under some conditions of qualification which are not made known to us¹), and intended, like the Archon Eponymus at Athens, as the recognised name to distinguish each Syracusan year. In this work of constitutional reform, as well as in all the labours and adjustments connected with the new settlers, Timoleon took a prominent part. But so soon as the new constitution was consummated and set at work, he declined undertaking any specific duties or exercising any powers under it. Enjoying the highest measure of public esteem, and loaded with honorary and grateful votes from the people, he had the wisdom as well as the virtue to prefer living as a private citizen; a resolution doubtless promoted by his increasing failure of eyesight, which presently became total blindness.² He dwelt in the house assigned to him by public vote of the

¹ Diodor. xvi. 70. Cicero in Verrem, ii. 51.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38.

people, which he had consecrated to the Holy God, and within which he had set apart a chapel to the goddess Automatia,—the goddess under whose auspices blessings and glory came as it were of themselves.¹ To this goddess he offered sacrifice, as the great and constant patroness who had accompanied him from Corinth all through his proceedings in Sicily.

By refusing the official prominence tendered to him, and by keeping away from the details of public life, Timoleon escaped the jealousy sure to attend upon influence so prodigious as his. But in truth, for all great and important matters, this very modesty increased instead of diminishing his real ascendancy. Here as elsewhere, the goddess Automatia worked for him, and brought to him docile listeners without his own seeking. Though the Syracusans transacted their ordinary business through others, yet when any matter of serious difficulty occurred, the presence of Timoleon was specially invoked in the discussion. During the later months of his life, when he had become blind, his arrival in the assembly was a solemn scene. Having been brought in his car drawn by mules across the market-place to the door of the theatre wherein the assembly was held, attendants then led or drew the car into the theatre amidst the assembled people, who testified their affection by the warmest shouts and congratulations. As soon as he had returned their welcome, and silence was restored, the discussion to which he had been invited took place, Timoleon sitting on his car and listening. Having heard the matter thus debated, he delivered his own opinion, which was usually ratified at once by the show of hands of the assembly. He then took leave of the people and retired, the attendants again leading the car out of the theatre, and the same cheers of attachment accompanying his departure; while the assembly proceeded with its other and more ordinary business.²

Arrival of the blind Timoleon in the public assembly of Syracuse during matters of grave and critical discussion.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 32. Ἐν τῇ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκτὸς ἱερῶς ἀμυνόμενος Ἀυτοματίας ἔθυσεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἱερῶς Δαίμονι καθιέρωσεν.

Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4; Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præcept. p. 815 D.

The idea of Ἀυτοματίας is not the

same as that of Τύχη, though the word is sometimes translated as if it were. It is more nearly the same as Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη—though still, as it seems to me, not exactly the same.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 38; Cornel. Nepos, Timoleon, c. 4.

Such is the impressive and picturesque description given (doubtless by Athanis or some other eyewitness¹) of the relations between the Syracusan people and the blind Timoleon, after his power had been abdicated, and when there remained to him nothing except his character and moral ascendancy. It is easy to see that the solemnities of interposition, here recounted, must have been reserved for those cases in which the assembly had been disturbed by some unusual violence or collision of parties. For such critical junctures, where numbers were perhaps nearly balanced, and where the disappointment of an angry minority threatened to beget some permanent feud, the benefit was inestimable, of an umpire whom both parties revered, and before whom neither thought it a dishonour to yield. Keeping aloof from the details and embarrassments of daily political life, and preserving himself (like the Salaminian trireme, to use a phrase which Plutarch applies to Periklês at Athens) for occasions at once momentous and difficult, Timoleon filled up a gap occasionally dangerous to all free societies, but which even at Athens had always remained a gap, because there was no Athenian at once actually worthy, and known to be worthy, to fill it. We may even wonder how he continued worthy, when the intense popular sentiment in his favour tended so strongly to turn his head, and when no contradiction or censure against him was tolerated.

Two persons, Laphystius and Demænetus, called by the obnoxious names of sycophants and demagogues, were bold enough to try the experiment. The former required him to give bail in a lawsuit; the latter, in a public discourse, censured various parts of his military campaigns. The public indignation against both these men was vehement; yet there can be little doubt that Laphystius applied to Timoleon a legal process applicable universally to every citizen: what may have been the pertinence of the censures of Demænetus, we are unable to say. However, Timoleon availed himself of the well-meant impatience of the people to protect him either from legal process or from censure, only to administer to them a serious and valuable lesson.

¹ It occurs in Cornelius Nepos ably copied by both from the same prior to Plutarch, and was prob- authority.

Protesting against all interruption to the legal process of Laphystius, he proclaimed emphatically that this was the precise purpose for which he had so long laboured, and combated—in order that every Syracusan citizen might be enabled to appeal to the laws and exercise freely his legal rights. And while he thought it unnecessary to rebut in detail the objections taken against his previous generalship, he publicly declared his gratitude to the gods, for having granted his prayer that he might witness all Syracusans in possession of full liberty of speech.¹

We obtain little from the biographers of Timoleon, except a few incidents, striking, impressive, and somewhat theatrical, like those just recounted. But what is really important is, the calm and temper which these incidents reveal, both in Timoleon and in the Syracusan people. To see him unperverted by a career of superhuman success, retaining the same hearty convictions with which he had started from Corinth; renouncing power, the most ardent of all aspirations with a Greek politician, and descending to a private station, in spite of every external inducement to the contrary; resisting the temptation to impose his own will upon the people, and respecting their free speech and public vote in a manner which made it imperatively necessary for every one else to follow his example; foregoing command, and contenting himself with advice when his opinion was asked—all this presents a model of genuine and intelligent public spirit, such as is associated with few other names except that of Timoleon. That the Syracusan people should have yielded to such conduct an obedience not merely voluntary, but heartfelt and almost reverential, is no matter of wonder. And we may be quite sure that the opinion of Timoleon, tranquilly and unostentatiously consulted, was the guiding star which they followed on most points of moment or difficulty; over and above those of exceptional cases of aggravated dissent where he was called in with such imposing ceremony as an umpire. On the value of such an oracle close at hand it is needless to insist; especially in a city which for the last half-century had known nothing but the dominion of force, and amidst a new miscellaneous aggregate composed of Greek settlers from many different quarters.

Uncor-
rupted mo-
deration
and public
spirit of
Timoleon.

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 37, Cornelius Nepos, Timoleon, c. 6.

Timoleon now enjoyed, as he had amply earned, what Xenophon calls "that good, not human, but divine—command over willing men—given manifestly to persons of genuine and highly trained temperance of character."¹ In him the condition indicated by Xenophon was found completely realised—temperance in the largest and most comprehensive sense of the word—not simply sobriety and continence (which had belonged to the elder Dionysius also), but an absence of that fatal thirst for coercive power at all price, which in Greece was the fruitful parent of the greater crimes and enormities.

Timoleon lived to see his great work of Sicilian enfranchisement consummated, to carry it through all its incipient difficulties, and to see it prosperously moving on. Not Syracuse alone, but the other Grecian cities in the island also, enjoyed under their revived free institutions a state of security, comfort, and affluence, to which they had been long strangers. The lands became again industriously tilled; the fertile soil yielded anew abundant exports; the temples were restored from their previous decay, and adorned with the votive offerings of pious munificence.² The same state of prosperous and active freedom, which had followed on the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty a hundred and twenty years before, and lasted about fifty years, without either despots within or invaders from without—was now again made prevalent throughout Sicily under the auspices of Timoleon. It did not indeed last so long. It was broken up in the year 316 B.C., twenty-four years after the battle of the Krimêssus, by the despot Agathoklês, whose father was among the immigrants to Syracuse under the settlement of Timoleon. But the interval of security and freedom with which Sicily was blessed between these two epochs, she owed to the generous patriotism and intelligent counsel of Timoleon. There are few other names among

¹ Xenoph. *Œconomio*. xxi. 12. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ ἀγθὸν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τοῦ ἐκείνου, ὃ ἄρχειν σαφῶς δὲ διδύεται τοῖς ἀλλήλοις σωφροσύνη τελευτούμεναι. Τοῦ δὲ ἀκόντων τυ-

ραννεῖν διδόναι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτεύειν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν ᾧδου λέγεται τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διατρίβειν, φοβούμενος μὴ δις ἀποθάνῃ.

² Diodor. xvi. 83.

the Grecian annals, with which we can connect so large an amount of predetermined and beneficent result.

Endeared to the Syracusans as a common father and benefactor,¹ and exhibited as their hero to all visitors from Greece, he passed the remainder of his life amidst the fulness of affectionate honour. Unfortunately for the Syracusans, that remainder was but too short; for he died of an illness apparently slight, in the year 337-336 B.C.—three or four years after the battle of the Krimêsus. Profound and unfeigned was the sorrow which his death excited, universally throughout Sicily. Not merely the Syracusans, but crowds from all other parts of the island, attended to do honour to his funeral, which was splendidly celebrated at the public cost. Some of the chosen youths of the city carried the bier whereon his body was deposited: a countless procession of men and women followed in their festival attire, crowned with wreaths, and mingling with their tears admiration and envy for their departed liberator. The procession was made to pass over that ground which presented the most honourable memento of Timoleon; where the demolished Dionysian stronghold had once reared its head, and where the court of justice was now placed, at the entrance of Ortygia. At length it reached the Nekropolis, between Ortygia and Achradina, where a massive funeral pile had been prepared. As soon as the bier had been placed on this pile, and fire was about to be applied, the herald Demetrius, distinguished for the powers of his voice, proclaimed with loud announcement as follows:—

B.C. 337-336.
Death and
obsequies
of Timoleon.

"The Syracusan people solemnise, at the cost of 200 minæ, the funeral of this man, the Corinthian Timoleon son of Timodemus. They have passed a vote to honour him for all future time with festival matches in music, horse and chariot race, and gymnastics,—because, after having put down the despots, subdued the foreign enemy, and recolonised the greatest among the ruined cities, he restored to the Sicilian Greeks their constitution and laws."

Proclamation at his funeral—monument to his honour.

A sepulchral monument, seemingly with this inscription recorded on it, was erected to the memory of

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39. Ἐκ τῆς προφάσεως τῷ χρόνῳ συναρξή-
τοι αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ προφάσει τῆς τιμῆς μετὰ μένης ἐτελεύτησεν.
ἐνόησε, ὡς περὶ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, ἐκ μι-

Timoleon in the agora of Syracuse. To this monument other buildings were presently annexed; porticoes for the assembling of persons in business or conversation,—and palæstræ, for the exercises of youths. The aggregate of buildings all taken together was called the Timoleonion.¹

When we reflect that the fatal battle of Chæroneia had taken place the year before Timoleon's death, and that his native city Corinth as well as all her neighbours were sinking deeper and deeper into the degradation of subject-towns of Macedonia, we shall not regret, for his sake, that a timely death relieved him from so mournful a spectacle. It was owing to him that the Sicilian Greeks were rescued, for nearly one generation, from the like fate. He had the rare glory of maintaining to the end, and executing to the full, the promise of liberation with which he had gone forth from Corinth. His early years had been years of acute suffering—and that, too, incurred in the cause of freedom—arising out of the death of his brother; his later period, manifesting the like sense of duty under happier auspices, had richly repaid him, by successes overpassing all reasonable expectation, and by the ample flow of gratitude and attachment poured forth to him amidst the liberated Sicilians. His character appears most noble, and most instructive, if we contrast him with Dion. Timoleon had been brought up as the citizen of a free, though oligarchical community in Greece, surrounded by other free communities, and amidst universal hatred of despots. The politicians whom he had learnt to esteem were men trained in this school, maintaining a qualified ascendancy against more or less of open competition from rivals, and obliged to look for the means of carrying their views apart from simple dictation. Moreover, the person whom Timoleon had selected for his peculiar model, was Epaminondas, the noblest model that Greece afforded.² It was to this example that Timoleon owed in part his energetic patriotism combined with freedom from personal ambition—his gentleness of political

¹ Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 39; Dio-dor. xvi. 90.

² Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36. 'Ο μέγιστος ἐν ᾧ ὁ βίος ἔτετο Τυποδόσιος Ἐπαινονδας, &c

Polybius reckons Hermoklātēs,

Timoleon, and Pyrrhus, to be the most complete men of action (πρῶτοι πράκτορες) of all those who had played a conspicuous part in Sicilian affairs (Polyb. xii. 26. ed. Didot).

